State Of Washington v. Jason Eli Martin
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 74467-4-1 Respondent, ) ) DIVISION ONE v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION JASON ELI MARTIN, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: March 13, 2017 ) APPELWICK, J. — Martin challenges the mandatory LFOs imposed by the
trial court. RCW 10.01.160(3) does not require an individualized inquiry into ability
to pay mandatory LFOs. We affirm.
FACTS
Jason Martin pleaded guilty to taking a motor vehicle without permission in
the second degree and theft in the third degree. At sentencing, Martin argued that
he did not have the ability to pay legal financial obligations (LFOs). The trial court
imposed $800 in mandatory LFOs. These LFOs were: a $500 victim penalty
assessment(VPA)fee, a $200 criminal filing fee, and a $100 deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA)collection fee. No. 74467-4-1/2
DISCUSSION
Martin challenges the LFOs imposed below. He contends that the trial court
should not have imposed any LF0s, because he is mentally ill and unable to pay.
RCW 10.01.160(1) authorizes courts to impose costs after a conviction.
But, it provides that a court shall not impose costs unless the defendant is or will
be able to pay them. RCW 10.01.160(3). In State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827,837-
38, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court
must make an individualized inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay prior to
imposing discretionary LF0s.
DNA, VPA, and criminal filing fees are authorized by statute. RCW
43.43.7541; RCW 7.68.035(1)(a); RCW 36.18.020(2)(h). The DNA collection
statute states, "Every sentence imposed for a crime specified in RCW 43.43.754
must include a fee of one hundred dollars." RCW 43.43.7541. The VPA statute
provides, "When any person is found guilty in any superior court of having
committed a crime, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, there shall
be imposed by the court upon such convicted person a penalty assessment."
RCW 7.68.035(1)(a). This assessment must be $500 for cases involving felonies
or gross misdemeanors. Id. And, RCW 36.18.020(2)(h) provides that "an adult
defendant in a criminal case shall be liable for a fee of two hundred dollars" after
a conviction or plea of guilty.
Martin argues that Blazina should alter our reading of these statutes. He
suggests that RCW 10.01.160(3) requires courts to consider ability to pay prior to
2 No. 74467-4-1/3
imposing any LFOs, and to refrain from imposing LFOs on indigent defendants.
But, this court has previously recognized that the VPA, DNA, and filing fees are
mandatory. See State v. Mathers, 193 Wn. App. 913, 918, 376 P.3d 1163(2016);
State v. Clark, 191 Wn. App. 369, 374, 362 P.3d 309 (2015). Blazina limited its
holding to discretionary LFOs. 182 Wn.2d at 837-38. Thus, the particular LFOs
that Martin challenges are not subject to RCW 10.01.160(3).
Martin asserts that GR 34(a) further supports his contention that no LFOs
should be imposed when ,a defendant is indigent. GR 34(a) provides, "Any
individual, on the basis of indigent status as defined herein, may seek a waiver of
filing fees or surcharges the payment of which is a condition precedent to a
litigant's ability to secure access to judicial relief from a judicial officer in the
applicable trial court." In Mathers, we recognized that the purpose of GR 34(a) is
different from that of the mandatory LFO statutes. 193 Wn. App. at 924. While
GR 34(a) permits filing fees to be waived so as to promote access to the courts, it
does not prohibit the enforcement of civil judgments against those whose filing fees
were waived. Id. at 924. Thus, GR 34(a) does not shed light on the interpretation
of mandatory LFOs. Id.
Martin also contends that constitutional concerns require courts to consider
ability to pay prior to imposing any LFOs. He argues that precluding courts from
waiving mandatory LFOs violates equal protection. Relying on GR 34(a), Martin
asserts that it violates equal protection to allow mandatory fees to be waived for
civil litigants, but not for criminal defendants. But, the Mathers court recognized
3 No. 74467-4-1/4
that civil litigants and criminal defendants are not similarly situated individuals
receiving disparate treatment. See 193 Wn. App. at 926. Thus, GR 34(a) cannot
support Martin's equal protection argument.
Martin also cites Fuller v. Oregon,417 U.S. 40, 94 S. Ct. 2116,40 L. Ed. 2d
642(1974)as support for his equal protection argument. Fuller upheld the Oregon
statute upon which RCW 10.01.160 was based. Mathers, 193 Wn. App. at 926;
Fuller, 417 U.S. at 45. But, it specifically addressed non-mandatory costs. Fuller,
417 U.S. at 45. Accordingly, we have previously rejected a similar argument that
imposing mandatory LFOs when a defendant is indigent violates equal protection
under Fuller. Mathers, 193 Wn. App. at 926.
Lastly, Martin asserts that imposing mandatory LFOs on indigent
defendants violates substantive due process. We have previously held that
mandatory LFOs are constitutional so long as the sentencing scheme provides
sufficient safeguards as to prevent imprisonment because of indigency. Mathers,
193 Wn. App. at 928; State v. Lundy, 176 Wn. App. 96, 102-03, 308 P.3d 755
(2013); State v. Curry, 118 Wn.2d 911, 917-18, 829 P.2d 166 (1992). And, we
have noted that an as-applied substantive due process challenge to the DNA
collection fee statute is not ripe for review until the State seeks to enforce collection
of the fee or impose a sanction for failure to pay. State v. Shelton, 194 Wn. App.
660, 674, 378 P.3d 230
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