FILED JANUARY 22, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40797-7-III ) (consolidated with Respondent, ) No. 40806-0-III) ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION MANUEL CARROSCO MENDOZA JR, ) ) Appellant. )
MURPHY, J. — In this consolidated appeal, Manuel Carrosco Mendoza Jr.
appeals from separate convictions for felony violation of a no-contact order—domestic
violence. Carrosco Mendoza argues he was denied due process when the trial court
proceeded to a stipulated facts bench trial without first holding a contested drug court
termination hearing. He asks this court to reverse the convictions and remand his case
for a full drug court termination hearing. The State concedes there was a due process
violation and agrees with the relief requested by Carrosco Mendoza. We accept the
State’s concession, reverse the convictions and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Because the parties agree on the underlying facts, we recite only those necessary
for resolution of this case. In January 2022, Carrosco Mendoza was charged in separate
causes of action with felony violation of a no-contact order—domestic violence. On
August 2, 2022, Carrosco Mendoza and the State entered into a drug court stipulation Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
and waiver agreement with the understanding that upon successful completion of the
program, the State would move for dismissal of the pending charges with prejudice. 1
However, if Carrosco Mendoza was terminated for cause from the program, then the
charges would be adjudicated through a stipulated facts bench trial.
Despite some minor sanctions, Carrosco Mendoza generally enjoyed
approximately one and one-half years of success in the drug court program. But in
February 2023, Carrosco Mendoza missed three scheduled urinalysis (UA) tests and
was then arrested and charged with fourth degree assault. Carrosco Mendoza received
a 28-day termination notice and was informed on March 7 that (1) to be considered
for removal from termination certain conditions must be met, and (2) any violations
while on termination notice would likely result in termination for cause from drug court.
On April 4, the court conducted a hearing and informed Carrosco Mendoza that the
termination notice period ended and he was in good standing.
However, at a review hearing two weeks later, the court informed Carrosco
Mendoza that he was being terminated from drug court, commenting:
I just don’t think you’re ready for this. You’ve collected some new charges. You’ve missed a UA. During the time that you were on termination notice, there was a dilute UA. We didn’t find out about it until after, so that wouldn’t have counted against you. But the day after missing a UA we just don’t think you’re ready for this program right now. So I’m terminating
1 A drug court contract and order was entered on this same date.
2 Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
you for cause from drug court. However, you still can participate in treatment. Merit resources are still open for you. I’m still rooting for you. I think that you can move forward in this, but we just can’t move forward in drug court. . . . .... So you need to be in touch with your attorney right away. And I’ll be scheduling some hearings for you going forward from there as well.
Rep. of Proc. (Apr. 18, 2023) at 189-90. A standard termination order was entered
that did not include specific findings. Carrosco Mendoza was not informed during the
April 18 hearing or in the written order of his right to an evidentiary hearing to contest
his termination from drug court.
At a hearing held on May 22, 2023, a second termination order was entered that
included findings. Although the boilerplate language in the second termination order
listed that a termination hearing took place, the parties agree it is unclear from the record
that a termination hearing ever occurred.
Carrosco Mendoza’s case proceeded in criminal court. At a hearing on June 12,
2023, defense counsel requested a continuance to resolve questions about the difference
between a stipulated trial and a drug court termination hearing. The State represented to
the trial court that Carrosco Mendoza was terminated from drug court for cause, but
confirmed he had a right to contest that order. Carrosco Mendoza’s counsel affirmatively
answered that Carrosco Mendoza contested his termination from drug court and wanted a
hearing. The trial court scheduled a contested termination hearing for June 30.
3 Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
However, rather than proceed with the scheduled contested drug court termination
hearing, for the next year a series of continuances were granted as the parties were
negotiating a global plea deal for Carrosco Mendoza’s various pending charges, including
the two charged violations of a no-contact order. Confusingly, the various orders setting
the case schedule inconsistently refer to the pending case hearings as stipulated trials,
revocation hearings, and drug court termination hearings. In at least one hearing, the State
represented that Carrosco Mendoza had been terminated from drug court, and a stipulated
bench trial was pending. However, no specific mention of a drug court termination
hearing was made during this time period. Instead, the hearing was continued as the
parties negotiated how to proceed with the different charges.
A stipulated bench trial on the two charged violations of a no-contact order took
place on October 8, 2024. Carrosco Mendoza was found guilty of both charges and
sentenced to 60 months of confinement on each count, to run consecutively.
ANALYSIS
Carrosco Mendoza argues the trial court violated his procedural due process rights
when he was terminated from drug court because, although he was informed of the
reasons for termination and his right to a contested hearing, he was denied due process
when an evidentiary hearing to contest the termination from drug court did not occur.
The State concedes that there was a due process violation. We agree with the parties that
4 Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
because a contested drug court termination hearing did not take place, and there are no
findings in the record to establish that the State met its burden by a preponderance of the
evidence in support of termination, Carrosco Mendoza’s due process rights were violated.
Our federal and state constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to due
process of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. Procedural due
process requires an individual receive notice of the deprivation of a protected interest and
a meaningful opportunity to be heard. State v. Starkgraf, 29 Wn. App. 2d 30, 45, 539
P.3d 855 (2023).
“Due process guarantees apply in drug court revocation proceedings.” State v.
Harrison, 24 Wn. App. 2d 40, 48, 519 P.3d 244 (2022). A defendant terminated from
drug court has a right to an “‘independent determination that the deferred prosecution
agreement was violated, by a preponderance of the evidence with the burden of proof on
the State.’” Id. at 49 (quoting State v. Cassill-Skilton, 122 Wn. App. 652, 656, 94 P.3d
407 (2004)). Drug court participants must be informed before or during the termination
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FILED JANUARY 22, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40797-7-III ) (consolidated with Respondent, ) No. 40806-0-III) ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION MANUEL CARROSCO MENDOZA JR, ) ) Appellant. )
MURPHY, J. — In this consolidated appeal, Manuel Carrosco Mendoza Jr.
appeals from separate convictions for felony violation of a no-contact order—domestic
violence. Carrosco Mendoza argues he was denied due process when the trial court
proceeded to a stipulated facts bench trial without first holding a contested drug court
termination hearing. He asks this court to reverse the convictions and remand his case
for a full drug court termination hearing. The State concedes there was a due process
violation and agrees with the relief requested by Carrosco Mendoza. We accept the
State’s concession, reverse the convictions and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Because the parties agree on the underlying facts, we recite only those necessary
for resolution of this case. In January 2022, Carrosco Mendoza was charged in separate
causes of action with felony violation of a no-contact order—domestic violence. On
August 2, 2022, Carrosco Mendoza and the State entered into a drug court stipulation Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
and waiver agreement with the understanding that upon successful completion of the
program, the State would move for dismissal of the pending charges with prejudice. 1
However, if Carrosco Mendoza was terminated for cause from the program, then the
charges would be adjudicated through a stipulated facts bench trial.
Despite some minor sanctions, Carrosco Mendoza generally enjoyed
approximately one and one-half years of success in the drug court program. But in
February 2023, Carrosco Mendoza missed three scheduled urinalysis (UA) tests and
was then arrested and charged with fourth degree assault. Carrosco Mendoza received
a 28-day termination notice and was informed on March 7 that (1) to be considered
for removal from termination certain conditions must be met, and (2) any violations
while on termination notice would likely result in termination for cause from drug court.
On April 4, the court conducted a hearing and informed Carrosco Mendoza that the
termination notice period ended and he was in good standing.
However, at a review hearing two weeks later, the court informed Carrosco
Mendoza that he was being terminated from drug court, commenting:
I just don’t think you’re ready for this. You’ve collected some new charges. You’ve missed a UA. During the time that you were on termination notice, there was a dilute UA. We didn’t find out about it until after, so that wouldn’t have counted against you. But the day after missing a UA we just don’t think you’re ready for this program right now. So I’m terminating
1 A drug court contract and order was entered on this same date.
2 Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
you for cause from drug court. However, you still can participate in treatment. Merit resources are still open for you. I’m still rooting for you. I think that you can move forward in this, but we just can’t move forward in drug court. . . . .... So you need to be in touch with your attorney right away. And I’ll be scheduling some hearings for you going forward from there as well.
Rep. of Proc. (Apr. 18, 2023) at 189-90. A standard termination order was entered
that did not include specific findings. Carrosco Mendoza was not informed during the
April 18 hearing or in the written order of his right to an evidentiary hearing to contest
his termination from drug court.
At a hearing held on May 22, 2023, a second termination order was entered that
included findings. Although the boilerplate language in the second termination order
listed that a termination hearing took place, the parties agree it is unclear from the record
that a termination hearing ever occurred.
Carrosco Mendoza’s case proceeded in criminal court. At a hearing on June 12,
2023, defense counsel requested a continuance to resolve questions about the difference
between a stipulated trial and a drug court termination hearing. The State represented to
the trial court that Carrosco Mendoza was terminated from drug court for cause, but
confirmed he had a right to contest that order. Carrosco Mendoza’s counsel affirmatively
answered that Carrosco Mendoza contested his termination from drug court and wanted a
hearing. The trial court scheduled a contested termination hearing for June 30.
3 Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
However, rather than proceed with the scheduled contested drug court termination
hearing, for the next year a series of continuances were granted as the parties were
negotiating a global plea deal for Carrosco Mendoza’s various pending charges, including
the two charged violations of a no-contact order. Confusingly, the various orders setting
the case schedule inconsistently refer to the pending case hearings as stipulated trials,
revocation hearings, and drug court termination hearings. In at least one hearing, the State
represented that Carrosco Mendoza had been terminated from drug court, and a stipulated
bench trial was pending. However, no specific mention of a drug court termination
hearing was made during this time period. Instead, the hearing was continued as the
parties negotiated how to proceed with the different charges.
A stipulated bench trial on the two charged violations of a no-contact order took
place on October 8, 2024. Carrosco Mendoza was found guilty of both charges and
sentenced to 60 months of confinement on each count, to run consecutively.
ANALYSIS
Carrosco Mendoza argues the trial court violated his procedural due process rights
when he was terminated from drug court because, although he was informed of the
reasons for termination and his right to a contested hearing, he was denied due process
when an evidentiary hearing to contest the termination from drug court did not occur.
The State concedes that there was a due process violation. We agree with the parties that
4 Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
because a contested drug court termination hearing did not take place, and there are no
findings in the record to establish that the State met its burden by a preponderance of the
evidence in support of termination, Carrosco Mendoza’s due process rights were violated.
Our federal and state constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to due
process of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. Procedural due
process requires an individual receive notice of the deprivation of a protected interest and
a meaningful opportunity to be heard. State v. Starkgraf, 29 Wn. App. 2d 30, 45, 539
P.3d 855 (2023).
“Due process guarantees apply in drug court revocation proceedings.” State v.
Harrison, 24 Wn. App. 2d 40, 48, 519 P.3d 244 (2022). A defendant terminated from
drug court has a right to an “‘independent determination that the deferred prosecution
agreement was violated, by a preponderance of the evidence with the burden of proof on
the State.’” Id. at 49 (quoting State v. Cassill-Skilton, 122 Wn. App. 652, 656, 94 P.3d
407 (2004)). Drug court participants must be informed before or during the termination
hearing of the specific reasons for termination. Id. at 50. Participants must also be
informed of their right to an evidentiary hearing to contest the termination or the alleged
violations that supported termination from drug court. Id. at 51. Unless there is a valid
waiver of this evidentiary hearing, the trial court must hold a contested hearing to allow
the participant to challenge the drug court’s findings. Id. at 52.
5 Nos. 40797-7-III; 40806-0-III State v. Carrosco Mendoza
Here, Carrosco Mendoza was denied due process when he was not given a
meaningful opportunity to contest his termination from drug court. We can find no
evidence in the record on review that Carrosco Mendoza waived his right to a hearing.
Instead, the record indicates Carrosco Mendoza affirmatively requested a contested
hearing. Although the trial court initially scheduled this hearing, a hearing ultimately
did not take place. Carrosco Mendoza, therefore, was denied due process.
Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and remand for further proceedings.
Because we grant the requested relief on the basis of a due process violation, we decline
to address Carrosco Mendoza’s alternative argument of ineffective assistance of counsel.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Murphy, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________ Staab, A.C.J. Hill, J.