FILED DECEMBER 18, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40913-9-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) KAYDEN RAY CHISUM, ) ) Appellant. )
MURPHY, J. — Kayden Ray Chisum appeals from his convictions for first degree
rape of a child and first degree child molestation. He was charged and convicted in adult
court after a jury trial.
On June 6, 2024, legislative amendments took effect to various statutes on
juvenile court jurisdiction found in the Juvenile Justice Act, chapter 13.40 RCW, and
Basic Juvenile Court Act, chapter 13.04 RCW. See LAWS OF 2024, ch. 117. Former
RCW 13.40.300 (2019) was amended such that juvenile court jurisdiction was expanded,
with several exceptions, to include any individual: 1) under the age of 21 at the time of
the filing of the information, and 2) accused of committing a criminal offense that
occurred when the individual was under the age of 18. The legislature specifically
provided that these statutory changes would apply to cases pending on the effective date No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
of the amendments. LAWS OF 2024, ch. 117, § 5(2). Chisum was born in late March
2001. 1 On February 25, 2022, when Chisum was 20 years old, he was charged in Chelan
County Superior Court with offense conduct that was alleged to have occurred when he
was 13 to 15 years old.
Chisum assigns error as follows: (1) his case was improperly tried in adult court
in violation of statutory changes requiring that the charged offenses be adjudicated
through juvenile court, (2) insufficient consideration of the mitigating effects of youth
at sentencing, (3) improper admittance at trial of hearsay and demeanor evidence,
(4) prosecutorial misconduct, and (5) ineffective assistance of counsel.
We agree that once the amendments to RCW 13.40.300 became effective on June
6, 2024, the juvenile court held exclusive jurisdiction over Chisum’s case. We reverse
Chisum’s convictions and remand for the judgment and sentence to be vacated with his
case transferred to juvenile court for adjudication. In light of this disposition, it is not
necessary to review Chisum’s other assignments of error.
FACTS
Because our review is focused on a specific question of law, recitation of the
underlying facts is abbreviated. When Chisum was a teenager, he babysat his cousins
1 Because juvenile jurisdiction is at issue in this case, Chisum’s date of birth, age at the times of the alleged offense conduct, and age when the charges were filed are relevant to our review.
2 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
T.P. and B.P. 2 In 2021, T.P. and B.P. disclosed Chisum had sexually abused them. These
acts were alleged to have occurred between January 1, 2015, and January 1, 2017, at
which time Chisum was between 13 to 15 years old and both T.P. and B.P. were under
the age of 12. On February 25, 2022, when Chisum was 20 years old, he was charged
with one count each of first degree rape of a child and first degree child molestation.
Chisum was prosecuted in adult court without a hearing on the question of
declining jurisdiction. At the time the case was initiated, the charged offenses were not
auto-decline offenses and were not classified to prompt a discretionary decline hearing.
In adult court, Chisum exercised his right to a jury trial. His first trial ended in a mistrial.
Chisum’s case proceeded to trial for a second time on November 19, 2024. The jury
found Chisum guilty as charged. Chisum was sentenced at the low end of the standard
sentencing range for each count, 120 months on the first degree rape of a child conviction
and 67 months on the first degree child molestation conviction, to be served concurrently,
followed by 36 months of community custody.
Chisum now appeals.
2 To protect the privacy interests of the minor children, we use their first and last name initials throughout the body of this opinion. Gen. Order 2012-1 of Division III, In re Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for Child Victims or Child Witnesses (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders_ orddisp&ordnumber=2012_001&div=III.
3 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
ANALYSIS
1. Standard of review
We review jurisdictional challenges de novo. In re Marriage of Shortway, 4 Wn.
App. 2d 409, 418, 423 P.3d 270 (2018). Whether a particular court has jurisdiction is a
question of law. Young v. Clark, 149 Wn.2d 130, 132, 65 P.3d 1192 (2003).
In interpreting a statute, “this court looks first to its plain language.” State v.
Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). “If the plain language is subject
to only one interpretation, our inquiry ends because plain language does not require
construction.” HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 166 Wn.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297
(2009). “If the statutory language is both plain and unambiguous, the meaning we give
the statute must be derived from the statutory language itself.” In re Adoption of T.A.W.,
186 Wn.2d 828, 840, 383 P.3d 492 (2016). “To ascertain the statute’s plain meaning,
we may examine (1) the entirety of the statute in which the disputed provision is found,
(2) related statutes, or (3) other provisions within the same act.” Id. (citing Dep’t of
Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).
2. Statutory changes to juvenile jurisdiction
A new law took effect on June 6, 2024, with the legislature amending various
statutes on juvenile court jurisdiction found in the Juvenile Justice Act and Basic Juvenile
Court Act. LAWS OF 2024, ch. 117. Extensive revisions were made to RCW 13.40.300
4 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
relating to the commitment of a juvenile to a rehabilitation facility and to the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court over an individual after their 18th birthday. The following section
that was added to the statute is particularly relevant to our review:
(2)(a) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over, and may place an individual under the authority of the department [of children, youth and families] in the following circumstances: (i) Except as provided under RCW 13.04.030 and 13.40.110, when the individual is under the age of 21 at the time of the filing of the information and is accused of committing a criminal offense that occurred when the individual was under the age of 18 . . . .
RCW 13.40.300(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added). This amendment expanded juvenile court
jurisdiction, giving two factors for the application of juvenile court jurisdiction: (1) the
individual is under the age of 21 at the time of filing of the information, and (2) the
alleged offense occurred before the individual reached 18 years of age. The exceptions to
these two factors are when (1) adult court has exclusive jurisdiction over a juvenile as a
result of RCW 13.04.030, the proverbial “auto-decline” statute, or (2) when pursuant to
RCW 13.40.110 the adult court establishes jurisdiction through a discretionary
declination hearing if certain criteria are met for such a hearing to be held.
These legislative amendments help to account for individuals involved in the
criminal justice system based on their actual ages at the time of their alleged offenses.
There are substantial differences in protections afforded to individuals adjudicated
5 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
through juvenile court versus those prosecuted in adult court. See State v. Saenz, 175
Wn.2d 167, 173, 283 P.3d 1094 (2012).
One of the biggest differences between juvenile court and adult court is the
sentencing ranges. Chisum was sentenced to a decade in prison. Under adult sentencing
guidelines, the calculated standard range for Chisum for first degree rape of a child was
120 to 160 months; the standard range for first degree child molestation was 67 to 89
months. The trial court sentenced Chisum to 120 months on the rape of a child
conviction, and 67 months on the child molestation conviction, to be served concurrently
for a total term of incarceration of 120 months.
In comparison with sentencing standards in juvenile court that were in effect
during time period of Chisum’s alleged offense conduct (former RCW 13.40.0357 (1997)
and former RCW 13.40.180 (2012)), rape of a child in the first degree and child
molestation in the first degree were classified as A- offenses, with 15- to 36-week
standard ranges for individuals with no prior juvenile adjudications, to run consecutively.
The standard range would increase to 30 to 40 weeks per count if Chisum had been found
to be between 15 and 17 years of age at the time of the offense conduct. 3 In 2018, the
standard range for category A- offenses became 30 to 40 weeks regardless of the age of
3 The jury sitting in adult court was not asked to find Chisum’s age at the time of the alleged offenses.
6 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
the offender at the time of the offense conduct. See LAWS OF 2018, ch. 162, § 6.
Assuming it could be established that Chisum was under the age of 15 at the time of his
alleged offense conduct, the total juvenile disposition, at most, for these two charges was
30 to 72 weeks. This is compared to the adult prison sentence Chisum received, that was
at the very bottom of the standard range, of 120 months on the rape of a child, and 67
months on the child molestation, to run concurrently.
In addition to the dramatic differences between the time in custody, one of the
fundamental purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act is to effectuate the rehabilitation of an
adjudicated individual. State v. K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d 745, 754, 374 P.3d 1141 (2016).
Sentences on juvenile adjudications are served in juvenile rehabilitation facilities
designed with youth programing for education, counseling, and therapy. See Tommy P. v.
Bd. of County Comm’rs of Spokane County, 97 Wn.2d 385, 388, 645 P.2d 697 (1982). In
addition, depending on the disposition and the court findings, a juvenile record may be
sealed upon completion of disposition. See State v. Garza, 200 Wn.2d 449, 458-459, 518
P.3d 1029 (2022). A sealed conviction typically has the result of reducing stigma later in
life as there is no public access to post-sealed juvenile convictions. Given this context,
whether Chisum was properly tried in adult court, or whether juvenile court had
jurisdiction over his conduct has significant impacts on Chisum in relation to the length
of his sentence, but also to his life in general.
7 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
Here, Chisum was between 13 and 15 years old when the criminal conduct was
alleged to have occurred. Charges were filed when Chisum was 20 years old. The
exceptions to RCW 13.40.300(2)(a)(i) did not apply. The auto-decline exception, under
RCW 13.04.030, does not apply because of the age range of Chisum at the time of the
alleged offenses. See RCW 13.04.030(1)(v). The discretionary decline exception, under
RCW 13.40.110, does not apply because the claimed offenses were not classified to
prompt a discretionary decline hearing, i.e., they were not classified as a serious violent
offense or murder. See RCW 13.04.110(1).
3. Amended RCW 13.40.300 applies to Chisum’s case
The legislature determined its amendments to RCW 13.40.300(2) and
RCW 13.40.110 would “apply to all cases in which charges are pending on [June 6,
2024], and to all cases in which charges are filed on or after [June 6, 2024].” LAWS OF
2024, ch. 117, § 5(2). On June 6, 2024, Chisum’s case had been pending in adult court
for over two years. At that time of the effective date of these statutory amendments,
Chisum’s case should have been transferred to juvenile court for adjudication. This
transfer, based on the legislature’s statutory amendments, should have occurred at least
before the November 2024 impaneling of a jury in adult court.
The State has offered several reasons why RCW 13.40.300 is not applicable to
Chisum’s case. We address each of these arguments in turn.
8 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
3.1 Error preservation
The State argues the error Chisum complains of was not preserved as he did not
object to his case being heard in adult court and did not, at any point, ask to have his case
moved to juvenile court. The State frames this as a statutory issue, not a constitutional or
jurisdictional one, and asserts that an objection must be made at the trial court level to
preserve the error for review by an appellate court.
We generally decline to review an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See
RAP 2.5(a). “The appellate courts will not sanction a party’s failure to point out at trial an
error which the trial court, if given the opportunity, might have been able to correct to
avoid an appeal and a consequent new trial.” State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685, 757
P.2d 492 (1988). However, an exception to RAP 2.5 permits a party to raise a “manifest
error affecting a constitutional right” for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3). This
exception is narrow and does not permit all asserted constitutional claims to be raised for
the first time on appeal. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 934, 155 P.3d 125
(2007). Rather, the asserted error must be “manifest,” which requires a showing of actual
prejudice. Id. at 935. To demonstrate actual prejudice, there must be a plausible showing
by the appellant that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences during
trial. State v. WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595, 603, 980 P.2d 1257 (1999). “[T]he focus of
the actual prejudice must be on whether the error is so obvious on the record that the
9 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
error warrants appellate review.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99-100, 217 P.3d 756
(2009).
Jurisdictional defects may be raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(1).
The June 2024 changes to the juvenile statutes have both constitutional and jurisdictional
consequences. Chisum correctly articulates that it is proper to raise a jurisdictional
challenge for the first time at the appellate court level, and that this is a jurisdictional
challenge. A claim of jurisdictional error may be raised for the first time on appeal if
it is either a manifest error affecting a constitutional right or a jurisdictional error. See
RAP 2.5(a). Likewise, illegal or erroneous sentences may be challenged for the first time
on appeal. See State v. Haas, 33 Wn. App. 2d 344, 347, 561 P.3d 299 (2024), review
denied, 4 Wn.3d 1025, 567 P.3d 1108 (2025). We review jurisdictional challenges
de novo. State v. Salavea, 151 Wn.2d 133, 140-41, 86 P.3d 125 (2004). The challenges
Chisum makes to his case proceeding in adult court, in light of the legislature’s
amendment to RCW 13.40.300, are properly before this court on appeal.
3.2 Felony jurisdiction
The State argues that the constitution grants jurisdiction to superior courts in all
felony cases. This principle is cited in the context of the State’s argument that the
legislature cannot rescind constitutional jurisdiction or vest jurisdiction exclusively in
another court. The State argues that because adult superior court had jurisdiction to hear
10 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
Chisum’s case because he was charged with felonies, there are no constitutional
implications to having Chisum’s case proceed in adult court versus juvenile court.
It is correct that the legislature cannot rescind the constitutional jurisdiction of
superior courts. The general jurisdiction of a superior court is not diminished by the
creation of the juvenile court, however. The legislature “has the power to ‘distribute and
assign a phase of business of the superior court’ and to ‘prescribe the mode of procedure
by which the superior court shall initiate, process and apply the remedies made available’
for juveniles.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 2 (quoting Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d
331, 352-53, 413 P.2d 940, 422 P.2d 783 (1966)). Juvenile court, which is assigned the
business of conducting juvenile adjudications for which they have jurisdiction, is the
proper forum, in accordance with RCW 13.40.300, for Chisum’s case.
3.2 Chisum’s age when the information was filed
The State also argues that the new law created in RCW 13.40.300 is inapplicable
to Chisum because Chisum was 23 years old at the time the statute went into effect. The
State argues that juvenile court lost jurisdiction over Chisum when he turned 21 years
old. Therefore, because Chisum turned 21 well in advance of the amendment to the law,
the 2024 change in the law did not apply to Chisum. See Br. of Resp’t at 8.
11 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
The statute states:
(2)(a) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over, and may place an individual under the authority of the department in the following circumstances: (i) . . . when the individual is under the age of 21 at the time of the filing of the information and is accused of committing a criminal offense that occurred when the individual was under the age of 18 . . . . .... (5) Except as otherwise provided herein, in no event may the juvenile court have authority to extend jurisdiction over any juvenile offender beyond the juvenile offender’s 21st birthday.
RCW 13.40.300(2)(a)(i), (5). The statute concedes through the use of the word “except”
that there are provisions within the statute that dictate when juvenile court has
jurisdiction over a case. As we have discussed previously, the applicability of the
amended statute turns on the person’s age at the time of filing of the information, not the
person’s age at the effective date of the amended law. The State’s reading of the statute,
to say that the law would not apply to Chisum because Chisum was 23 years old at the
time the jurisdictional amendments came into effect would nullify this law for its
intended beneficiaries. This law is applicable to Chisum.
3.3 Juvenile sentencing options
The State also contends, in support of its argument that RCW 13.40.300 does not
apply to Chisum, that juvenile court cannot sentence Chisum for placement in a juvenile
rehabilitation facility past his 23rd birthday, which has already passed. Br. of Resp’t at 9.
12 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
RCW 13.40.300(1)(c) provides:
(1) Except as provided in (a) through (c) of this subsection, a juvenile offender may not be committed by the juvenile court to the department for placement in a juvenile rehabilitation facility beyond the juvenile offender’s 21st birthday. .... (c) A juvenile offender who is 18 or older at the time of the adjudication may be committed by the juvenile court to the department for placement in a juvenile rehabilitation facility up to the juvenile offender’s 23rd birthday, but not beyond, in order to serve a standard range disposition.
Here, if Chisum is convicted, after going through the juvenile adjudication process
on remand, then the adult court can sentence Chisum consistent with the standard
juvenile range.
Our Supreme Court, in State v. Posey, 174 Wn.2d 131, 272 P.3d 840 (2012),
provides insight on this issue. In 2003, 16-year-old Daniel Posey Jr. was charged in
juvenile court with three counts of second degree rape and one count of first degree
assault while armed with a firearm. Posey, 174 Wn.2d at 133-34. Because the assault
charge was classified as a “serious violent offense,” Posey’s case was auto-declined to
adult court. Id. at 134. A jury convicted Posey of two counts of second degree rape and
acquitted him of one count of second degree rape and the first degree assault charge. Id.
Posey was sentenced in adult court to a minimum term of 119 months’ incarceration. Id.
Posey appealed, claiming that the adult court no longer had jurisdiction to sentence him
as an adult after his acquittal on the first degree assault charge. Id. The Supreme Court
13 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
agreed and remanded Posey’s case to juvenile court for further proceedings. Id. Posey
turned 21 years old one month after the Supreme Court’s mandate but prior to the
juvenile court sentencing proceedings on remand. Id. At the sentencing hearing in
juvenile court, Posey’s counsel moved to dismiss, arguing that because his client had
since turned 21 years of age the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to proceed with
sentencing. Id. The judge presiding over the juvenile court proceedings agreed with the
jurisdictional argument and subsequently, acting in their role as a superior court judge,
sentenced Posey to a “juvenile standard range disposition of 60 to 80 weeks.” Id. at 134-
35. Posey appealed his sentence, arguing that by operation of statute, neither the juvenile
court nor the superior court had jurisdiction to sentence him for his crimes of conviction.
The Supreme Court disagreed and noted that because article IV, section 6 of the
Washington Constitution vests jurisdiction in the superior courts over all felony offenses,
the superior court “possessed jurisdiction to sentence Posey.” Id. at 140-41. “[The
legislature does not have the power to alter the constitutional jurisdiction of a superior
court under article IV.” Id. at 142.
Here, although the issue in this case is not directly on point with Posey, that case is
helpful to our analysis. Posey was sentenced to a juvenile sentence in adult court after it
was determined the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction. Here, the juvenile court has
jurisdiction over Chisum’s case, but if Chisum on remand is adjudicated guilty, he could
14 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
not be commitment to a department juvenile rehabilitation facility because he is already
past the age of 23.
It is noted that if Chisum is adjudicated guilty in juvenile court as charged, and if
he is sentenced to a juvenile court standard range sentence, he would likely have already
served his time in custody. Therefore, RCW 13.40.300(1)(c) may not apply because he
may not be required to be placed in a juvenile rehabilitation facility. While commitment
may be limited in this particular case, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction for other
dispositions such as community supervision, restitution, or treatment. RCW 13.40.300(4);
RCW 13.40.0357. On remand, if Chisum is adjudicated guilty, the juvenile court can
craft an appropriate remedy within statutory bounds.
3.5 Invited error
The State argues that if there was an error, then Chisum invited it by demanding
a jury trial in adult court and is now precluded from raising a claim of error. See Br. of
Resp’t at 10. The State claims Chisum “primarily assented to and contributed to the error
by demanding he receive a jury trial (a 12-person jury trial specifically).” Id. at 11.
“‘The [invited error] doctrine applies when a party takes affirmative and voluntary
action that induces the trial court to take the action that that party later challenges on
appeal.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Salinas, 189 Wn.2d 747, 757, 408 P.3d 344 (2018)
(alteration in original). “‘In determining whether the invited error doctrine applies,
15 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
we have considered whether the defendant affirmatively assented to the error, materially
contributed to it, or benefited from it.’” Id. at 755 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of
Coggin, 182 Wn.2d 115, 119, 340 P.3d 8101 (2009)).
There is no evidence in the record before us that the State moved to transfer the
case to juvenile court and Chisum objected. There is no evidence in the record that
Chisum requested he be prosecuted in adult court. Rather, Chisum, who was being
prosecuted in adult court, asserted his right to a jury trial as any other defendant in adult
court may demand. Chisum did not affirmatively assent to the alleged jurisdictional error,
nor did he invite it. Chisum certainly did not benefit from the error. 4 The amendment
post-dated charging of the information in adult court, and so no invitation by Chisum
occurred. Moreover, proceeding without objection does not waive a post-enactment
jurisdictional claim based on an amended statute.
3.6 Harmless error
Finally, the State argues that even if it was an error to keep Chisum’s case in adult
court, then the error was harmless. The State claims that although a juvenile sentence
would have been a fraction of the adult sentencing range, the adult sentencing court was
4 The State argued Chisum benefited from the error because the State 1) had to convince 12 jurors beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes, 2) jury nullification was possible, and 3) jury convictions are vulnerable to reversal due to evidentiary errors that typically occur at jury trials. As the State did not cite any legal authority to support these arguments, and we do not give weight to it.
16 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
“free to impose any sentence from within the standard range all the way down to zero
days based on Chisum’s youthfulness.” Br. of Resp’t at 15. Therefore, the State claims
that Chisum had the opportunity to get the same sentence in adult court as he would have
received in the juvenile court—making any error harmless.
Chisum disagrees and points out that had he been convicted in juvenile court,
his charges would be capable of being sealed. He further identifies that there is a
presumption that a standard range for juvenile dispositions is proper absent a finding of
manifest injustice, whereas under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94
RCW, it is the defendant’s burden to prove a substantial and compelling reason for an
exceptional sentence below the standard range.
We agree that the ramifications of Chisum’s case proceeding in adult court, rather
than through the juvenile justice system, do not support the assertion that any error was
harmless. In light of the many articulated reasons for the creation of the Juvenile Justice
Act of 1977 and the Basic Juvenile Court Act, individuals would choose to be
adjudicated in juvenile court.
4. Sentencing
The State argues that if an error occurred, and if that error was not harmless, then
the obvious remedy is not reversal of the convictions, but remand for resentencing with a
juvenile standard range disposition. Chisum replies that the legislature has not authorized
17 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
that he be tried as an adult, in adult court, before a jury. Therefore, the jury verdicts
finding him guilty are nullities and cannot be used to support an adult sentence or a jury
disposition. He contends a contrary construction would allow Washington courts to
convene juries to try all juvenile cases regardless of how young the individuals are.
Here, once the statutory amendments became effective on June 6, 2024, the
juvenile court had jurisdiction over Chisum’s case. There was, therefore, no authority to
convene a jury to serve as fact finder in adult court. See RCW 13.04.021(2) (identifying
that cases in juvenile court shall be tried without a jury). Therefore, the jury verdicts are
void. On remand, the judgment and sentence is to be vacated. Chisum’s case is to be
transferred to juvenile court for adjudication pursuant to the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977
and the Basic Juvenile Court Act.
5. Other assignments of error
Chisum’s other assignments of error on appeal are not reviewed in light of remand
for the judgment and sentence to be vacated and the case to be transferred to juvenile
court for adjudication through the Juvenile Justice Act and Basic Juvenile Court Act.
CONCLUSION
Absent proper jurisdiction in adult court, the convictions are void. We reverse
Chisum’s convictions and remand with instructions to vacate the judgment and sentence
18 No. 40913-9-III State v. Chisum
and transfer the matter to juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 and the Basic Juvenile Court Act.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Murphy, J. WE CONCUR:
____________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. Staab, J.