State of Washington v. Leland James Westerlund

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 9, 2026
• Docket: 40775-6
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED JUNE 9, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40775-6-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) LELAND JAMES WESTERLUND, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )

HILL, J. — Leland Westerlund pleaded guilty to one count of first degree murder

and two counts of first degree robbery based on events that occurred when he was

16 years old. In consideration of Westerlund’s age and troubled childhood, the parties

agreed to recommend an exceptional downward sentence. The State recommended

37.25 years, and Westerlund recommended 22.25 years. The court, after making an

extensive record pursuant to the Houston-Sconiers mandate, 1 determined Westerlund’s

1 State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

youth played a role in the commission of the crimes. The court imposed an exceptional

downward sentence of 32 years.

Westerlund now appeals his sentence on two grounds. First, he contends that the

sentencing court erred in including his previous juvenile convictions in his offender score

because an amendment to former RCW 9.94A.525(1), effective on July 23, 2023,

precluded the inclusion of such convictions in offender score calculations. LAWS OF

2023, CH. 415, § 2. Second, he contends the court did not properly consider his youth at

sentencing by overemphasizing punishment and retribution while underemphasizing

rehabilitation and by improperly incorporating the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA),

chapter 9.94A RCW, principles into its decision. We disagree with both contentions and

affirm Westerlund’s sentence.

BACKGROUND

In February 2023, Westerlund, age 16, and two adult males met with cannabis oil

dealers whom they intended to rob. Upon approaching the dealers, Westerlund began

shooting a firearm, killing one of the dealers and severely wounding the other two. One

of Westerlund’s companions drove the victim’s vehicle from the scene, while Westerlund

and the other adult male fled on foot.

Westerlund was later arrested and charged. As part of a plea agreement, the

charges were reduced to one count of first degree murder and two counts of first degree

2 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

assault. This reduction was significant, as Westerlund’s original charges included

additional robbery counts and consecutive firearm enhancements. In addition to the

benefit of fewer charges and a reduced sentencing range, the parties agreed to request that

the court impose an exceptional downward sentence in consideration of Westerlund’s

youth at the time of the commission of the crime. The State would recommend a

sentence of 37.25 years, and Westerlund would ask for a 22.25 year sentence.

Prior to sentencing, the parties provided the court with a report by Dr. Nathan

Henry, who conducted a forensic mental health evaluation on Westerlund to assess

whether his crimes reflected youthful immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to appreciate

risks and consequences. The evaluation was thorough, covering various aspects of

Westerlund’s extremely difficult childhood and his mental development. The court also

reviewed the parties’ sentencing briefs, which incorporated Dr. Henry’s evaluation and

the applicable law for sentencing a youth in adult court.

At sentencing, the court first heard from the surviving victims and several family

members. Westerlund gave a short allocution apologizing for his actions. The State

addressed the mitigating factors of youth and agreed that Westerlund’s youthfulness

impacted the crime. However, the State argued it took Westerlund’s youth into account

in its plea agreement and sentencing recommendation. Westerlund’s attorney

acknowledged that the parties “worked through all the various nuances in the law

3 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

regarding children” before addressing each of the factors and their application to the case.

Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 65.

The court thoroughly analyzed the facts before it through the Houston-Sconiers

framework and determined that Westerlund’s youth played a factor in the commission of

the crimes. The court imposed an exceptional sentence downward of 32 years (384

months).

Westerlund appeals. He alleges the sentencing court erred by including his

previous juvenile convictions in his offender score. He also alleges that “the trial court

underweighed his potential for rehabilitation and overweighed punishment and

retribution when it sentenced him to 32 years in prison.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 25.

ANALYSIS

Juvenile Convictions

Westerlund argues the trial court erred when it included his prior juvenile

convictions in his offender score. Specifically, Westerlund argues that a 2023

amendment to former RCW 9.94A.525(1) applies prospectively to his sentencing. This

statute now prohibits the court from including most juvenile felony convictions in the

defendant’s offender score. The amendment became effective after Westerlund

committed his current offenses but before his sentencing. Whether to apply the statute

4 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

prospectively or retrospectively is a matter of statutory construction, which we review de

novo. State v. Schwartz, 194 Wn.2d 432, 438, 450 P.3d 141 (2019).

While Westerlund’s appeal was pending, we decided this issue in State v. Boyce.

“We conclude[d] that the legislature did not intend for RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) to apply

retroactively.” No. 40700-4-III, slip op at 6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2026). We need

not address this issue further as there is nothing in Westerlund’s argument to distinguish

his case from Boyce. We therefore conclude Westerlund’s juvenile convictions were

properly included in his offender score as Westerlund’s crimes occurred prior to the

statute’s amendment.

Youth

Westerlund also contends that the court did not meaningfully consider the

mitigating qualities of his youth at sentencing. However, his specific argument is more

nuanced. Westerlund does not argue that the court was unaware it had discretion to

impose a sentence below the standard range or that it failed to address juvenile brain

development. Nor does Westerlund argue that the court failed to conduct “a thorough

hearing based on a clear understanding of [the juvenile sentencing factors] and the role

the mitigating qualities of youth must play in sentencing a juvenile offender as an adult.”

See State v. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d 266, 275, 516 P.3d 1213 (2022).

Instead, Westerlund argues that some of the trial court’s comments during

5 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

sentencing show that it (1) overemphasized punishment and discounted Westerlund’s

potential for rehabilitation by ignoring current science and (2) improperly relied on the

SRA principle of commensurate sentencing, while simultaneously sentencing Westerlund

to a sentence that was not commensurate with other defendants. See Reply Br. of

Appellant at 26.

This court will only reverse a sentencing court’s decision if we find a clear abuse

of discretion or misapplication of the law. State v. Haag, 198 Wn.2d 309, 317, 495 P.3d

241 (2021). A sentencing court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Id. “‘A decision is based on untenable

grounds when its factual findings are unsupported by the record.’” Anderson, 200 Wn.2d

at 286 (quoting Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 317)). We review the sentencing court’s findings of

fact for substantial evidence. Id. 2 “Substantial evidence exists where there is a sufficient

2 The State argues that Westerlund cannot appeal his sentence because he was not aggrieved by it; i.e., because Westerlund received an exceptional downward sentence due to his youthfulness. We disagree with this argument. Regardless of the sentence Westerlund received, the court was required to “meaningfully consider how juveniles are different from adults, how those differences apply to the facts of the case, and whether those facts present the uncommon situation where the juvenile offender is just as culpable as an adult offender.” Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 286 (quoting State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 435, 387 P.3d 650 (2017)). Since Westerlund challenges the court’s application of this mandate, his sentence may still potentially fall under RAP 3.1’s definition of an “aggrieved party” who may seek appellate review. See State v. Rogers, 17 Wn. App. 2d 466, 468, 487 P.3d 177 (2021) (“recognizing that standardless and unreviewable sentencing could both allow arbitrary and biased decision-making and run afoul of our

6 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth

of the finding.” State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).

Under the dual mandate articulated in Houston-Sconiers, a sentencing court has

complete discretion to impose an appropriate sentence for a particular juvenile. In

crafting such a sentence, the court must consider the potential mitigating qualities of

youth. 188 Wn.2d at 23. These mitigating factors include:

(1) the juvenile’s age, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the nature of the juvenile’s family circumstances and surrounding environments; (3) the juvenile’s participation in the crime and the effect of any family or peer pressures; (4) how the juvenile’s youth impacted the legal defense; and (5) the juvenile’s chances of being successfully rehabilitated.

State v. Stewart, 27 Wn. App. 2d 441, 447, 532 P.3d 211 (2023); see also Houston-

Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23; In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 236, 474 P.3d

507 (2020). The sentencing court also must meaningfully consider the differences

between juveniles and adults, as well as how those differences apply to the case. Stewart,

27 Wn. App. 2d at 447-48.

As Westerlund does not contest that the court recognized its discretion to craft a

sentence outside the standard range or that it failed to thoroughly discuss each of the

state constitution’s guaranty of a defendant’s right to an appeal, such decisions must be capable of being entertained on appellate review.”)

7 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

Houston-Sconiers factors before finding Westerlund’s youth played a role in the

commission of the crime, we focus only on his specific contentions regarding retribution

and commensurate sentencing.

Westerlund argues that although the court found his youth impacted the crime

when it imposed a sentence below the standard range, the court’s sentence shows it must

not have truly appreciated the science surrounding youth brain development, which

presents greater possibilities for rehabilitation. As Westerlund argues in his reply brief,

“[s]imply acknowledging the truth that a child can rehabilitate is insufficient—the child’s

sentence must actually reflect that truth.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 34. Westerlund

reiterates this claim throughout his briefing, arguing that “[a] 32 year sentence for a child

cannot reflect anything but a desire for retribution and punishment,” and “a 32 year

sentence does not support [Westerlund’s] rehabilitation, does not reflect scientific

consensus, and does not reflect a belief that [Westerlund]—a child—can change.” Br. of

Appellant at 52-53, 56.

To support his argument, Westerlund points to some of the court’s comments that,

in his opinion, show the court “relied on the now-debunked trope that some children lack

humanity, cannot change, and should be punished accordingly.”

8 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

Br. of Appellant at 52. However, the comments Westerlund refers to occurred while the

court was explaining the sentencing procedure to the victims and the victims’ families,

before the court began its analysis.

The court explained how the law regarding juvenile sentencing has changed, not

because “somebody wants to be soft on crime” but because of science and research.

RP at 74.

The court said:

Frankly, on the one hand, it can be easy to say send [Westerlund] to jail until he’s 80 years old. It’s potentially an easy decision, off he goes, and no one thinks about it again. It is not easy to look at this young man sitting here and have some humility and humanity in planning because the act that brings him here lacks humanity that you all referred to for the victims in this case.”

RP at 75.

The court continued:

I can also tell you that if the Court attempts to use [sentencing] as a way to just exact retribution . . . against [Westerlund] on behalf of the victims, which is what you all seek, and I certainly understand that we will be back here doing this again. That’s what the law tells me I cannot do.

Quite the opposite of showing the court was focusing on retribution above

punishment, we read the court’s comments as an attempt to express understanding for the

victims’ pain, while preparing them for, as the court explained it, “a fact-finding

9 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

procedure that is focused on [Westerlund] and not what happened to the victims and their

families.” RP at 76.

Also contrary to Westerlund’s argument, the court clearly articulated its

understanding of the difference between youth and adults, both scientifically and from

personal observation. The court noted:

There are studies about the youthful brain, which have changed how the courts treat youthful offenders. Youth are different from adults. They are not mature, they do not make mature decisions. I have yet to meet a 14, 15, or 16-year-old who doesn’t think they are mature enough to make these decisions that they’re entitled to. It’s an indication of youth in my opinion. The systems, all the systems in a youth are still developing, but most specifically with regards to brain development.

RP at 77.

The court acknowledged that “youth have the ability to mature and change,”

particularly in an environment that provides the tools for growth. RP at 84. The court

recognized that, despite Westerlund’s criminal history and his actions in this case, he had

the ability to change.

We see no evidence that the court overemphasized punishment to the detriment of

rehabilitation. Regardless, as our Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed,

“[w]hile sentencing courts must focus on [the] mitigating qualities of youth, they must

also consider the facts of the particular case, including those that counsel in favor of

punishment.” Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 286. Once a trial court considers the qualities of

10 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

youth at sentencing, nothing prohibits it from imposing a lengthy sentence. See Pers.

Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 239-40; In re Pers. Restraint of Forcha-Williams, 200

Wn.2d 581, 605, 520 P.3d 939 (2022). The court’s comments throughout the sentencing

hearing showed it understood, considered, and applied the factors necessary for

sentencing a juvenile in adult court.

Commensurate Sentencing

Westerlund also argues the court improperly considered the SRA principle of

commensurate sentencing when making its decision. Specifically, Westerlund takes issue

with the trial court’s written findings:

Under the Sentencing Reform Act, this court is tasked with being as even- handed in the sentencing of those who come before it for like-type sentences. The court is attempting to keep in mind those others who the Court has sentenced and to remain commensurate in sentencing but also giving weight to youthfulness as required. Accountability needs to be upheld, despite the youthfulness presented here.

Clerk’s Papers at 92-93.

Westerlund argues this statement shows the court improperly resorted to the SRA

to craft its sentence. He argues that once the court determines youth played a role in the

crime, only constitutional principles govern sentencing, not legislative mandates.

See Reply Br. of Appellant at 27.

11 No. 40775-6-III State v. Westerlund

In support of this argument, Westerlund cites Rogers, 17 Wn. App. 2d 466. But

Rogers only reiterates the principle that “the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14

of our state constitution require that sentencing courts have complete discretion to

consider pertinent aspects of youth in arriving at a just sentence.” Id. Rogers does not

stand for the proposition that the court must entirely throw out the principles of the SRA,

for among these principles are considerations of public safety, providing a punishment

that is just, and offering the offender an opportunity to improve. RCW 9.94A.010. Here,

the court understood, as articulated in Houston-Sconiers, that it had “absolute discretion

to depart as far as [it] want[s] below otherwise applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing

enhancements.” 188 Wn.2d at 9. The court was not prohibited from considering SRA

principles in making its decision.

CONCLUSION

Relying on our recent decision in Boyce, we conclude the sentencing court

correctly included Westerlund’s juvenile offenses in his offender score. We also

conclude the court appropriately considered Westerlund’s youth at sentencing.

We affirm.

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A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

Hill, J.

WE CONCUR:

Staab, C.J. Murphy, J.