State Of Washington, V. Michael Furman

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: May 24, 2022
• Docket: 52105-9
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

May 24, 2022

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52105-9-II

Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MICHAEL FURMAN,

Appellant.

WORSWICK, J. — Michael Furman appeals his sentence following a Miller-fix

resentencing hearing. He argues that the sentencing court imposed an unconstitutional de facto

life sentence. We agree, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

Furman was convicted and sentenced to death for first degree murder with five

aggravating factors committed when he was 17 years old. In 1993, the Supreme Court vacated

his death sentence, holding that juvenile offenders cannot be subject to the death penalty. On

resentencing, the superior court sentenced Furman to life in prison without the possibility of

parole.

In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court declared that mandatory

life sentences without parole for juveniles were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). In response, the Washington

Legislature in June 2014 passed what is known as the Miller-fix statute, RCW 10.95.030. State

v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 74, 428 P.3d 343 (2018). RCW 10.95.035(1) required that juveniles No. 52105-9-II

sentenced before Miller to life in prison without parole under the former mandatory scheme, like

Furman, be resentenced. In addition, RCW 10.95.030(3)(b) required that resentencing courts

“take into account mitigating factors that account for the diminished culpability of youth as

provided in Miller.”

The superior court conducted a Miller-fix hearing where Furman presented evidence of

the developments in adolescent brain research and the differences between juveniles and adults.

Furman also presented evidence that his psychological development was severely damaged from

his early childhood by chronic instability, neglect, and abuse. Additionally, Furman presented

substantial evidence of his rehabilitation while in prison.

Following the resentencing hearing, the superior court entered findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The superior court concluded that Furman’s age was of minimal weight,

balancing the fact that Furman was two months shy of his 18th birthday but also acknowledging

the juvenile brain research and case law. The superior court concluded that Furman’s childhood

and life experiences impacted his psychological development and considered it a mitigating

factor in its sentence. The court also concluded that “the degree of responsibility [Furman] was

capable of exercising in this instance was quite high, despite his general diminished capacity for

self-control and judgment as a juvenile.” Clerk’s Papers at 221. The superior court

acknowledged the evidence of Furman’s rehabilitation in prison and that it may be relevant to the

level of his culpability in light of the research on adolescent brain science.

2 No. 52105-9-II

The superior court ultimately sentenced Furman to 48 years in prison, making Furman

first eligible for parole at age 65. Furman appeals his sentence.1

ANALYSIS

Furman raises several issues on appeal that are premised upon his assertion that the

sentence imposed in this case was a de facto life sentence. 2 We address this argument first

because it is dispositive.

Although a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders is not barred by the

federal constitution, 3 our State Supreme Court has held that such a sentence is categorically

prohibited under our state constitution. State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 91, 428 P.3d 343 (2018).

Our Supreme Court has recently held that a 46-year minimum sentence amounts to an

unconstitutional de facto life sentence. State v. Haag, 198 Wn.2d 309, 327, 495 P.3d 241 (2021).

The court explained

[A] juvenile sentenced to be released at the age of 63 has lost incalculably more than an adult in the same circumstances, the ability to work, to vote, or even to operate a motor vehicle . . . given the shortened life expectancy and compromised health associated with life in prison, releasing Haag from confinement at the age of 63 deprives him of a meaningful opportunity to return to society, depriving him of a meaningful life.

198 Wn.2d at 328-29.

1 The State argues that Furman’s appeal should be reviewed as a personal restraint petition. At the time of briefing, the State did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s decision clarifying this issue in State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 456 P.3d 806 (2020). There, the Court held that a Miller hearing results in a new, appealable sentence. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 125. 2 Furman also argues that the sentencing court misapplied the Miller factors and erroneously refused to consider Furman’s rehabilitation during resentencing. 3 Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021) (imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile defendant does not require a finding of incorrigibility).

3 No. 52105-9-II

Under Haag, Furman also received a de facto life sentence. Furman was resentenced to a

48-year minimum sentence with possible parole at the age of 65—a longer sentence and later age

of parole than Haag. Under Bassett, life sentences for juvenile offenders are categorically

prohibited. In light of Haag, we vacate Furman’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Worswick, J. We concur:

Lee, J.

Cruser, A.C.J.