State Of Washington, V. Mathew D. Tran

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 21, 2025
• Docket: 87071-8
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE Respondent, No. 87071-8-I v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION MATHEW D. TRAN,

Appellant.

PER CURIAM — Mathew Tran appeals from the judgment entered on a

jury’s verdict finding him guilty of one count of unlawful possession of a controlled

substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver and one count of unlawful

manufacture of a controlled substance (marijuana) within 1,000 feet of a school

bus route stop. He contends that the trial court wrongly deprived him of the right

to self-representation guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Washington

constitution by denying his request to represent himself. We conclude that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request after determining

that Tran did not appreciate the consequences of the charges or the

proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm. No. 87071-8-I/2

I.

Tran and several co-conspirators were arrested and charged by

information with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with

intent to deliver and one count of unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance

in connection with a large marijuana propagation operation. The State

subsequently amended the information to include a special allegation that the

unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance was within 1,000 feet of a school

bus route stop.

Counsel was appointed to represent Tran. However, early in the case,

Tran filed a motion with the court requesting permission to proceed pro se. The

motion read: “i Matt, a living and spirited man of flesh and blood, the grantor and

administrator of the defendant MATHEW DOUGLAS TRAN, hereby motion to

proceed pro se.” Tran signed the motion with his name followed by the words

and phrases, “without recourse,” “all rights reserved,” “U.S.C. 1-308,” “without

prejudice,” “U.C.C. 18,” and “sec. 1342/241/242.”

During an early case management hearing, the trial court entertained

Tran’s motion to represent himself as well as a motion to withdraw that had been

filed by his appointed counsel. The trial court first considered counsel’s motion to

withdraw. Tran’s attorney informed the court that “there is really a complete and

utter breakdown in the communication between myself and Mr. Tran.” According

to counsel, she had explained to Tran that any motions would need to be made

through her, and while he expressed that he understood, Tran persisted in filing

motions on his own. She stated, “I feel Mr. Tran is either unable or unwilling to

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listen to any of my advice or direction, and I believe he is, as I have presented to

him, is harming his case with actions on his own that I’m not able to help curtail in

any way.” When the trial court inquired as to whether counsel believed that a

change of attorney would result in any improvement, Tran’s attorney replied,

“based on my interaction and lack thereof with Mr. Tran, I don’t believe there is

going to be an improvement, if there is another attorney.” She believed the issue

was not personal to her but was, instead, the result of “a position Mr. Tran has

taken that is incompatible with outside attorney legal advice.”

The trial court then initiated a conversation with Tran concerning his

attorney’s motion to withdraw. Tran began by stating, “Your Honor, I

conditionally accept you to call me Mr. Tran as long as you calling me Mr. Tran

will reserve my full reservation of all of my unalienable rights.” He further stated:

Your Honor, if you are saying that this case has to do with I, then I don’t need anyone to represent myself or I, the defendant, or the defendant Mr. Tran. This has nothing to do with the attorney, with me going pro se. As mentioned before, I would like to speak to the Court in person as a living man and for the Court to hear my voice. So that is the reason for me going to pro se, so I can address the Court.

The trial court explained to Tran that it was only considering counsel’s motion to

withdraw at that time and asked if “there would be an improvement in your case

and your defense and your proceedings before this Court” if his counsel were to

withdraw and another attorney were to be appointed. Tran responded, “[i]f

another attorney is to be appointed to my case to represent me, I do not believe

that anything would change for, like I stated, I cannot be represented. I would

not mind a standby counsel, but to be represented is not something that I would

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agree with.” The trial court determined that the conflict between Tran and his

counsel was not personal and that appointment of new counsel would not make

a difference and, therefore, denied the motion to withdraw.

After denying counsel’s motion to withdraw, the trial court then turned to

Tran’s motion to represent himself. When asked to address the motion, Tran

stated:

Your Honor addressing the matter of the defendant going pro se, I, Matt, a sovereign, natural, living, spirited man understand that I, Matt, have inalienable God-given rights. This is the reason for me going to pro se, because I do not feel I’m subjected or bound to statutes or codes that go against the constitutional rights of the living man. I would like to also address the breaches and violations of the Washington state Constitution of 1899 [sic] and I, Matt’s, inalienable rights. For being detained, robbed of property of sweat before any proof of claim was provided, Article 1 § 3 of the Washington Constitution. Art. 1 § 7, I have yet to see any true document supported by oath or affirmation giving any public servant jurisdiction over I.

After a brief pause, Tran continued, “[t]he matter of me going pro se is mainly for

me to represent myself and not be represented by another attorney or public

servant. I wish to represent myself and I, the defendant. That’s all I have to

say.”

The trial court then entered into a colloquy with Tran, first asking whether

he understood that there were expectations regarding behavior in the courtroom,

“including speaking only on the record at the lectern, not from the back of the

courtroom.” When asked if he would abide by that requirement, Tran responded,

“I conditionally accept as long as I have the full reservation of my rights upon

entering the court and entering up to the lectern to be on the record.” The trial

4 No. 87071-8-I/5

court then made two attempts to clarify whether Tran would agree to speak only

from the lectern, and received the same response both times. The trial court

then asked, “[s]o you won’t answer that yes or no?” to which Tran replied, “I will

not answer that unless you accept my condition.”

The trial court next inquired as to whether Tran was familiar with the

charges against him. Tran replied that he was not familiar with them and did not

understand the charges. Tran stated, “I have not seen any of the original

documents. So I cannot . . . describe any of those charges to you.” Tran further

stated that he was unaware of the potential sentences he could face if convicted.

In response to additional inquiries from the trial court, Tran admitted that he did

not understand the rules of evidence, the criminal court rules, the limitations on

questioning witnesses, and how the trial would proceed. When asked why he

wanted to represent himself, Tran answered:

Being represented by an attorney, it restricts my right to speak, so that removes my freedom of speech, and I was advised that if I would like to speak in court, that I would have to go pro se to represent myself, which is the reason for going pro se.

Tran informed the court that he was willing to learn the rules and that he would

agree to standby counsel to “learn from or to counsel with.”

After the exchange between the court and Tran, defense counsel

explained that she had met with Tran and had reviewed the charging document,

the initial police reports, and the possible penalties facing Tran. The State

expressed concern that Tran believed that, if he represented himself, “then his

freedom to speak or address things to the Court or the jury would not be limited.”

5 No. 87071-8-I/6

Tran responded, “I only wish to address the Court to be able to speak freely upon

myself but not to interrupt the Court and not to be in dishonor, just to cooperate

with the Court to help settle this matter and resolve.”

The trial court denied Tran’s motion to proceed pro se. In its oral ruling,

the trial court explained:

[B]ased upon his answers to my questions, it appears to me quite clearly that he does not have a full understanding of the charges against him, not that they haven’t been explained to him. I know that they have and that has been represented, but there is some sort of lack of understanding there, but, more importantly, he does not appreciate the consequences to him of these charges and of this proceeding, including a potential trial.

The trial court also stated that it was concerned “that Mr. Tran has not shown that

familiarity with the rules, statutes, and procedures that apply such that he can

represent himself well, and it appears to me that he does require an attorney to

represent him in order for this matter to go forward.” In its subsequent written

ruling, the trial court explained that, “[t]he defendant’s lack of familiarity with the

statutes, court rules, and rules of evidence also cause the court concern,

especially in light of his stated lack of understanding of his charges and the

consequences of conviction.”

A jury convicted Tran as charged. He was sentenced pursuant to RCW

9.94A.650, the first-time offender waiver statute, to 90 days of incarceration and

six months of community custody.

Tran timely appeals.

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II.

The trial court denied what Tran characterizes as an unequivocal and

timely motion to proceed pro se. The trial court did so after finding that Tran

lacked sufficient familiarity with the applicable rules, statutes, and procedures

that would govern the trial and that he lacked an understanding of the charges

against him and the potential consequences of conviction. Tran claims that the

trial court erred by so doing. We disagree.

Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution provides criminal

defendants with the explicit right to self-representation. State v. Madsen, 168

Wn.2d 496, 503, 229 P.3d 714 (2010). However, “[t]he right to proceed pro se is

neither absolute nor self-executing.” Id. at 504. The defendant must invoke the

right to self-representation with an unequivocal and timely demand to waive

counsel and proceed pro se. Id. If the request is unequivocal and timely, the trial

court must then conduct a colloquy to determine whether the request is

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. The colloquy should generally include a

discussion of the charges against the defendant, the maximum penalty the

defendant faces, and the fact that the defendant will be required to adhere to the

technical and procedural rules of the court. State v. Burns, 193 Wn.2d 190, 203,

438 P.3d 1183 (2019). The court may consider additional, nonexhaustive factors

such as the defendant’s education, experience with the justice system, mental

health, and competency. Id. “The trial court may also look to the defendant’s

behavior, intonation, and willingness to cooperate with the court.” Id.

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When evaluating a motion to proceed pro se, courts are required to

“indulge in ‘every reasonable presumption’ against a defendant’s waiver of his or

her right to counsel.” Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 504 (internal quotations omitted)

(quoting In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379, 396, 986 P.2d 790 (1999)).

However, even in light of the presumption against the waiver of counsel, a trial

court may only deny a request to proceed pro se if the request is “equivocal,

untimely, involuntary, or made without a general understanding of the

consequences.” Id. at 505. “A court may not deny a motion for self-

representation based on grounds that self-representation would be detrimental to

the defendant’s ability to present [their] case or concerns that courtroom

proceedings will be less efficient and orderly than if the defendant were

represented by counsel.” Id.

We review a trial court’s decision on a defendant’s request to proceed pro

se for abuse of discretion. Burns, 193 Wn.2d at 202. “A trial court abuses its

discretion if the decision is manifestly unreasonable such that no reasonable

mind could come to that decision, if the decision is not supported by the facts, or

if the judge applied an incorrect legal standard.” Id. “We give great deference to

the trial court’s discretion because the trial court is in a favorable position to the

appellate courts in evaluating a request to proceed pro se.” Id. As noted by our

Supreme Court, trial judges have more experience in evaluating such requests

and have the benefit of observing the behavior, intonation, and characteristics of

the defendant during the request. Id. at 203. “So long as a trial court conducted

an adequate inquiry into a defendant’s request and there is a factual basis for the

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court’s finding that the waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary, the trial court’s discretionary decision will not be disturbed on appeal.

Id. at 204.

Here, the parties do not dispute that Tran’s request to represent himself

was timely and unequivocal. Rather, Tran contends that the trial court improperly

denied the request because he did not understand the nature of the charges

against him when the court should have informed him of that information during

the colloquy and because he was not familiar with court rules and procedures.

However, as the trial court noted, the charges had been explained to Tran. The

court’s concern stemmed from Tran’s lack of general understanding and

appreciation of the consequences. Burns is instructive on this issue.

In Burns, the trial court conducted a comprehensive colloquy in

consideration of the defendant’s motion to represent himself. Id. Burns informed

the court, “‘I completely understand everything that I’m up against,’” but the

colloquy demonstrated otherwise. Id. Among his statements, Burns indicated to

the trial court that the charges did not pertain to him, that he did not enter into a

contract with the State, that the United States is a corporation of which he is not

a citizen, and that he rejected any contract that created the case against him. Id.

The trial court denied the motion to proceed pro se, finding that Burns did not

understand “‘the nature of the charges and the seriousness of the situation.’” Id.

at 198. On review, our Supreme Court concluded that the colloquy, “was

extensive and comprehensive and supports the conclusion that Burns did not

understand the nature or seriousness of the charges against him.” Id. at 205.

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Tran made similar statements during his colloquy with the trial court

below. He referred to himself as “I, Matt, a sovereign, natural, living, spirited

man,” and said that he had “inalienable God-given rights.” Tran only

“conditionally” agreed to abide by the court’s basic requirement of speaking only

from the lectern “as long as I have the full reservation of my rights.” He refused

to agree unless the trial court accepted his “condition.” And concerningly, Tran

explained that he wanted to represent himself “because I do not feel I’m

subjected or bound to statutes or codes that go against the constitutional rights of

the living man.” Tran also believed that representation by counsel would restrict

his freedom of speech and that by representing himself he could “address the

Court to be able to speak freely upon myself.”

Tran contends that the trial court should have explained the charges and

should not have focused on his lack of understanding of the technical and

procedural aspects of a trial. However, these arguments ignore that Tran’s

answers during the colloquy demonstrated more than a mere lack of knowledge

about the details of both the charges against him and trial procedures. Instead,

Tran’s statements establish that he held misunderstandings about the legal

system in general which provides a factual basis for the trial court’s finding that

Tran lacked an understanding of the charges and proceedings. These

statements, as in Burns, “are not consistent with a defendant who understands

the nature and seriousness of the charges against him.” Id. at 206. Accordingly,

Tran could not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. The trial

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court’s denial of Tran’s motion to represent himself was not an abuse of

discretion.

Affirmed.

For the Court: