IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80625-4-I ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) MICAH JAMES GODFREY, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) )
VERELLEN, J. — Micah Godfrey challenges the trial court’s check-the-box
findings supporting a third competency restoration in accordance with
RCW 10.77.086(4). An appeal is moot if this court may not provide effective relief.
Here, Godfrey did not seek a stay of the court’s decision to order a third
competency restoration, and his competency has been restored. As a result, this
appeal is moot because no effective relief is available. Godfrey does not establish
any collateral consequences resulting from the third competency restoration order,
and the public interest exception does not apply because there is little likelihood
that reaching the merits would provide future guidance.
Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
FACTS
Micah Godfrey was charged with five counts of second degree assault with
a deadly weapon enhancement on each count. In January 2019, the trial court No. 80625-4-I/2
found Godfrey incompetent to stand trial and committed him to Eastern State
Hospital for a 90-day restoration period.
At the end of the restoration period, Dr. Amy Sellers evaluated him. Dr.
Sellers diagnosed Godfrey with delusional disorder and concluded he was
incompetent because he continued to “exhibit paranoid delusions.”1 As a result,
she recommended a second 90-day restoration period, which the trial court
ordered.
At the end of Godfrey’s second restoration period, Dr. Sellers evaluated
Godfrey again and diagnosed him with schizophrenia. Dr. Sellers reported that
Godfrey’s auditory hallucinations were partially managed by his medications. But
she noted his paranoid delusions, “where he believes people are out to get him,”
are fixed.2 As a result, Dr. Sellers concluded that Godfrey remained incompetent
to stand trial and further efforts to restore competency were not likely to be
successful.
On October 9, 2019, the trial court conducted Godfrey’s third competency
hearing. The trial court concluded that Godfrey’s “ongoing delusions” made him
incompetent, and the court committed him for a third restoration period of 180-
days.3 The court reasoned his delusions had improved over time and continued
improvement was “quite possible.”4
1 Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 35. 2 Ex. 1. 3 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 9, 2019) at 50-58. 4 Id. at 55.
2 No. 80625-4-I/3
After the court’s ruling, the prosecutor asked the court to find that Godfrey
“is a substantial danger to other person[s] or presents a substantial likelihood of
committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security and that there’s a
substantial probability he’ll regain competency within a reasonable time.”5 The
trial court responded “Yes,” and signed an order prepared by the prosecutor. The
order included a check-the-box finding that “a third restoration period is
appropriate under RCW 10.77.086.”6
Godfrey appeals the court’s decision to order a third competency
restoration. At oral argument before this court, the prosecutor confirmed that
Godfrey’s third restoration period was successful, he was found competent, and is
currently awaiting trial.
ANALYSIS
Godfrey contends that the trial court’s “findings” were insufficient to order a
third competency restoration. Even assuming Godfrey is correct, we conclude this
appeal is moot.
“When we can no longer provide effective relief, an appeal is moot.”7 And
“‘[a]s a general rule, this court will not review a moot case.””8
Godfrey did not seek a stay of the third competency restoration order
pending appeal. He finished his third restoration period during the pendency of
5 Id. at 58. 6 CP at 44. 7 Matter of Dependency of T.P., 12 Wn. App. 2d 538, 544, 458 P.3d 825 (2020) (citing In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93 P.3d 124 (2004)). 8 Id. at 545 (quoting Horner, 151 Wn.2d at 891).
3 No. 80625-4-I/4
this appeal and has been found competent to stand trial. Godfrey cites no
authority supporting the proposition that in the absence of a stay, he is entitled to
relief from the court’s current determination that his competency to stand trial has
been restored. Because we cannot provide effective relief on the issue before us,
Godfrey’s appeal is moot.
Godfrey contends we should reach the merits of his appeal because
exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply here. We disagree.
Specifically, he argues this appeal is not moot because there are collateral
consequences to the order committing him to a third restoration period. An appeal
is not moot where the decision appealed can have collateral consequences.9
Godfrey relies upon In re Detention of M.K., where the court held an appeal
of an involuntary civil commitment order is not moot even if the period of
commitment has expired.10 The court explained RCW 71.05.245 allows a court in
a future involuntary civil commitment proceeding to consider recent prior civil
commitments.11 Because “each order of commitment entered up to three years
before the current commitment hearing becomes a part of the evidence against a
person seeking denial of a petition for commitment,” the civil commitment order
was not moot.12 But unlike the detainee in M.K., Godfrey fails to show any true
collateral consequences resulting from the third competency restoration order.
9 In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 625-26, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). 10 168 Wn. App. 621, 629-30, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). 11 Id. at 626. 12 Id.
4 No. 80625-4-I/5
At oral argument before this court, Godfrey asserted collateral
consequences based upon RCW 71.05.212, where the legislature acknowledges
previous efforts to restore competency in a criminal case, chapter 10.77 RCW, can
be considered in an involuntary civil commitment. Specifically, he notes that
RCW 71.05.212(1)(c) provides a professional conducting an evaluation under the
involuntary civil commitment statutes shall consider “[p]rior determinations of
incompetency under chapter 10.77 RCW.” But Godfrey has not challenged the
trial court’s prior determinations of incompetency in this appeal. Instead, he
challenges the adequacy of the trial court’s “findings” to order a third competency
restoration.
Further, RCW 71.05.212(a) provides that a professional conducting an
evaluation under the involuntary civil commitment statutes shall consider “[p]rior
recommendations for evaluation of the need for civil commitments when the
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80625-4-I ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) MICAH JAMES GODFREY, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) )
VERELLEN, J. — Micah Godfrey challenges the trial court’s check-the-box
findings supporting a third competency restoration in accordance with
RCW 10.77.086(4). An appeal is moot if this court may not provide effective relief.
Here, Godfrey did not seek a stay of the court’s decision to order a third
competency restoration, and his competency has been restored. As a result, this
appeal is moot because no effective relief is available. Godfrey does not establish
any collateral consequences resulting from the third competency restoration order,
and the public interest exception does not apply because there is little likelihood
that reaching the merits would provide future guidance.
Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
FACTS
Micah Godfrey was charged with five counts of second degree assault with
a deadly weapon enhancement on each count. In January 2019, the trial court No. 80625-4-I/2
found Godfrey incompetent to stand trial and committed him to Eastern State
Hospital for a 90-day restoration period.
At the end of the restoration period, Dr. Amy Sellers evaluated him. Dr.
Sellers diagnosed Godfrey with delusional disorder and concluded he was
incompetent because he continued to “exhibit paranoid delusions.”1 As a result,
she recommended a second 90-day restoration period, which the trial court
ordered.
At the end of Godfrey’s second restoration period, Dr. Sellers evaluated
Godfrey again and diagnosed him with schizophrenia. Dr. Sellers reported that
Godfrey’s auditory hallucinations were partially managed by his medications. But
she noted his paranoid delusions, “where he believes people are out to get him,”
are fixed.2 As a result, Dr. Sellers concluded that Godfrey remained incompetent
to stand trial and further efforts to restore competency were not likely to be
successful.
On October 9, 2019, the trial court conducted Godfrey’s third competency
hearing. The trial court concluded that Godfrey’s “ongoing delusions” made him
incompetent, and the court committed him for a third restoration period of 180-
days.3 The court reasoned his delusions had improved over time and continued
improvement was “quite possible.”4
1 Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 35. 2 Ex. 1. 3 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 9, 2019) at 50-58. 4 Id. at 55.
2 No. 80625-4-I/3
After the court’s ruling, the prosecutor asked the court to find that Godfrey
“is a substantial danger to other person[s] or presents a substantial likelihood of
committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security and that there’s a
substantial probability he’ll regain competency within a reasonable time.”5 The
trial court responded “Yes,” and signed an order prepared by the prosecutor. The
order included a check-the-box finding that “a third restoration period is
appropriate under RCW 10.77.086.”6
Godfrey appeals the court’s decision to order a third competency
restoration. At oral argument before this court, the prosecutor confirmed that
Godfrey’s third restoration period was successful, he was found competent, and is
currently awaiting trial.
ANALYSIS
Godfrey contends that the trial court’s “findings” were insufficient to order a
third competency restoration. Even assuming Godfrey is correct, we conclude this
appeal is moot.
“When we can no longer provide effective relief, an appeal is moot.”7 And
“‘[a]s a general rule, this court will not review a moot case.””8
Godfrey did not seek a stay of the third competency restoration order
pending appeal. He finished his third restoration period during the pendency of
5 Id. at 58. 6 CP at 44. 7 Matter of Dependency of T.P., 12 Wn. App. 2d 538, 544, 458 P.3d 825 (2020) (citing In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93 P.3d 124 (2004)). 8 Id. at 545 (quoting Horner, 151 Wn.2d at 891).
3 No. 80625-4-I/4
this appeal and has been found competent to stand trial. Godfrey cites no
authority supporting the proposition that in the absence of a stay, he is entitled to
relief from the court’s current determination that his competency to stand trial has
been restored. Because we cannot provide effective relief on the issue before us,
Godfrey’s appeal is moot.
Godfrey contends we should reach the merits of his appeal because
exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply here. We disagree.
Specifically, he argues this appeal is not moot because there are collateral
consequences to the order committing him to a third restoration period. An appeal
is not moot where the decision appealed can have collateral consequences.9
Godfrey relies upon In re Detention of M.K., where the court held an appeal
of an involuntary civil commitment order is not moot even if the period of
commitment has expired.10 The court explained RCW 71.05.245 allows a court in
a future involuntary civil commitment proceeding to consider recent prior civil
commitments.11 Because “each order of commitment entered up to three years
before the current commitment hearing becomes a part of the evidence against a
person seeking denial of a petition for commitment,” the civil commitment order
was not moot.12 But unlike the detainee in M.K., Godfrey fails to show any true
collateral consequences resulting from the third competency restoration order.
9 In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 625-26, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). 10 168 Wn. App. 621, 629-30, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). 11 Id. at 626. 12 Id.
4 No. 80625-4-I/5
At oral argument before this court, Godfrey asserted collateral
consequences based upon RCW 71.05.212, where the legislature acknowledges
previous efforts to restore competency in a criminal case, chapter 10.77 RCW, can
be considered in an involuntary civil commitment. Specifically, he notes that
RCW 71.05.212(1)(c) provides a professional conducting an evaluation under the
involuntary civil commitment statutes shall consider “[p]rior determinations of
incompetency under chapter 10.77 RCW.” But Godfrey has not challenged the
trial court’s prior determinations of incompetency in this appeal. Instead, he
challenges the adequacy of the trial court’s “findings” to order a third competency
restoration.
Further, RCW 71.05.212(a) provides that a professional conducting an
evaluation under the involuntary civil commitment statutes shall consider “[p]rior
recommendations for evaluation of the need for civil commitments when the
recommendation is made pursuant to an evaluation conducted under 10.77
RCW.”13 Therefore, the evaluator’s recommendations would be properly before
the court whether or not the court ordered a third competency restoration.14 And
RCW 71.05.212(1)(a) undercuts any suggestion that a court’s order of a third
competency restoration under chapter 10.77 RCW would have any consequence
for a future involuntary civil commitment proceeding.
Therefore, neither RCW 71.05.212(1)(c) nor (1)(a) support a collateral
consequence exception to the mootness of Godfrey’s appeal.
13 (Emphasis added.) 14 RCW 71.05.212(1).
5 No. 80625-4-I/6
Godfrey also invokes the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
Even though Godfrey’s case is moot, “we may nevertheless decide [a case] if [it]
involve[s] matters of continuing and substantial public interest.”15 Courts weigh
five considerations when evaluating the public interest exception, including
“‘whether an authoritative determination is desirable to provide future guidance to
public officers.’”16 But the core question of the sufficiency of the “findings” turns
largely on the trial court’s use of conclusory check-the-box findings in a mental
health proceeding. And there is ample authority rejecting such “findings” in mental
health settings.17 Thus, there are minimal, if any, prospects for future guidance
arising out of yet another challenge to check-the-box findings. We are not
persuaded we should reach the merits in this context.
15 In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Eyman v. Ferguson, 7 Wn. App. 2d 312, 320, 433 P.3d 863 (2019); Cox v. Kroger Co., 2 Wn. App. 2d 395, 408, 409 P.3d 1191 (2018). 16 In re Det. of H.N., 188 Wn. App. 744, 749-50, 355 P.3d 294 (2015) (“In deciding whether a case presents issues of continuing and substantial public interest three factors are determinative: ‘(1) whether the issue is of a public or private nature; (2) whether an authoritative determination is desirable to provide future guidance to public officers; and (3) whether the issue is likely to recur.’ A fourth factor that ‘may also play a role’ is ‘the level of genuine adverseness and the quality of advocacy of the issues.’ Finally, the court may consider ‘the likelihood that the issue will escape review because the facts of the controversy are short-lived.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 286-87, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994)). 17 E.g., LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 219-20 (holding that “findings” entered on “preprinted standardized form[s]” that only recite “generally the statutory grounds for involuntary commitment” are not sufficient); Matter of Det. of G.D., 11 Wn. App. 2d 67, 70, 450 P.3d 668 (2019) (holding that in mental health settings the court’s “findings” must be “sufficiently specific to permit meaningful [appellate] review” and they must “indicate the factual bases for the court’s conclusion.”) (citing id. at 218- 19).
6 No. 80625-4-I/7
The relief Godfrey seeks is reversal and remand “for vacation of the
commitment order and dismissal of Mr. Godfrey’s charges.”18 Godfrey fails to
show how this remedy is appropriate for inadequate competency restoration
“findings.” Because the third restoration period has restored his competency and
he is currently awaiting trial, the typical remedy of remanding for entry of “findings”
regarding the court’s previous order will not provide effective relief. No exceptions
to the mootness doctrine apply.
WE CONCUR:
18 Appellant’s Br. at 30.