State of Washington v. Owen Thomas Beckey

Opinion

FILED

SEPTEMBER 17, 2026

In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, )

) No. 41076-5-III Respondent, )

)

v. )

)

OWEN THOMAS BECKEY, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION )

Appellant. )

COONEY, J. — In 2023, Owen Beckey was convicted of six felony offenses and received an exceptional sentence of 144 months. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by imposing terms that exceeded the statutory maximum on two convictions and by relying on an aggravating factor not found by the jury to justify the exceptional sentence. This court agreed, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court again imposed a total term of 144 months.

Mr. Beckey appeals from the resentencing, contending the court failed to exercise its discretion by reimposing the same term of confinement and to meaningfully consider evidence of his rehabilitation. We reject these arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

A jury found Mr. Beckey guilty of six felony offenses—two class B felonies and four class C felonies—and four misdemeanor offenses for crimes committed between 2021 and

State v. Beckey 2022. 1 The jury also found that four of the felony convictions were aggravated domestic violence offenses. The jury was not asked to determine any other aggravating factors.

At sentencing, the State requested an exceptional sentence based on the domestic violence aggravators and argued that a standard range sentence 2 would be “clearly too lenient” under RCW 9.94A.535(2)(b) absent an exceptional sentence. Rep. of Proc. (RP) (No. 58306-2-II) (May 24, 2023) at 731-32 (citing RCW 9.94A.535(2)(b)). The court imposed an exceptional sentence totaling 144 months that included a high end standard range sentence on each count plus an additional 8 months on each count. The additional 8 months were based on the domestic violence aggravators found by the jury and the “clearly too lenient” aggravator found by the court. The court imposed 68-month terms, exceeding the 60-month statutory maximum for two of the class C convictions.

Mr. Beckey appealed his judgment and sentence, arguing the court erred by imposing terms that exceeded the statutory maximum on two of the class C convictions and engaging in impermissible factfinding by relying on the “clearly too lenient” aggravating factor to support an exceptional sentence without a jury determination. State v. Beckey, No. 58306-2-

1 The convictions included stalking (domestic violence (DV)), residential burglary (DV), felony violation of a no contact order (DV), rape in the third degree (DV), and two counts of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. Mr. Beckey does not appeal his misdemeanor sentences.

2 The standard range sentences for each conviction are as follows: 72 to 96 months for stalking, 63 to 84 months for residential burglary, 60 months for felony violation of a no contact order, 60 months for rape in the third degree, and 17 to 22 months for attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle.

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State v. Beckey II, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa. gov/opinions. This court agreed, vacated the sentence, and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Id. at 7.

The court resentenced Mr. Beckey on February 7, 2025. At the outset of the hearing, the court acknowledged its discretion to impose a sentence within “a range” and to consider evidence of Mr. Beckey’s post incarceration rehabilitation. RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 4. The State conceded that its prior recommendation of 68-month terms on two of the class C convictions was erroneous and that the “clearly too lenient” aggravator must be found by a jury. Nevertheless, the State requested an exceptional sentence based on the domestic violence aggravator for the two class B convictions (stalking (DV) and residential burglary (DV)) and urged the court to impose a total sentence of 144 months.

Defense counsel reminded the court that it was not bound by the original sentencing decision, that resentencing on remand is “de novo,” and the court “should be free to consider any matters relevant to sentencing.” RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 6-7. During allocution, Mr. Beckey (1) expressed remorse, (2) asserted he had “demonstrated rehabilitation,” (3) described programs he had completed while incarcerated, and (4) submitted certificates from the completed programs. RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 6. He asked the court to impose a sentence of 96 months without aggravators or, alternatively, to impose a sentence of 104 months with “some aggravators.” RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 8.

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State v. Beckey While imposing the sentence, the court stated it remembered the case “vividly” and described it as “a rather graphic case that documented extended physical . . . abuse [of another].” RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 11. The court acknowledged there was “some significant change since [Mr. Beckey] was last before the court” and observed that “it appears that he’s doing well with some of the structure and the programs in the [Department of Corrections] system.” RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 11-12. Nonetheless, the court was “not persuaded to change the ultimate disposition of the case in terms of the 144 month total sentence.” RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 12-13.

The court concluded that an exceptional sentence was warranted based on the jury’s findings of domestic violence aggravators. It imposed high end standard range sentences on each count and added exceptional time of 12 months and 36 months on the two class B convictions for a total sentence of 144 months.

Mr. Beckey timely appeals.

ANALYSIS

Where a sentencing court has discretion, we review its decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ellis, 5 Wn.3d 549, 557, 579 P.3d 37 (2025). A court abuses its discretion when its decision rests on unreasonable or untenable grounds. State v. C.J., 148 Wn.2d 672, 686, 63 P.3d 765 (2003). A court’s “decision is based on ‘untenable grounds’ or made ‘for untenable reasons’ if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard.” State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638

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State v. Beckey (2003) (quoting State v. Rundquist, 79 Wn. App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995)). A sentencing court’s “failure to exercise its discretion is itself an abuse of discretion subject to reversal.” State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 697, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

When this court reverses or vacates a sentence, the resentencing on remand is de novo in nature. State v. Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d 238, 245, 532 P.3d 652 (2023). “Resentencing must proceed as an entirely new proceeding when all issues bearing on the proper sentence must be considered de novo and the defendant is entitled to the full array of due process rights.” Id. Resentencing courts have discretion to consider new sentencing issues and are not bound by the earlier sentencing court’s decision. State v. Vasquez, 4 Wn.3d 208, 216, 560 P.3d 853 (2024). This court has also “repeatedly recognized that the discretion of a resentencing court is broad and can be exercised either for or against” the one being sentenced. Id. at 215.

Mr. Beckey argues the resentencing court failed to exercise its discretion by deferring to its original sentencing decision rather than conducting a de novo resentencing. He also contends the court failed to meaningfully consider evidence of his rehabilitation. We reject both arguments.

The resentencing court did not abuse its discretion in reimposing a total term of 144 months. Unlike State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d 550, 553-54, 61 P.3d 1104 (2003), where the resentencing court mistakenly believed it was bound by the original sentence, the court here expressly recognized its discretion to impose a sentence within a range. Defense counsel

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State v. Beckey likewise reminded the court that “‘any resentencing [on remand] should be de novo’” and that “the resentencing court is not bound by the trial court.” CP at 84 (quoting Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 244); RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 6. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court emphasized the seriousness of the underlying conduct— describing the case as “rather graphic” and involving “extended physical [abuse] of another”—and concluded an exceptional sentence remained warranted. RP (No. 41076-5- III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 11. On this record, the court exercised independent judgment at a de novo resentencing; the fact it reached the same total term does not establish improper deference to the original sentence.

We next address Mr. Beckey’s contention that the resentencing court failed to meaningfully consider evidence of his rehabilitation. As the State notes, although a resentencing court may consider evidence of post incarceration rehabilitation, it is not constitutionally required. 3 State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 449, 387 P.3d 650 (2017). In any event, the record shows the court did consider Mr. Beckey’s post incarceration rehabilitation. The court acknowledged there was “some significant change since

3 A sentencing court’s discretion to consider actions a defendant has taken toward rehabilitation after an initial sentencing differs between adult and youthful offenders. With respect to youthful offenders, “[c]ourts must ‘consider the capacity for rehabilitation when making an initial sentencing decision’ involving [life without parole], but ‘evidence of actual “demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” is generally considered later,’ when determining whether a defendant ‘who is up for parole should be given early release.’” State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 221, 548 P.3d 935 (2024) (quoting State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 449, 387 P.3d 650 (2017)). The same does not hold true for adult offenders.

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State v. Beckey [Mr. Beckey] was last before the court” and observed that “it appears that he’s doing well with some of the structure and the programs in the DOC system.” RP (No. 41076-5-III) (Feb. 7, 2025) at 11-12. The court nevertheless concluded that the seriousness of Mr. Beckey’s offenses warranted maintaining the 144-month sentence. On this record, Mr. Beckey has not shown the court failed to consider his rehabilitation evidence or otherwise abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

Cooney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Staab, C.J.

Murphy, J.