State of Washington v. Labarron Teshaun Conners

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedOctober 29, 2024
Docket58656-8
StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Washington v. Labarron Teshaun Conners (State of Washington v. Labarron Teshaun Conners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Washington v. Labarron Teshaun Conners, (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

October 29, 2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 58656-8-II

Respondent,

v.

LABARRON TESHAUN CONNERS, aka UNPUBLISHED OPINION CLAYTON T. KING, CLAYTON T KING, CLAYTON TYRONE KING, LABARRON CONNERS, LABARRON T. CONNERS, LABARRON TYSHAUN CONNERS,

Appellant.

CRUSER, C.J. — Labarron Conners pleaded guilty to second degree assault. As a condition

of Conners’ community custody, the superior court ordered a mental health evaluation and

treatment. Conners appeals, arguing that the superior court erred by ordering a mental health

evaluation without first finding him mentally ill and that this condition contributed to his offense

as required by RCW 9.94B.080. The State contends that the court properly ordered Conners to

undergo a mental health evaluation because it was undisputed that Conners suffered from a mental

illness that contributed to his offense. We affirm.

FACTS

In February 2021, Conners was voluntarily admitted to Wellfound Behavioral Health

Hospital (WBHH) due to “disease progression,” and his history of paranoid schizophrenia, suicidal No. 58656-8-II

ideation, and auditory hallucination. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 95. Conners was diagnosed with

schizoaffective disorder bipolar type and unspecified anxiety.

Shortly thereafter, Conners struck another patient in the face, breaking his jaw. Conners

was charged with second degree assault. The superior court ordered a competency evaluation at

defense counsel’s request.

The competency evaluation report, dated two years after the assault, concluded that

Conners presented no current symptoms of a genuine mental illness that significantly interfered

with his capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist in his own

defense. The evaluation also noted Conners’ significant mental health history, including “one

hearing and four investigations . . . , two previous competency evaluations, one period of

competency restoration services, psychotropic medications, and diagnoses related to psychosis and

antisocial behavior.” Id. at 21. Conners told the evaluator that he received services from several

behavioral health centers in the past four years. Consistent with the evaluator’s recommendation,

the court concluded that Conners was competent to stand trial.

Conners pleaded guilty to second degree assault. The court sentenced Conners to a term of

incarceration below the standard range on the recommendations of both the State and defense

counsel. Both parties emphasized Conners’ mental health concerns in making their

recommendations. In fact, Conners’ mental health and his need for treatment was the centerpiece

of his argument for a downward departure of his sentence. The court ordered Conners to complete

a mental health evaluation and any required treatment as a condition of community custody at

defense counsel’s request. The court did not enter any express, written findings in support of the

community custody conditions.

2 No. 58656-8-II

Conners appeals the trial court’s order for a mental health evaluation and treatment.

ANALYSIS

Conners argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to complete a mental health

evaluation and treatment without first finding that he has a mental illness as defined in RCW

71.24.025 and that this condition was likely to have contributed to the offense. We reject this

contention, however, because Conners invited the error of which he now complains. The

invited error doctrine prohibits “ ‘a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of

it on appeal.’ ” City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720, 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (quoting State v.

Pam, 101 Wn.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Olson,

126 Wn.2d 315, 893 P.2d 629 (1995)). In determining whether an error was invited, a reviewing

court considers “whether the defendant affirmatively assented to the error, materially contributed

to it, or benefited from it.” In re Pers. Restraint of Coggin, 182 Wn.2d 115, 119, 340 P.3d 810

(2014).

Here, Conners’ mental health and his need for treatment were central to his argument for

an exceptional sentence below the standard range. And Conners specifically requested that the

court order a mental health evaluation and treatment. Because Conners was the proponent of the

condition he now seeks to challenge on appeal, the invited error doctrine precludes review of the

merits of his alleged error.

Even if this error were not invited, a superior court may impose crime-related community

custody conditions at sentencing. State v. Brooks, 142 Wn. App. 842, 850, 176 P.3d 549 (2008).

Relevant here, a court may order a mental health evaluation and resulting treatment as a condition

of community custody “if the court finds that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the offender

3 No. 58656-8-II

is a mentally ill person as defined in RCW 71.24.025, and that this condition is likely to have

influenced the offense.” RCW 9.94B.080. The mental health evaluation order may be “based on a

presentence report and . . . mental status evaluations that have been filed with the court.” Id.; see

also State v. Shelton, 194 Wn. App. 660, 676 n.11, 378 P.3d 230 (2016).

Although Conners contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to

complete a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment we note that Conners fails

to articulate whether his complaint centers on the trial court’s failure to enter specific written

findings, or whether he simply contends that the trial court’s oral findings are insufficient to

support the community custody condition. To the extent that Conners complains that the trial court

failed to enter written findings in support of the condition, Conners cites to no authority requiring

the trial court to make express, written findings under RCW 9.94B.080. Where, as here, “no

authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities,

but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” DeHeer v. Seattle Post-

Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962).

To the extent Conners argues that the evidence before the superior court was insufficient

to support the required findings, we again disagree because defense counsel argued to the court

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Related

DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer
372 P.2d 193 (Washington Supreme Court, 1962)
State v. Pam
680 P.2d 762 (Washington Supreme Court, 1984)
State v. Olson
893 P.2d 629 (Washington Supreme Court, 1995)
City of Seattle v. Patu
58 P.3d 273 (Washington Supreme Court, 2002)
State Of Washington v. Michael Christopher Shelton
378 P.3d 230 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2016)
City of Seattle v. Patu
147 Wash. 2d 717 (Washington Supreme Court, 2002)
In re the Personal Restraint of Coggin
340 P.3d 810 (Washington Supreme Court, 2014)
State v. Brooks
176 P.3d 549 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2008)

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