FILED DECEMBER 16, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40257-6-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) JOEL A. BARAJAS-GONZALEZ, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Joel Barajas-Gonzalez appeals the trial court’s
restitution order entered more than 180 days after his sentencing without a finding of
good cause. Here, Barajas-Gonzalez waived the good cause requirement by agreeing to
reset the restitution hearing outside the 180-day requirement. We affirm the trial court’s
restitution order.
FACTS
The State charged Joel Barajas-Gonzalez with first degree assault after he shot his
neighbor in the leg. Later, because of evidentiary problems, a plea agreement was
reached reducing the charge to third degree assault in return for a plea of guilty. No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
At the July 3, 2023, sentencing, the following comments from the court to the
victim show that the initial setting of restitution was perfunctory and in anticipation of a
later hearing:
THE COURT: . . . I understand that the State is going to schedule this for a restitution hearing. A restitution hearing is to allow the Court to consider imposing damages against Mr. Barajas for your injuries. But, that will be subject to another hearing. That won’t be addressed today. .... The Court is going to strike the victim assessment. I will impose the DNA collection fee. The restitution payable to the crime victim’s compensation, $2,714.64. I understand though that additional restitution may arise as a result of a future restitution hearing that we’re gonna set for a status hearing on October 11th. [THE STATE]: Yes, Your Honor. And if I can say just for [the victim] to hear. Because there’s a guilty plea, you’re entitled to restitution. Now, we got a claim that I think I saw for the first time on Friday. It’s a big claim. I can’t present it today. We’re gonna need more documentation from you. So that’s why we set this hearing.
Rep. of Proc. (RP) (July 3, 2023) at 17, 22.
On October 9, the State filed a brief seeking to increase the restitution amount to
$103,110.30. At the October 11 hearing, defense counsel requested that the hearing be
postponed because he had not been able to discuss the restitution increase with his client.
The parties agreed to continue the hearing until November 15.
On November 15, defense counsel argued:
[Mr. Barajas] believes restitution ought to be limited to approximately $2,700, which is what was contemplated when he pled . . . and was sentenced.
2 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
I don’t know that I’ve read this final restitution report or seen a copy of it. What I have seen, however, is conclusory. It doesn’t show me what—it doesn’t give me sufficient detail to say that restitution should be ordered or what kind of restitution they are seeking. .... I don’t believe there’s been a sufficient basis laid in this case to grant the State’s request for restitution of $100,000 or anything more than, I believe it was $2,714 ordered in the original judgment and sentence. Accordingly, I ask the Court to deny the State’s request.
RP (Nov. 15, 2023) at 9.
The trial court noted that the State’s memorandum listed expenses but did not
contain evidence sufficient for a restitution hearing. The State then realized it had
neglected to file the itemized restitution report and requested to set the hearing over.
Defense counsel objected. The trial court granted the State’s request and reset the
hearing to December 7.
On December 7, defense counsel was not available and replacement counsel
requested a continuance because he had learned only a “couple of minutes” earlier of the
need to appear. RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 13. The trial court indicated it had 119 cases that
morning and welcomed a continuance. Because the court did not have defense counsel’s
schedule, it had to set a hearing to discuss a new restitution hearing date. The court set a
December 20 hearing for that purpose.
3 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
Barajas-Gonzalez did not appear at the December 20 hearing. Defense counsel
stated he had received four dates from the State that would work for a future restitution
hearing. Defense counsel added he would contact his client to see which of those dates
worked for his schedule. The trial court replied it would give counsel until that afternoon
to report back, otherwise it would pick one of those dates.
We note that “within 180 days” from the July 3, 2023 sentencing would be
December 29, 2023. See RCW 9.94A.753(1). On December 21, the trial court signed an
order resetting the restitution hearing for January 17, 2024.
At the January 17, 2024 restitution hearing, the State elicited testimony from a
claims manager for the crime victim’s compensation fund, which had paid the victim’s
medical costs and lost wages and was entitled to recoupment.1 The claims manager
testified that the victim’s medical bills and lost wages totaled $103,355.18. The State
introduced and the court admitted the supporting documentation. The victim testified
about additional losses, not reimbursed by the fund, which he believed were attributable
to being shot by Barajas-Gonzalez.
1 The Department of Labor and Industries administers the crime victim’s fund and is entitled to petition the trial court within one-year of sentencing for a restitution order. RCW 9.94A.753(7). This case does not involve such a petition.
4 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
After the State presented its evidence, defense counsel argued that the State failed
to sufficiently establish the restitution amount, and that the proper amount was the
original $2,714.00 entered by the trial court at sentencing. At no time did defense
counsel object to the hearing date.
The trial court entered an order setting restitution at $108,355.18, inclusive
of the original amount entered at sentencing. Barajas-Gonzalez timely appealed
the restitution order, and the trial court stayed its order pending appeal.
ANALYSIS
Barajas-Gonzalez argues the trial court erred by entering the restitution order more
than 180 days after sentencing without the required good cause finding. The State
responds that Barajas-Gonzalez waived the finding. We agree with the State.
RCW 9.94A.753(1) generally requires a trial court to set a restitution hearing
within 180 days of sentencing. The trial court can set a date beyond this time for good
cause. Id. A defendant constructively waives the requirement for a good cause finding
by, within the 180-day requirement, agreeing to a setting outside of that time. State v.
Kerow, 192 Wn. App. 843, 847-48, 368 P.3d 260 (2016). Barrajas-Gonzalez
acknowledges this. He argues the record simply does not establish that he waived the
required good cause finding. We disagree.
5 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
The December 21, 2023 order resetting the restitution hearing to January 17, 2024,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED DECEMBER 16, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40257-6-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) JOEL A. BARAJAS-GONZALEZ, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Joel Barajas-Gonzalez appeals the trial court’s
restitution order entered more than 180 days after his sentencing without a finding of
good cause. Here, Barajas-Gonzalez waived the good cause requirement by agreeing to
reset the restitution hearing outside the 180-day requirement. We affirm the trial court’s
restitution order.
FACTS
The State charged Joel Barajas-Gonzalez with first degree assault after he shot his
neighbor in the leg. Later, because of evidentiary problems, a plea agreement was
reached reducing the charge to third degree assault in return for a plea of guilty. No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
At the July 3, 2023, sentencing, the following comments from the court to the
victim show that the initial setting of restitution was perfunctory and in anticipation of a
later hearing:
THE COURT: . . . I understand that the State is going to schedule this for a restitution hearing. A restitution hearing is to allow the Court to consider imposing damages against Mr. Barajas for your injuries. But, that will be subject to another hearing. That won’t be addressed today. .... The Court is going to strike the victim assessment. I will impose the DNA collection fee. The restitution payable to the crime victim’s compensation, $2,714.64. I understand though that additional restitution may arise as a result of a future restitution hearing that we’re gonna set for a status hearing on October 11th. [THE STATE]: Yes, Your Honor. And if I can say just for [the victim] to hear. Because there’s a guilty plea, you’re entitled to restitution. Now, we got a claim that I think I saw for the first time on Friday. It’s a big claim. I can’t present it today. We’re gonna need more documentation from you. So that’s why we set this hearing.
Rep. of Proc. (RP) (July 3, 2023) at 17, 22.
On October 9, the State filed a brief seeking to increase the restitution amount to
$103,110.30. At the October 11 hearing, defense counsel requested that the hearing be
postponed because he had not been able to discuss the restitution increase with his client.
The parties agreed to continue the hearing until November 15.
On November 15, defense counsel argued:
[Mr. Barajas] believes restitution ought to be limited to approximately $2,700, which is what was contemplated when he pled . . . and was sentenced.
2 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
I don’t know that I’ve read this final restitution report or seen a copy of it. What I have seen, however, is conclusory. It doesn’t show me what—it doesn’t give me sufficient detail to say that restitution should be ordered or what kind of restitution they are seeking. .... I don’t believe there’s been a sufficient basis laid in this case to grant the State’s request for restitution of $100,000 or anything more than, I believe it was $2,714 ordered in the original judgment and sentence. Accordingly, I ask the Court to deny the State’s request.
RP (Nov. 15, 2023) at 9.
The trial court noted that the State’s memorandum listed expenses but did not
contain evidence sufficient for a restitution hearing. The State then realized it had
neglected to file the itemized restitution report and requested to set the hearing over.
Defense counsel objected. The trial court granted the State’s request and reset the
hearing to December 7.
On December 7, defense counsel was not available and replacement counsel
requested a continuance because he had learned only a “couple of minutes” earlier of the
need to appear. RP (Dec. 7, 2023) at 13. The trial court indicated it had 119 cases that
morning and welcomed a continuance. Because the court did not have defense counsel’s
schedule, it had to set a hearing to discuss a new restitution hearing date. The court set a
December 20 hearing for that purpose.
3 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
Barajas-Gonzalez did not appear at the December 20 hearing. Defense counsel
stated he had received four dates from the State that would work for a future restitution
hearing. Defense counsel added he would contact his client to see which of those dates
worked for his schedule. The trial court replied it would give counsel until that afternoon
to report back, otherwise it would pick one of those dates.
We note that “within 180 days” from the July 3, 2023 sentencing would be
December 29, 2023. See RCW 9.94A.753(1). On December 21, the trial court signed an
order resetting the restitution hearing for January 17, 2024.
At the January 17, 2024 restitution hearing, the State elicited testimony from a
claims manager for the crime victim’s compensation fund, which had paid the victim’s
medical costs and lost wages and was entitled to recoupment.1 The claims manager
testified that the victim’s medical bills and lost wages totaled $103,355.18. The State
introduced and the court admitted the supporting documentation. The victim testified
about additional losses, not reimbursed by the fund, which he believed were attributable
to being shot by Barajas-Gonzalez.
1 The Department of Labor and Industries administers the crime victim’s fund and is entitled to petition the trial court within one-year of sentencing for a restitution order. RCW 9.94A.753(7). This case does not involve such a petition.
4 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
After the State presented its evidence, defense counsel argued that the State failed
to sufficiently establish the restitution amount, and that the proper amount was the
original $2,714.00 entered by the trial court at sentencing. At no time did defense
counsel object to the hearing date.
The trial court entered an order setting restitution at $108,355.18, inclusive
of the original amount entered at sentencing. Barajas-Gonzalez timely appealed
the restitution order, and the trial court stayed its order pending appeal.
ANALYSIS
Barajas-Gonzalez argues the trial court erred by entering the restitution order more
than 180 days after sentencing without the required good cause finding. The State
responds that Barajas-Gonzalez waived the finding. We agree with the State.
RCW 9.94A.753(1) generally requires a trial court to set a restitution hearing
within 180 days of sentencing. The trial court can set a date beyond this time for good
cause. Id. A defendant constructively waives the requirement for a good cause finding
by, within the 180-day requirement, agreeing to a setting outside of that time. State v.
Kerow, 192 Wn. App. 843, 847-48, 368 P.3d 260 (2016). Barrajas-Gonzalez
acknowledges this. He argues the record simply does not establish that he waived the
required good cause finding. We disagree.
5 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
The December 21, 2023 order resetting the restitution hearing to January 17, 2024,
bears his attorney’s signature.2 It is true that the presentation of this order is potentially
mysterious because there is no transcript to explain its entry and because the order bears a
notation, “off docket.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 73. Nevertheless, what is important is that
defense counsel agreed to the order and never objected to resetting the restitution hearing
beyond the 180-day requirement.
Barajas-Gonzalez argues there is no evidence the order was agreed to because
there is a box on the form that would indicate whether the order was agreed, and the box
is unmarked. We disagree for two reasons.
First, the box Barajas-Gonzalez alludes to is for indicating whether the motion for
continuance is brought by the State, the defense, or both. It is not for marking whether
the continuance is agreed.
Second, a closer look at the signatures on the order shows that defense counsel
signed both for himself and “for N. Barrett,” the State’s attorney. CP at 73. We consider
this fact dispositive of whether Barrajas-Gonzales waived a good cause finding. He did.
2 Barajas-Gonzalez states, the “order appears to bear the signature of both State’s counsel and Mr. Barajas-Gonzalez’s trial counsel.” Appellant’s Br. at 7.
6 No. 40257-6-III State v. Barajas-Gonzalez
We affirm the restitution order.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
Staab, J. 0 Murphy, J.