IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 84360-5-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JAGJIT SINGH,
Appellant.
PER CURIAM — Jagjit Singh appeals from a judgment and sentence entered upon
his resentencing for one count of assault in the first degree and one count of assault in the
second degree. He contends that the trial court erred by imposing community custody
supervision fees given its stated intent to waive all nonmandatory legal financial
obligations (LFOs). The State concedes error in this regard. We accept the State’s
concession and remand to the trial court to strike the provision in Singh’s judgment and
sentence directing him to pay community custody supervision fees. Otherwise, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2018, Singh was convicted of and sentenced for one count of assault in the first
degree (Count 1) and one count of assault in the second degree (Count 2). Both offenses,
which were committed against Singh’s then wife, carried domestic violence designations.
Singh appealed and argued among other things that he was sentenced based on
an incorrect offender score of “4.” See State v. Singh, No. 79017-0-I, slip op. at 1-2
(March 9, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/790170.pdf. The No. 84360-5-I/2
State conceded error on this issue. Id. at 5. This court accepted the State’s concession
and remanded for resentencing. Id.
Singh was resentenced in July 2022. Based on a corrected offender score of “2,”
the standard range for Count 1 was 111 to 147 months, and the standard range for Count
2 was 12 months plus one day to 14 months.
At sentencing, the State requested an exceptional upward sentence of 171 months
on Count 1, citing aggravating circumstances that were proven at trial. Meanwhile, Singh’s
counsel argued for a low-end standard range sentence, citing various mitigating
circumstances. Following his counsel’s argument, Singh made a statement in which he
asked the court to impose an exceptional downward sentence of 72 months on Count 1.
The trial court denied both the State’s request for an exceptional upward sentence
and Singh’s request for an exceptional downward sentence. It explained, addressing
Singh:
I will say given that the information that’s been provided by your attorney, while [the factfinder] did clearly find . . . that two crimes for which you were convicted were part of an ongoing pattern of psychological and physical abuse of [the victim] over a prolonged period of time. Based on the mitigating information presented however, I don’t think an exceptional sentence above the standard range is appropriate. However, your request for a sentence of 72 months is also wildly disproportionate to your actions and to the consequences of your actions. I – I’m glad you’re doing better, truly I am. And . . . I hope you have a long life ahead of you; as I said, you’re still a young man. And it sounds like there are people in your life who care about you and cherish you and can use help from you, that’s actually a blessing. But as I said, . . . the actions that you took have to have significant consequences.
The trial court ultimately imposed concurrent sentences of 132 months on Count 1
and 14 months on Count 2, with credit for time served. Singh appeals.
-2- No. 84360-5-I/3
DISCUSSION
Community Custody Supervision Fees
At sentencing, the trial court stated on the record that “[a]ny nonmandatory financial
penalties are waived.” However, Appendix H to Singh’s judgment and sentence directs
Singh to “[p]ay supervision fees as determined by the Department of Corrections.” Singh
contends this was an error.
The State “agrees that the court did not intend to order collection of supervision
fees” and concedes “that the requirement should be stricken from Appendix H to the
judgment.” We accept the State’s concession and remand to the trial court to strike, from
Appendix H of Singh’s judgment and sentence, the provision directing Singh to “[p]ay
supervision fees as determined by the Department of Corrections.” 1 See State v.
Bowman, 198 Wn.2d 609, 629, 498 P.3d 478 (2021) (confirming that community custody
supervision fees are discretionary LFOs and holding that trial court “committed procedural
error by imposing [the] discretionary fee where it has otherwise agreed to waive such
fees”).
Statement of Additional Grounds for Review
Singh has filed a statement of additional grounds for review (SAGR) in which he
asserts that he is entitled to resentencing, before a different judge. In support, Singh first
argues that he was denied his right of allocution. See RCW 9.94A.500(1) (at sentencing
hearing, court “shall . . . allow arguments from . . . the offender . . . as to the sentence to be
1 Singh also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a waiver of the
community custody supervision fees. Because we remand to strike the fees based on the State’s concession of error with regard to their imposition, Singh’s ineffective assistance claim is moot, and we do not reach it. See In re Pers. Restraint of Stevens, 191 Wn. App. 125, 133, 361 P.3d 252 (2015) (“An issue is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief.”).
-3- No. 84360-5-I/4
imposed”); cf. In re Pers. Restraint of Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d 323, 336, 6 P.3d 573 (2000)
(trial courts “should scrupulously follow” the statutory allocation procedure “by directly
addressing defendants during sentencing hearings, asking whether they wish to say
anything to the court in mitigation of sentence, and allowing ‘arguments from . . . the
offender[ ] . . . as to the sentence to be imposed.’ ” (quoting former RCW 9.94A.110)). But
the record reflects that during his resentencing hearing, Singh was permitted to—and
did—give a statement in which he apologized for his actions, argued that he was now a
“different man,” and asked the court to impose an exceptional downward sentence. Singh
was not denied his right of allocution. See Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d at 336 (allocation
procedure satisfied where record showed that offender made an argument for leniency as
part of his direct testimony during his sentencing hearing).
Next, Singh argues that for a number of reasons, the trial court erred by failing to
meaningfully consider—and denying—his request for an exceptional downward sentence.
But “where a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard
range[,] review is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise
discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an
exceptional sentence below the standard range.” State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App.
322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997). “A court refuses to exercise its discretion if it refuses
categorically to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range under any
circumstances; i.e., it takes the position that it will never impose a sentence below the
standard range.” Id.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 84360-5-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JAGJIT SINGH,
Appellant.
PER CURIAM — Jagjit Singh appeals from a judgment and sentence entered upon
his resentencing for one count of assault in the first degree and one count of assault in the
second degree. He contends that the trial court erred by imposing community custody
supervision fees given its stated intent to waive all nonmandatory legal financial
obligations (LFOs). The State concedes error in this regard. We accept the State’s
concession and remand to the trial court to strike the provision in Singh’s judgment and
sentence directing him to pay community custody supervision fees. Otherwise, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2018, Singh was convicted of and sentenced for one count of assault in the first
degree (Count 1) and one count of assault in the second degree (Count 2). Both offenses,
which were committed against Singh’s then wife, carried domestic violence designations.
Singh appealed and argued among other things that he was sentenced based on
an incorrect offender score of “4.” See State v. Singh, No. 79017-0-I, slip op. at 1-2
(March 9, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/790170.pdf. The No. 84360-5-I/2
State conceded error on this issue. Id. at 5. This court accepted the State’s concession
and remanded for resentencing. Id.
Singh was resentenced in July 2022. Based on a corrected offender score of “2,”
the standard range for Count 1 was 111 to 147 months, and the standard range for Count
2 was 12 months plus one day to 14 months.
At sentencing, the State requested an exceptional upward sentence of 171 months
on Count 1, citing aggravating circumstances that were proven at trial. Meanwhile, Singh’s
counsel argued for a low-end standard range sentence, citing various mitigating
circumstances. Following his counsel’s argument, Singh made a statement in which he
asked the court to impose an exceptional downward sentence of 72 months on Count 1.
The trial court denied both the State’s request for an exceptional upward sentence
and Singh’s request for an exceptional downward sentence. It explained, addressing
Singh:
I will say given that the information that’s been provided by your attorney, while [the factfinder] did clearly find . . . that two crimes for which you were convicted were part of an ongoing pattern of psychological and physical abuse of [the victim] over a prolonged period of time. Based on the mitigating information presented however, I don’t think an exceptional sentence above the standard range is appropriate. However, your request for a sentence of 72 months is also wildly disproportionate to your actions and to the consequences of your actions. I – I’m glad you’re doing better, truly I am. And . . . I hope you have a long life ahead of you; as I said, you’re still a young man. And it sounds like there are people in your life who care about you and cherish you and can use help from you, that’s actually a blessing. But as I said, . . . the actions that you took have to have significant consequences.
The trial court ultimately imposed concurrent sentences of 132 months on Count 1
and 14 months on Count 2, with credit for time served. Singh appeals.
-2- No. 84360-5-I/3
DISCUSSION
Community Custody Supervision Fees
At sentencing, the trial court stated on the record that “[a]ny nonmandatory financial
penalties are waived.” However, Appendix H to Singh’s judgment and sentence directs
Singh to “[p]ay supervision fees as determined by the Department of Corrections.” Singh
contends this was an error.
The State “agrees that the court did not intend to order collection of supervision
fees” and concedes “that the requirement should be stricken from Appendix H to the
judgment.” We accept the State’s concession and remand to the trial court to strike, from
Appendix H of Singh’s judgment and sentence, the provision directing Singh to “[p]ay
supervision fees as determined by the Department of Corrections.” 1 See State v.
Bowman, 198 Wn.2d 609, 629, 498 P.3d 478 (2021) (confirming that community custody
supervision fees are discretionary LFOs and holding that trial court “committed procedural
error by imposing [the] discretionary fee where it has otherwise agreed to waive such
fees”).
Statement of Additional Grounds for Review
Singh has filed a statement of additional grounds for review (SAGR) in which he
asserts that he is entitled to resentencing, before a different judge. In support, Singh first
argues that he was denied his right of allocution. See RCW 9.94A.500(1) (at sentencing
hearing, court “shall . . . allow arguments from . . . the offender . . . as to the sentence to be
1 Singh also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a waiver of the
community custody supervision fees. Because we remand to strike the fees based on the State’s concession of error with regard to their imposition, Singh’s ineffective assistance claim is moot, and we do not reach it. See In re Pers. Restraint of Stevens, 191 Wn. App. 125, 133, 361 P.3d 252 (2015) (“An issue is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief.”).
-3- No. 84360-5-I/4
imposed”); cf. In re Pers. Restraint of Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d 323, 336, 6 P.3d 573 (2000)
(trial courts “should scrupulously follow” the statutory allocation procedure “by directly
addressing defendants during sentencing hearings, asking whether they wish to say
anything to the court in mitigation of sentence, and allowing ‘arguments from . . . the
offender[ ] . . . as to the sentence to be imposed.’ ” (quoting former RCW 9.94A.110)). But
the record reflects that during his resentencing hearing, Singh was permitted to—and
did—give a statement in which he apologized for his actions, argued that he was now a
“different man,” and asked the court to impose an exceptional downward sentence. Singh
was not denied his right of allocution. See Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d at 336 (allocation
procedure satisfied where record showed that offender made an argument for leniency as
part of his direct testimony during his sentencing hearing).
Next, Singh argues that for a number of reasons, the trial court erred by failing to
meaningfully consider—and denying—his request for an exceptional downward sentence.
But “where a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard
range[,] review is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise
discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an
exceptional sentence below the standard range.” State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App.
322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997). “A court refuses to exercise its discretion if it refuses
categorically to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range under any
circumstances; i.e., it takes the position that it will never impose a sentence below the
standard range.” Id. And “[a] court relies on an impermissible basis for declining to
impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range if it takes the position, for
example, that no drug dealer should get an exceptional sentence down or it refuses to
-4- No. 84360-5-I/5
consider the request because of the defendant’s race, sex, or religion.” Id.
Here, the trial court did not categorically refuse to impose an exceptional downward
sentence or rely on an impermissible basis to deny Singh’s request for one. Instead, the
record shows that while the court concluded that mitigating circumstances warranted
denial of the State’s request for an exceptional upward sentence, it also concluded that
those circumstances did not warrant an exceptional downward sentence. This was an
appropriate exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion and will not be disturbed on
appeal. Cf. id. at 330-31 (no abuse of discretion where trial court “just disagreed with [the
defendant] that the facts warranted” an exceptional downward sentence).
Next, Singh argues that reversal is required because he “was not provided a copy
of, or aware of the contents of a letter [the victim] submitted to the court that was
considered by the court [at] sentencing.”2 Singh attaches a copy of the alleged letter to his
SAGR. He also attaches a letter from counsel, which he cites to support the proposition
that the letter was “undisclosed” and he did not receive a copy of it at or before sentencing.
But the victim’s letter, the letter from counsel, and Singh’s assertions about the timing of
the letter’s disclosure are matters outside of the record on appeal. Accordingly, we do not
reach the merits of Singh’s claims related to the victim’s letter. See RAP 10.10(c) (“Only
documents that are contained in the record on review should be attached or referred to in
[a SAGR].”); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (in direct
appeal, this court does not consider matters outside the record, and “[i]f a defendant
wishes to raise issues on appeal that require evidence or facts not in the existing trial
record, the appropriate means of doing so is through a personal restraint petition.”).
2 Some capitalization omitted.
-5- No. 84360-5-I/6
Finally, Singh argues that cumulative error warrants reversal. But “[t]he cumulative
error doctrine applies only when several trial errors occurred which, standing alone, may
not be sufficient to justify a reversal, but when combined together, may deny a defendant a
fair trial.” State v. Hodges, 118 Wn. App. 668, 673-74, 77 P.3d 375 (2003). Because
Singh has not identified any errors, the doctrine does not apply here.
Conclusion
We remand to the superior court to strike, from Appendix H of Singh’s judgment
and sentence, the provision directing Singh to “[p]ay supervision fees as determined by
the Department of Corrections.” Otherwise, we affirm.
FOR THE COURT:
-6-