State Of Washington, V Karen Denise Abron

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 87828-0-I

Respondent,

DIVISION ONE

v.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

KAREN DENISE ABRON (AKA HILL),

Appellant.

BUI, J. — Karen Abron 1 used her employer’s credit card to make personal purchases and exerted unauthorized control over property totaling more than $172,000. Abron pleaded guilty to theft in the first degree and identity theft in the first degree. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a condition requiring Abron to inform her current and future prospective employers of her convictions. On appeal, Abron argued the trial court lacked authority to impose the condition. We agree and reverse.

FACTS

Abron was employed by MacDonald, Hoague, and Bayless law firm as a firm administrator. 2 In her role, she was given access to corporate credit cards to make business-related purchases on the firm’s behalf. The written policy covering employee credit card usage required prompt submission of receipts, or

1 Also known as “Hill.”

2 The parties stipulated that the facts contained in the certification for determination of probable cause and prosecutor’s summary are “real and material facts” for purposes of sentencing.

in the case of lost receipts, an explanation of the purchase and its business purpose. During Abron’s employment, the law firm had issues with Abron not turning in receipts for company credit card use. The firm became suspicious of Abron’s use of the company credit cards and decided to investigate.

On January 15, 2020, one of the firm’s partners, Joseph Shaeffer, called Amazon about large purchases that did not appear to be legitimate business purchases. Amazon verified most of the purchases reportedly made for the firm were delivered to Abron’s old home address, and the purchases included hair products, hair extensions, beauty products, vitamins, and supplements. Schaeffer also reviewed the financial records of the firm and record of Abron’s use of company credit cards. He discovered that Abron was ordering personal items from websites, paying her personal bills, and ordering gift cards exceeding $1,000. In total, the firm sustained a loss of $172,377.33 from Abron’s unauthorized personal purchases.

On January 16, the firm confronted Abron about the purchases. Abron resigned the same day.

In August 2023, the State charged Abron with two class B felonies, 3 one count of theft in the first degree and one count of identity theft in the first degree, with aggravating factors of major economic offenses.

Abron agreed to plead guilty to the original charges following the State amending the information to remove the aggravating factors. In her statement of guilt, Abron stated she, “wrongfully exerted unauthorized control over property

3 See RCW 9A.56.030(2); 9.35.020(2).

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[totaling $172,377.33] of MacDonald, Hoague, and Bayless by color or aid of deception.” And “knowingly used the financial information (a credit card number) of another person with the intent to commit the crime of theft.”

The parties presented an agreed recommendation, except the State’s recommended jail time, and the State’s recommendation of the sentence condition that Abron must inform current, future, and prospective employers of her convictions.

At sentencing, the court ordered Abron to “inform her current and any future prospective employer of these convictions.” The trial court also entered a restitution order separate from the judgment and sentence.

Abron timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

Abron contends the trial court lacked authority to impose the condition that she must inform her current and any future prospective employer of her convictions. We agree.

A trial court’s sentencing authority is limited to that granted by statute.

In re Post–Sentence Review of Combs, 176 Wn. App. 112, 117, 308 P.3d 763 (2013) (citing State v. Skillman, 60 Wn. App. 837, 838, 809 P.2d 756 (1991)). Whether a sentencing court has exceeded its statutory authority is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Murray, 118 Wn. App. 518, 521, 77 P.3d 1188 (2003).

Under RCW 9.94A.505(9), which provides that “[a]s a part of any sentence, the court may impose and enforce crime-related prohibitions and

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affirmative conditions as provided in this chapter.” The phrase “as provided in this chapter” does not require crime-related prohibitions to be authorized by some other provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW. State v. Acrey, 135 Wn. App. 938, 943-44, 146 P.3d 1215 (2006); see also State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 114, 156 P.3d 201 (2007) (RCW 9.94A.505(9) constitutes independent grant of authority to impose crime-related prohibitions). The “as provided in this chapter” qualifier does apply, however, to crime-related prohibitions with affirmative conditions. See Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d at 114; Acrey, 135 Wn. App. at 943-44.

Crime-related prohibitions may not include orders that direct an offender to perform affirmative conduct. State v. Button, 184 Wn. App. 442, 446, 339 P.3d 182 (2014) (citing RCW 9.94A.030(10); Acrey, 135 Wn. App. at 945). “ ‘Persons may be punished for their crimes[,] and they may be prohibited from doing things which are directly related to their crimes, but they may not be coerced into doing things which are believed will rehabilitate them.’ ” State v. Parramore, 53 Wn. App. 527, 530, 768 P.2d 530 (1989) 4 (quoting DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON, § 4.5 (1985)). “Consequently, any order directing an offender to affirmatively do something is an affirmative condition and must be expressly authorized by the SRA.” Button, 184 Wn. App. at 447.

The sentencing condition directs Abron to “inform her current, and any future prospective employer of these convictions.” Because the condition directs

4 Emphasis omitted.

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Abron to do something, it is an affirmative condition. The issue becomes whether the condition is expressly authorized by the SRA.

The parties disagree whether the trial court’s sentencing condition was expressly authorized by the SRA, under RCW 9.94A.753(8).

RCW 9.94A.753(8) provides in relevant part,

“an offender who has been found guilty of an offense involving fraud or other deceptive practice . . . may be ordered by the sentencing court to give notice of the conviction to the class of persons or to the sector of the public affected by the conviction or financially interested in the subject matter of the offense. . . .”

The statute authorizes the trial court to order a sentencing condition requiring notice be given to “the class of persons or to the sector of the public affected by the conviction or financially interested in the subject matter of the offense.” RCW 9.94A.753(8).

It is not disputed that Abron’s crime involved financial deception because she used her employer’s credit card to make unauthorized, personal purchases, and represented the purchases were for the employer. Accordingly, the trial court may subject her to give notice to entities provided in RCW 9.94.A.753(8). For example, notice may be given to the sector of the public that was affected by or financially interested in Hill’s offenses, which could be law firms or institutions such as banks, mortgage companies, or entities employing Hill to manage its financials. However, the sentencing condition does not limit notice to only employers within those classes or categories. Rather, Abron was ordered to inform current and any future employers of her convictions. 5 The condition is too

5 Emphasis added.

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broad to comport with RCW 9.94A.753(8). Therefore, it is not authorized under RCW 9.94A.505(9).

Abron asserts even if the condition was authorized, the trial court did not have the authority to impose a condition that did not contain a temporal expiration. A sentence may not exceed the statutory maximum term for the crime. See 9.94A.505(5); see also RCW 9A.20.021(1)(b) (class B felonies can be punished for a maximum of 10 years). There is no dispute that Abron’s crimes are class B felonies. The State concedes error that the condition did not have a temporal limitation. We accept the concession.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and sentencing condition, and remand to the trial court to strike the condition from the judgment and sentence.

WE CONCUR: