State of Washington v. Landmark Technology A LLC

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 15, 2023
• Docket: 2:21-cv-00728
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8

9 STATE OF WASHINGTON, Case No. 21-728RSM 10 Plaintiff, 11 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO v. STRIKE COUNTERCLAIMS 12 LANDMARK TECHNOLOGY A, LLC, 13

14 Defendant.

15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff State of Washington’s Motion to Strike 16 17 Counterclaims and Jury Demand, Dkt. #48. Defendant Landmark Technology A, LLC 18 opposes. Dkt. #51. Plaintiff has since withdrawn its request to strike Defendant’s jury 19 demand. Dkt. #53 at 2. Neither party has requested oral argument. 20 The Attorney General of the State of Washington brought this action to enforce the 21 22 provisions of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86 (“CPA”) and the Patent 23 Troll Prevention Act, RCW 19.350 (“PTPA”). A more detailed review of the original 24 Complaint and Defendant’s arguments for dismissal can be found at Dkt. #35. 25 Defendant Landmark, a North Carolina patent-assertion entity (“PAE”), has answered 26 the Amended Complaint with several affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Dkt. #45. The 27 28 affirmative defenses include, inter alia: failure to state a claim, preemption by federal patent law, unconstitutionality, lack of bad faith, no unfair or deceptive acts, no violation of RCW 1 2 19.86, no violation of RCW 19.350, that the patent was not “objectively baseless,” and many 3 other defenses along those lines. Id. at 41–43. The three counterclaims are titled as follows: 4 “declaratory judgment re: invalidity or preemption of Patent Troll Protection Act under first- 5 fifth & fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, and federal patent law;” 6 “declaratory judgment re: CPA is invalid and/or preempted as applied under first, fifth & 7 8 fourteenth amendments, as well as the supremacy and patent clauses of the U.S. Constitution 9 and title 35 of the U.S. code;” and “declaratory judgment regarding no violation of 10 Washington’s Consumer Protection Act.” Id. at 46–54. 11 Plaintiff now moves to strike the counterclaims as duplicative of Defendant’s 12 13 affirmative defenses. Dkt. #48. 14 A court may strike from a pleading “an insufficient defense or any redundant, 15 immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f) 16 motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating 17 spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins 18 19 Co., 697 F2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Motions to strike “are generally disfavored because they 20 are often used as delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal 21 practice.” Nelson v. United States Fed. Marshal's Serv., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38980, *3-4, 22 2017 WL 1037581 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (citing Rosales v. Citibank, 133 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1180 23 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). “In the context of counterclaims for declaratory relief, some courts use their 24 25 discretion to dismiss ‘mirror image’ counterclaims that are redundant of affirmative defenses or 26 claims found in the complaint.” Perez v. Guardian Roofing, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30302, *5 27 28 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (citing Rayman v. Peoples Sav. Corp. 735 F.Supp. 842, 852 (N.D.Ill.1990); 1 2 Daily v. Federal Ins. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46001, 2005 WL 14734 *6 (N.D.Cal.2005)). 3 In Perez, the court found that three counterclaims seeking declaratory judgment were 4 “redundant and nothing more than a mirror image of the Complaint.” Id. The court reasoned 5 that the counterclaims did not serve “any useful purpose” because “they raise no issues not also 6 raised by the Complaint” and because “decision on Complaint’s merits would render the 7 8 Counterclaims for declaratory judgment moot.” Id. The court also found that denying the 9 motion would prejudice the moving party, because allowing the redundant claims to proceed 10 would cause the trier of fact to be confused or draw unwarranted inferences at trial. Id. at *8. 11 Here, the Court finds that the counterclaims are duplicative of Defendant’s affirmative 12 13 defenses and redundant based on factual and legal issues raised in the Amended Complaint. 14 The Court’s decisions on Plaintiff’s claims will render the counterclaims moot. Unless 15 Defendant abandons its affirmative defenses, in ruling on Plaintiff’s claims, the Court will 16 necessarily need to rule on the constitutionality of the Patent Troll Protection Act and whether 17 it is preempted by Federal Patent law, same with the CPA. It goes without saying that the 18 19 Court will need to rule whether or not Defendant violated the CPA. To the extent Defendant’s 20 counterclaims seek declaratory judgments untethered to the actions of the parties, such are also 21 properly stricken under Rule 12(f) as immaterial to this case. While it is unclear whether the 22 Court needs to find that the counterclaims do not serve any useful purpose or that the denial of 23 the instant Motion would prejudice Plaintiff, the Court finds this case sufficiently analogous to 24 25 Perez to reach the same conclusions as in that case. These issues do not bar Plaintiff’s 26 requested relief. The Court hopes that granting this relief will, in some small way, streamline 27 this case and conserve resources. 28 Having reviewed the relevant briefing and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby 1 2 finds and ORDERS that the State of Washington’s Motion to Strike Counterclaims, Dkt. #48, is 3 GRANTED. Defendant’s counterclaims are STRICKEN. 4

5 DATED this 15th day of March, 2023. 6 A 7 8 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9

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