IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 85788-6-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JAXON ADAMS,
Appellant.
CHUNG, J. — Jaxon Adams challenges his conviction for assault in the
second degree based on strangulation, unlawful imprisonment, and assault in the
fourth degree of his former girlfriend, K.B. On appeal, he claims the presence of
a uniformed officer in the courtroom during only K.B.’s testimony denied his right
to a fair trial. We disagree and affirm his convictions.
FACTS
Jaxon Adams and K.B. began dating in February 2021. Shortly thereafter,
K.B. went to visit Adams at his home in Federal Way. Although not initially
planning to stay for an extended period of time, K.B. remained at the apartment
until the end of April. Over the few months that K.B. lived with Adams, the
relationship grew strained. Adams expressed jealousy of other men and had K.B.
delete male contacts from her phone and social media. He also insisted they
remain near one another and that he and K.B. shower together. He often looked
over K.B.’s shoulder as she texted and threatened to break K.B.’s phone on No. 85788-6-I/2
multiple occasions. At one point, Adams disabled a program on K.B.’s phone that
allowed her family to see her location.
On April 26, 2021, Adams and K.B. argued because K.B. wanted to return
to her home in Lummi Nation. K.B. later testified that she attempted to leave in
her car, but as she was sitting with the key in the ignition, Adams reached
through the window and broke the key fob. He then came around to the
passenger seat, put his forearm around K.B.’s neck, and choked her. K.B.
testified that Adams then released her, took her phone and keys, and said she
was not permitted to leave. According to K.B., Adams prevented her from leaving
in the days that followed in a variety of ways, including physically blocking
doorways, keeping her phone or keys away from her, and threatening to harm
himself if K.B. left.
K.B. recounted how on April 30, 2021, during another argument, Adams
grabbed both of her arms and threw her against a wall, causing her to hit her
head. While Adams was showering, K.B. saw an opportunity to leave. She
gathered her phone and some belongings, got into her car, and drove away.
During this time, she also texted and called her stepmother and father, explaining
to them what happened and seeking their help. The next day, K.B. provided
statements to Aaron Hillaire, Patrol Sergeant of the Lummi Nation Police
Department, and Federal Way police officer Jon Dietrich.
On May 5, 2021, Adams was charged with assault in the second degree
based on strangulation, unlawful imprisonment, later amended to add a charge of
assault in the fourth degree, each with a domestic violence aggravator. Trial took
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place in July 2023. During the trial, shortly before K.B. was to testify, the State
requested “additional security to be present in the courtroom” for K.B.’s safety.
When the trial court asked if there was a record of prior incidents that would
warrant this action, the State replied there were no prior incidents in court, but
that there were “prior incidents of violations of the no-contact order . . . within
the last couple of years since this incident.” 1 The State stated that none of the
interactions had been violent, “but some of them have been intimidating in
nature.” In addition to raising security concerns, the State noted that “it’s already
hard enough to testify in a courtroom” and see the person who you are “accusing
of committing crimes against you.”
In response, the court stated it would let K.B. “hold hands with who[m]ever
she wants to coming in,” but it was “not going to order additional security absent
some record of issues in the courtroom. There’s always a risk that that creates a
specter of prejudice in front of the jury.” The court further elaborated that it
needed “to make some findings” on the issue, noting “there’s security around” as
well as other security measures, and it would not “post extra officers for that
reason,” i.e., “to assuage concerns of a witness,” whereas it might do so had
there been a history of outbursts in court or similar concerns. Adams opposed
the request, emphasizing the prejudice that would result from suddenly having an
officer present in the courtroom and allowing the jurors to see K.B. escorted by
1 The State did not elaborate on these allegations until after the trial had concluded, when
Adams requested, and the court granted, an order allowing him to remain out of custody pending sentencing. In giving details about the incidents, the State mentioned two encounters at powwows Adams and K.B. attended.
3 No. 85788-6-I/4
police, arguing that “the spectacle of a cop, police officer, sheriff’s deputy to be
walking around with someone” was “a direct interference of due process.”
The trial court asked whether the officers would walk K.B. into the
courtroom itself or just to the doors, and the State responded, “That will depend
on the Court’s ruling, obviously, on whether or not the Court’s going to allow a
Sheriff’s Officer to—to sit in the back of the courtroom.” The court then ruled it
would “not limit one officer from sitting in the pews, nor do I think I can,” and,
further, it would not limit K.B. from walking in the courtroom doors with whomever
she wanted. Adams made a note for the record that there had not been a
uniformed police officer in the courtroom the entire time up until when K.B. would
testify. Adams argued there was no reason “to believe that [Adams] means to
cause any harm.” The court stated it was not making “any . . . finding about that.”
The court further clarified it would not be unduly prejudicial to have one officer
sitting in the back of the courtroom, as “it’s common for trials when folks are in
custody,” which “[t]he jury doesn’t know,” and it was also “common to have an
officer—maybe even three—sitting quietly and just securing the situation.”
The court also declined to order the officer to be in plainclothes, reasoning
that a uniform alone was not “akin to wearing a shirt with someone’s name on it
or photos that would elicit sympathy,” to which Adams responded, “Except the
officer’s going to leave . . . as soon as [K.B.’s] done. . . . The jury’s not stupid.”
The court suggested the jury might conclude K.B. was in custody instead or
“could think all sorts of things,” but that there was nothing unduly prejudicial
about a single officer in the back of the courtroom. However, the court did agree
4 No. 85788-6-I/5
to hold jurors back when K.B. entered or left the courtroom, so as to limit the
amount of time the jury saw her with support personnel.
After K.B. provided some preliminary testimony outside the jury’s
presence, Adams raised the issue again and noted the victim advocate escorted
K.B. to and from the witness stand. Adams argued this group of people assisting
K.B. contributed to the “othering” of Adams, impacting his trial. In response, the
court indicated that whoever assisted K.B. should not go past the spectator
benches. The State then formally called K.B. as its next witness.
At lunch recess, consistent with Adams’s request, the jury exited before
K.B. and her support personnel left—including the sheriff’s deputy—and the
jurors were instructed to remain in the jury room for a few minutes afterward to
prevent them from seeing K.B. outside of the courtroom as well. Before going off
the record, Adams noted that another uniformed officer entered the courtroom
during the proceedings and reemphasized the alleged resulting prejudice.
The trial court then added to the record that initially, “[t]here was one
uniformed officer sitting in the back row of the courtroom on the defense side,”
and while it observed the sitting officer, “it looked like he was playing on his
phone.” The court stated that overall, “[t]here wasn’t any show of force.” In
describing the second officer who entered into the courtroom, the trial court
mentioned he chatted briefly with the seated officer but left almost immediately:
“[H]e was in the courtroom for a moment. The officer did not come forward
through the well, did not stand next to the witness, did not stand next to the
defendant, did not otherwise make any motions to indicate that there was a
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danger or a risk.” To limit concerns of prejudice from the presence of additional
officers, the trial court requested the officers communicate via text instead of
gathering in the courtroom. Upon returning from the lunch break, the court noted
there was a single uniformed officer in the back of the courtroom who was
different from the officer before but in the same seat.
When trial resumed the following week, Adams filed a motion to dismiss
based on the presence of the officers. The court again recounted events for the
record. It specified that since the beginning of K.B.’s testimony, one uniformed,
presumed armed, officer sat in the back of the courtroom. The court noted that
the officers primarily stayed in the back of the courtroom, except for when K.B.
first came in, which happened in front of the jury.
Adams then reemphasized the officers were clearly associated with K.B.,
and they left once K.B.’s testimony concluded. The trial court acknowledged
there was a cognizable connection between K.B. and the officers, but it again
suggested a reasonable jury may instead assume K.B. was in custody, since
they seemed physically oriented toward her. During this exchange, Adams
highlighted that the State had not demonstrated that K.B. required security.
The court responded that it read through Adams’s briefing and several
out-of-state decisions, which were primarily concerned with the appearance that
officers are guarding the accused. Although the court recognized the presence of
the officers was not entirely neutral, it did not believe the possible resulting
prejudice was severe enough to warrant dismissal. The court did, however, offer
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to instruct the jury with a curative instruction or to keep an officer present for the
remainder of the trial regardless of who was testifying.
When invited to contribute to the record, the prosecutor reiterated that as
the alleged victim, K.B. had rights as well. The court responded that the victim’s
rights must be balanced with the constitutional considerations of the defendant.
K.B.’s testimony resumed, with an officer present. The next day, when
K.B.’s testimony finished, Adams noted on the record that “after [K.B.] finished
testifying yesterday, the police officer that had been stationed in the courtroom
with [K.B.], left.” Adams later noted that the court had offered a mitigating
instruction, which Adams declined, explaining,
The defense feels hamstrung in that if Defense argues an instruction or seeks an instruction, she will call more attention to it, versus not seeking an instruction appearing to waive an opportunity. Defense maintains the objection and strategically seeks not to offer an instruction so as to seek mitigation or amelioration in that regard.
The jury subsequently convicted Adams as charged. The court sentenced
him to a low-end standard range sentence of 13 months on assault in the second
degree, with the other sentences to run concurrently. Adams timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
Adams contends that the presence of uniformed police officers solely
during K.B.’s testimony created inherent prejudice, “othered” him as a Native
American, and indicated he was dangerous. He argues the culmination of these
circumstances undermined his right to a fair trial. Alternatively, he argues even if
not inherently prejudicial, allowing K.B.’s police escort to be present absent a
showing of necessity was an abuse of discretion. We agree with the State that
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the court did not abuse its discretion by permitting an officer to sit in the back of
the courtroom during K.B.’s testimony.
“The trial court has broad discretion to make trial management decisions,
including ‘provisions for the order and security of the courtroom.’ ” State v.
Gorman-Lykken, 9 Wn. App. 2d 687, 691, 446 P.3d 694 (2019) (quoting State v.
Dye, 178 Wn.2d 541, 547-48, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013)). Therefore, we review a trial
court’s decisions regarding security measures for an abuse of discretion. Id. This
standard applies even if the challenged procedure is allegedly prejudicial. Id.
“A defendant has the fundamental right to a fair trial.” State v. Butler, 198
Wn. App. 484, 493, 394 P.3d 424; U.S. CONST. amends. VI and XIV; W ASH.
CONST. art. I, § 22. Although not articulated in the Constitution, the presumption
of innocence is a “ ‘basic component’ ” of this right. State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d
792, 844, 975 P.2d 967 (1999) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503,
96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976)).
“[T]o preserve a defendant’s presumption of innocence before a jury, the
defendant is ‘entitled to the physical indicia of innocence which includes the right
of the defendant to be brought before the court with the appearance, dignity, and
self-respect of a free and innocent [person].’ ” State v. Jaime, 168 Wn.2d 857,
861-62, 233 P.3d 554 (2010) (quoting Finch, 137 Wn.2d at 844). “Measures
which single out a defendant as a particularly dangerous or guilty person
threaten his or her constitutional right to a fair trial.” Id. at 862 (quoting Finch, 137
Wn.2d at 845). “Such measures threaten a defendant’s right to a fair trial
because they erode [the] presumption of innocence; these types of courtroom
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practices are inherently prejudicial.” Id. at 862. For example, courts have
recognized courtroom security measures such as shackling, handcuffing,
gagging, or holding a trial in jail are inherently prejudicial. See Gorman-Lykken, 9
Wn. App. 2d at 692 (citing Finch, 137 Wn.2d at 844 (shackling, handcuffing, or
other physical restraints; gagging the defendant) and Jaime, 168 Wn.2d at 864
(holding a trial in a jail)).
Because of these concerns, courts must closely scrutinize such practices
to ensure they further essential state interests. Jaime, 168 Wn.2d at 865. “When
courtroom arrangements inherently prejudice the fact-finding process, it violates
due process unless the arrangements are required by an essential state interest.”
Butler, 198 Wn. App. at 493 (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-72, 106
S. Ct. 1340, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986)).
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “conspicuous, or at least
noticeable, deployment of security personnel in a courtroom during trial” is not
inherently prejudicial. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 562, 568; see also Gorman-Lykken,
9 Wn. App. 2d at 693 (“The routine use of security personnel in a courtroom
during trial [] is not an inherently prejudicial practice.”). In Holbrook, the Supreme
Court considered whether the presence of four uniformed security officers seated
behind the defendants in the front row of the spectators’ section throughout trial
was inherently prejudicial. 475 U.S. at 562. In determining it was not inherently
prejudicial, the Court reasoned,
The chief feature that distinguishes the use of identifiable security officers from courtroom practices we might find inherently prejudicial is the wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the officers’ presence. While shackling and
9 No. 85788-6-I/10
prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large, the presence of guards at a defendant’s trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable. Jurors may just as easily believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that jurors will not infer anything at all from the presence of the guards. If they are placed at some distance from the accused, security officers may well be perceived more as elements of an impressive drama than as reminders of the defendant’s special status. Our society has become inured to the presence of armed guards in most public places; they are doubtless taken for granted so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official concern or alarm.
Id. at 569.
However, the Court also recognized there could be a possible set of facts
in which a security force within the courtroom might “ ‘create the impression in
the minds of the jury that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy.’ ” Id.
(quoting Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 108 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 959, 94 S. Ct. 1976, 40 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1974)). Thus, the Court
acknowledged that “ ‘reason, principle, and common human experience’ counsel
against a presumption that any use of identifiable security guards in the
courtroom is inherently prejudicial” and “a case-by-case approach is more
appropriate.” Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569 (citation omitted) (quoting Estelle, 425
U.S. at 504).
A. Inherent Prejudice
Adams argues that it is inherently prejudicial for an officer to be present
solely during a complainant’s (alleged victim’s) testimony. When a courtroom
arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial, the question does not
10 No. 85788-6-I/11
revolve around “whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of some
prejudicial effect, but rather whether ‘an unacceptable risk is presented of
impermissible factors coming into play.’ ” Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 570 (quoting
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505). Courts “evaluate the likely effects of a particular
procedure based on ‘reason, principle, and common human experience.’ ” Butler,
198 Wn. App. at 493 (quoting Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504).
Washington courts have followed Holbrook and declined to hold that the
routine presence of security officers is inherently prejudicial. For example, in
Butler, a jail officer was present because the defendant was in custody, and an
additional jail officer was present for a portion of the victim’s testimony. 198 Wn.
App. at 489. This court concluded the second officer’s presence was not
inherently prejudicial, as “[t]he second officer was not conspicuously close to
Butler, did not obstruct [his] view of the witness, did not attract attention, and was
not present for the remainder of the victim’s testimony.” Id. at 486. Further, the
court “remedied any potential juror confusion or concern” by providing a limiting
instruction conveying that security had not been deliberately heightened at any
time during the trial, but additional security “may have appeared because of a
routine change in personnel,” and the jury should not draw any conclusions
based on the presence of security staff. Id. at 489-90, 494.
Similarly, in Gorman-Lykken, the court held there was no inherent
prejudice when a corrections officer was stationed next to the witness stand
during the defendant’s testimony. 9 Wn. App. 2d at 695. The court noted that the
officer had been present throughout trial, there was only one officer, she did not
11 No. 85788-6-I/12
draw attention to herself, and the defendant and the officer moved to and from
the witness box outside the jury’s presence. Id.
Here, though the officers rotated, only a single officer was present at any
time and only during K.B.’s testimony rather than throughout the trial, so unlike in
the cases discussed above, there was not a continual security presence. Adams
argues that “[t]he officers’ presence sent a message to the jury that additional
security was needed to protect [K.B.] from Adams,” and that this implicit bias
othered him, citing State v. Bagby, 200 Wn.2d 777, 794-95, 522 P.3d 982 (2023)
(“Studies have shown that even the simplest racial cues can trigger implicit
biases and affect the way jurors evaluate evidence and ‘subtle manipulations’ of
a defendant’s background—such cues can affect juror decision-making more so
than even explicit references to race.”) (quoting Praatika Prasad, Notes, Implicit
Racial Biases in Prosecutorial Summations: Proposing an Integrated Response,
86 FORDHAM L. REV 3091, 3101 (2018)). But like the officers in Holbrook and
Butler, the officers present during K.B.’s testimony were inconspicuously
positioned in the back of the courtroom, in the row the furthest away from Adams,
and did not attract attention. As in Gorman-Lykken, the jury was not present
when the officer moved with K.B. to and from the witness stand, except for the
first instance.
Like the courts in Holbrook, Butler, and Gorman-Lykken, we decline to
apply “a presumption that any use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom
is inherently prejudicial.” Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569. As the Holbrook Court noted,
our society is “inured to the presence of armed guards in most public places,” id.,
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and the presence of a single officer for portions of the trial did not convey that
Adams was particularly dangerous or culpable or that K.B. was in need of
protection, but could just as easily be interpreted as a means to ensure order in
the courtroom and protection from outside disruptions. Moreover, as to Adams’s
suggestion that he was “othered” as a Native American, 2 while implicit race bias
may well be present, under these facts, the presence of an officer only during
K.B.’s testimony did not create inherent prejudice based on Adams’s racial or
ethnic status. We conclude that the presence of a single officer solely during
K.B.’s testimony was not inherently prejudicial and that a case-specific analysis is
more appropriate.
B. Exercise of Discretion
Adams argues in the alternative that if the security officer’s presence
during K.B.’s testimony was not inherently prejudicial, then the trial court abused
its discretion when it did not make case-specific findings related to the security
measure. Again, we disagree.
“[T]he trial court must actually exercise discretion based on the facts of the
case in considering whether to allow a courtroom security measure.” Gorman-
Lykken, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 696. However, “[f]or routine security measures such as
the presence of officers in the courtroom, no specific inquiry on the record is
required for the trial court’s exercise of discretion.” Id. “[J]urors may not infer
anything negative about the presence of security officers ‘[i]f they are placed at
some distance from the accused.’ ” Id. (quoting Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569).
2 We note that K.B. also is Native American.
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Here, in all but one instance, the jury never saw an officer accompany
K.B. to the witness stand, and the single officer who was present was seated “at
some distance”—indeed, the furthest row possible—away from Adams. This
case is factually distinguishable from Gorman-Lykken, in which the court
“recognize[d] that the potential for prejudice is greater when a security officer is
stationed next to a testifying defendant than when an officer or officers merely
are present elsewhere in the courtroom.” 9 Wn. App. 2d at 696. In this case,
there was no officer stationed near the witness stand at any time. Thus, there
was no need for the trial court to state case-specific reasons for the need for the
security measure or to determine that the need for the security measure
outweighs the potential prejudice to the testifying defendant, unlike in Gorman-
Lykken. See 9 Wn. App. 2d at 697-98. 3
The court must still exercise its discretion based on the facts of the case.
Gorman-Lykken, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 695-96. The record is replete with evidence
that the court did so here. As discussed above, the trial court heard robust
argument from both parties before concluding that one officer sitting in the back
would not be unduly prejudicial, especially when, as the court noted, it was
common to have up to three officers sitting quietly in a courtroom. See Dye, 178
Wn.2d at 553 (“the trial court is in the best position to analyze the actual
necessity of a special dispensation”). Moreover, the court considered and
3 Adams relies on State v. Kennon, in which the security measure at issue was allowing
additional officers to be generally present in the courtroom while the victim was testifying. No. 80813-3-I, slip op. at 5 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/ pdf/808133.pdf. The court concluded that “whatever the security measure, a court must provide a reason for its determination.” Id. at 13 n.2. As Kennon is an unpublished decision, it has no precedential value and is not binding on any court. GR 14.1(c).
14 No. 85788-6-I/15
adopted steps to minimize any prejudice: It required the officer and K.B. to enter
and exit outside the presence of the jury; it required the officer to sit in the back
of the courtroom; and, rather than allowing multiple officers in the courtroom, it
required officers to communicate with each other via text.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion by permitting a single
officer to remain in the back of the courtroom while K.B. testified. Accordingly, we
affirm Adams’s convictions.
WE CONCUR: