FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40304-1-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) MASON TYLER PILLING, ) ) Appellant. )
MURPHY, J. — A jury found Mason Pilling guilty of second degree attempted rape
of a child and communication with a minor for immoral purposes. Pilling was sentenced
to 84 months to life imprisonment, to be followed by 36 months of community custody.
He was also assessed multiple community custody conditions.
Pilling appeals from his judgment and sentence, alleging (1) his convictions
violate double jeopardy, and (2) one of his community custody conditions is not
sufficiently crime related and should be stricken.
We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Background of facts as testified to at trial
In August 2022, the Washington State Patrol Missing and Exploited Children Task No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
Force 1 was conducting a “Net Nanny” operation in Moses Lake, Washington.
2 Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Dec. 7, 2023) at 347. The task force had created a profile
on “the Grindr application” with the name “Darrin.” 2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 283.
“Grindr is an application . . . used for hookups in the LGBTQ [lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, or queer] community, specifically male hookups.” 2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023)
at 281. Conversations between Mason Pilling and “Darrin” occurred on Grindr,
as well as another messaging platform called ”Kik,” in addition to text messaging.
2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 297-98.
Detective sergeant Jake Klein of the Washington State Patrol, who was
communicating as the fictitious 13-year-old boy, “Darrin,” testified at trial that Pilling
engaged in lengthy sexually explicit conversations with “Darrin,” despite “Darrin”
telling Pilling he was “13 [years old] but mature.” 2 2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 302.
Their conversations resulted in Pilling arranging to meet “Darrin” for sex:
1 This task force “spearheads multi-agency operations, including federal, state, and local law enforcement, aimed at finding and recovering sexually exploited children and apprehending child predators.” WASH. STATE PATROL, MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD. TASK FORCE, https://wsp.wa.gov/crime/mectf/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2026); see also RCW 13.60.100-.110. 2 The name “Darrin” was used initially on Grindr. Later, the task force used the name “Jake” on a different application. See 2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 308. Although the names were different, Pilling treated each persona as the same individual. For readability purposes, we refer to the personas collectively as “Darrin.”
2 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
“PILLING: How are you man? If you're on or near the base we should totally kick it sometime. “KLEIN: Dude I’m lookin 4 rn lol. “PILLING: Ahh okay, you hosting? “KLEIN: Ya. “PILLING: Oh nice, I could probably walk over. “KLEIN: Cool dude. “U cool that im young? “PILLING: Yeah that’s cool. Love younger (with a wink, tongue out emoji) how young? “KLEIN: 13 but mature and discrete. “PILLING: Ahh cool. I’d be down just delete that message. “KLEIN: Ya dude. “Wanna txt?
2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 302. Following their messaging exchanges, Pilling sent sexually
explicit photos and described his anatomy, with each conversation remaining sexual in
nature. “Darrin” asked Pilling when he could meet, with Pilling responding, “I can come
over [right now] if you want. ‘Get this hole owned by a young twink.” 2 RP (Dec. 7,
2023) at 309. In anticipation of the meeting, Pilling told “Darrin” he was “freshly lubed
with Vaseline so you can just shove it in no matter how big.” 2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at
311-12.
As initially arranged between the two, Pilling first went to a gas station. Pilling
was then asked by “Darrin” to meet him down the road across from a middle school.
When Pilling arrived at the location across from the school, he was arrested. Klein
testified that the task force uses multiple locations for meetings because a second location
3 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
provides an opportunity for the perpetrator to change their mind about following through
with the meeting and it also gives the task force more opportunity for surveillance. Klein
noted that some people will “chat and talk about and fantasize about stuff,” while not
taking a substantial step toward committing the act. 2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 322.
Another member of the task force, Grant County Sheriff’s Office Detective Jacob
Fisher, testified that after Pilling was arrested, he collected the shorts Pilling was
wearing, with Fisher photographing “what appeared to be a greasy spot . . . around the
center of the buttocks area.” 4 RP (Dec. 8, 2023) at 430-31.
Pilling testified during his case-in-chief. On direct examination, he told the jury
that he did not believe that “Darrin” was actually a 13-year-old boy. When shown photos
of “Darrin” utilized by the task force, Pilling said “Darrin” was “most likely 15, but
possibly 16 or 17, maybe 18.” 4 RP (Dec. 11, 2023) at 484. On cross-examination, Pilling
asserted that he did not pre-lube his anus for “Darrin,” but rather a different person he
was going to meet prior to “Darrin.”
A jury found Pilling guilty of attempted rape of a child in the second degree and
communication with a minor for immoral purposes. The trial court subsequently
sentenced Pilling to a concurrent term of imprisonment of 84 months to life on the second
degree attempted rape of a child conviction and 12 months on the communication with a
minor for immoral purposes conviction, to be followed by a 36-month term of
4 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
community custody. The trial court also imposed multiple community custody
conditions.
Pilling now appeals.
ANALYSIS
1. Pilling’s convictions for attempted second degree rape of a child and communication with a minor for immoral purposes do not violate double jeopardy
Pilling argues his convictions for attempted second degree rape of a child and
communication with a minor for immoral purposes violate double jeopardy because the
State relied on the same evidence, the electronic messages between Pilling and “Darrin,”
to prove Pilling both took a substantial step on the attempted rape of a child charge and
communicated with a minor for immoral purposes. Pilling asserts that “as proven, these
offenses are the same in law and fact.” Br. of Appellant at 2.
Pilling did not raise the double jeopardy argument with the trial court, but a
constitutional challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Adel, 136
Wn.2d 629, 631-32, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998).
The principle of double jeopardy is that “[n]o person shall . . . be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in double jeopardy.”).
“Double jeopardy is violated if, but only if, both convictions punish the same offense.”
5 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
State v. Ray, 5 Wn.3d 350, 362, 575 P.3d 321 (2025). Washington applies the “‘same
evidence’ rule,” 3 to ascertain whether each offense includes an element not included in
the other and requires proof of a fact the other does not. State v. Bell, 26 Wn. App. 2d
821, 839, 529 P.3d 448 (2023). When a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses based
on the same act or transaction, “we must determine whether [the] convictions . . . both
punish the same offense or, instead, punish two different offenses.” Ray, 5 Wn.3d at 362.
When multiple convictions arise from different statutory provisions, a defendant
has the burden to establish the convictions are identical in fact and in law in the context
of a four-part double jeopardy analysis. Ray, 5 Wn.3d at 362-65. “If they are not the
same, we must presume separate punishment for [the] convictions are authorized, absent
‘a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.’” Id. at 365 (quoting State v. Calle, 125
Wn.2d 769, 778, 888 P.2d 155 (1995)). Factual overlap alone does not trigger double
jeopardy. See id. at 368.
The statutes applicable to Pilling’s convictions are not explicit as to the
legislature’s intent to authorize cumulative punishment for attempted rape of a child
in the second degree and communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. See
RCW 9A.44.076; RCW 9A.28.020; RCW 9.68A.090, .001. Absent clear legislative intent
3 “The ‘same evidence’ rule is sometimes referred to as the ‘same elements’ test.’” State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d 643, 652, 160 P.3d 40 (2007).
6 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
to the contrary, we apply the Blockburger 4 test, which focuses on the statutory elements
of the offenses charged, not the evidence presented at trial. Ray, 5 Wn.3d at 368 (citing
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 n.12, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 109 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1990),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S. Ct. 2894, 125
L. Ed. 2d 556 (1993) (partial plurality opinion). “This focus on the statutory elements of
each offense is necessary because the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit multiple
punishments based on the same conduct or the same evidence. Instead, . . . the double
jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id.
Pilling contends his communications with “Darrin” formed the factual basis for
both convictions but argues the “substantial step” element of attempt was proven solely
through the same sexually explicit messages that established proof for the communication
offense.
Attempted rape of a child in the second degree requires proof that the defendant
(1) intended to commit rape of a child in the second degree, and (2) took a substantial
step toward that goal. RCW 9A.44.076(1); RCW 9A.28.020(1). A substantial step is
an action that is strongly corroborative of the defendant’s criminal purpose. State v.
Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 899, 270 P.3d 591 (2012). “Mere preparation to commit a
crime is not an attempt.” State v. Wilson, 1 Wn. App. 2d 73, 83, 404 P.3d 76 (2017).
4 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). 7 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
In online sting cases, traveling to an arranged meeting place constitutes a substantial step.
See State v. Wilson, 158 Wn. App. 305, 317-18, 242 P.3d 19 (2010); State v. Sivins,
138 Wn. App. 52, 64, 155 P.3d 982 (2007).
In contrast, communication with a minor for immoral purposes criminalizes
knowingly communicating with a minor, or someone the defendant believed to be a
minor, for the sexual exploitation or abuse of the minor. RCW 9.68A.090(2), .001.
The statute’s focus is on the communicative act itself, as it is intended to prohibit
“communication with children for the predatory purpose of promoting their exposure
to and involvement in sexual misconduct.” State v. McNallie, 120 Wn.2d 925, 933,
846 P.2d 1358 (1993).
Each statute here demands proof that the other does not. Attempted second degree
rape of a child requires specific intent to achieve sexual intercourse plus a substantial step
toward commission of that crime. In closing argument, the State reviewed for the jury the
evidence it believed supported a finding that Pilling took a substantial step to commit
rape of a child: (1) Pilling’s communication with a fictitious 13-year-old and his inquiry
of whether “Darrin” would be “hosting,” i.e. welcoming, (2) sending explicit
photographs, (3) applying lubrication, (4) getting in his car and driving to the first agreed
upon location, and (5) then driving to a second agreed upon location. This evidence is not
necessary to achieve a conviction for communication with a minor for immoral purposes.
8 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
Conversely, the communication charge demands proof of a minor’s involvement in the
conversation, and a communication medium. Neither one of these elements are essential
to the attempted rape charge. The evidentiary overlap in Pilling’s messaging does not
alter this. Blockburger turns on statutory elements, not facts produced at trial. See Ray,
5 Wn.3d at 368 (Evidence may overlap without rendering offenses identical in law.)
With offenses that are distinct under the Blockburger test, a presumption of
legislative authorization attaches. Ray, 5 Wn.3d at 367-68. Pilling offers no evidence
of contrary intent. RCW 9.68A.090 was enacted to deter predatory grooming of a
minor independent of any ultimate offense. See McNallie, 120 Wn.2d at 933.
RCW 9A.28.020(1) permits punishment of anticipatory offenses of any Washington
crime, in this case rape of a child, which is a harm beyond communicating with a minor
for immoral purposes. The offenses are neither the same in fact nor in law. Cumulative
punishment aligns with legislature intent. Pilling’s two convictions do not violate double
jeopardy.
Citing to State v. Weber, 159 Wn.2d 252, 269, 149 P.3d 646 (2006), Pilling
also contends that because his conviction for communication with a minor for immoral
purposes “carries a seriousness level of three, and a much shorter standard range
sentence, it is a lesser offense and must be dismissed.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 22.
We disagree. The trial court correctly treated Pilling’s two convictions as separate
9 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
criminal conduct. Pilling’s communicative intent to solicit a discussion of a sexual nature
with “Darrin” evolved into the distinct and separate purpose of physical consummation of
what was being discussed.
2. The condition prohibiting Pilling from accessing or having accounts related to online dating applications is sufficiently crime-related
Pilling argues the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed discretionary
community custody condition 14. At sentencing, the trial court edited the State’s
proposed condition 14, with the ordered condition reading: “The defendant shall not
access or have active accounts relating to on-line dating applications or hookup sites.” 5
CP at 369; see also 1 RP (Mar. 12, 2024) at 25.
Pilling argues this “imposed a blanket restriction on Mr. Pilling’s ability to access
dating applications. The condition is not limited to communicating with a minor. This
condition must be sensitively imposed because it affects Mr. Pilling’s freedom of
association.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 2. To support his contention, Pilling argues that
his “use of Grindr was mostly appropriate” and argues “it was law enforcement who
improperly used that application when it posed as a 13-year-old.” Appellant’s Opening
5 The condition as proposed by the State read, “The defendant shall not access or have any active social media accounts including but not limited to Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, chat rooms, or on-line dating applications.” CP at 303. The court explained to the parties that it edited the condition to make it “much more specific to the allegations in this case.” 1 RP (Mar. 12, 2024) at 25.
10 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
Br. at 28. Pilling further argues that the statutes applicable to Pilling’s convictions “deal
with the inappropriate language and conduct involving minors, not a misuse of a dating
application.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 28.
We review community custody conditions for abuse of discretion and will disturb
a condition only if it is manifestly unreasonable. State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677,
416 P.3d 712 (2018).
A sentencing court has discretion to impose “crime-related prohibitions” that
directly relate to the circumstances of the offense. RCW 9.94A.505(9),.703(3)(f).
A prohibition is crime-related if “it is reasonably related to the crime, the offender’s
risk of reoffense, and the protection of public safety.” In re Pers. Restraint of Winton,
196 Wn.2d 270, 278, 474 P.3d 532 (2020). Conditions that interfere with a fundamental
right “must be ‘sensitively imposed’” and narrowly drawn “so that they are ‘reasonably
necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the State and public order.’” In re Pers.
Restraint of Rainey, 168 Wn.2d 267, 374, 229 P.3d 686 (2010) (quoting State v. Warren,
165 Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).
Here, Pilling initiated contact on Grindr, a geosocial dating and hookup
application, with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old boy. Over more than
one messaging platform Pilling sent sexually explicit images and messages, arranged
an in-person sexual encounter, and traveled to the designated location while texting that
11 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
he was “freshly lubed” for the meet up. 2 RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 311-12. The facts are that
Pilling’s offense was entirely facilitated by the use of online dating/hookup applications,
and text messaging. Prohibiting Pilling from accessing or maintaining active profiles on
such platforms directly addresses the mechanism of his crime and reduces the risk of
reoffense by eliminating the digital gateway Pilling exploited.
Here, the condition is confined to the specific category of applications Pilling
weaponized—dating and hookup sites—leaving him free to use the internet for
employment, education, banking, and countless other lawful purposes. When a conviction
involves sexual activities with a minor, restricting the offender’s opportunity to contact
minors is both related to the crime and reasonable for the protection of the public. State v.
Julian, 102 Wn. App. 296, 306, 9 P.3d 851 (2000).
Pilling’s associational arguments are unavailing. The First Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects a person’s freedom of association, including intimate
association, but these rights may be limited when sensitively imposed and when
reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the State. See State v.
Frederick, 20 Wn. App. 2d 890, 909-10, 506 P.3d 690 (2022). Community custody
condition 14 does not bar Pilling from dating or associating with consenting adults;
it merely requires him to do so through means other than the location-based platforms
12 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
he abused. Any incidental burden to Pilling is outweighed by the State’s compelling
interest in preventing contact with minors.
Finally, Pilling’s request to strike the condition is unwarranted. The sentencing
court retains authority to clarify or narrow conditions if monitoring reveals practical
difficulties. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 135-36, 942 P.2d 363 (1997).
3. Statement of additional grounds for review (SAG)
Pilling asserts four additional grounds for review, arguing that: (1) he was
deprived of his right to trial by an impartial jury, (2) the guilty verdict was reached
because of the prosecutor’s inflammatory statements and inherent juror biases regardless
of the entrapment defense being proved beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) misleading
evidence was shown at trial relative to the “oily stain” on Pilling’s shorts, SAG at 7-8,
and (4) his Fifth and Six Amendment rights were violated.
3.1 Impartial jury
Pilling claims that of the twelve seated jurors, six of those stated they had close
friends or family members who work in law enforcement, and one juror indicated they
had a close friend or family member who had been affected by a crime similar to the
crime for which he was being prosecuted.
It is true that some jurors during voir dire stated they have a close friend or family
member who was employed by or volunteered for law enforcement agencies. The trial
13 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
court asked those jurors if the relationships would unduly influence their consideration of
Pilling’s case, or if they would be more likely to give credibility to an officer’s testimony
solely because the witness was an officer. The jurors who indicated they may be
influenced by their relationships were removed for cause. It is also true that several jurors
indicated they had personal involvement in a case or incident involving communication
with a minor for immoral purposes or allegations of rape of a child. Again, the trial court
discussed these issues with the jurors and removed potentially biased jurors for cause.
We can discern no error in the trial court’s empaneling of the jury.
Within this additional ground, Pilling also argues that the prosecution appealed
to the emotions of the jury, which led to juror bias. The defendant bears the burden of
proving the prosecution’s conduct was both improper and prejudicial. State v. Fisher,
165 Wn.2d 727, 747, 202 P.3d 937 (2009). The “failure to object to an improper remark
constitutes a waiver of error unless the remark is so flagrant and ill intentioned that
it causes an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by
an admonition to the jury.” State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994).
No objection was made at trial to the comments attributed to the prosecutor by Pilling,
and he fails to establish prejudice on review.
14 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
3.2 Entrapment defense
Pilling argues jury bias was obvious because it reached a guilty verdict despite
defense counsel proving entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the jury was
instructed on Pilling’s entrapment defense. As held in Pilling’s first additional ground for
review, there was no indication of jury bias. As the sole judges of credibility, the jury was
not persuaded by the entrapment defense.
3.3 Misleading evidence
Pilling argues that the State presented misleading evidence when Grant County
Sheriff’s Office Detective Jacob Fisher presented the shorts Pilling was wearing on the
night of his arrest and claimed that although the officer testified there was an oily stain on
his shorts, at trial an oily stain could not be seen. Pilling additionally cites that there was
no testing of the shorts to verify the stain was Vaseline. At trial, officers testified they
observed an oily spot on Pilling’s shorts. With this observation, they photographed the
shorts and took them as evidence. In his testimony, Pilling admitted to using lubrication,
but claimed this was done earlier on the same day of his arrest. Whether or not the stain
was present at the time of trial, the evidence was not misleading. If a stain was not
present at trial, then this was arguably favorable to Pilling’s defense, making the officer’s
testimony appear less credible.
15 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
3.4 Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
Pilling argues law enforcement violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
when “aggressively extracting a statement” from him on the night of his arrest. SAG
at 8-9. He claims that although the trial court suppressed his statements, his right to
effective counsel was violated because his attorney should have argued the case should
not have gone to trial. To be entitled to relief, Pilling must show both that (1) defense
counsel’s representation was deficient and (2) the deficient representation was
prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984). If one prong of the Strickland test fails, then this court need not address the
remaining prong. State v. Crow, 8 Wn. App. 2d 480, 507, 438 P.3d 541 (2019).
Representation is deficient if, after considering all the circumstances, it falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260
(2011).
Prior to the start of trial, Pilling filed a motion to suppress post-arrest statements
made to law enforcement. See CP at 26. The trial court suppressed a majority of Pilling’s
statements. CP at 142-43. Pilling argues that if he had effective counsel, the guilty verdict
would have been set aside due to violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Despite his assertion, Pilling fails to show ineffective assistance of counsel. The proper
16 No. 40304-1-III State v. Pilling
remedy for post-Miranda 6 incriminating statements is suppression of the statements.
See United States v. Perez-Lopez, 348 F.3d 839, 849 (9th Cir. 2003). Since his counsel
properly achieved the suppression of his statements, Pilling’s counsel was not deficient.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Murphy, J. WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
Staab, J.
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).