State Of Washington, V. Jared E. Peth

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: August 11, 2025
• Docket: 86198-1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86198-1-I

Respondent, DIVISION ONE

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JARED EMIL PETH

Appellant.

SMITH, J. — Over the course of a year, Jared Peth engaged in

inappropriate contact with three minors. The State charged Peth with child

molestation in the second degree, possession of depictions of minors engaged in

sexually explicit conduct in the first degree, and communication with a minor for

immoral purposes. Peth pleaded guilty to all three charges.

The court sentenced Peth to 75 months of confinement for the first count,

61 months for the second, and 364 days for the third. The court also imposed 36

months of community custody.

Peth appeals four of the community custody conditions, asserting the

conditions are vague, overbroad, and violate his privacy rights under the

Washington State constitution. We affirm the condition prohibiting possession

and access to computers and computer-related devices and conclude that the

condition requiring random searches of Peth’s computer-related devices is not

yet ripe for review. We remand for the trial court to narrow the condition No. 86198-1-I/2

restricting internet use, clarify the condition restricting chat room1 access, and

strike the condition requiring urinalysis and breath analysis.

FACTS

From June 2020 through January 2021, Jared Peth regularly contacted

two minors, B.L.G. and V.J.B., through various social media platforms. Two

CyberTips2 informed the Everett Police Department that these communications

involved alleged attempts to entice a minor for sexual activity.

In June 2021, the mother of Peth’s child, Layla Van Meter, informed the

Everett Police Department that Peth had kidnapped a minor, C.H.S., who had

been reported missing. An investigation revealed that Peth had engaged in

sexual contact with C.H.S. while she was reportedly missing and that he had

sexual content involving a minor on his phone.

The State charged Peth with child molestation in the second degree,

possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in the

first degree, and communication with a minor for immoral purposes. Peth

pleaded guilty to all three charges.

The trial court sentenced Peth to concurrent, standard range sentences of

75 and 61 months for each felony, respectively, and 36 months of community

1 A chat room is a real-time online interactive discussion group. MERRIAM- WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ chat%20room (last visited July 11, 2025). 2 A CyberTip is a report of child sexual exploitation made to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC).

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custody. The court sentenced him to an additional 364 days of confinement for

the gross misdemeanor charge, to run concurrently with the rest of his sentence.

At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that the community custody

condition prohibiting alcohol consumption and controlled substance usage was

not crime-related. Accordingly, the court stated it would omit that condition from

the order. Defense counsel then objected to certain internet-related restrictions,

arguing they were overbroad and did not reflect modern life. Focusing on the

facts of the crime, the court did not modify those conditions.

Ultimately, the court imposed a number of community custody conditions,

including four that (1) required urinalysis and breath analysis testing, (2)

restricted internet usage outside employment purposes, (3) prohibited the use of

chat rooms, and (4) prohibited the possession of digital storage devices.

Peth appeals.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

Peth contends that we review constitutional challenges to community

custody conditions de novo. We disagree and proceed under an abuse of

discretion standard.

We review community custody conditions for an abuse of discretion. State

v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 744, 487 P.3d 893 (2021); State v. Wallmuller, 194

Wn.2d 234, 238, 449 P.3d 619 (2019). A trial court abuses its discretion if a

community custody condition is manifestly unreasonable or based on unjustified

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reasoning. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 744; State v. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 678,

425 P.3d 847 (2018). The imposition of an unconstitutional condition is

inherently an abuse of discretion. State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416

P.3d 712 (2018); Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 678; State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 753,

193 P.3d 678 (2008).

Community Custody Conditions

Peth challenges the conditions requiring urinalysis and breath analysis

upon request, restrictions on his internet use, random searches of his computer-

related devices, and the prohibition on accessing chat rooms. We remand for the

trial court to strike any reference to urinalysis and breath analysis and to clarify

the restrictions on accessing chat rooms. We decline to review the

constitutionality of conducting random searches of Peth’s computer-related

devices. And lastly, we affirm the condition prohibiting possession and access to

computer-related and digital storage devices.

During sentencing, a court may impose community custody conditions to

promote public safety and reduce the risk of reoffending. RCW 9.94A.010.

Sentencing courts have discretion to order a criminal offender to comply with any

crime-related prohibitions. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f). A crime-related prohibition is

“an order of a court prohibiting conduct that directly relates to the circumstances

of the crime for which the offender has been convicted.” RCW 9.94A.030(10).

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1. Urinalysis and Breath Analysis for Alcohol

Peth first asserts that the condition requiring urinalysis and breath analysis

at the request of his community custody officer (CCO) violates article I, section 7

of the Washington State Constitution.

While imposing urinalysis and breath analysis requirements does implicate

privacy interests, individuals on community custody, similar to a probationer,

have “a reduced expectation of privacy” because their sentence requires them to

be “supervise[d] and scrutinize[d]” by the State. Such an intrusion is “

‘constitutionally permissible only to the extent necessitated by the legitimate

demands’ of community custody.” State v. Nelson, -- Wn. App. --, 565 P.3d 906

(2025) (quoting State v. Olsen, 189 Wn.2d 118, 125, 399 P.3d 1141 (2017)).

Here, as the State concedes, the court did not specifically prohibit Peth

from consuming alcohol or drugs, and indicated that it would omit the community

custody provision which prohibited such usage. Without such a prohibition, there

would be no reason to test for alcohol or drug use. The court did not indicate a

legitimate demand of community custody for which imposing the urinalysis and

breath analysis testing is constitutionally permissible.

We remand for the trial court to strike any reference to urinalysis and

breath analysis from the community custody conditions.

2. Restrictions on Internet Use

Peth next contends that the condition restricting his internet use to

exclusively employment purposes is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

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Both parties acknowledge that, because Peth used the internet to contact the

victims, his internet use may be restricted by approved filters or monitoring

software. Because there are less restrictive alternatives available, we agree that

the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad and remand for further tailoring.

A community custody condition is unconstitutionally vague if it includes an

insufficient definition of the proscribed conduct, such that an ordinary person

would not understand, or a lack of sufficiently “ascertainable standards to protect

against arbitrary enforcement.” Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677. To avoid

unconstitutional overbreadth, conditions pertaining to internet use “must be

narrowly tailored to the dangers posed by the specific defendant.” Johnson, 197

Wn.2d at 745. The limitation of internet use to employment purposes only is

overbroad. In re Pers. Restraint of Sickels, 14 Wn. App. 2d 51, 73, 469 P.3d 322

(2020).

Peth asserts that the condition is vague because the community

corrections officer has unfettered discretion when authorizing internet access.

Following a similar challenge in Johnson, the Washington Supreme Court held

arbitrary enforcement is not of concern because “the crimes themselves and the

statement of probable cause provide sufficient direction.” 197 Wn.2d at 749.

Two of the three crimes in Johnson are the same as the charges to which Peth

pleaded guilty. We conclude that this condition is not unconstitutionally vague.

But Peth also asserts that the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad

and that monitoring software is a feasible, more narrowly tailored restriction on

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internet access. The State concedes that monitoring software is a more

appropriate, less restrictive alternative. Because caselaw establishes that the

current condition is too broad and both parties agree as to a feasible, more

narrowly tailored alternative, we remand for the lower court to impose that more

narrowly tailored restriction on internet use.

3. Random Searches

Peth also asserts that permitting random searches of computer-related

devices violates state constitutional privacy rights under article I, section 7. We

conclude that this issue is not yet ripe for review.

Community custody sentences reduce the privacy protections granted by

article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution but only to the extent

necessary to monitor compliance with the community custody conditions. State

v. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d 296, 304, 412 P.3d 1265 (2018); Olsen, 189 Wn.2d

at 125. Offenders under community supervision may be subject to search and

seizure of their person or personal property when reasonable suspicion indicates

a community custody condition has been violated. RCW 9.94A.631; State v.

Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 628, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

However, a pre-enforcement challenge to community custody conditions is

ripe for review when “the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further

factual development, and the challenged action is final.” State v. Cates, 183

Wn.2d 531, 534, 354 P.3d 831 (2015). Further factual development is required

when the appellant’s challenge is based on a potential “future misapplication of

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the community custody condition” where an attempted enforcement of the

condition has not yet occurred. Cates, 183 Wn.2d at 535.

The conditions subjecting Peth to random searches of his computer-

related devices do not require him to do, or refrain from doing, anything unless

and until his CCO requests it. Therefore, Peth’s challenges against random

searches of his computer-related devices are not ripe for review and we decline

to address them.

4. Chat Rooms

Peth next claims the condition prohibiting access to chat rooms is

unconstitutionally vague. We agree and remand for clarification.

As stated above, sentencing courts have discretion to order a criminal

offender to comply with crime-related prohibitions. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f);

Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 684 (citing State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 658-59, 364

P.3d 830 (2015)). A crime-related prohibition is “an order of a court prohibiting

conduct that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the

offender has been convicted.” RCW 9.94A.030(10).

An unconstitutionally vague community custody condition entails either an

insufficient definition of the prohibited conduct or insufficient standards to protect

against arbitrary enforcement. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677. Conditions that limit

constitutionally protected conduct, such as free speech, must be imposed

sensitively and be narrowly tailored to the dangers posed by the specific

defendant. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 744-745.

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Peth asserts that the term “chat room” is unconstitutionally vague because

the condition is not clear as to what it prohibits. Moreover, Peth maintains that

imposing monitoring software is an appropriate alternative to imposing a blanket

ban on chat rooms. The State contends the sentencing court acted within its

discretion because chat room use is a crime-related prohibition.

The State relies on two opinions, one unpublished and one published in

part, in support of its assertion. Both cases upheld similar conditions for similar

offenses, but neither addressed a vagueness challenge: State v. Reedy, No.

83039-2-I, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 22 (Wash. Ct. App. April 10, 2023),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/830392.pdf., and State v. Wright, No.

81834-1-I, slip op. at 14 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2020) (unpublished), https://

www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/818341.pdf.

In Reedy, the appellant argued that a nearly identical condition is not

crime-related because he did not use online forums to contact the victim.

No. 83039-2-I, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 22. This court disagreed and

upheld the condition as reasonably related to the conviction. Reedy, No. 83039-

2-I, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 22. The appellant in Wright argued that a

similar condition barring his access to social media websites, including chat

rooms, was overbroad. No. 81834-1-I, slip op. at 14. This court disagreed and

upheld the condition because the language was sufficiently tailored. Wright,

No. 81834-1-I, slip op. at 14.

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Here, as in Reedy, the condition barring Peth from accessing chat rooms

is crime-related. Peth used online forums to contact minors to entice sexual

conduct. In fact, as the State indicates, Peth encouraged minors to download

apps and set up online accounts, seemingly for that purpose. But, unlike Wright,

the language of the condition is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Given the

various contexts that one could perceive as a chat room, including the comment

section under online news articles or online discussion forums in academic

settings, we conclude that the condition lacks a sufficient definition of “chat room”

such that an ordinary person would know what was prohibited. So, although the

condition is crime-related, it is nevertheless unconstitutionally vague.

We remand for the trial court to clarify the prohibited conduct.

5. Computers and Digital Storage Devices

Lastly, Peth asserts that the condition prohibiting possession of a

computer, computer-related devices, and digital storage devices is

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We disagree.

A trial court has discretion to impose a community custody condition that

prohibits conduct reasonably related to the crime. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f);

Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 684. But as noted, a community custody condition is

unconstitutionally vague if it provides either an insufficient definition of the

prohibited conduct or a lack of understandable standards to protect against

arbitrary enforcement. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677.

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Peth relies on several unpublished cases to assert that, despite the

apparent relationship between the condition and the crime, an absolute

prohibition on possessing or accessing a computer is vague and overbroad.

State v. Moore, No. 80503-7-I, slip op. at 8 (Wash. Ct. App. April 19, 2021)

(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/805037.pdf; State v.

Smith, No. 79454-0-I, slip op. at 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jun. 22, 2020) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/794540.pdf; State v. Hammerquist,

No. 75949-3-I, slip op at 5-6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/759493.PDF. But Peth is not subject to

an absolute ban on computer access. Rather, Peth’s computer access is subject

to community corrections officer authorization.

The State contends that the condition is crime-related and not overbroad

because it prohibits Peth’s access to means through which he committed the

crime. And indeed, the record displays that Peth stored a depiction of a minor

engaging in sexual conduct on a computer-related device. Therefore, prohibiting

possession of computers, related devices, and digital storage devices is directly

related to Peth’s offense.

Additionally, because the condition is specific as to Peth’s restrictions and

does not subject him to an absolute ban, the condition does not provide an

insufficient definition of prohibited conduct or allow for arbitrary enforcement.

We conclude that the condition restricting possession of computers and

digital storage devices is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

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We affirm the condition prohibiting possession and access to computers

and computer-related devices and conclude that the condition requiring random

searches of Peth’s computer-related devices is not yet ripe for review. We

remand for the trial court to narrow the condition restricting internet use, clarify

the condition restricting chat room access, and strike the condition requiring

breath and urinalysis.

WE CONCUR: