FILED JULY 14, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40602-4-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) OMAR IVAN MANCINAS GARZA, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )
COONEY, J. — A jury found Omar Mancinas Garza guilty of attempted rape of a
child in the second degree and communication with a minor for immoral purposes. The
charges stemmed from an undercover operation conducted by a law enforcement officer
posing as a fictious 13-year-old girl. Mr. Mancinas Garza appeals, arguing his trial
attorney was ineffective and cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree
with his arguments and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In August 2022, the Washington State Patrol Missing and Exploited Children Task
Force (Task Force) conducted an undercover online “Net Nanny” operation in Grant
County, Washington. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 303. The operation consisted of
Detective Sergeant Jake Klein posing as a fictious 27-year-old woman named “Crystal”
on an Internet dating website called “Badoo.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 17. Mr. Mancinas No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
Garza responded to the invented profile by messaging “Crystal” on August 22, 2022.
“Crystal” replied to Mr. Mancinas Garza and informed him that she was actually 13 years
old. Mr. Mancinas Garza and “Crystal” eventually agreed to engage in sexual acts, and
he was arrested when he arrived at their meeting location. His cellphone was seized and
relevant data later extracted. Mr. Mancinas Garza participated in a recorded interview
with law enforcement following his arrest.
The State charged Mr. Mancinas Garza with attempted rape of a child in the
second degree and communication with a minor for immoral purposes. The case
proceeded to a jury trial.
Defense counsel moved in limine to exclude the recorded interview from
admission into evidence, arguing that portions of the interview “should only be allowed if
the contents of the video would be admissible in the form of testimony rather than a
video.” CP at 73. Defense counsel stated, “[T]he prosecutor should elicit testimony,
where appropriate, point-by-point, about what exactly [Mr. Mancinas Garza] was asked,
and what his response was.” CP at 73. Defense counsel also moved to exclude several
statements Detective Jimmy Welsh made during the interview, claiming the statements
were improper character and propensity evidence and were also inadmissible under
ER 404(b). The court reserved ruling on excluding the recording because it had not
“had a chance to review [the recording].” VRP at 30.
2 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
Additionally, defense counsel sought the exclusion of “[p]rofile evidence, in the
form of testimony by law enforcement officers that criminals have certain characteristics”
that could suggest that Mr. Mancinas Garza shares those characteristics. CP at 84
(emphasis omitted). The court granted the motion.
Defense counsel also moved to exclude testimony related to “conversation[s]
about what the detectives would find on [Mr. Mancinas Garza’s] cell phone if they
looked,” including a discussion of whether Mr. Mancinas Garza viewed child
pornography. CP at 86 (emphasis omitted). He contended this type of evidence was
improper under ER 404(b) and would be “propensity evidence and it’s more prejudicial
than probative.” VRP at 33. The State opposed Mr. Mancinas Garza’s motions to
exclude testimony related to whether “[Mr. Mancinas Garza] masturbates to child
pornography or [has] seen child pornography or pornography in general” because such
testimony would be admissible “with regard to that entrapment defense.” VRP at 34-35.
Although defense counsel asserted that Mr. Mancinas Garza would not be raising
entrapment, the State argued evidence of Mr. Mancinas Garza viewing child pornography
should be allowed if Mr. Mancinas Garza raised an entrapment defense. The court ruled
that evidence about what type of pornography Mr. Mancinas Garza views and whether
Mr. Mancinas Garza had previously viewed child pornography or masturbates to child
pornography was admissible only “in rebuttal if a legitimate entrapment defense is
raised.” VRP at 39.
3 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
At trial, Detective Sergeant Dan McDonald of the Task Force testified about the
Net Nanny operations, explaining that the Task Force deals with “proactive and reactive
cases.” VRP at 234. He described “proactive work” as “try[ing] to identify people that
are online that are communicating with minors for immoral purposes.” VRP at 235. The
court overruled defense counsel’s objection to this testimony. Detective Sergeant
McDonald also explained the training and role of the Task Force’s interview team:
Yeah, so the interview team, we have two-person interview teams, everybody that’s assigned to an interview team, the primary interviewer is specially trained by Dr. Joe Sullivan, who is a—he’s a psychologist based out of Ireland, that has spent his whole career studying sex offenders, and he has created an interview model where when you talk to a sex offender, you can extract information that may identify victims.
VRP at 256.
Trooper Carol Fuchs, who was 29 years old at the time, testified that she took
“selfies” for law enforcement to use in the Net Nanny operation. VRP at 487. She told
the jurors of how she would take photographs in a manner similar to how younger people
photograph themselves, “[j]ust kind of playful, not wearing as much makeup, just
appearing younger, wearing more younger clothes.” VRP at 488. Trooper Fuchs further
participated in the operation by reviewing chats and waiting on standby to take additional
photographs.
The State offered, and the court admitted, an extraction report of data found on
Mr. Mancinas Garza’s cellphone. The extraction consisted of a “text message exchange”
and photographs consisting of “a selfie of the undercover, or the undercover persona, and
4 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
that’s of a female standing in front of it looks like a mirror posing.” VRP at 393, 375.
The call log extraction from Mr. Mancinas Garza’s cellphone revealed two outgoing
telephone calls to the undercover officer’s telephone number. A text message from Mr.
Mancinas Garza’s cellphone depicting Trooper Fuchs, posing as “Crystal,” was admitted
into evidence.
The State reported to the court during trial that it redacted portions of Mr.
Mancinas Garza’s recorded interview. The State indicated it had “added a last-minute
edit” and removed “one small clip, about 30 seconds, that needed to come out” regarding
a question by an investigator “about what [Mr. Mancinas Garza] does when he’s not at
school, and basically referencing where he was employed.” VRP at 407-08.
The State then offered the testimony of Detective Sergeant Klein who created
“Crystal’s” Badoo profile and worked as an “undercover chatter” during the operation.
VRP at 414. Detective Klein testified that a profile with the username “Ox,” who was
later identified as Mr. Mancinas Garza, messaged “Crystal” on August 22, 2022, and the
conversation quickly moved from the Badoo application to text messaging through an
application called “Callyo.” VRP at 436-37.
Detective Klein read a sampling of the messages between “Crystal” and Mr.
Mancinas Garza to the jury:
[“CRYSTAL”]: r u cool that im young?
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: Yeah r u cool that I’m old lol
5 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
[“CRYSTAL”]: ya I like older lol
[“CRYSTAL”]: im 13 so im into more mature (happy face emoji)
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: You are how old?
[“CRYSTAL”]: 13 lol but mature like I said[1]
....
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: Hope you are not looking to get me in trouble because I’m more mature than you?
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: Are you wanting to meet up sometime
VRP at 441-42.
Mr. Mancinas Garza then called “Crystal.” Mr. Mancinas Garza spoke with Agent
Isabelle Ghini of the FBI, posing as “Crystal,” for over 13 minutes. Agent Ghini detailed
a portion of that telephone conversation to the jury:
[PROSECUTOR]: And what age did you identify yourself as?
[AGENT GHINI]: Thirteen.
[PROSECUTOR]: How many times did you do that?
[AGENT GHINI]: Multiple. According to my report, at least—I believe at least three times.
[AGENT GHINI]: . . . He asked me about why the website said that I was 28.[2] And I told him that it was because I couldn’t list my true age.
1 “Crystal” sent a photo to Mr. Mancinas Garza before sending this text message. 2 “Crystal’s” Badoo profile lists her as 27 years old.
6 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
And then he said—he laughed and said that that made sense. And then he expressed concern that he could get in trouble.
VRP at 473, 475.
Mr. Mancinas Garza requested to meet “Crystal.” Agent Ghini asked Mr.
Mancinas Garza “what he likes.” VRP at 477. The two then discussed various sexual
acts. Agent Ghini again told Mr. Mancinas Garza that she “was only 13” and has not
“done much.” VRP at 477. Mr. Mancinas Garza asked “Crystal” if she was virgin.
After “Crystal” confirmed she was a virgin, Mr. Mancinas Garza responded that “he’s not
that big, so it wouldn’t hurt and would be good for a first time.” VRP at 478. Detective
Ghini testified that Mr. Mancinas Garza and “Crystal” agreed to meet at “Crystal’s”
house while her mother was working.
Mr. Mancinas Garza and “Crystal” continued exchanging text messages after the
telephone call. Mr. Mancinas Garza sent “Crystal” a message asking if she could “get
away during the day in the morning.” VRP at 443. “Crystal” replied, “I could sneak out
[. . .] then we just like do it in ur car?” VRP at 443.
On the day the two agreed to meet, Mr. Mancinas Garza and “Crystal” exchanged
the following text messages:
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: What time does your mom leave to work?
[“CRYSTAL”]: she leaves at 4 for work
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: Can you sneak out
7 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
[“CRYSTAL”]: Did you want to head this way now so u can just come over when she leaves?
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: Yeah if you’re ok with that
[“CRYSTAL”]: Ya im cool with that way u can just come over as soon as shes gone lol
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: Ok but I’ll need to know where
[“CRYSTAL”]: Ya lemme look up a gas station by my house rq
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: Just be honest with me. Hope you are not trying to get me caught up in some bs because you are younger than me baby
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: I’d be in deep shit lol
[MR. MANCINAS GARZA]: . . . I just don’t want to get caught
VRP at 444-45.
“Crystal” provided Mr. Mancinas Garza with the address to a Chevron gasoline
station and instructed Mr. Mancinas Garza to “lmk when u get [to the Chevron]” and to
send a “selfie” of himself in the parking lot, at which point she would provide her home
address. VRP at 448-49. “Crystal” provided Mr. Mancinas Garza with her home address
after he sent the two photographs. Mr. Mancinas Garza was arrested on his arrival.
8 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
The State provided a redacted version of the recorded interview for defense
counsel to review. After reviewing the redacted recording, defense counsel stated, “I
believe that largely the video comports with the court’s prior rulings” and renewed his
objection to portions of the interview that included “a monologue by Detective Welsh,
giving his opinions.” VRP at 499. The court clarified that “all of [defense counsel’s]
other objections are still outstanding,” and defense counsel agreed. VRP at 499.
Furthermore, the court stated it intended to provide two limiting instructions to the jury
before they watched the recorded interview. In light of the instructions, the court
overruled defense counsel’s objections to the recorded interview.
Mr. Mancinas Garza testified in his own defense. Mr. Mancinas Garza testified
that he believed the picture associated with the Badoo profile appeared to be a 27-year-
old woman and that he had no reason to suspect “Crystal” was younger than her stated
age. When asked how he reacted when “Crystal” told him she was 13 years old, Mr.
Mancinas Garza responded, “I didn’t—I didn’t believe. I took it as a joke, that she’s
stating, LOL. LOL means laugh out loud. So I did. I laughed out loud.” VRP at 551.
Mr. Mancinas Garza testified he “would have never thought [“Crystal”] was 13, just by
the way she was conversating and the texts that she sent.” VRP at 555-56.
Mr. Mancinas Garza claimed that phone call with “Crystal” confirmed his belief
that “[s]he was a 27-year-old, or she was an adult.” VRP at 558. Mr. Mancinas Garza
acknowledged he drove from Richland to Moses Lake to meet “Crystal” and did not
9 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
believe he was meeting with a 13-year-old child for sex during the trip. On arrival at
“Crystal’s” house, Mr. Mancinas Garza saw “the brunette from the picture that she had
sent” and “recognized the person at the door as the person that had sent [him] the
picture.” VRP at 564. Mr. Mancinas Garza claimed the person in the doorway appeared
to be 27 years old.
The jury ultimately found Mr. Mancinas Garza guilty of attempted rape of a child
in the second degree and communication with a minor for immoral purposes. The court
sentenced Mr. Mancinas Garza to an indeterminate sentence of 80 months to life.
Mr. Mancinas Garza timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Mancinas Garza argues he was afforded ineffective assistance from his trial
attorney when his attorney (1) failed to raise the defense of entrapment or request the jury
be instructed on entrapment; (2) failed to object to improper profile evidence, opinion
evidence, and character evidence; and (3) agreed to curative jury instructions that
constituted improper judicial comments on the evidence. Lastly, Mr. Mancinas Garcia
claims cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree with Mr. Mancinas
Garza’s first two arguments and decline review of his third. Finding no error, we reject
Mr. Mancinas Garza’s cumulative error argument.
Defendants have a constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of
counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; State v. Lopez, 190 Wn.2d
10 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
104, 115, 410 P.3d 1117 (2018). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is an issue
of constitutional magnitude that may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Nichols, 161 Wn.2d 1, 9, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007). We review ineffective assistance of
counsel claims de novo. State v. White, 80 Wn. App. 406, 410, 907 P.2d 310 (1995). We
examine the entire record when considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant bears the
burden of showing (1) that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances and, if so, (2) that there is
a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s poor performance, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. Id. at 334-35. If either element is not satisfied,
the inquiry ends. State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009).
A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel bears the burden of showing
deficient representation. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335. In reviewing the record, there is
a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable. Id. To overcome the
presumption, “the defendant must show in the record the absence of legitimate strategic
or tactical reasons supporting the challenged conduct by counsel.” Id. at 336.
Even if we find that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant must
affirmatively prove prejudice. State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225-26, 743 P.2d 816
(1987). This requires more than simply showing that “the errors had some conceivable
11 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
effect on the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). A defendant demonstrates prejudice by showing that the
proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s deficient representation.
McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 337.
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
Mr. Mancinas Garza contends his trial attorney was ineffective in not pursuing an
entrapment defense and in failing to request the court instruct the jury on the defense of
entrapment. We disagree.
Defense counsel has a duty to investigate all reasonable defenses, but “no duty to
pursue strategies that reasonably appear unlikely to succeed.” State v. Brown, 159 Wn.
App. 366, 371, 245 P.3d 776 (2011). “Generally, choosing a particular defense is a
strategic decision ‘for which there is no correct answer, but only second guesses.’” In re
Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 745, 101 P.3d 1 (2004) (quoting Hendricks v.
Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)).
An attorney may be ineffective in failing to request a jury be instructed on a
potential defense. In re Pers. Restraint of Hubert, 138 Wn. App. 924, 929, 158 P.3d
1282 (2007). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a trial
attorney’s failure to request a jury instruction, an appellant is required to establish that
(1) had the instruction been requested, the trial court would likely have given it, and
12 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
(2) that the failure to request the instruction was not a legitimate strategic or tactical trial
decision. State v. Powell, 150 Wn. App. 139, 154-55, 206 P.3d 703 (2009).
Here, the court likely would have instructed the jury on entrapment had defense
counsel requested the instruction. “Entrapment” is a defense when:
(a) The criminal design originated in the mind of law enforcement officials, or any person acting under their direction, and
(b) The actor was lured or induced to commit a crime which the actor had not otherwise intended to commit.
RCW 9A.16.070(1). Entrapment is unavailable as a defense where law enforcement
merely provided “an opportunity to commit a crime.” RCW 9A.16.070(2).
A defendant is required to put forth “some evidence on the elements of the
defense” of entrapment before a jury will be instructed on the defense. State v. Arbogast,
199 Wn.2d 356, 366-68, 506 P.3d 1238 (2022). This means the defense must present
evidence of inducement and predisposition. Id. at 366, 374. The pertinent inquiry for an
entrapment defense “is whether a fact finder could reasonably conclude from the
evidence that the defendant had no predisposition to commit the crime until the intent
was implanted in his or her mind by police and that the defendant was induced to commit
the crime through fundamentally unfair efforts by law enforcement.” Id. at 379.
Law enforcement operated an undercover operation and communicated with Mr.
Mancinas Garza on an adult platform while posing as a 27-year-old woman. It was only
after Mr. Mancinas Garza responded to the posting that “Crystal” identified herself as a
13 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
13-year-old child. The two exchanged several messages before agreeing to meet for
sexual acts. Mr. Mancinas Garza testified that he believed “Crystal” was an adult,
despite being repeatedly informed that “Crystal” was 13 years old.
The State concedes that Mr. Mancinas Garza likely meets the prima facie standard
to be entitled to the entrapment defense. We agree, based on the evidence presented at
trial, that the fact finder could reasonably conclude that Mr. Mancinas Garza was not
predisposed to commit the crimes until the intent was implanted in his mind by law
enforcement and that he was induced to commit the crime through fundamentally unfair
efforts by law enforcement. Consequently, the trial court would likely have instructed
the jury on the defense of entrapment had the defense requested the instruction.
We next consider whether Mr. Mancinas Garza established that his attorney’s
failure to request the entrapment instruction for the jury was not a legitimate strategic or
tactical trial decision.
Defense counsel had strategic and tactical reasons justifying his decision not to
pursue an entrapment defense. Namely, the State likely would have been allowed to
present evidence of Mr. Mancinas Garza’s predisposition to commit the crime of
attempted rape of a child and communication with a minor for immoral purposes had the
defense been asserted. Specifically, the State informed the court and Mr. Mancinas
Garza that it would seek to introduce evidence of Mr. Mancinas Garza’s cellphone usage
and pornography preferences should the defense be asserted. Although the court
14 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
excluded such evidence from the State’s case-in-chief, the court cautioned that the
evidence may be admissible “in rebuttal if a legitimate entrapment defense is raised.”
VRP at 39. Under these circumstances, defense counsel’s decision to forego the defense
of entrapment was reasonable.
Because highly prejudicial evidence likely would have been admitted had Mr.
Mancinas Garza pursued an entrapment defense, Mr. Mancinas Garza failed to show the
absence of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons supporting his attorney’s decision to
forego an entrapment defense. Thus, Mr. Mancinas Garza’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim fails.
PROFILE, OPINION, AND CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Mr. Mancinas Garza argues his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to object to
Detective Sergeant McDonald’s “inadmissible profile and/or opinion testimony,”
admission of his recorded interview with law enforcement, and to statements Detective
Welsh made during the recorded interview. Br. of Appellant at 51. We disagree with
each of Mr. Mancinas Garza’s arguments because his attorney properly objected.
If an appellant bases his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on his trial
attorney’s failure to object, he “‘must show that the objection would likely have
succeeded.’” State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239, 248, 494 P.3d 424 (2021) (quoting State
v. Crow, 8 Wn. App. 2d 480, 508, 438 P.3d 541 (2019)). “A few or even several failures
to object are not usually cause for finding that an attorney’s conduct has fallen below the
15 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
objective standard of conduct.” Id. at 250. “‘Only in egregious circumstances, on
testimony central to the State’s case, will the failure to object constitute incompetence of
counsel justifying reversal.’” Id. at 248 (quoting Crow, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 508). If
defense counsel fails to object to inadmissible evidence, this constitutes deficient
performance. Id.
Mr. Mancinas Garza first argues his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to
object to portions of Detective Sergeant McDonald’s inadmissible profile and opinion
testimony. Notably, Mr. Mancinas Garza does not challenge the court’s ruling on these
objections. Mr. Mancinas Garza challenges the following testimony:
[DETECTIVE SERGEANT MCDONALD]: On the proactive side of the house, we do undercover work where we essentially create undercover profiles and we identify people who are online that are trying to—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled on this in explaining in general what it does. You can answer.
[DETECTIVE SERGEANT MCDONALD]: Thank you. So the proactive work is when we go undercover online and we create profiles where we try to identify people that are online that are communicating with minors for immoral purposes.
[DETECTIVE SERGEANT MCDONALD]: . . .The idea with the Net Nanny operation is to identify people that are online communicating with minors for immoral purposes, and they’re communicating with us.
16 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer.
[DETECTIVE SERGEANT MCDONALD]: Thank you. They’re communicating with us instead of communicating with an actual minor. We’ll investigate the people that we’re communicating with, and then if the investigation progresses, we’ll provide them a location where our undercovers are there. And then when they show up, then we’ll arrest them for the attempted rape of a child.
VRP at 235-36. Because defense counsel properly objected to the testimony Mr.
Mancinas Garza identifies on appeal, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
his attorney’s failure to object fails.
Mr. Mancinas Garza next challenges Detective Sergeant McDonald’s testimony
regarding the Net Nanny “interview team.” Br. of Appellant at 54-55. After providing a
block quotation of the challenged testimony, Mr. Mancinas Garza claims, “The foregoing
excerpts, when taken in conjunction with the testimony concerning the participants
backgrounds, served to paint Mr. Garza with a broad brush as a preconceived child
molester.” Br. of Appellant at 55. We decline review of Mr. Mancinas Garza’s claimed
error related to the interview team based on his failure to provide a meaningful analysis
or reasoned argument. See Wiklem v. City of Camas, 31 Wn. App. 2d 575, 593, 551 P.3d
1067 (2024), review denied, 4 Wn.3d 1002, 561 P.3d 739 (2025).
Finally, Mr. Mancinas Garza claims his attorney was ineffective in failing to
adequately redact the recorded interview. The lack of redaction, according to Mr.
Mancinas Garza, resulted in the admission of improper character evidence, improper
profile evidence, impermissible opinion evidence, and violated ER 404(b). We conclude
17 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
defense counsel was not ineffective because he properly objected to the entirety of the
recording as well as the specific statements complained of on appeal.
Defense counsel moved in limine for exclusion of the entire recording and further
requested the court exclude specific statements Detective Welsh made during the
interview. During trial, defense counsel again objected to statements consisting of
“mostly a monologue by Detective Welsh, giving his opinions.” VRP at 499. The court
overruled the objections. Mr. Mancinas Garza does not challenge the trial court’s rulings.
Because defense counsel repeatedly objected to admission of the recorded interview—
both in its entirety and to specific statements—Mr. Mancinas Garza’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails. Moreover, as reflected by the court’s ruling on the
exclusion of specific aspects of the recording, any objection lodged by defense counsel
would have proven unsuccessful.
LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
Mr. Mancinas Garza argues his attorney was ineffective in agreeing to the trial
court giving the jury limiting instructions, claiming the instructions amounted to a
judicial comment on the evidence. We decline review of this claim due to the inadequacy
of Mr. Mancinas Garza’s briefing.
An appellant’s brief is required to contain “argument in support of the issues
presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant
parts of the record.” RAP 10.3(a)(6). We will therefore not comb through the record to
18 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
find support for an appellant’s argument. Moreover, “‘passing treatment of an issue or
lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit our consideration.’” West v. Thurston
County, 168 Wn. App. 162, 187, 275 P.3d 1200 (2012) (quoting Holland v. City of
Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998)). “A party waives an assignment of
error not adequately argued in its brief.” Milligan v. Thompson, 110 Wn. App. 628, 635,
42 P.3d 418 (2002).
Here, Mr. Mancinas Garza argues, without citation to the record or a quotation of
the challenged instructions, that “[t]he trials court’s limit[ing] instructions” amounted to a
judicial comment on the evidence. Br. of Appellant at 80. Mr. Mancinas Garza does not
provide citations to the challenged instructions, fails to articulate whether the court gave
the instructions orally or in writing, and fails to explain how the instructions constituted
an improper comment on the evidence. Consequently, we decline review of his claimed
error related to the instructions.
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Mr. Mancinas Garza argues the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of a
fair trial. We disagree.
“Under the cumulative error doctrine, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial
when cumulative errors produce a trial that is fundamentally unfair.” State v. Emery, 174
Wn.2d 741, 766, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). To prevail under the cumulative error doctrine, an
appellant must show that while multiple errors “standing alone . . . might not be of
19 No. 40602-4-III State v. Mancinas Garza
sufficient gravity to constitute grounds for a new trial, the combined effect of the
accumulation of errors most certainly requires a new trial.” State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 772,
789, 684 P.2d 668 (1984).
Because we disagree that Mr. Mancinas Garza’s claimed errors occurred,
cumulative errors could not have led to a fundamentally unfair trial.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Cooney, J.
WE CONCUR:
Staab, C.J.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.