Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
November 14, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 49178-8-II
Respondent,
v.
LENDIN SAITI, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MELNICK, J. — Lendin Saiti appeals his convictions and sentence for unlawful possession
of a controlled substance (PCS), theft of a motor vehicle with two aggravating circumstances
(position of trust and invasion of privacy), unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, and
use of drug paraphernalia.
We conclude that sufficient evidence supports each conviction, no right to confrontation
violation occurred, and the trial court properly calculated the offender score and sentenced Saiti
on all charges. We do not consider whether sufficient evidence supports the aggravating
circumstances. We affirm.
FACTS
Patty Lopez initially met Saiti through Facebook. At the time, Saiti lived in California.
They began a romantic relationship in July 2015. Saiti moved to Washington and lived with Lopez
“[o]ff and on.” Report of Proceedings (RP) (May 24, 2016) at 48. Saiti did not have his own car;
Lopez often allowed him to use her car. 49178-8-II
During their relationship, Lopez purchased a firearm and showed it to Saiti. In Saiti’s
presence, she put the gun in her purse. She kept it there at all times, but would move the gun from
purse to purse when changing purses.
Lopez lived above the restaurant where she worked. Saiti often came into the restaurant
throughout the day.
On December 20, as Lopez was getting ready for work, Saiti asked Lopez for money.
Lopez refused to give him money because she did not want him to buy drugs. Previously, Lopez
had given Saiti money for drugs.
Lopez exited her apartment and went to work. Lopez took her purse and put it in the
kitchen. The kitchen was restricted to employees only. Her purse contained her car keys, cash,
and her gun, among other items.
Amy Leback, Lopez’s coworker, knew Saiti was Lopez’s boyfriend. Leback saw Saiti
come into the restaurant. Saiti went into the kitchen and again asked Lopez for money. She again
refused. Saiti left, looking frustrated and mad.
Leback left the kitchen and saw Saiti quickly leaving the restaurant out the back door. He
had Lopez’s purse. Lopez walked down the hall and saw her car leaving the parking lot. Lopez
ran back to the kitchen to check on her purse, but found it missing. Lopez yelled to Leback to call
the police because Saiti drove off in her car with her purse.1 Leback called the police.
1 Lopez later testified that Saiti did not ask Lopez for permission to use the car, but if he had, she stated that she would have allowed him to borrow the car. However, she did not give him permission to take the car.
2 49178-8-II
Pacific County Sheriff’s Deputy Samuel Schouten saw Lopez’s car at an RV park.
Schouten saw Saiti walk away from the car and enter a trailer. The police went to the trailer and
arrested Saiti after he exited it.
Long Beach Police Officer Rodney Nawn searched Saiti and the vehicle after his arrest.
Nawn discovered a rubber container containing heroin in Saiti’s pocket. The police found Lopez’s
purse with the gun inside on the front seat of her car. The police did not recover the money.
The State charged Saiti with possession of heroin with a deadly weapon, theft of a motor
vehicle, theft of a firearm, unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, and possession/use
of drug paraphernalia.2 The theft charges each had two aggravating factors charged: that Saiti used
his position of trust, confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the
offense, and that the offense involved an invasion of Lopez’s privacy.3
Before trial, the State filed a motion to depose Lopez who refused to return phone calls or
make herself available for an interview. The trial court granted the motion. After Lopez failed to
appear for her deposition, the State moved for a material witness warrant and the court issued one.
Lopez appeared at trial. After some questions, the State informed the court that Lopez was
not testifying as she had during her interview the previous day. The trial court had a colloquy with
Lopez and discussed the meaning of perjury with her.
The State asked to treat Lopez as a hostile witness. The State stated that “the statements
she’s saying today are sworn under penalty of perjury. If there were untruthful statements, that
2 RCW 69.50.4013; RCW 9A.56.065; RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a); RCW 9A.56.300; RCW 9.41.040(1)(a); RCW 69.50.412(1). 3 RCW 9.94A.535(3)(n) & (p).
3 49178-8-II
would be grounds for perjury. To prove whether or not it’s perjury, we have several statements.”
RP (May 24, 2016) at 55.
Saiti responded that Lopez’s failure to remember did not amount to hostility. Saiti said
that Lopez has “just been told that if you don’t start responding the way you did yesterday, then,
you know, we’re going to charge you with [perjury].” RP (May 24, 2016) at 58. The trial court
denied the motion and reiterated that Lopez needed to testify truthfully.
Saiti sought to elicit testimony about Lopez’s material witness warrant. He argued that the
evidence was relevant to bias, prejudice, and credibility. The trial court denied the motion.
The jury found Saiti guilty of all charges except theft of a firearm.4 By special verdict, the
jury found both aggravating factors on the theft of a motor vehicle charge.
The trial court sentenced Saiti to a total of 67 months of confinement and 12 months of
community custody. In calculating Saiti’s offender score, the trial court included one point for an
attempted grand theft conviction from California.5 After reviewing documentation the State
provided, the court found that the conviction was comparable to a Washington felony, to-wit
attempted theft in the first degree. Saiti appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Saiti argues insufficient evidence supports his convictions for unlawful possession, theft of
a motor vehicle, and the two aggravating circumstances. He argues that the State failed to prove
4 On the possession of heroin charge, the jury did not find that Saiti was armed with a deadly weapon. 5 Cal. Penal Code §§ 487(c) & 664.
4 49178-8-II
that he knew Lopez’s purse contained her gun. Saiti also argues insufficient evidence showed that
he intended to deprive Lopez of her car.
We conclude that sufficient evidence supports Saiti’s convictions. We do not consider
whether sufficient evidence supports the two aggravating circumstances.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational fact finder could have
found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 576,
210 P.3d 1007 (2009). “‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded
person of the truth of the asserted premise.” State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102, 106, 330 P.3d 182
(2014). Circumstantial evidence is equally as reliable as direct evidence. State v. Kintz, 169 Wn.2d
537, 551, 238 P.3d 470 (2010).
In claiming insufficient evidence, “the defendant necessarily admits the truth of the State’s
evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it.” State v. Drum, 168 Wn.2d 23,
35, 225 P.3d 237 (2010). Any inferences “‘must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted
most strongly against the defendant.’” Homan, 181 Wn.2d at 106 (quoting State v. Salinas, 119
Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)). In addition, we “must defer to the trier of fact for purposes
of resolving conflicting testimony and evaluating the persuasiveness of the evidence.” Homan, 181
Wn.2d at 106.
B. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM
A person “is guilty of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, if
the person owns, has in his or her possession, or has in his or her control any firearm after having
previously been convicted . . . of any serious offense as defined in this chapter.” RCW
5 49178-8-II
9.41.040(1)(a). The State must prove that the defendant knowingly owned, possessed, or
controlled the firearm. State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 904, 909, 148 P.3d 993 (2006).
Saiti stipulated at trial that he had previously been convicted of a serious offense. He
argues that insufficient evidence exists to show he knowingly possessed or controlled a firearm.
Actual possession occurs when a defendant has physical custody of the item, and
constructive possession occurs if the defendant has dominion and control over the item. State v.
Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 333, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002). Constructive possession is established when
“the defendant was in dominion and control of either the drugs or the premises on which the drugs
were found.” State v. Callahan, 77 Wn.2d 27, 30-31, 459 P.2d 400 (1969). To determine whether
a defendant had constructive possession of a firearm, we examine the totality of the circumstances
touching on dominion and control. State v. Jeffrey, 77 Wn. App. 222, 227, 889 P.2d 956 (1995).
“A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when: (i) he or she is aware of a
fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense.” RCW
9A.08.010(1)(b)(i). As the jury instructions in this case explain, “[i]f a person has information
that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is
permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of that fact.” CP at 99 (Instr.
27).
The evidence shows that Lopez showed Saiti her gun when she purchased it. She placed
the gun in her purse in Saiti’s presence. Lopez always kept the gun in her purse. She moved the
gun into different purses when changing them. Saiti took the same purse he had originally seen
Lopez place the gun into. He placed the purse on the front seat and drove away in her car. The
gun was easily accessible. A reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Saiti had
knowledge of the gun’s presence and that he knowingly possessed it.
6 49178-8-II
Saiti analogizes his case to State v. Davis, 176 Wn. App. 849, 315 P.3d 1105 (2013) rev’d
on other grounds by 182 Wn.2d 222, 340 P.3d 820 (2014). However, the issue in Davis involved
whether the defendant had dominion and control over the car in which the gun was present. 176
Wn. App. at 868. The defendant did not argue he lacked knowledge about the gun’s presence.
Therefore, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Saiti’s conviction of unlawful
possession of a firearm.
C. THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
Saiti argues that the State failed to present evidence that he intended to deprive Lopez of
her car. In addition, Saiti argues that the State failed to prove that he exerted unauthorized control
over the vehicle.
The State had to prove that Saiti wrongfully obtained or exerted unauthorized control over
another’s motor vehicle, and that he intended to deprive that person of the motor vehicle. RCW
9A.56.020(1)(a); RCW 9A.56.065(1). The jury instructions explained that “[t]heft means to
wrongfully obtain or exert unauthorized control over the property or services of another, or the
value thereof, with intent to deprive that person of such property or services.” CP at 85 (Instr. 13)
and that “[a] person acts with intent or intentionally when acting with the objective or purpose to
accomplish a result that constitutes a crime.” CP at 110 (Instr. 35).
“[T]he specific criminal intent of the accused may be inferred from the conduct where it is
plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability.” State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618
P.2d 99 (1980). Moreover, when analyzing intent in a theft case, intent to permanently deprive is
not required. State v. Crittenden, 146 Wn. App. 361, 369-70, 189 P.3d 849 (2008). A person who
exceeds the permissive authority to use a vehicle wrongfully obtains that vehicle and may be
convicted of theft. State v. Clark, 96 Wn.2d 686, 691, 638 P.2d 572 (1982).
7 49178-8-II
Here, Saiti took Lopez’s purse and car keys, and drove off in her vehicle. There is no
evidence that he had permission to use the vehicle on the date in question, regardless of the fact
that he regularly used Lopez’s vehicle without asking permission. Lopez called law enforcement
because she wanted her car back. This evidence, along with Lopez telling Leback to call the police,
demonstrated that even if Saiti had permission to use her vehicle on some occasions, a rational
jury could conclude that he exceeded the scope of that permission when he took her vehicle after
Lopez refused to give him money. Thus, sufficient evidence supports Saiti’s conviction for theft
of a motor vehicle.
D. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
This issue is moot because the trial court did not impose an exceptional sentence based on
the aggravating factors. Accordingly, we do not consider the issue further.
“As a general rule, we do not consider questions that are moot.” State v. Hunley, 175
Wn.2d 901, 907, 287 P.3d 584 (2012). “A case is technically moot if the court can no longer
provide effective relief.” Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 907. However, we will review an appeal if the
sentence has collateral effects. State v. Rinaldo, 98 Wn.2d 419, 422, 655 P.2d 1141 (1982).
Because the trial court did not impose an exceptional sentence, the jury’s special verdict
on the aggravating circumstances is moot.
II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE VIOLATION
Saiti argues that the trial court violated his confrontation clause right when it denied Saiti’s
motion to introduce evidence of Lopez’s material witness warrant because it was relevant for the
jury’s credibility assessment of Lopez. Because the court did not err in excluding the evidence,
we disagree.
8 49178-8-II
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution guarantee criminal
defendants the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 22. “The purpose is to test the perception, memory, and credibility of witnesses.”
State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 620, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002). Accordingly, the right to confrontation
must be zealously guarded. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 620.
Yet, the right is not absolute. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 621. “Courts may, within their sound
discretion, deny cross-examination if the evidence sought is vague, argumentative, or speculative.”
Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 620-21. “The confrontation right and associated cross-examination are
limited by general considerations of relevance.” Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 621.
We review a trial court’s ruling limiting cross-examination for a manifest abuse of
discretion. State v. Lile, 188 Wn.2d 766, 782, 398 P.3d 1052 (2017); Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 619.
A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence, and the trial
court's decision will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Swan, 114
Wn.2d 613, 658, 790 P.2d 610 (1990). A manifest abuse of discretion arises when “the trial court’s
exercise of discretion is ‘manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons.’”
Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 619 (quoting State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995)).
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
Saiti moved to introduce evidence of the material witness warrant because, he argues, it
showed Lopez’s bias, prejudice, or credibility as a witness. It would demonstrate that pressure
from the State caused her to testify as she did.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a disputed material fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. ER 401. Only minimal logical relevancy is
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required. State v. Bebb, 44 Wn. App. 803, 814, 723 P.2d 512 (1986), aff’d, 108 Wn.2d 515, 740
P.2d 829 (1987). The trial court may exclude relevant evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value. ER 403. The trial court has considerable discretion
to consider what evidence is relevant and to balance its possible prejudicial impact against its
probative value. State v. Barry, 184 Wn. App. 790, 801, 339 P.3d 200 (2014).
Here, the evidence of Lopez’s material witness warrant was not relevant. As the trial court
stated, Lopez did not testify that she felt pressured to testify in the way that she did. The court did
not abuse its discretion by ruling that the necessity of a warrant to insure Lopez came to court was
irrelevant to any disputed fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
excluding the evidence of the material witness warrant and it did not violate Saiti’s confrontation
right.
III. COMPARABILITY OF FOREIGN OFFENSE
Saiti argues that the trial court erred by concluding his California conviction for attempted
grand theft was comparable to the Washington crime of attempted theft in the first degree. He
argues that it is more appropriately comparable to theft in the third degree because his sentence
reflected that of a misdemeanor and the restitution fee imposed indicated that the value of the
attempted theft did not exceed $700, as required by Washington’s theft in the third degree statute.
Saiti also argues that, because his California conviction is not defined as a felony or a
misdemeanor, and gross misdemeanors do not exist in California, the rule of lenity should apply.
We disagree with Saiti.
10 49178-8-II
We conduct de novo review of a sentencing court’s decision to count a prior conviction as
criminal history. State v. Moeurn, 170 Wn.2d 169, 172, 240 P.3d 1158 (2010).
There is a two-part test to determine the comparability of a foreign offense. State v.
Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d 409, 415, 158 P.3d 580 (2007). We must first determine whether the foreign
offense is legally comparable, or “whether the elements of the foreign offense are substantially
similar to the elements of the Washington offense.” Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415. “If the elements
of the foreign offense are broader than the Washington counterpart, the sentencing court must then
determine whether the offense is factually comparable—that is, whether the conduct underlying
the foreign offense would have violated the comparable Washington statute.” Thiefault, 160
Wn.2d at 415. “In making its factual comparison, the sentencing court may rely on facts in the
foreign record that are admitted, stipulated to, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thiefault,
160 Wn.2d at 415. If the court determines that the “prior, foreign conviction is neither legally nor
factually comparable, it may not count the conviction.” Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Watson, 146
Wn.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002). “In interpreting statutory provisions, the primary objective is
to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the Legislature in creating the statute.”
Watson, 146 Wn.2d at 954. “The court discerns legislative intent from the plain language enacted
by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in
which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory
scheme as a whole.” Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 187 Wn.2d 27, 33, 384 P.3d 232 (2016).
11 49178-8-II
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED CRIMINAL HISTORY
First, we must determine whether the statutes at issue are legally comparable. Thiefault,
160 Wn.2d at 415.
Saiti’s conviction for attempted grand theft is based upon a violation of California Penal
Code §§ 664 and §487(c). The former is California’s attempt statute. Cal. Penal Code § 664
(2006). The latter provides, “[g]rand theft is theft committed in any of the following cases: . . .
When the property is taken from the person of another.” Cal. Penal Code § 487(c) (2009).
Washington’s statute for theft in the first degree states, “(1) [A] person is guilty of theft in
the first degree if he or she commits theft of: . . . Property of any value, other than a firearm as
defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor vehicle, taken from the person of another.” RCW
9A.56.030(1)(b).
Both statutes contain unambiguous language and criminalize theft of property from the
person of another. Cal. Penal Code § 487(c) (2009); RCW 9A.56.030(1)(b). Although the lesser
degrees of theft and other prongs of theft in the first degree in Washington have monetary
requirements as elements, RCW 9A.56.030(1)(b) does not. See RCW 9A.56.040; RCW
9A.56.050. The plain language of grand theft and theft in the first degree are the same. Cal. Penal
Code § 487(c) (2009); RCW 9A.56.030(1)(b). Accordingly, we conclude that the statutes are
legally comparable.
We next consider whether the crime committed in California is factually comparable to a
felony crime in Washington. “Factual comparability requires the sentencing court to determine
whether the defendant’s conduct, as evidenced by the indictment or information, or the records of
the foreign conviction, would have violated the comparable Washington statute.” State v.
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Farnsworth, 133 Wn. App. 1, 18, 130 P.3d 389 (2006) remanded, 159 Wn.2d 1004, 151 P.3d 976
(2007) (internal citations omitted).
The record does not contain any clear facts to allow for a full factual comparability analysis.
The record only contains the judgment and sentence. The record does not contain the charging
document. The judgment includes a restitution amount of $200. Saiti argues that because the
restitution amount in the judgment was $200, it must be a misdemeanor. However, the judgment
is also clear that Saiti was charged under California Penal Code § 487(c) (2009), which involves
the theft of property of any value from a person, similar to RCW 9A.56.030(1)(b).
One prong of Washington’s theft in the first degree statute similarly does not have a
monetary requirement. RCW 9A.56.030(1)(b). Therefore, if Saiti committed grand theft as
proscribed by the California statute, the facts required by the statute (that he took property from
another person) would have also violated Washington’s theft in the first degree statute.
Therefore, the trial court did not err by including Saiti’s California conviction as criminal
history.
IV. CONCURRENT STATUTES
Saiti argues that his conviction of unlawful possession of heroin and unlawful use of drug
paraphernalia are concurrent crimes and the trial court should have dismissed the possession of a
controlled substance charge. He argues that because the object in question was a legal object and
became drug paraphernalia only because of the presence of a controlled substance, the statutes are
necessarily concurrent. We disagree with Saiti.
We review the question of whether two statutes are concurrent de novo. State v. Wilson,
158 Wn. App. 305, 314, 242 P.3d 19 (2010).
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“When a specific statute and a general statute punish the same conduct, the statutes are
concurrent and the State can charge a defendant only under the specific statute.” Wilson, 158 Wn.
App. at 313-14. “This rule gives effect to legislative intent and ensures charging decisions comport
with that intent.” Wilson, 158 Wn. App. at 314.
However, if a person can violate the specific statute without violating the general statute,
the statutes are not concurrent. State v. Heffner, 126 Wn. App. 803, 808, 110 P.3d 219 (2005).
“Statutes are concurrent only when every violation of the specific statute would result in a violation
of the general statute.” Wilson, 158 Wn. App. at 314.
In determining whether two statutes are concurrent, we examine the elements of each of
the statutes to ascertain whether a person can violate the specific statute without necessarily
violating the general statute. Heffner, 126 Wn. App. at 808. “Statutes are concurrent if all of the
elements to convict under the general statute are also elements that must be proved for conviction
under the specific statute.” Wilson, 158 Wn. App. at 314. The facts of the particular case need
not be examined, we examine only the elements of the statutes. Wilson, 158 Wn. App. at 314.
B. THE STATUTES ARE NOT CONCURRENT
Saiti claims that the rubber container became drug paraphernalia only because it contained
heroin residue, and thus, the convictions are inseparable. However, we do not examine the facts
of the particular case, we only examine the statutory elements. Wilson, 158 Wn. App. at 314.
RCW 69.50.412(1) states that:
It is unlawful for any person to use drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance other than marijuana. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor.
14 49178-8-II
RCW 69.50.4013(1) provides that it is “unlawful for any person to possess a controlled
substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or
order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his or her professional practice, or except as
otherwise authorized by this chapter.” A person that violates this statute is guilty of a class C
felony. RCW 69.50.4013(2).
In State v. Williams, 62 Wn. App. 748, 754, 815 P.2d 825 (1991), the court held that the
drug paraphernalia statute and the possession of controlled substances statute were not concurrent
statutes. In its reasoning, the court described an example where the defendant could admit to
recently attending a party where he used drug paraphernalia to inject controlled substances:
Although no controlled substances or paraphernalia are found in the defendant’s possession, his behavior and appearance may be consistent with recent controlled substance use, tests of his blood could confirm the presence of controlled substances, and recent injection marks could be found on his arm. Among other offenses, the defendant could be prosecuted for using drug paraphernalia to inject controlled substances, although it could not be established that he was in possession of either drug paraphernalia or controlled substances. There are no doubt other situations where the evidence may establish that a defendant was under the influence of controlled substances at the time of his arrest, although no paraphernalia or controlled substances are found. Nevertheless, such evidence creates an inference that drug paraphernalia was used to ingest the controlled substances.
Williams, 62 Wn. App. at 752-53 (footnote omitted).
Although the law has been recodified since Williams, the rationale remains the same.6
Even though one statute may implicate the other because of the relation between the two, facts in
a given case could support a charge for use of paraphernalia without evidence to support a charge
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Because the elements of the statutes are not the
6 See LAWS OF 2017, ch. 317 § 15; LAWS OF 2013, ch. 3 § 22 (most recent amendments to the possession of controlled substance and paraphernalia statutes, respectively).
15 49178-8-II
same and not every violation of one statute would be a violation of the other, we conclude that the
statutes are not concurrent.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Melnick, J.
We concur:
Johanson, P.J.
Lee, J.