FILED COURT OF APPEALS DIV I STATE Or V:ASHINGTOI!
2011 .11E1 9: 1 6
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) DIVISION ONE Respondent, ) ) No. 74828-9-1 v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION LONZO M. WILSON, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: June 5, 2017 ) DWYER, J. — Lonzo Wilson appeals from a trial court's order revoking his
suspended sentence entered as a special sex offender sentencing alternative.
On appeal, Wilson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider alternatives to revocation. Finding no error, we affirm.
In May 2002, Lonzo Wilson pled guilty to rape of a child in the second
degree. The sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence of 102
months of incarceration but suspended the incarceration as a special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA). A lifetime of community custody was
also imposed. Wilson was ordered to undergo and complete three years of
sexual offender treatment and have no unsupervised contact with any minors.
Wilson was consistently noncompliant. Sixteen sentencing modification
hearings were held between 2002 and 2009. In several of these hearings, the
court determined that Wilson was out of compliance with the terms and No. 74828-9-1/2
conditions of his sentence—either by failing to pay legal financial obligations or
by failing to complete treatment. Wilson stopped engaging in treatment entirely
by April 2009.
On October 12, 2012, the Department of Corrections discovered that
Wilson had fathered two children and had been having direct contact with these
children since 2005. Wilson had been concealing his relationship with the
mother of his children from his treatment provider and from the Department.
Nevertheless, the State recommended that Wilson be given one last chance to
comply with the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence. Wilson was
ordered to serve 180 days of confinement and was again ordered to complete
the mandated sex offender treatment.
Wilson failed to report to the Department as required in January 2015. In
February 2015, he tested positive for methamphetamine. Wilson admitted to
both violations but claimed that neither violation was willful. Again, the court
declined to revoke the SSOSA. Instead, Wilson was ordered to serve a short
period of confinement and was ordered to complete treatment within the following
six months. The court warned Wilson that, had there been any additional
connection between the use of methamphetamine and his contact with children,
the court would have revoked the SSOSA sentence.
In May 2015, Wilson again tested positive for methamphetamine. Wilson
also admitted to having unapproved contact with his minor children during
February and May 2015. In light of Wilson's repeated failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of his suspended sentence, the State asked that Wilson's
2 No. 74828-9-1/3
SSOSA be revoked. Thirteen years after Wilson's guilty plea, the trial court
granted the motion. Wilson appeals.
Wilson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his
suspended sentence. This is so, he asserts, because the trial court failed to
consider alternatives to revocation. We disagree.
Pursuant to the SSOSA statute, a sentencing court may suspend the
sentence of a first-time sexual offender if the offender is shown to be amenable
to treatment. RCW 9.94A.670. "A SSOSA sentence may be revoked at any time
where there is sufficient proof to reasonably satisfy the trial court that the
defendant has violated a condition of the suspended sentence or has failed to
make satisfactory progress in treatment." State v. Miller, 159 Wn. App. 911, 917-
18, 247 P.3d 457(2011)(citing State v. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d 689, 705, 213
P.3d 32(2009); RCW 9.94A.670(10)). When the offender's violation is a threat
to the safety and welfare of society, the sentencing court need not inquire into the
reasons for the violation. State v. Miller, 180 Wn. App. 413, 421, 325 P.3d 230
(2014).
We review a trial court's decision to revoke a SSOSA suspended
sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Partee, 141 Wn. App. 355, 361,
170 P.3d 60(2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is
manifestly unreasonable or exercised on an untenable ground or for untenable
reasons. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d at 706.
3 No. 74828-9-1/4
Here, the trial court heard testimony from Wilson's treatment provider, Dr.
Michael O'Connell. Dr. O'Connell testified that he had been providing treatment
services to Wilson since May 2013. Dr. O'Connell testified that Wilson has a
history of self-defeating behavior—such as lying to his treatment providers and
others who were trying to help him—but that this behavior was likely not a danger
to the community. Dr. O'Connell testified that he did not see any present issues
of sexual deviancy, sexual preference for minors, or antisociality, which he
described as being the major predictors of sexual re-offense. Dr. O'Connell also
testified that he would be willing to continue to work with Wilson and that he did
not believe that the community would be made safer from sexual predation by
sending Wilson to prison.
The trial court disagreed with Dr. O'Connell's assessment that Wilson's
use of methamphetamine did not pose a risk to his children or to the community.
The trial court found that Wilson had repeatedly used methamphetamine, lied
about his relationships, lied about where he was living, and—after more than a
dozen years—failed to complete the sex offender treatment that had been
repeatedly ordered by the court. The trial court found that Wilson's actions were
in violation of the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence. The trial
court also noted that Wilson's behavior was especially egregious in light of the
fact that Wilson's crime was rape of a child.
The trial court then weighed the competing interests of all those affected.
The trial court considered the victim and her family, who had expected Wilson's
treatment obligation to be taken seriously and completed. The trial court also
4 No. 74828-9-1/5
considered Wilson's interests, noting that the court had previously "made
perfectly clear" that any further contact with children or further use of drugs would
not be tolerated. Reflecting on its clear instructions to Wilson, the trial court
pondered that "if the Court were again to do what it did last time, deny the
request for revocation, does anyone think we wouldn't be back here?"
The trial court concluded:
I've previously and I've tried today to consider the alternatives before the Court. I've relied on all the evidence before me, which is the CCO's document and report of allegations, the pleadings of the parties, as well as then the testimony of Dr. O'Connell.
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FILED COURT OF APPEALS DIV I STATE Or V:ASHINGTOI!
2011 .11E1 9: 1 6
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) DIVISION ONE Respondent, ) ) No. 74828-9-1 v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION LONZO M. WILSON, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: June 5, 2017 ) DWYER, J. — Lonzo Wilson appeals from a trial court's order revoking his
suspended sentence entered as a special sex offender sentencing alternative.
On appeal, Wilson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider alternatives to revocation. Finding no error, we affirm.
In May 2002, Lonzo Wilson pled guilty to rape of a child in the second
degree. The sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence of 102
months of incarceration but suspended the incarceration as a special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA). A lifetime of community custody was
also imposed. Wilson was ordered to undergo and complete three years of
sexual offender treatment and have no unsupervised contact with any minors.
Wilson was consistently noncompliant. Sixteen sentencing modification
hearings were held between 2002 and 2009. In several of these hearings, the
court determined that Wilson was out of compliance with the terms and No. 74828-9-1/2
conditions of his sentence—either by failing to pay legal financial obligations or
by failing to complete treatment. Wilson stopped engaging in treatment entirely
by April 2009.
On October 12, 2012, the Department of Corrections discovered that
Wilson had fathered two children and had been having direct contact with these
children since 2005. Wilson had been concealing his relationship with the
mother of his children from his treatment provider and from the Department.
Nevertheless, the State recommended that Wilson be given one last chance to
comply with the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence. Wilson was
ordered to serve 180 days of confinement and was again ordered to complete
the mandated sex offender treatment.
Wilson failed to report to the Department as required in January 2015. In
February 2015, he tested positive for methamphetamine. Wilson admitted to
both violations but claimed that neither violation was willful. Again, the court
declined to revoke the SSOSA. Instead, Wilson was ordered to serve a short
period of confinement and was ordered to complete treatment within the following
six months. The court warned Wilson that, had there been any additional
connection between the use of methamphetamine and his contact with children,
the court would have revoked the SSOSA sentence.
In May 2015, Wilson again tested positive for methamphetamine. Wilson
also admitted to having unapproved contact with his minor children during
February and May 2015. In light of Wilson's repeated failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of his suspended sentence, the State asked that Wilson's
2 No. 74828-9-1/3
SSOSA be revoked. Thirteen years after Wilson's guilty plea, the trial court
granted the motion. Wilson appeals.
Wilson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his
suspended sentence. This is so, he asserts, because the trial court failed to
consider alternatives to revocation. We disagree.
Pursuant to the SSOSA statute, a sentencing court may suspend the
sentence of a first-time sexual offender if the offender is shown to be amenable
to treatment. RCW 9.94A.670. "A SSOSA sentence may be revoked at any time
where there is sufficient proof to reasonably satisfy the trial court that the
defendant has violated a condition of the suspended sentence or has failed to
make satisfactory progress in treatment." State v. Miller, 159 Wn. App. 911, 917-
18, 247 P.3d 457(2011)(citing State v. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d 689, 705, 213
P.3d 32(2009); RCW 9.94A.670(10)). When the offender's violation is a threat
to the safety and welfare of society, the sentencing court need not inquire into the
reasons for the violation. State v. Miller, 180 Wn. App. 413, 421, 325 P.3d 230
(2014).
We review a trial court's decision to revoke a SSOSA suspended
sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Partee, 141 Wn. App. 355, 361,
170 P.3d 60(2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is
manifestly unreasonable or exercised on an untenable ground or for untenable
reasons. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d at 706.
3 No. 74828-9-1/4
Here, the trial court heard testimony from Wilson's treatment provider, Dr.
Michael O'Connell. Dr. O'Connell testified that he had been providing treatment
services to Wilson since May 2013. Dr. O'Connell testified that Wilson has a
history of self-defeating behavior—such as lying to his treatment providers and
others who were trying to help him—but that this behavior was likely not a danger
to the community. Dr. O'Connell testified that he did not see any present issues
of sexual deviancy, sexual preference for minors, or antisociality, which he
described as being the major predictors of sexual re-offense. Dr. O'Connell also
testified that he would be willing to continue to work with Wilson and that he did
not believe that the community would be made safer from sexual predation by
sending Wilson to prison.
The trial court disagreed with Dr. O'Connell's assessment that Wilson's
use of methamphetamine did not pose a risk to his children or to the community.
The trial court found that Wilson had repeatedly used methamphetamine, lied
about his relationships, lied about where he was living, and—after more than a
dozen years—failed to complete the sex offender treatment that had been
repeatedly ordered by the court. The trial court found that Wilson's actions were
in violation of the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence. The trial
court also noted that Wilson's behavior was especially egregious in light of the
fact that Wilson's crime was rape of a child.
The trial court then weighed the competing interests of all those affected.
The trial court considered the victim and her family, who had expected Wilson's
treatment obligation to be taken seriously and completed. The trial court also
4 No. 74828-9-1/5
considered Wilson's interests, noting that the court had previously "made
perfectly clear" that any further contact with children or further use of drugs would
not be tolerated. Reflecting on its clear instructions to Wilson, the trial court
pondered that "if the Court were again to do what it did last time, deny the
request for revocation, does anyone think we wouldn't be back here?"
The trial court concluded:
I've previously and I've tried today to consider the alternatives before the Court. I've relied on all the evidence before me, which is the CCO's document and report of allegations, the pleadings of the parties, as well as then the testimony of Dr. O'Connell. And what's changed is we're simply at what I would describe as a — in that balancing, we're at a tipping point. The motion for revocation is granted. And the Court takes no joy in the ruling.
The trial court's ruling was tenable. The record establishes that the trial
court considered the evidence before it and determined that Wilson's repeated
violations of his SSOSA sentence constituted a threat to the safety and welfare of
society. The trial court heard and considered the testimony of Dr. O'Connell but
simply disagreed with the doctor's view of the situation.
Nevertheless, Wilson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to consider alternatives to revocation. He cites to no authority requiring
trial courts to consider alternatives to revocation after making a determination
that an offender's violation is a threat to the safety and welfare of society. In any
event, the record establishes that the trial court did consider alternatives. The
trial court had previously given Wilson numerous opportunities to bring his
conduct into conformity with the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence.
At last, the trial court determined, Wilson's noncompliance had reached "a tipping
-5- No. 74828-9-1/6
point." Full and proper consideration of all necessary factors was engaged in by
the trial judge. There was no judicial error. Wilson's present circumstance is
entirely of his own creation.
Affirmed.
We concur: