State of Washington v. Miguel Angel Sanchez

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedOctober 20, 2020
Docket36721-5
StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Washington v. Miguel Angel Sanchez (State of Washington v. Miguel Angel Sanchez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Washington v. Miguel Angel Sanchez, (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

FILED OCTOBER 20, 2020 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 36721-5-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZ, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )

KORSMO, A.C.J. — Miguel Sanchez appeals from five convictions arising from

assaulting and contacting his former girlfriend, challenging his counsel’s effectiveness

and the admission of motive evidence for the assault. Finding no prejudicial error, we

affirm.

FACTS

Mr. Sanchez and the victim, Ms. Candelaria, were engaged to be married and lived

together with her children. On December 18, 2018, Ms. Candelaria confronted him over

his drug use. The argument turned physical and Sanchez choked her. After she broke free No. 36721-5-III State v. Sanchez

and fled outside, he caught her and struck her while dragging her back to the house. A

passing motorist saw the incident and allowed Candelaria to call 911. Sanchez then fled.

Police located Mr. Sanchez in a Walmart parking lot two days later. An officer

told Sanchez he was under arrest for “some warrants,” but Sanchez kept asking the

officer questions. The officer stated that asking questions

is a common tactic for somebody that doesn’t want to be arrested. Usually leads into a foot chase is my experience. It’s kind of a delay tactic and that’s exactly what happened.

Report of Proceedings at 72. Mr. Sanchez fled the officer, but was caught and arrested.

A no-contact order was issued December 21. Despite being served with the order,

Sanchez repeatedly contacted Candelaria from jail and attempted to influence her

testimony. As a result, the prosecutor ultimately filed charges of second degree assault,

witness tampering, and three gross misdemeanor counts of violation of a no-contact

order. The case proceeded to jury trial in the Benton County Superior Court.

The State moved in limine to be permitted to use evidence of the defendant’s flight

from authorities and solicit Ms. Candelaria’s explanation for why the assault occurred.

Over defense objection, the court ruled that the State could present limited evidence on

both topics.

At trial, Ms. Candelaria testified about the onset of the assault. She was surprised

to see the defendant at home at a time he was supposed to be at work. She believed he

2 No. 36721-5-III State v. Sanchez

was “high” and accused him of using drugs. He denied the accusation and began packing

his clothes. Their argument grew into an assault.

An officer who authenticated the jail conversation videos for the jury testified, in

response to questioning by defense counsel, that he identified Mr. Sanchez on the videos

in part based on looking at his “police photos.” There was no objection to the statement.

The jury convicted Mr. Sanchez on the five counts and also returned findings that

the crimes constituted domestic violence. The jury also determined that the second

degree assault constituted aggravated domestic violence due to the presence of a minor.

Based on that aggravating factor, the court imposed an exceptional sentence of 102

months on the assault charge and lesser concurrent terms on the remaining offenses.

Mr. Sanchez timely appealed to this court. A panel considered his appeal without

conducting argument.

ANALYSIS

The appeals raises contentions of ineffective assistance and error in the admission

of the drug use testimony. We address the claims in that order.

Ineffective Assistance

This issue alleges that counsel erred by failing to object to some testimony and in

eliciting other testimony. He does not satisfy the heavy burden of proof placed on an

ineffective assistance argument.

3 No. 36721-5-III State v. Sanchez

The principles governing this argument are very well settled. An attorney’s failure

to perform to the standards of the profession will require a new trial when the client has

been prejudiced by counsel’s failure. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333-335, 899

P.2d 1251 (1995). Courts must be highly deferential to counsel’s decisions when

evaluating ineffectiveness claims. A strategic or tactical decision is not a basis for

finding error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-691, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.

Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland, courts evaluate counsel’s performance using a two-

prong test that requires determination whether or not (1) counsel’s performance failed to

meet a standard of reasonableness and (2) actual prejudice resulted from counsel’s failures.

Id. at 690-692. When a claim fails one prong, a reviewing court need not consider both

Strickland prongs. Id. at 697; State v. Foster, 140 Wn. App. 266, 273, 166 P.3d 726

(2007). If the evidence necessary to resolve the ineffective assistance argument is not in

the record, the claim is not manifest and cannot be addressed on appeal. McFarland, 127

Wn.2d at 334.

The governing authority in the specific context raised by Mr. Sanchez is further

refined by the case law. As the Strickland court noted, no two lawyers would try a case

in the same manner. 466 U.S. at 689. Accordingly, discerning error relating to the

admission of testimony from an undeveloped appellate record is largely a fruitless

undertaking because the decision to object is a “classic example of trial tactics.” See

State v. Madison, 53 Wn. App. 754, 763, 770 P.2d 662 (1989). “Only in egregious

4 No. 36721-5-III State v. Sanchez

circumstances, on testimony central to the State’s case, will the failure to object

constitute incompetence of counsel.” Id. A reviewing court presumes that a “failure to

object was the product of legitimate trial strategy or tactics, and the onus is on the

defendant to rebut this presumption.” State v. Johnston, 143 Wn. App. 1, 20, 177 P.3d

1127 (2007) (citing cases).

Against this backdrop of authority, the challenges to counsel’s trial performance

utterly fail. The first and third challenges involve the testimony that the officer was

attempting to arrest Sanchez for “some warrants” and he responded by asking questions

before fleeing. Mr. Sanchez now claims these items were significantly prejudicial and

required his attorney to object. He cannot overcome the “presumption” of trial tactics.

Id. Sanchez was arrested two days after the assault; jurors would understandably believe

there was an arrest warrant outstanding. The reference to plural warrants likely was

error, but counsel understandably would not want to call attention to the point by

objecting or clarifying the situation. Trial counsel reasonably would want to leave the

matter undeveloped. Little or nothing would be gained by objecting.

The questioning and flight fell within the scope of the trial court’s ruling in limine

concerning “flight” testimony. Appellant does not challenge the pre-trial ruling

permitting this testimony. He therefore cannot show that counsel erred by declining to

object further to testimony that the court had already admitted.

5 No. 36721-5-III State v. Sanchez

The remaining challenge is to the failure to object to testimony, elicited by the

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Dowling v. United States
493 U.S. 342 (Supreme Court, 1990)
State v. Guloy
705 P.2d 1182 (Washington Supreme Court, 1985)
State Ex Rel. Carroll v. Junker
482 P.2d 775 (Washington Supreme Court, 1971)
State v. Madison
770 P.2d 662 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1989)
State v. Zwicker
713 P.2d 1101 (Washington Supreme Court, 1986)
State v. McFarland
899 P.2d 1251 (Washington Supreme Court, 1995)
State v. Foster
166 P.3d 726 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2007)
State v. DeVincentis
74 P.3d 119 (Washington Supreme Court, 2003)
State v. DeVincentis
150 Wash. 2d 11 (Washington Supreme Court, 2003)
State v. Powell
206 P.3d 321 (Washington Supreme Court, 2009)
State v. Foster
140 Wash. App. 266 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2007)
State v. Johnston
177 P.3d 1127 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
State of Washington v. Miguel Angel Sanchez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-washington-v-miguel-angel-sanchez-washctapp-2020.