Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
December 17, 2024
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59370-0-II
Respondent,
v.
IVAN V. FELTSAN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Police found a stolen car in a grocery store parking lot. Ivan V. Feltsan
approached the officers, asked what they were doing near his car, and said that he had driven the
car to the store. After police detained and handcuffed him, Feltsan said his friend “G” owned and
drove the car, but Feltsan also explained that the car’s ignition was damaged and it could be started
with any key. The State charged Feltsan with possession of a stolen vehicle and a jury convicted
him.
Feltsan appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession
of a stolen vehicle because the State failed to prove he possessed the car or knew the car was stolen.
We affirm.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
In late 2022, a woman’s car was stolen from her apartment parking lot. The owner had both
sets of keys for the car, and the car had both front and rear license plates and an undamaged ignition
before it was stolen. No. 59370-0-II
One night in February 2023, two police officers found the car in a grocery store parking
lot. The car had no license plates and the ignition had been “punched in,” meaning that it had been
forced into the steering column so that someone could start the car “with a screwdriver or any type
of vehicle key.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 227-28. A Latino man in a blue shirt got out of
the backseat and went into the grocery store.
Upon checking the vehicle identification number against a police database, the officers
learned that the car had been reported stolen. The car’s registration had been cancelled when it was
reported stolen. Instead, the car had “what appeared to be a 3-day trip permit” displayed on the
rear windshield, but officers could not read the permit because of the tint on the windshield. VRP
at 228.
After confirming that the car was stolen, one officer went to retrieve the man who had been
in the backseat from the grocery store. As the officer crossed the parking lot, Feltsan—who is
White—approached the officer and said “something to the effect of, ‘Hey, what are you doing
around my vehicle?’” VRP at 198. Feltsan then walked with the officer to the car. When the other
officer asked Feltsan if he had driven the car to the store, Feltsan answered, “Yeah.” Ex., 2A at 30
sec., to 35 sec. The officers then arrested and handcuffed Feltsan. Later, they retrieved the other
man from inside the store.
One of the officers interviewed Feltsan in the back of a police cruiser. Feltsan stated that
the car belonged to his friend “G,” and that G had driven the car while Feltsan and the man from
the backseat were passengers. VRP at 242. Feltsan stated that G was a Native American male who
had fled on foot. And he said that G had bought the car “on OfferUp about a month ago.” VRP at
2 No. 59370-0-II
243. Feltsan also said that G had lost the car’s key, but the ignition was broken so he could start
the car with any key, even though he had to reach into the hole in the steering column to do so.
The State charged Feltsan with unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle.
II. TRIAL
During trial, the State’s witnesses testified consistent with the facts above. The jury also
saw body camera footage. One police officer testified that trip permits, such as the one displayed
on the car, were frequently and easily forged and posted on stolen vehicles. He also stated that
people who steal cars can punch in the ignition if they “take a screwdriver, a flathead most
commonly, and pound it into the ignition and force access to the cylinder so that they can freely
turn it with a screwdriver” or any key. VRP at 228.
The jury saw body camera footage of the officers’ conversation with Feltsan, where he said
he was the driver of the car. Moreover, an officer testified that when they searched the car, they
found a phone and passport that did not belong to Feltsan, the man from the backseat, or the car’s
owner. This officer stated that stolen vehicles frequently have other people’s identification
documents and belongings in them because the thieves use the vehicles to commit other crimes.
No keys, title, registration, bill of sale, or license plates were found in the car. On cross-
examination, both officers acknowledged that they never observed Feltsan in or near the car before
they arrested him. And police did not review any security footage that showed who drove the car
to the grocery store.
The jury instructions stated that to convict Feltsan of possession of a stolen vehicle, the
jury had to find that he “knowingly possessed a stolen motor vehicle,” that he “acted with
3 No. 59370-0-II
knowledge that the motor vehicle had been stolen,” and that he “withheld or appropriated the motor
vehicle to the use of someone other than the true owner.” Clerk’s Papers at 24.
The jury convicted Feltsan of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle. The trial court
sentenced Feltsan to seven days in jail. Feltsan appeals.
ANALYSIS
Feltsan argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of unlawful possession
of a stolen vehicle. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove that he “knowingly
possessed a stolen motor vehicle or that he knew the vehicle was stolen.” Br. of Appellant at 6.
Feltsan reasons that his admission that he drove the car does not mean that he had possession of
the car or knew that it was stolen. We disagree.
There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, taking the State’s evidence as true
and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find
the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dreewes, 192 Wn.2d 812,
821, 432 P.3d 795 (2019). Circumstantial evidence is as reliable as direct evidence. State v.
Scanlan, 193 Wn.2d 753, 770, 445 P.3d 960 (2019). And we defer to the fact finder’s resolution
of conflicting testimony and evaluation of the evidence’s persuasiveness. State v. Homan, 181
Wn.2d 102, 106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014).
It is illegal to knowingly possess a stolen vehicle. RCW 9A.56.068. A person possesses
stolen property if they knowingly “receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property
knowing that it has been stolen” and “withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person
other than the true owner,” regardless of whether they are the person who stole the property in the
first place. RCW 9A.56.140(1). And a person acts knowingly when they are “aware of a fact, facts,
4 No. 59370-0-II
or circumstances or result” or have “information [that] would lead a reasonable person in the same
situation to believe that facts exist” that are “described by a statute defining an offense.” RCW
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
December 17, 2024
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59370-0-II
Respondent,
v.
IVAN V. FELTSAN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Police found a stolen car in a grocery store parking lot. Ivan V. Feltsan
approached the officers, asked what they were doing near his car, and said that he had driven the
car to the store. After police detained and handcuffed him, Feltsan said his friend “G” owned and
drove the car, but Feltsan also explained that the car’s ignition was damaged and it could be started
with any key. The State charged Feltsan with possession of a stolen vehicle and a jury convicted
him.
Feltsan appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession
of a stolen vehicle because the State failed to prove he possessed the car or knew the car was stolen.
We affirm.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
In late 2022, a woman’s car was stolen from her apartment parking lot. The owner had both
sets of keys for the car, and the car had both front and rear license plates and an undamaged ignition
before it was stolen. No. 59370-0-II
One night in February 2023, two police officers found the car in a grocery store parking
lot. The car had no license plates and the ignition had been “punched in,” meaning that it had been
forced into the steering column so that someone could start the car “with a screwdriver or any type
of vehicle key.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 227-28. A Latino man in a blue shirt got out of
the backseat and went into the grocery store.
Upon checking the vehicle identification number against a police database, the officers
learned that the car had been reported stolen. The car’s registration had been cancelled when it was
reported stolen. Instead, the car had “what appeared to be a 3-day trip permit” displayed on the
rear windshield, but officers could not read the permit because of the tint on the windshield. VRP
at 228.
After confirming that the car was stolen, one officer went to retrieve the man who had been
in the backseat from the grocery store. As the officer crossed the parking lot, Feltsan—who is
White—approached the officer and said “something to the effect of, ‘Hey, what are you doing
around my vehicle?’” VRP at 198. Feltsan then walked with the officer to the car. When the other
officer asked Feltsan if he had driven the car to the store, Feltsan answered, “Yeah.” Ex., 2A at 30
sec., to 35 sec. The officers then arrested and handcuffed Feltsan. Later, they retrieved the other
man from inside the store.
One of the officers interviewed Feltsan in the back of a police cruiser. Feltsan stated that
the car belonged to his friend “G,” and that G had driven the car while Feltsan and the man from
the backseat were passengers. VRP at 242. Feltsan stated that G was a Native American male who
had fled on foot. And he said that G had bought the car “on OfferUp about a month ago.” VRP at
2 No. 59370-0-II
243. Feltsan also said that G had lost the car’s key, but the ignition was broken so he could start
the car with any key, even though he had to reach into the hole in the steering column to do so.
The State charged Feltsan with unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle.
II. TRIAL
During trial, the State’s witnesses testified consistent with the facts above. The jury also
saw body camera footage. One police officer testified that trip permits, such as the one displayed
on the car, were frequently and easily forged and posted on stolen vehicles. He also stated that
people who steal cars can punch in the ignition if they “take a screwdriver, a flathead most
commonly, and pound it into the ignition and force access to the cylinder so that they can freely
turn it with a screwdriver” or any key. VRP at 228.
The jury saw body camera footage of the officers’ conversation with Feltsan, where he said
he was the driver of the car. Moreover, an officer testified that when they searched the car, they
found a phone and passport that did not belong to Feltsan, the man from the backseat, or the car’s
owner. This officer stated that stolen vehicles frequently have other people’s identification
documents and belongings in them because the thieves use the vehicles to commit other crimes.
No keys, title, registration, bill of sale, or license plates were found in the car. On cross-
examination, both officers acknowledged that they never observed Feltsan in or near the car before
they arrested him. And police did not review any security footage that showed who drove the car
to the grocery store.
The jury instructions stated that to convict Feltsan of possession of a stolen vehicle, the
jury had to find that he “knowingly possessed a stolen motor vehicle,” that he “acted with
3 No. 59370-0-II
knowledge that the motor vehicle had been stolen,” and that he “withheld or appropriated the motor
vehicle to the use of someone other than the true owner.” Clerk’s Papers at 24.
The jury convicted Feltsan of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle. The trial court
sentenced Feltsan to seven days in jail. Feltsan appeals.
ANALYSIS
Feltsan argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of unlawful possession
of a stolen vehicle. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove that he “knowingly
possessed a stolen motor vehicle or that he knew the vehicle was stolen.” Br. of Appellant at 6.
Feltsan reasons that his admission that he drove the car does not mean that he had possession of
the car or knew that it was stolen. We disagree.
There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, taking the State’s evidence as true
and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find
the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dreewes, 192 Wn.2d 812,
821, 432 P.3d 795 (2019). Circumstantial evidence is as reliable as direct evidence. State v.
Scanlan, 193 Wn.2d 753, 770, 445 P.3d 960 (2019). And we defer to the fact finder’s resolution
of conflicting testimony and evaluation of the evidence’s persuasiveness. State v. Homan, 181
Wn.2d 102, 106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014).
It is illegal to knowingly possess a stolen vehicle. RCW 9A.56.068. A person possesses
stolen property if they knowingly “receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property
knowing that it has been stolen” and “withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person
other than the true owner,” regardless of whether they are the person who stole the property in the
first place. RCW 9A.56.140(1). And a person acts knowingly when they are “aware of a fact, facts,
4 No. 59370-0-II
or circumstances or result” or have “information [that] would lead a reasonable person in the same
situation to believe that facts exist” that are “described by a statute defining an offense.” RCW
9A.08.010(1)(b)(i)-(ii).
In general, “possession of recently stolen property in connection with other evidence
tending to show guilt is sufficient.” State v. Couet, 71 Wn.2d 773, 775, 430 P.2d 974 (1967).
Although a passenger may not have constructive possession of a vehicle, a driver has actual
possession of the vehicle. State v. Plank, 46 Wn. App. 728, 731-33, 731 P.2d 1170 (1987).
Here, an officer testified that Feltsan asked police what they were doing near his car and
answered affirmatively when asked if he had driven the car to the store. This was evidence that
Feltsan had actual possession of the car. Plank, 46 Wn. App. at 731. Although Feltsan changed his
story after being handcuffed to say that G drove and owned the car, we defer to the jury’s resolution
of conflicting evidence. Homan, 181 Wn.2d at 106.
Additionally, Feltsan knew that the ignition was damaged and that the car could be started
without the original key. The jury heard testimony that damage like that done to the car’s ignition
allows people to easily steal vehicles. The jury also heard testimony that no keys, registration, bill
of sale, title, or other evidence of ownership was found in the car, and that car thieves frequently
forge short-term trip permits like the one displayed in the back window. Taking the State’s
evidence as true and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the State, this was
circumstantial evidence that a reasonable jury could rely on to find that Feltsan knew that the car
was stolen. Dreewes, 192 Wn.2d at 821; Scanlan, 193 Wn.2d at 770. In sum, there was sufficient
evidence to convict Feltsan of possession of a stolen vehicle.
5 No. 59370-0-II
CONCLUSION
We affirm Feltsan’s conviction.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
GLASGOW, J. We concur:
LEE, J.
VELJACIC, A.C.J.