IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 85214-1-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JOSE LUIS BELETZUY CAJAS,
Appellant.
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — José Luís Beletzuy Cajas appeals his conviction for
one count of rape in the second degree against his wife, R. He contends that
insufficient evidence supports the element of forcible compulsion under RCW
9A.44.050(1)(a). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
record shows that Beletzuy 1 used force to overcome R’s resistance and raped her
while she was physically compromised and recovering from a serious surgery.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 3, 2020, the State charged Beletzuy with one count of rape
in the second degree against his wife, R, and a separate count of assault in the
1 While the charging document, and therefore caption from the trial court, inserts a hyphen
between Beletzuy Cajas’ patrilineal and matrilineal last names, the record establishes that he signs his name simply as Beletzuy. His method of abbreviation of his last names is consistent with Latinx naming conventions and both the defendant and named victim required the use of Spanish- language interpreters during trial. Accordingly, we decline to utilize the hyphenated version of his name as inconsistent with historical and cultural traditions of Latinx communities and rather refer to the defendant in the manner by which he self-identifies. No. 85214-1-I/2
fourth degree with sexual motivation against his adult stepdaughter, C, and alleged
both were crimes of domestic violence. Thereafter, the State filed an amended
information that added three separate counts of rape in the third degree against R.
Again, each count was designated as a crime of domestic violence.
Following jury selection and motions in limine, the case proceeded to trial
and the parties delivered opening statements on December 19, 2022. R testified
to her relationship 2 with Beletzuy and the circumstances that gave rise to the
charges against him. The two met approximately 15 years earlier and began
dating about 8 years after meeting. Beletzuy moved into R’s house after they had
been dating for a little under a year and they were soon married. R explained that
they had consensual sex two to three times per week during their relationship,
which Beletzuy would often initiate either verbally or nonverbally.
When asked whether Beletzuy had nonconsensual sex with her, R said
plainly, “Yes.” She explained that, to her, nonconsensual sex means that
“someone’s not ready to have sexual relationships [sic] with the [other] person.” R
then testified that Beletzuy had nonconsensual sex with her “[v]ery often” during
their relationship. According to R, in those instances, Beletzuy “would take off [her]
clothes, [they] would struggle, then he would have sexual relationships [sic] with
[her] and then [she] would go to sleep.” R confirmed that she would tell him no,
but she was unable to physically stop him from having sex with her.
R explained that, in 2019 and 2020, she was suffering from a hormonal
disorder and began taking medication which lowered her sex drive. During that
2 At the time of the trial, R and Beletzuy were still married, but R had initiated divorce
proceedings.
-2- No. 85214-1-I/3
time, however, R said that Beletzuy continued to have sex with her on a regular
basis without her consent. She testified in detail about her medical condition and
the particular facts underlying each of the charged crimes. 3 The jury returned
verdicts of guilty on all counts except for count 4. By way of special verdicts, the
jury found that the remaining counts all involved domestic violence and that count
2 was committed with sexual motivation.
Following trial, Beletzuy moved under CrR 7.4(a)(3) to arrest judgment on
count 1. He contended that the State failed to prove the element of “forcible
compulsion” as required for the crime of rape in the second degree. After taking
argument from the parties on the motion, the trial court denied it. The trial court
found that the evidence showed forcible compulsion because: R physically and
verbally resisted Beletzuy’s sexual advances, she was crying and told him that she
was in pain, “she was in a weak and debilitated state” so “the forcible compulsion
needed would not have been the same as it would [with] somebody who was able-
bodied and in possession of their full strength,” and the “victim doesn’t have to
resist continually throughout the process of penetration.”4
3 Because Beletzuy only appeals from the conviction for rape in the second degree by
forcible compulsion in count 1, the facts underlying that count are set out in detail in the analysis section. 4 Beletzuy does not expressly challenge the trial court’s finding of forcible compulsion in its
ruling on the defense motion under CrR 7.4(a)(3). The State contends that the unchallenged findings become verities on appeal and cites to City of Seattle v. Wiggins, 23 Wn. App. 2d 401, 407, 515 P.3d 1029 (2022). However, Wiggins is distinguishable as that case concerned discretionary review of the superior court’s application of the Rules for Appeal for Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ) to a pretrial ruling from the district court on the admissibility of certain evidence. Id. at 403. Here, we are faced with a criminal defendant raising a claim of insufficient evidence on direct appeal after a conviction by a jury, which we review de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016).
-3- No. 85214-1-I/4
At sentencing, Beletzuy moved to vacate the rape in the third degree
conviction on count 3 on the basis that it merged with the rape in the second degree
conviction on count 1. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed count 3.
The court then sentenced Beletzuy to 29 months in prison on count 5, 120 months
to life on count 1, and 364 days for count 2, all to run concurrently.
Beletzuy timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Beletzuy’s sole assignment of error goes to his conviction for rape in the
second degree on the ground that the State failed to prove the element of forcible
compulsion. His position lacks merit.
Due process “requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
facts necessary to constitute the crime charged.” State v. Hundley, 126 Wn.2d
418, 421, 895 P.2d 403 (1995). “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and decide
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Mines, 163 Wn.2d 387, 391, 179 P.3d 835 (2008).
“[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State
and interpreted most strongly against the defendant.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d
192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). While “the existence of a fact cannot rest upon
guess, speculation or conjecture,” a defendant in this context “admits the truth of
the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from that
evidence.” State v. Hutton, 7 Wn. App. 726, 728, 502 P.2d 1037
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 85214-1-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JOSE LUIS BELETZUY CAJAS,
Appellant.
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — José Luís Beletzuy Cajas appeals his conviction for
one count of rape in the second degree against his wife, R. He contends that
insufficient evidence supports the element of forcible compulsion under RCW
9A.44.050(1)(a). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
record shows that Beletzuy 1 used force to overcome R’s resistance and raped her
while she was physically compromised and recovering from a serious surgery.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 3, 2020, the State charged Beletzuy with one count of rape
in the second degree against his wife, R, and a separate count of assault in the
1 While the charging document, and therefore caption from the trial court, inserts a hyphen
between Beletzuy Cajas’ patrilineal and matrilineal last names, the record establishes that he signs his name simply as Beletzuy. His method of abbreviation of his last names is consistent with Latinx naming conventions and both the defendant and named victim required the use of Spanish- language interpreters during trial. Accordingly, we decline to utilize the hyphenated version of his name as inconsistent with historical and cultural traditions of Latinx communities and rather refer to the defendant in the manner by which he self-identifies. No. 85214-1-I/2
fourth degree with sexual motivation against his adult stepdaughter, C, and alleged
both were crimes of domestic violence. Thereafter, the State filed an amended
information that added three separate counts of rape in the third degree against R.
Again, each count was designated as a crime of domestic violence.
Following jury selection and motions in limine, the case proceeded to trial
and the parties delivered opening statements on December 19, 2022. R testified
to her relationship 2 with Beletzuy and the circumstances that gave rise to the
charges against him. The two met approximately 15 years earlier and began
dating about 8 years after meeting. Beletzuy moved into R’s house after they had
been dating for a little under a year and they were soon married. R explained that
they had consensual sex two to three times per week during their relationship,
which Beletzuy would often initiate either verbally or nonverbally.
When asked whether Beletzuy had nonconsensual sex with her, R said
plainly, “Yes.” She explained that, to her, nonconsensual sex means that
“someone’s not ready to have sexual relationships [sic] with the [other] person.” R
then testified that Beletzuy had nonconsensual sex with her “[v]ery often” during
their relationship. According to R, in those instances, Beletzuy “would take off [her]
clothes, [they] would struggle, then he would have sexual relationships [sic] with
[her] and then [she] would go to sleep.” R confirmed that she would tell him no,
but she was unable to physically stop him from having sex with her.
R explained that, in 2019 and 2020, she was suffering from a hormonal
disorder and began taking medication which lowered her sex drive. During that
2 At the time of the trial, R and Beletzuy were still married, but R had initiated divorce
proceedings.
-2- No. 85214-1-I/3
time, however, R said that Beletzuy continued to have sex with her on a regular
basis without her consent. She testified in detail about her medical condition and
the particular facts underlying each of the charged crimes. 3 The jury returned
verdicts of guilty on all counts except for count 4. By way of special verdicts, the
jury found that the remaining counts all involved domestic violence and that count
2 was committed with sexual motivation.
Following trial, Beletzuy moved under CrR 7.4(a)(3) to arrest judgment on
count 1. He contended that the State failed to prove the element of “forcible
compulsion” as required for the crime of rape in the second degree. After taking
argument from the parties on the motion, the trial court denied it. The trial court
found that the evidence showed forcible compulsion because: R physically and
verbally resisted Beletzuy’s sexual advances, she was crying and told him that she
was in pain, “she was in a weak and debilitated state” so “the forcible compulsion
needed would not have been the same as it would [with] somebody who was able-
bodied and in possession of their full strength,” and the “victim doesn’t have to
resist continually throughout the process of penetration.”4
3 Because Beletzuy only appeals from the conviction for rape in the second degree by
forcible compulsion in count 1, the facts underlying that count are set out in detail in the analysis section. 4 Beletzuy does not expressly challenge the trial court’s finding of forcible compulsion in its
ruling on the defense motion under CrR 7.4(a)(3). The State contends that the unchallenged findings become verities on appeal and cites to City of Seattle v. Wiggins, 23 Wn. App. 2d 401, 407, 515 P.3d 1029 (2022). However, Wiggins is distinguishable as that case concerned discretionary review of the superior court’s application of the Rules for Appeal for Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ) to a pretrial ruling from the district court on the admissibility of certain evidence. Id. at 403. Here, we are faced with a criminal defendant raising a claim of insufficient evidence on direct appeal after a conviction by a jury, which we review de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016).
-3- No. 85214-1-I/4
At sentencing, Beletzuy moved to vacate the rape in the third degree
conviction on count 3 on the basis that it merged with the rape in the second degree
conviction on count 1. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed count 3.
The court then sentenced Beletzuy to 29 months in prison on count 5, 120 months
to life on count 1, and 364 days for count 2, all to run concurrently.
Beletzuy timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Beletzuy’s sole assignment of error goes to his conviction for rape in the
second degree on the ground that the State failed to prove the element of forcible
compulsion. His position lacks merit.
Due process “requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
facts necessary to constitute the crime charged.” State v. Hundley, 126 Wn.2d
418, 421, 895 P.2d 403 (1995). “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and decide
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Mines, 163 Wn.2d 387, 391, 179 P.3d 835 (2008).
“[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State
and interpreted most strongly against the defendant.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d
192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). While “the existence of a fact cannot rest upon
guess, speculation or conjecture,” a defendant in this context “admits the truth of
the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from that
evidence.” State v. Hutton, 7 Wn. App. 726, 728, 502 P.2d 1037 (1972); State v.
Colquitt, 133 Wn. App. 789, 796, 137 P.3d 892 (2006).
-4- No. 85214-1-I/5
An individual is guilty of rape in the second degree when, “under
circumstances not constituting rape in the first degree, the person engages in
sexual intercourse with another person . . . [b]y forcible compulsion.” RCW
9A.44.050(1)(a). The statute defines “forcible compulsion” as “physical force
which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person
in fear of death or physical injury to [themselves] or another person, or in fear that
[they] or another person will be kidnapped.” RCW 9A.44.010(3).
“Forcible compulsion requires more than the force normally used to achieve
sexual intercourse or sexual contact.” State v. Ritola, 63 Wn. App. 252, 254, 817
P.2d 1390 (1991). In the context of rape in the second degree, “there must have
been force that was ‘directed at overcoming the victim’s resistance and was more
than that which is normally required to achieve penetration.’” State v. Gene, 20
Wn. App. 2d 211, 224, 499 P.3d 214 (2021) (quoting State v. McKnight, 54 Wn.
App. 521, 528, 774 P.2d 532 (1989)). “The resistance that forcible compulsion
overcomes need not be physical resistance, but it must be reasonable resistance
under the circumstances.” Id.
Here, the evidence is plainly sufficient to show forcible compulsion as
defined for purposes of rape in the second degree. R saw a doctor due to stomach
pain while she was being treated for her hormonal condition in 2019 and 2020, and
was told that she needed abdominal surgery for a hernia. Following the surgery in
March 2020, R remained hospitalized for five or six days, longer than the originally
anticipated two days, due to the amount of pain she was in from the “incision [that]
was made in [her] stomach.” She described the incision as approximately three
-5- No. 85214-1-I/6
inches in size and explained that “it starts approximately right below [her] belly
button and then it gets almost all the way to [her] private part.” The incision was
closed with several stitches and covered with a long white “bandage that went all
around [her] body.”
When she returned home from the hospital, R explained, she was unable
to move normally, lift things, or work. She described her pain during that time as
a 10 out of 10 on a pain scale and explained that the doctors told her she could
not have sex until she recovered. R testified that she was physically weaker than
usual for two or three weeks following the surgery. R stated that Beletzuy
nonetheless forced her to have sex with him a “little over a week” after she was
discharged from the hospital. According to R, on the night of the incident, she was
still bandaged from surgery and laying down in the bedroom wearing a nightgown,
and Beletzuy laid down next to her and began touching her. R said that she told
Beletzuy she was “not feeling well, that it was not the right thing to do,” but he did
not stop. R recalled Beletzuy touching her breasts and she “pushed his hands
away” and “told him that [she] didn’t feel well.” She remembered telling him that
she did not want to have sex and testified that Beletzuy knew that, at that point in
her recovery from surgery, the doctor had advised that she was not supposed to
have intercourse. R explained that Beletzuy “said just a little bit. That he was
going to be gentle and careful.” Though she did not change her mind, R explained
that Beletzuy got on top of her and “penetrated her gently until he finished.” R
testified that she tried to push him off of her with her hands when “he was
penetrating her” as “he was hurting [her].” She pushed his shoulders but was
-6- No. 85214-1-I/7
unable to push him off. After attempting to move him off of her, R stated that “[she]
let him finish” after concluding that she “didn’t have the strength” to push Beletzuy
off of her. R noted that, afterwards, Beletzuy “cleaned [her] up because [she] was
not able to clean [herself].” She scaled her pain as an 8 out of 10 during this
incident and recalled that she was crying as it was happening. Following the
incident, R explained that she had to call the doctor as the pain had become “quite
worse.”
The facts presented at trial clearly establish that R was in a compromised
state and her ability to physically resist was greatly diminished as she was still
weakened while recovering from surgery. When the incident occurred, not only
was R still wrapped in a bandage with an incision running between her belly button
and “private part,” but she was also in serious pain and incapable of lifting things
or moving normally. Additionally, the evidence shows that R verbally and
physically resisted Beletzuy’s advances, but he ignored her expressions of
nonconsent, persisted, and overcame her defiance. When Beletzuy began
touching her breasts, R “pushed his hands away” and told him that she did not
want to have sex. Nevertheless, Beletzuy got on top of her and “penetrated her.”
R then tried to push Beletzuy off of her as “he was hurting [her].” Though she
pushed his shoulders, R was unable to move him off of her. Only after her
unsuccessful verbal and physical attempts to get Beletzuy off of her, did she “let
him finish.”
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence establishes
that Beletzuy used physical force that overcame R’s resistance, which falls
-7- No. 85214-1-I/8
squarely within the definition of forcible compulsion. RCW 9A.44.010(3). Though
Beletzuy claims the State failed to show that he “used any force beyond what was
necessary to have sexual intercourse with [R],” this is simply contradicted by the
record and R’s detailed testimony of the rape. Two weeks after a serious surgery,
while she was visibly bandaged, physically weak, and in constant pain, R used her
diminished strength to resist Beletzuy’s advances but it was not enough. Under
these circumstances, and when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence supports a finding of forcible compulsion and shows that Beletzuy
committed rape in the second degree. See McKnight, 54 Wn. App. at 527-28.
WE CONCUR:
-8-