IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 73422-9-1
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v.
JAHROD BESHAH JIMMA, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: August 1,2016
Appelwick, J. — Jimma challenges his jury conviction for possession of
marijuana and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He contends that he was unlawfully detained and that he was interrogated without being advised of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). He argues that the trial court erred in denying his CrR 3.5 and 3.6 motions
to suppress the marijuana and the firearm. We affirm.
FACTS
Around 10:45 p.m. on October 31, 2013, Officer Rex Miller observed a car
driving 53 miles per hour in a 40 mile per hour zone. Officer Miller stopped the car
and the driver provided Officer Miller with an identification card listing her age as
19. Because it was dark, Officer Miller shone a flashlight into the car in order to 73422-9-1/2
see the car's other occupants. The passengers, two females and a male,
"appeared to be the same age as the driver."
While speaking with the driver, Officer Miller smelled "a very strong odor of
marijuana." Believing that all of the car's occupants were not of legal age to
possess marijuana, Officer Miller asked "if there was anybody in the vehicle that's
21 or older."1 Allfourof the car's occupants admitted they were under 21. Officer
Miller asked the occupants "where the marijuana was at." The occupants all
denied having marijuana. Officer Miller told them he "had been doing the job for
quite a while" and "knew what the smell of marijuana was." He asked the car's
occupants a second time if anyone had marijuana. At this point, the male
passenger, later identified as Jahrod Jimma, admitted that he had marijuana.
Jimma reached into hisjacket pocketand handed Officer Miller a small bag ofwhat
appeared to be marijuana. Officer Miller asked Jimma for identification. Jimma
gave Officer Miller an instruction permit showing his age as 20. .
Officer Miller returned to his patrol car and called for backup. He waited in
his patrol car until an additional officer arrived a few minutes later. The officers told Jimma that he was under arrest for possession of marijuana and handcuffed
him. During a search incident to arrest, the officers found a handgun and several
additional bags of marijuana in Jimma's jacket pockets. Officer Miller placed
Jimma in his patrol car and advised Jimma of his Miranda rights. Jimma agreed
1 Possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana by anyone under the age of 21 is a misdemeanor offense. RCW 69.50.4013(4), RCW 69.50.4014. 73422-9-1/3
to answer questions. He admitted the gun was his and that he had purchased the
marijuana.
At a CrR 3.5 and 3.6 hearing, Jimma moved to suppress the marijuana and
the firearm. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted Jimma of
possession of marijuana and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Jimma
appeals.
DISCUSSION
Jimma argues that the trial court erred by denying his CrR 3.5 and 3.6
motions to suppress evidence. He contends that Officer Miller unlawfully enlarged
the scope of the initial traffic stop by asking questions about marijuana because
he lacked a specific, individualized suspicion that Jimma possessed marijuana.
He also claims that the stop constituted a custodial interrogation and thus his
statements and actions during the stop—admitting to having marijuana and giving
the marijuana to Officer Miller—were inadmissible because he had not been
advised of his Miranda rights beforehand.
"When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, an appellate court
determines whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact
and whether the findings support the conclusions of law." State v. Garvin, 166
Wn.2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). We review a trial court's conclusions of
law de novo. Id. 73422-9-1/4
I. Terry2 Stop
As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures. Id. Warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable absent an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Ladson,
138 Wn.2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). One such exception is an investigative
detention, or Terry stop. State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539, 182 P.3d 426
(2008).
A Terry stop is permissible whenever an officer has a reasonable suspicion,
grounded in specific and articulable facts, that the person stopped has been or is
about to be involved in a crime. State v. Acrev, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594
(2003). The stop must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to
effectuate the stop's purpose. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 738, 689 P.2d
1065 (1984). However, a stop "may be enlarged or prolonged ... if the stop
confirms or arouses further suspicions." State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App.
326, 332, 734 P.2d 966 (1987). An officer may " 'maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtaining more information.' " Williams, 102 Wn.2d at 737
(quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612
(1972)).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a stop, we "evaluate the totality of
circumstances presented to the investigating officer." State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d
2Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L Ed. 2d 889 (1968). -4- 73422-9-1/5
509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991). Ifthe initial stop was unlawful or if officers exceed
the scope of a valid stop, the evidence discovered during the unlawful portion of
that stop is inadmissible. State v. Saggers, 182 Wn. App. 832, 839, 332 P.3d 1034
(2014).
Here, there is no dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid based on Officer
Miller's reasonable suspicion that the driver was speeding. During the traffic stop,
Officer Miller smelled what he knew, based on past law enforcement experience,
to be marijuana. Officer Miller also had reason to believe that none of the car's
occupants were of legal age to possess marijuana. Officer Miller therefore had a
reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed: that a minor was in
possession of marijuana. This suspicion reasonably justified extending the initial
detention to investigate the possible presence of marijuana in the car.
Citing State v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 73422-9-1
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v.
JAHROD BESHAH JIMMA, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: August 1,2016
Appelwick, J. — Jimma challenges his jury conviction for possession of
marijuana and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He contends that he was unlawfully detained and that he was interrogated without being advised of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). He argues that the trial court erred in denying his CrR 3.5 and 3.6 motions
to suppress the marijuana and the firearm. We affirm.
FACTS
Around 10:45 p.m. on October 31, 2013, Officer Rex Miller observed a car
driving 53 miles per hour in a 40 mile per hour zone. Officer Miller stopped the car
and the driver provided Officer Miller with an identification card listing her age as
19. Because it was dark, Officer Miller shone a flashlight into the car in order to 73422-9-1/2
see the car's other occupants. The passengers, two females and a male,
"appeared to be the same age as the driver."
While speaking with the driver, Officer Miller smelled "a very strong odor of
marijuana." Believing that all of the car's occupants were not of legal age to
possess marijuana, Officer Miller asked "if there was anybody in the vehicle that's
21 or older."1 Allfourof the car's occupants admitted they were under 21. Officer
Miller asked the occupants "where the marijuana was at." The occupants all
denied having marijuana. Officer Miller told them he "had been doing the job for
quite a while" and "knew what the smell of marijuana was." He asked the car's
occupants a second time if anyone had marijuana. At this point, the male
passenger, later identified as Jahrod Jimma, admitted that he had marijuana.
Jimma reached into hisjacket pocketand handed Officer Miller a small bag ofwhat
appeared to be marijuana. Officer Miller asked Jimma for identification. Jimma
gave Officer Miller an instruction permit showing his age as 20. .
Officer Miller returned to his patrol car and called for backup. He waited in
his patrol car until an additional officer arrived a few minutes later. The officers told Jimma that he was under arrest for possession of marijuana and handcuffed
him. During a search incident to arrest, the officers found a handgun and several
additional bags of marijuana in Jimma's jacket pockets. Officer Miller placed
Jimma in his patrol car and advised Jimma of his Miranda rights. Jimma agreed
1 Possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana by anyone under the age of 21 is a misdemeanor offense. RCW 69.50.4013(4), RCW 69.50.4014. 73422-9-1/3
to answer questions. He admitted the gun was his and that he had purchased the
marijuana.
At a CrR 3.5 and 3.6 hearing, Jimma moved to suppress the marijuana and
the firearm. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted Jimma of
possession of marijuana and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Jimma
appeals.
DISCUSSION
Jimma argues that the trial court erred by denying his CrR 3.5 and 3.6
motions to suppress evidence. He contends that Officer Miller unlawfully enlarged
the scope of the initial traffic stop by asking questions about marijuana because
he lacked a specific, individualized suspicion that Jimma possessed marijuana.
He also claims that the stop constituted a custodial interrogation and thus his
statements and actions during the stop—admitting to having marijuana and giving
the marijuana to Officer Miller—were inadmissible because he had not been
advised of his Miranda rights beforehand.
"When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, an appellate court
determines whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact
and whether the findings support the conclusions of law." State v. Garvin, 166
Wn.2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). We review a trial court's conclusions of
law de novo. Id. 73422-9-1/4
I. Terry2 Stop
As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures. Id. Warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable absent an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Ladson,
138 Wn.2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). One such exception is an investigative
detention, or Terry stop. State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539, 182 P.3d 426
(2008).
A Terry stop is permissible whenever an officer has a reasonable suspicion,
grounded in specific and articulable facts, that the person stopped has been or is
about to be involved in a crime. State v. Acrev, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594
(2003). The stop must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to
effectuate the stop's purpose. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 738, 689 P.2d
1065 (1984). However, a stop "may be enlarged or prolonged ... if the stop
confirms or arouses further suspicions." State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App.
326, 332, 734 P.2d 966 (1987). An officer may " 'maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtaining more information.' " Williams, 102 Wn.2d at 737
(quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612
(1972)).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a stop, we "evaluate the totality of
circumstances presented to the investigating officer." State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d
2Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L Ed. 2d 889 (1968). -4- 73422-9-1/5
509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991). Ifthe initial stop was unlawful or if officers exceed
the scope of a valid stop, the evidence discovered during the unlawful portion of
that stop is inadmissible. State v. Saggers, 182 Wn. App. 832, 839, 332 P.3d 1034
(2014).
Here, there is no dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid based on Officer
Miller's reasonable suspicion that the driver was speeding. During the traffic stop,
Officer Miller smelled what he knew, based on past law enforcement experience,
to be marijuana. Officer Miller also had reason to believe that none of the car's
occupants were of legal age to possess marijuana. Officer Miller therefore had a
reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed: that a minor was in
possession of marijuana. This suspicion reasonably justified extending the initial
detention to investigate the possible presence of marijuana in the car.
Citing State v. Grande, 164Wn.2d 135,187 P.3d 248 (2008), Jimma argues
that continued detention was unjustified because even if Officer Miller reasonably
believed that someone in the car had marijuana, he lacked individualized suspicion
with respect to any particular passenger. Grande does not control here. In
Grande, an officer performed a routine traffic stop on a car with two occupants. ]d.
at 138. The officer smelled marijuana emanating from the car and arrested both
the driver and the passenger based solely on the odor. Id. at 139. The court held
that the officerlacked probable cause to arrest both occupants without establishing
individualized probable cause as to either occupant, id. at 146. But, an officer
may have reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop based on less evidence 73422-9-1/6
than is needed for probable cause to make an arrest. Acrev, 148 Wn.2d at 746-
47; see also State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 218-19, 95 P.3d 345 (2004)
(officers who smelled marijuana emanating from a group of juveniles and saw one
of the juveniles holding what appeared to be a marijuana pipe were entitled to ask
all the members of the group about ownership of the marijuana pipe as part of a
valid Terry stop).
Here, Officer Miller had a reasonable suspicion that one of the car's
underage occupants had marijuana. He was therefore entitled to ask a moderate
number of questions to confirm or dispel his suspicions as part of a Terry stop.
See Grande, 164 Wn.2d at 146 (an officer is not required to "simply walk away
from a vehicle from which the odor of marijuana emanates and in which more than
one occupant is present if the officer cannot determine which occupant possessed
or used the illegal drug."). Officer Miller's brief amount of questioning did not
exceed the valid scope of a Terry stop.
II. Miranda
The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination
requires that custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the accused that he
or she has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
478-9. If officers conduct a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings,
statements made by the suspect during the interrogation must be suppressed. Id.
at 479. An interrogation is "custodial" if, after considering the circumstances, a
reasonable person would feel that his or her freedom was curtailed to a degree
-6- 73422-9-1/7
associated with formal arrest. State v. Short, 113 Wn.2d 35, 40, 775 P.2d 458
(1989).
Jimma argues that at the time of the traffic stop, he was in custody for
Miranda purposes because he did not feel "free to leave." But, by definition, a
person subject to a traffic stop or a Terry stop is not free to leave. State v.
Kennedy. 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). " '[F]or the duration of a traffic
stop ... a police officer effectively seizes everyone in the vehicle.'" State v.
Marcum, 149 Wn. App. 894, 910, 205 P.3d 969 (2009) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L
Ed. 2d 694 (2009). But, this does not make a stop comparable to a formal arrest
for Miranda purposes, because traffic or Terry stops occur in public and are
"presumptively temporary and brief." Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 437,
104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984). Thus, a "detaining officer may ask a
moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the
suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions without rendering the
suspect 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Heritage, 152 Wn.2d at 218.
Here, Jimma was not in custody when he admitted to possessing marijuana
and gave Officer Miller the bag of marijuana. The stop occurred on a public road and lasted only a few minutes. Officer Miller asked the car's occupants a limited
numberof questions, all directed toward confirming or disproving his suspicion that
one of the occupants illegally possessed marijuana. Jimma argues that the
encounter was custodial because Officer Miller was in uniform, carried a firearm, 73422-9-1/8
and shone a bright flashlight in the car. But, Jimma does not explain how these
facts differ from any routine traffic stop. The scope and duration of the stop was
reasonably related to its legitimate purposes: determining whether a traffic
infraction had been committed and whether any of the car's occupants were
committing a crime. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by admitting Jimma's
statements and actions during the stop.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
VY6l /i\*Q^- 3" LLA !t4&
CD
-8-