State Of Washington, V. Jordan T. Godsey

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: November 14, 2023
• Docket: 57419-5
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

November 14, 2023

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 57419-5-II

Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

JORDAN THOMAS GODSEY,

Appellant.

MAXA, P.J. – Jordan Godsey appeals his sentence for convictions of four counts of first

degree possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and the trial

court’s imposition of community custody supervision fees. In a statement of additional grounds

(SAG), Godsey challenges his convictions.

We hold that (1) as the State concedes, the trial court imposed a term of confinement and

a term of community custody that exceeded the statutory maximum sentence; (2) as the State

concedes, the community custody supervision fees imposed in the judgment and sentence must

be stricken; and (3) we reject or decline to consider under RAP 10.10(c) Godsey’s SAG claims

relating to his convictions. Accordingly, we affirm Godsey’s convictions, but we remand for the

trial court to correct the term of community custody so Godsey’s sentence does not exceed the

statutory maximum and to strike the community custody supervision fees from the judgment and

sentence. No. 57419-5-II

FACTS

Background

In November 2020, the Chehalis police department received a tip from the Seattle

Internet Crimes against Children (“ICAC”) task force that Godsey was downloading images of

children engaged in sexual activity. CP 37. ICAC is a law enforcement agency task force that

investigates crimes against children on the internet, including child pornography. The ICAC

report stated that the images were downloaded by Godsey associated with the e-mail

Jordan_godsey@hotmail.com. Daniel Dozois, a detective with Chehalis police, conducted an IP

address search and confirmed that the images had been accessed from an address where Godsey

resided.

The ICAC report contained links to six images. Dozois reviewed the images and

determined that they appeared to be depictions of young girls engaged in sexual activity.

Search Warrants for Electronic Devices

Chehalis police obtained a warrant to search the electronic devices at Godsey’s residence.

The original warrant authorized law enforcement to “[e]xtract the information which are

evidence of the above crimes.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 25. The relevant “above crimes” were

listed as “RCW 9.68A.075 Viewing Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit

Conduct” and “RCW 9.65A.070 Possession of Depictions of Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit

Conduct.” CP at 24. The warrant did not specify what information should be extracted from the

electronic devices.

When the warrant was executed, law enforcement seized two phones in Godsey’s

possession and a desktop computer. The phones and the computer contained hundreds of images

and/or videos depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

2 No. 57419-5-II

In June 2021, the State charged Godsey with four counts of first degree possession of

depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

Godsey moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his electronic devices pursuant to the

original search warrant, arguing that the warrant failed to describe with particularity the things to

be seized. In response, Chehalis police requested a new warrant. The new warrant declaration

stated,

This Affidavit for Warrant has been amended and is being submitted to correct any arguable over breadth of the original warrant. The Affidavit and Warrant were previously submitted and granted and the defense has filed a motion to exclude evidence based on warrant over breadth. Pursuant to State v. Betancourth, 190 Wn.2d 357 (2018) and State v. Miles, 159 Wn. App. 282 (2011), the State is asking for a “do-over” warrant. The information submitted to support this affidavit is not altered in any way based on evidence found during the original search(es). Further, the State does not intend to re-search the devices, this is merely being done in an effort to rectify any arguable errors in the original warrant.

CP at 35. The declaration essentially was the same as the declaration to obtain the original

warrant. The trial court issued a new warrant, which specifically directed law enforcement to

search for “depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct as defined by RCW

9.68A.011(4) (a thru g).” CP at 43.1

Following a CrR 3.6 hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the motion to

suppress. The court concluded that the first warrant was not overbroad and was sufficiently

specific, and the second warrant “provided an added layer of protection, and is an independent

source for the evidence collected.” CP at 51.

1 The trial court actually issued two essentially identical warrants, one that expired after 10 days and another that was issued 11 days later.

3 No. 57419-5-II

Trial and Conviction

At trial, Dozois testified that when officers executed the search warrant, they seized two

cell phones that were in Godsey’s pocket and a desktop computer that was in Godsey’s room.

Godsey was using the computer when law enforcement arrived.

Godsey provided Dozois with the passcode for the phones. When Dozois accessed the

phones, he found suspected depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct in the

Google Photos application and other applications.

A forensic search was conducted of the two phones and the computer. This search

revealed likely depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct on all three devices,

412 images and/or videos on one phone, 188 images and/or videos on the second phone, and 114

images and/or videos on the computer. The trial court admitted into evidence 10 images of

young girls engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The jury found Godsey guilty of all four counts as charged. The trial court sentenced

Godsey to 89.5 months in confinement and 36 months of community custody. The judgment and

sentence contained a provision that mandated payment of community custody supervision fees.

Godsey appeals his convictions and sentence.

ANALYSIS

A. SENTENCE EXCEEDING STATUTORY MAXIMUM

Godsey argues, and the State concedes, that his sentence is unlawful because the

combination of his term of confinement and his term of community custody exceeds the statutory

maximum sentence. We agree.

A defendant’s total sentence cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the offense,

including sentence enhancements and community custody. RCW 9.94A.505(5); State v.

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LaBounty, 17 Wn. App. 2d 576, 582, 487 P.3d 221 (2021). First degree possession of depictions

of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct is a class B felony. RCW 9.68A.070(b). The

statutory maximum for a class B felony is 120 months. RCW 9A.20.020(1)(b).

The trial court sentenced Godsey to 89.5 months in confinement and 36 months of

community custody, for a total of 125.5 months. This sentence exceeds the statutory maximum

of 120 months. Therefore, the term of community custody must be reduced so the total sentence

does not exceed the statutory maximum. RCW 9.94A.701(10).

We remand for the trial court to correct the term of community custody in Godsey’s

judgment and sentence.

B. COMMUNITY CUSTODY SUPERVISION FEES

Godsey argues, and the State concedes, that the community custody supervision fees

should be stricken from the judgment and sentence. We agree.

Godsey was sentenced in October 2022. Effective July 2022, RCW 9.94A.703(2) no

longer authorizes the imposition of community custody supervision fees. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn.

App. 2d 1, 17, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). Therefore, we remand for the trial court to strike the

imposition of the community custody supervision fees.

C. SAG CLAIMS

1. Improper Search Warrant

Godsey asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized

from his electronic devices because the search warrant failed to describe with sufficient

particularity the things to be seized. We disagree.

a. Legal Principles

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no [w]arrants

5 No. 57419-5-II

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This amendment

was designed to prohibit “general searches,” and to prevent “ ‘general, exploratory rummaging in

a person’s belongings.’ ” State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 545, 834 P.2d 611 (1992) (quoting

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976)). Similarly,

article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be disturbed

in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”

Under these constitutional provisions, a search warrant must be sufficiently particular so

that the officer executing the warrant can reasonably ascertain and identify the property

authorized to be seized. State v. Besola, 184 Wn.2d 605, 610, 359 P.3d 799 (2015). The

particularity requirement both “limit[s] the executing officer’s discretion” and “inform[s] the

person subject to the search what items the officer may seize.” State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 29,

846 P.2d 1365 (1993). “Warrants for materials protected by the First Amendment require a

heightened degree of particularity.” Besola, 184 Wn.2d at 611. For these materials, the

particularity requirement must be strictly applied. Id.

b. Validity of First Search Warrant

It is unclear whether Godsey is challenging the first warrant or the second warrant. But

whether the first search warrant satisfied the particularity requirement is immaterial because the

trial court issued a second search warrant that was more particular.

If the evidence procured by unlawful police action was “obtained pursuant to a valid

warrant or other lawful means independent of the unlawful action,” the evidence is not subject to

exclusion under the independent source doctrine. State v. Betancourth, 190 Wn.2d 357, 364-

365, 413 P.3d 566 (2018). Courts determine whether challenged evidence has an independent

6 No. 57419-5-II

source by inquiring whether the illegally obtained information affected (1) the magistrate’s

decision to issue the warrant or (2) the decision of the state agents to seek the warrant. Id. at

365. If the illegally obtained information did not affect the magistrate’s decision to issue the

warrant or the decision of the state agents to seek the warrant, then the evidence is “admissible

through the lawful warrant under the independent source doctrine.” Id.

In Betancourth, the district court issued a search warrant for an out-of-state cell phone

carrier and the carrier provided the records. 190 Wn.2d at 360-61. However, the superior court

later ruled in a separate case that only superior courts were authorized to issue out-of-state

warrants. Id. at 361. Following this ruling, a detective obtained a second warrant from the

superior court based on an affidavit that essentially was identical to the affidavit used to obtain

the first warrant. Id. at 362. The detective sent the second warrant to the cell phone carrier, but

they did not provide any new records because the records already had been provided. Id.

The Supreme Court held that the phone records were admissible based on the second,

valid warrant under the independent source doctrine even though law enforcement did not

reseize the records. Id. at 370-73. The court reasoned that the records were “untainted by any

prior illegality” because the “decision to issue the 2013 superior court warrant [was not] affected

by, or made in reliance on, information obtained from the illegal search.” Id. at 370.

Here, the trial court’s decision to issue the second warrant was not affected by or made in

reliance on information obtained in the search pursuant to the first search warrant. The second

search warrant declaration essentially was the same as the first search warrant declaration, and

was based on the ICAC report. Therefore, under the independent source rule, the information

obtained pursuant to the first search warrant is admissible regardless of whether it was valid, as

long as the second search warrant was valid.

7 No. 57419-5-II

c. Validity of Second Search Warrant

The first warrant simply referenced the applicable statutes but did not specifically

identify the information for which law enforcement was authorized to search. The second

warrant corrected this problem by authorizing law enforcement to search specifically for

“depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct as defined by RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a

thru g).” CP at 43. We conclude that this language satisfied the particularity requirement.

Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Godsey’s suppression

motion.

2. Sufficiency of Evidence

Godsey asserts that his convictions must be reversed because the State failed to produce

sufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit

conduct. We disagree.

The test for determining the sufficiency of evidence is whether any rational trier of fact

could find the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt after viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Scanlan, 193 Wn.2d 753, 770, 445 P.3d

960 (2019). We resolve all reasonable inferences based on the evidence in favor of the State and

interpret inferences most strongly against the defendant. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as

equally reliable as direct evidence. State v. Farnsworth, 185 Wn.2d 768, 775, 374 P.3d 1152

(2016).

RCW 9.68A.070(1)(a) states that a person is guilty of first degree possession of

depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct “when he or she knowingly possesses

a visual or printed matter depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct as defined

in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e).” A person acts knowingly when “(i) He or she is aware of

8 No. 57419-5-II

a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or (ii) He or

she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that

facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense.” RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b).

Here, the two phones in Godsey’s possession and the computer seized by law

enforcement pursuant to the search warrant contained hundreds of images and/or videos

depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. When Dozois accessed Godsey’s phones,

he was able to see images depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could reasonably

infer that Godsey knew that depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct were on

his phones and his computer. Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support

Godsey’s convictions.

3. Vague Claims

In request for relief 3, Godsey references the “scope of [the] search warrant,” but he does

not explain the basis for any claim. SAG at 2. In request for relief 5, Godsey references

“probable cause in the information granting [the] search warrant” and then references

“defendant’s known place of residence,” “property to be searched ownership,” and “owner of IP

address/internet provider.” SAG at 2. But Godsey does not explain the nature of any alleged

errors.

Under RAP 10.10(c), we will not consider a SAG claim “if it does not inform the court of

the nature and occurrence of alleged errors.” Accordingly, we decline to address these claims.

9 No. 57419-5-II

CONCLUSION

We affirm Godsey’s convictions, but we remand for the trial court to correct the term of

community custody in Godsey’s sentence so as not to exceed the statutory maximum and to

strike the imposition of community custody supervision fees from the judgment and sentence.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

MAXA, P.J.

We concur:

VELJACIC, J.

CHE, J.