IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86570-6-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JOKANE RIKLON,
Appellant.
BIRK, J. — Jokane Riklon appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of
a firearm in the second degree, arguing he was denied his right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment and article 1, section 22 of the Washington Constitution.
After granting an earlier motion to discharge appointed counsel, the superior court
denied Riklon’s later motion to discharge appointed counsel. Because Riklon did
not show an irreconcilable conflict or total breakdown in communication between
him and his counsel, and because Riklon was not prejudiced by the representation
he received, we affirm.
I
In March 2023, the King County prosecutor charged Riklon with one count
of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. Separately, in March
2023, the Benton County prosecutor filed a charge against Riklon for robbery in
the first degree, with a deadly weapon. In April 2023, in the King County matter,
Riklon moved to discharge his appointed counsel because he did not see “eye to No. 86570-6-I/2
eye” with him “when it comes to case strategy.” Riklon explained that he was ready
to go to trial but his counsel kept delaying. After further questioning, the court
concluded, “I don’t hear a basis to give you a new lawyer. I hear that you’re being
told bad news that you don’t like and that you’re uncomfortable with and sometimes
your lawyer’s job is to give you bad news.” The court asked Riklon to try to work
with his counsel, but also told him he could come back if the matter did not improve.
In May 2023, Riklon again moved to discharge his appointed counsel for
“the same reasons” as before. Riklon expressed frustration that he was ready to
go trial but his counsel was not. The court explained that “given the charges here,
this case is going to take some time to get ready,” and “if I give you a new attorney,
it’s going to slow things down, not speed things up.” Riklon said he was not
comfortable going to trial with his counsel, and when asked why by the judge,
Riklon replied, “I don’t know. Just reasons.” Riklon’s counsel said that Riklon did
not trust him and did not want to talk to him anymore. The court asked Riklon if he
understood that new counsel would slow the case down. And the court asked,
“[D]o you understand that if I give you a new attorney now, I’m probably not going
to give you another new attorney later?” He acknowledged both questions
affirmatively, and the court granted Riklon’s motion. .
In September 2023, Riklon moved to discharge his new appointed counsel.
Riklon told the court that he and his counsel were “not on the same . . . page.” The
court pointed out that this was the same complaint he had raised about his first
lawyer, and asked, “Was there anything specific you wanted to me to know about?”
Riklon told the court, “No.” Riklon’s counsel had also filed a motion to withdraw,
2 No. 86570-6-I/3
and she explained that “Mr. Riklon and my understanding of the facts, and
therefore, presentation of the facts at trial are significantly different. And, actually,
Your Honor, would be something that would be impossible for me to present to a
jury or to a court.” She told the court that there was a “fundamental disagreement,”
and that “[c]ommunication no longer exists.” The court asked, “Mr. Riklon, why
aren’t you talking to your lawyer?” And he replied, “No comment.” The court told
Riklon that he faced two choices, to represent himself or to communicate with his
lawyer. Riklon replied, “I guess I got to communicate with my attorney, then.”
The court denied Riklon’s motion without prejudice. The court explained
that part of a lawyer’s job is to give their clients bad news, and “just because you
don’t like the information that you’re getting, doesn’t mean that it’s wrong or bad
information.” The court encouraged Riklon and his counsel to work together, and
told them if they couldn’t work together to “come back into court and figure out
what to do next.”
Riklon made no further motions to discharge counsel. At the conclusion of
trial, a jury convicted Riklon of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second
degree. Riklon appeals.
II
Riklon argues that he was deprived of his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, when the
superior court denied his third motion to discharge counsel. He asserts that the
court “failed to adequately inquire into the basis for [Riklon’s] requests,” that the
“record shows a complete breakdown of communication between [Riklon] and
3 No. 86570-6-I/4
counsel,” and that Riklon and his counsel had “so serious” a conflict “that their
relationship collapsed.” We disagree.
The decision whether to grant a defendant’s motion for new court appointed
counsel is within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 733,
940 P.2d 1239 (1997). The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is
manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons. State v. Vermillion, 112 Wn. App. 844, 855, 51 P.3d 188 (2002)).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of
counsel, but it does not guarantee a right to particular court appointed counsel or
a right to a “meaningful relationship” with appointed counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983). “[T]he right to the effective
assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect
it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.” United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). “[T]he Sixth
Amendment is not implicated absent an effect of the challenged conduct on the
reliability of the trial process.” State v. McCabe, 25 Wn. App. 2d 456, 461, 523
P.3d 271, review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1014, 530 P.3d 186 (2023).
To justify substitution of counsel, the defendant must show good cause.
State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 200, 86 P.3d 139 (2004). Good cause includes a
conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in
communication between counsel and defendant. Id. In evaluating whether to
grant a motion to substitute counsel, courts consider (1) the extent of the conflict,
(2) the adequacy of the inquiry, and (3) the timeliness of the motion. State v.
4 No. 86570-6-I/5
Holmes, 31 Wn. App. 2d 269, 280, 548 P.3d 570, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1024,
556 P.3d 1111 (2024). “[T]his court considers the extent and nature of the
breakdown in the relationship and its effect on the representation actually
presented. . . . If the representation is adequate, prejudice must be shown.” State
v. Schaller, 143 Wn. App. 258, 270, 177 P.3d 1139 (2007) (footnotes omitted). Our
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86570-6-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JOKANE RIKLON,
Appellant.
BIRK, J. — Jokane Riklon appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of
a firearm in the second degree, arguing he was denied his right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment and article 1, section 22 of the Washington Constitution.
After granting an earlier motion to discharge appointed counsel, the superior court
denied Riklon’s later motion to discharge appointed counsel. Because Riklon did
not show an irreconcilable conflict or total breakdown in communication between
him and his counsel, and because Riklon was not prejudiced by the representation
he received, we affirm.
I
In March 2023, the King County prosecutor charged Riklon with one count
of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. Separately, in March
2023, the Benton County prosecutor filed a charge against Riklon for robbery in
the first degree, with a deadly weapon. In April 2023, in the King County matter,
Riklon moved to discharge his appointed counsel because he did not see “eye to No. 86570-6-I/2
eye” with him “when it comes to case strategy.” Riklon explained that he was ready
to go to trial but his counsel kept delaying. After further questioning, the court
concluded, “I don’t hear a basis to give you a new lawyer. I hear that you’re being
told bad news that you don’t like and that you’re uncomfortable with and sometimes
your lawyer’s job is to give you bad news.” The court asked Riklon to try to work
with his counsel, but also told him he could come back if the matter did not improve.
In May 2023, Riklon again moved to discharge his appointed counsel for
“the same reasons” as before. Riklon expressed frustration that he was ready to
go trial but his counsel was not. The court explained that “given the charges here,
this case is going to take some time to get ready,” and “if I give you a new attorney,
it’s going to slow things down, not speed things up.” Riklon said he was not
comfortable going to trial with his counsel, and when asked why by the judge,
Riklon replied, “I don’t know. Just reasons.” Riklon’s counsel said that Riklon did
not trust him and did not want to talk to him anymore. The court asked Riklon if he
understood that new counsel would slow the case down. And the court asked,
“[D]o you understand that if I give you a new attorney now, I’m probably not going
to give you another new attorney later?” He acknowledged both questions
affirmatively, and the court granted Riklon’s motion. .
In September 2023, Riklon moved to discharge his new appointed counsel.
Riklon told the court that he and his counsel were “not on the same . . . page.” The
court pointed out that this was the same complaint he had raised about his first
lawyer, and asked, “Was there anything specific you wanted to me to know about?”
Riklon told the court, “No.” Riklon’s counsel had also filed a motion to withdraw,
2 No. 86570-6-I/3
and she explained that “Mr. Riklon and my understanding of the facts, and
therefore, presentation of the facts at trial are significantly different. And, actually,
Your Honor, would be something that would be impossible for me to present to a
jury or to a court.” She told the court that there was a “fundamental disagreement,”
and that “[c]ommunication no longer exists.” The court asked, “Mr. Riklon, why
aren’t you talking to your lawyer?” And he replied, “No comment.” The court told
Riklon that he faced two choices, to represent himself or to communicate with his
lawyer. Riklon replied, “I guess I got to communicate with my attorney, then.”
The court denied Riklon’s motion without prejudice. The court explained
that part of a lawyer’s job is to give their clients bad news, and “just because you
don’t like the information that you’re getting, doesn’t mean that it’s wrong or bad
information.” The court encouraged Riklon and his counsel to work together, and
told them if they couldn’t work together to “come back into court and figure out
what to do next.”
Riklon made no further motions to discharge counsel. At the conclusion of
trial, a jury convicted Riklon of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second
degree. Riklon appeals.
II
Riklon argues that he was deprived of his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, when the
superior court denied his third motion to discharge counsel. He asserts that the
court “failed to adequately inquire into the basis for [Riklon’s] requests,” that the
“record shows a complete breakdown of communication between [Riklon] and
3 No. 86570-6-I/4
counsel,” and that Riklon and his counsel had “so serious” a conflict “that their
relationship collapsed.” We disagree.
The decision whether to grant a defendant’s motion for new court appointed
counsel is within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 733,
940 P.2d 1239 (1997). The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is
manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons. State v. Vermillion, 112 Wn. App. 844, 855, 51 P.3d 188 (2002)).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of
counsel, but it does not guarantee a right to particular court appointed counsel or
a right to a “meaningful relationship” with appointed counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983). “[T]he right to the effective
assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect
it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.” United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). “[T]he Sixth
Amendment is not implicated absent an effect of the challenged conduct on the
reliability of the trial process.” State v. McCabe, 25 Wn. App. 2d 456, 461, 523
P.3d 271, review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1014, 530 P.3d 186 (2023).
To justify substitution of counsel, the defendant must show good cause.
State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 200, 86 P.3d 139 (2004). Good cause includes a
conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in
communication between counsel and defendant. Id. In evaluating whether to
grant a motion to substitute counsel, courts consider (1) the extent of the conflict,
(2) the adequacy of the inquiry, and (3) the timeliness of the motion. State v.
4 No. 86570-6-I/5
Holmes, 31 Wn. App. 2d 269, 280, 548 P.3d 570, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1024,
556 P.3d 1111 (2024). “[T]his court considers the extent and nature of the
breakdown in the relationship and its effect on the representation actually
presented. . . . If the representation is adequate, prejudice must be shown.” State
v. Schaller, 143 Wn. App. 258, 270, 177 P.3d 1139 (2007) (footnotes omitted). Our
purpose is to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial. Id. To warrant substitution
of counsel, “[c]ounsel and defendant must be at such odds as to prevent
presentation of an adequate defense.” State v. Thompson, 169 Wn. App. 436,
457, 290 P.3d 996 (2012). A trial court’s inquiry in response to a motion to
discharge counsel is adequate when the trial court allows the defendant and
counsel to express their concerns fully. Holmes, 31 Wn. App. 2d at 284. When a
defendant “asserts his reasons for dissatisfaction on the record, formal inquiry is
not always necessary.” Id.
First, as to the extent of the conflict between Riklon and his counsel, Riklon
provided vague, nonspecific reasons for his dissatisfaction, saying he did not “see
eye to his eye” with his counsel. The court probed for more specific reasons, but
Riklon declined to provide any. Riklon’s counsel suggested that there was a
difference in strategy between the two, saying she had spent time negotiating a
plea agreement but Riklon was determined to go to trial. Riklon’s counsel
explained that she and Riklon differed in their “understanding of the facts.” This
difference of understanding would lead to a difference in presentation of facts at
trial, but counsel hinted that ethical obligations would prohibit her from presenting
Riklon’s understanding of the facts. But this did not show a breakdown in
5 No. 86570-6-I/6
communications. And any ethical obligations limiting Riklon’s counsel would have
limited any other counsel.
Second, the superior court’s inquiry was adequate. The superior court
asked Riklon, “Was there anything you wanted to tell me about why you feel that
way?” After receiving a vague answer, the court asked, “Was there anything
specific you wanted me to know about?” Riklon replied, “No, your honor.” And
after Riklon’s counsel explained her understanding of their conflict, the court
asked, “Mr. Riklon, why aren’t you talking to your lawyer?” And he replied, “No
comment.” The superior court gave Riklon numerous opportunities to express his
concerns on the record. Despite this, Riklon never provided a specific explanation
for any breakdown in the relationship.
Third, although Riklon’s motion was potentially timely in relation to trial, the
superior court denied the motion because it lacked a substantive basis.
Because Riklon received adequate representation, he also would need to
show prejudice which he does not show. Defense counsel interviewed witnesses,
filed and argued motions in limine, cross-examined a witness during the CrR 3.5
hearing, questioned jurors during voir dire, exercised peremptory challenges,
argued opening and closing, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, offered
exhibits into evidence, and argued jury instructions. Cf. Holmes, 31 Wn. App. 2d
at 283-84 (adequate defense by counsel included conducting voir dire, cross-
examining during the CrR 3.5 hearing, filing motions in limine, making opening and
closing statements, and questioning witnesses). After trial, Riklon’s counsel
argued for, and secured, a sentence at the low end of the standard range.
6 No. 86570-6-I/7
The record belies Riklon’s assertion that “the record shows a complete
breakdown of communication.” Riklon and his counsel communicated before trial,
as shown by counsel’s statement that they did not agree on their understanding of
the facts. At a hearing regarding trial readiness, which Riklon did not attend, his
counsel told the court that she would “keep Mr. Riklon informed.” During trial,
Riklon’s counsel consulted with him directly, referenced conversations she had
had with him already, and expressed her intention to consult with him in the future.
And when the superior court denied Riklon’s third motion to discharge counsel
without prejudice, the court told Riklon he could “come back” if he and his counsel
could not figure out how to communicate. But Riklon did not file another motion to
discharge counsel. The record does not show a deprivation of Riklon’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: