State of Washington v. Michael Randall Lauderdale

Opinion

FILED JUNE 13, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39441-7-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) MICHAEL RANDALL LAUDERDALE ) ) Appellant. )

PENNELL, J. — In 1995, a jury found Michael Lauderdale guilty of aggravated

first degree murder and first degree felony murder, and sentenced him to life without

parole (LWOP). Mr. Lauderdale was 19 years old at the time of the offense conduct. In

2021, his case was remanded by our Supreme Court to the trial court for resentencing to

consider the mitigating factors of youth in light of In re Personal Restraint of Monschke.

197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality opinion). On resentencing, the trial court

reimposed Mr. Lauderdale’s LWOP sentence. We affirm. No. 39441-7-III State v. Lauderdale

FACTS 1

In 1994, then 19-year-old Michael Lauderdale killed Jeremy Wood by assaulting

him with a baseball bat. Forensic evidence indicated Mr. Lauderdale also bound

Mr. Woods’s legs and sexually assaulted Mr. Wood’s deceased body. A jury convicted

Mr. Lauderdale of aggravated first degree murder and first degree felony murder.

He received a sentence of LWOP. In 2019, Mr. Lauderdale moved for resentencing,

alleging a double jeopardy violation. The State conceded the violation. The trial court

then vacated the felony murder conviction and Mr. Lauderdale was resentenced to

LWOP, as it was required to do at the time.

Mr. Lauderdale appealed the LWOP sentence, arguing the trial court had the

discretion, but failed to recognize it, to impose a sentence below life in prison based on

the mitigating characteristics of youth. We rejected Mr. Lauderdale’s argument on appeal.

See State v. Lauderdale, No. 37141-7-III, (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2020) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/371417_2_ord.pdf. The Supreme Court accepted

1 The transcript from Mr. Lauderdale’s 1995 trial is unavailable. Unless otherwise noted, we draw our factual recitation from this court’s prior decisions. See State v. Lauderdale, No. 37141-7-III, (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/371417_2_ord.pdf; State v. Lauderdale, noted at 83 Wn. App. 1023 (1996).

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review only on the sentencing issue and immediately remanded the case to the trial court

for resentencing in light of Monschke, which held that Washington’s constitutional

prohibition of mandatory LWOP sentences extends to youthful offenders aged 18 to 20.

Ruling Granting Rev., State v. Lauderdale, No. 99591-5 (Wash. Sept. 1, 2021).

On remand, Mr. Lauderdale’s attorney submitted a voluminous mitigation packet,

including a detailed family history, psychological evaluation report, risk assessment

report from the Department of Corrections, and various certificates of achievement and

training earned by Mr. Lauderdale while incarcerated.

A resentencing hearing was held on October 20, 2022. The trial court listened to

statements from several of Mr. Wood’s family members and friends. The parties then

presented their recommendations. The State argued that, under Monschke, the court

“must give meaningful consideration to [Mr.] Lauderdale’s youthfulness at the time

he committed the crime.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Oct. 20 ,2022) at 30. Nevertheless, the

State asked the court to reimpose the LWOP sentence based on the facts of the case,

seriousness of the crime, and Mr. Lauderdale’s continued lack of remorse. Id. at 31-33.

Mr. Lauderdale asked for a 30-year sentence, which would essentially amount to time

served. During his allocution, Mr. Lauderdale stated he was ashamed of what he had

3 No. 39441-7-III State v. Lauderdale

done, but was focused on changing himself for the better. Id. at 45-48. The court then

took the matter under advisement.

The trial court reconvened on November 3, 2022. At that hearing, the court

referenced the applicable case law, including Monschke. The court read from State v.

Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 387 P.3d 650 (2017), identifying the factors relevant to

determining whether an offender’s culpability was impacted by the mitigating factors

of youth. RP (Nov. 3, 2022) at 58-59.

The court detailed the information set forth in Mr. Lauderdale’s mitigation packet.

It acknowledged Mr. Lauderdale had a traumatic childhood and lack of impulse control

as a juvenile. Id. at 60-62. The court also noted Mr. Lauderdale had largely stayed out of

trouble in prison and maintained employment and engagement in prison programming.

Id. at 62-63.

The court then turned to the details of Mr. Lauderdale’s offense conduct. The

crime against Mr. Wood showed calculation and planning. It “was not an impulsive act.”

Id. at 69. And, although Mr. Lauderdale had taken responsibility for some of his conduct,

he had never admitted to binding Mr. Wood’s legs or sexually assaulting Mr. Wood. Id.

at 65, 71. There was no evidence Mr. Lauderdale’s conduct was prompted by peer or

family pressure. Id. at 67. And after completion of the crime, Mr. Lauderdale attempted

4 No. 39441-7-III State v. Lauderdale

to get rid of evidence connecting him to the murder, thus exhibiting not only

consciousness of guilt but an awareness of consequences. Id. at 70-71.

In terms of Mr. Lauderdale’s circumstances at the time of the offense conduct,

the trial court explained Mr. Lauderdale was living as an adult. He was no longer in

his abusive childhood home. He was employed and had obtained independent housing

and his GED (general educational diploma). Id. at 67. “[Mr. Lauderdale] had control

over his own environment at the time that he committed this crime.” Id. at 70. After his

arrest, Mr. Lauderdale demonstrated he was capable of working with counsel and

assisting with his defense. Id. at 67.

The trial court recited the various purposes of punishment under the Sentencing

Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, including proportionality, respect for law,

community protection, “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” Id.

at 71-72. The court then determined the original LWOP sentence remained appropriate

for Mr. Lauderdale. Id. at 72. The court subsequently conformed its oral decision to

written findings. Clerk’s Papers at 176-82.

Mr. Lauderdale has filed a timely appeal.

5 No. 39441-7-III State v. Lauderdale

ANALYSIS

Mr. Lauderdale’s first argument on appeal is that the Washington Constitution

requires a categorical bar on LWOP for defendants aged 20 and under. Mr. Lauderdale

cites to State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 428 P.3d 343 (2018), which adopted a categorical

bar for juveniles under age 18. According to Mr. Lauderdale, the court’s decision in

Monschke dictates that a categorical bar must also apply to young adults aged 18 to 20.

We disagree with Mr. Lauderdale’s assessment of Monschke. The lead opinion in

Monschke “was careful to note it was not concluding that LWOP is categorically barred

for young adults and was therefore not announcing a decision similar to State v. Bassett.”

In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d 1, 23, 513 P.3d 769 (2022). The Monschke

lead opinion specifically recognized that “[n]ot every 19- and 20-year-old will exhibit

. . . mitigating characteristics” warranting leniency. 197 Wn.2d at 326. Accordingly,

Monschke affords trial courts discretion to assess the propriety of an LWOP sentence on

an individual basis. This court has repeatedly rebuffed invitations to extend Monschke’s

ruling. See State v. Krueger, 26 Wn. App. 2d 549, 555-56, 540 P.3d 126 (2023), review

denied, ___ Wn.2d ___, 547 P.3d 900 (2024).

Consistent with Monschke, we hold sentencing courts retain discretion to impose

LWOP sentences on youthful adult offenders. To the extent Mr. Lauderdale believes

6 No. 39441-7-III State v. Lauderdale

Bassett must be expanded to include youthful offenders, that must be resolved by our

Supreme Court.

Mr. Lauderdale also argues the trial court abused its discretion at resentencing by

focusing on the facts of the offense and retribution instead of taking a forward-looking

approach focused on rehabilitation. In support of this argument, Mr. Lauderdale cites

State v. Haag, 198 Wn.2d 309, 495 P.3d 241 (2021). 2

Mr. Lauderdale’s reliance on Haag is misplaced. Haag involved a juvenile

resentencing under former RCW 10.95.030(3) (2015) and former RCW 10.95.035 (2015).

Former RCW 10.95.030(3)(b) set forth the following process for imposing a sentence for

aggravated first degree murder on a defendant under age 18:

[T]he court must take into account mitigating factors that account for the diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v. Alabama, [567 U.S. 460,] 132 S. Ct. 2455[, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407] (2012) including, but not limited to, the age of the individual, the youth’s childhood and life experience, the degree of responsibility the youth was capable of exercising, and the youth’s chances of becoming rehabilitated.[3]

Haag noted that this statutory language does not include a “any reference to retributive

factors.” 198 Wn.2d at 322. Given the statutory text, the Supreme Court reasoned that

2 Mr. Lauderdale also complains the trial court improperly relied on facts outside the record and did not reconstruct the 1995 trial transcript. These contentions were not preserved in the trial court and therefore will not be reviewed on appeal. See RAP 2.5(a). 3 This same provision is now found in RCW 10.95.030(2)(b).

7 No. 39441-7-III State v. Lauderdale

“the legislature intended sentencers to focus on mitigating factors, with retribution

playing a minor role.” Id. According to the Haag court, this means the sentencing hearing

“must be forward looking, not backward looking.” Id. at 322-23.

Because Mr. Lauderdale was nearly 19 years and 8 months old at the time of his

offense conduct, his 2022 resentencing did not fall under former RCW 10.95.030(3)(b).

Rather, as recognized by the trial court at the time of resentencing, Mr. Lauderdale’s

sentencing was governed by the nonstatutory, constitutional factors set forth in Ramos.

As explained in Ramos, when assessing the constitutionality of an LWOP sentence

on a youthful offender, a trial court “must meaningfully consider how juveniles are

different from adults.” 187 Wn.2d at 434-35. “If the [young person] proves by a

preponderance of the evidence that his or her crimes reflect transient immaturity,

substantial and compelling reasons would necessarily justify an exceptional sentence

below” LWOP. Id. at 435. A court assessing the constitutionality of an LWOP sentence

during a resentencing hearing may consider evidence of a defendant’s postsentencing

rehabilitative efforts. Id. at 449. However, it is not required to consider such evidence. Id.

The resentencing court here complied with the procedure set forth in Ramos.

The court gave meaningful consideration to Mr. Lauderdale’s mitigation evidence.

It recognized Mr. Lauderdale had a traumatic childhood. It also recognized he had done

8 No. 39441-7-III State v. Lauderdale

a lot to rehabilitate himself during his time in prison. But the court determined that

at the time of the offense Mr. Lauderdale was exhibiting adult conduct and behavior.

His offense conduct did not reflect transient immaturity. Thus, the court was not

constitutionally prohibited from imposing a sentence of LWOP.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in

the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

_________________________________ Pennell, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________ Staab, A.C.J.

______________________________ Cooney, J.