FILED FEBRUARY 5, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40928-7-111 ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) IAN CONNOR TAKESH OZASA, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. -Ian Ozasa appeals his conviction of felony violation
of a no-contact order. For the first time on appeal, he argues the information was
constitutionally deficient. The State concedes error but urges us to not follow State v.
Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 812 P.2d 86 (1991), and adopt a harmless error test. We accept
the State's concession, reject its invitation to ignore binding authority, and direct the trial
court to dismiss Ozasa' s conviction without prejudice.
FACTS
In June 2023, the Thurston County Superior Court issued an amended no-contact
order (NCO) against Ian Ozasa to protect his wife, Amanda Ozasa. The NCO expires in
March 2028. No. 40928-7-III State v. Ozasa
In August 2024, a neighbor saw Ozasa and his wife outdoors in a heated
discussion. Ozasa was standing behind Ms. Ozasa as she sat on a bench and had his
hands on her shoulder while she was upset and crying. From the neighbor's perspective,
it· appeared Ozasa was angrily restraining her. When the neighbor approached, Ozasa
left. The neighbor called 911.
Officer Michael Sirenko was the first officer to arrive. During his investigation,
he discovered the existing NCO between Ozasa and Ms. Ozasa. Officer Sirenko
confirmed the NCO was valid; that if had been served on· Ozasa, and reviewed its terms.
By amended information, the State charged Ozasa with residential burglary and
three counts of felony violation of an NCO. In relevant part, the amended information
stated that Ozasa "with knowledge that he was the subject ofa ..·. no contact·otcler ...
protecting Amanda Kay Ozasa,' 'and said order being valid and in effect, did violate the
order." Clerks Papers (CP) at 18.
The parties tried their case to a jury. During opening statements, both the
prosecutor and defense counsel explained that an NCO violation must be knowingly
committed. Before jury deliberations, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss
the burglary charge.
The court instructed the jury that it must find Ozasa "knowingly violated a
provision of [a no-contact] order" to convict him. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 3579. In closing,
2 No. 40928-7-III State v. Ozasa
the prosecutor reviewed the court's definition of "knowingly" and reminded the jury that
"Ozasa knew there was a no-contact order in place" and, when Ozasa saw the neighbor
approaching, he left. RP at 3596. The defense argued in closing the State had to prove
Ozasa knowingly violated the NCO, meaning that "he knew about the order, about the
specific provision, and when he acted he knew that what he was doing violated the
order." RP at 3602.
The jury convicted Ozasa of only one of the three felony counts of violating an
NCO. At sentencing, the court imposed the standard-range 60-month sentence
recommended by the State.
Ozasa appeals to this court.
ANALYSIS
DEFICIENCY OF THE CHARGING DOCUMENT
Ozasa argues his conviction should be reversed and remanded for dismissal of the
NCO charge because the amended information failed to include the essential element that
he knowingly violated a provision of the NCO. The State concedes the amended
information was constitutionally deficient but urges us to not follow Kjorsvikand instead
apply a constitutional harmless error test. We agree with Ozasa and decline to depart
from binding precedent.
3 No. 40928-7-111 State v. Ozasa
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of a charging document de novo. · State v.
Briggs, 18 Wn. App. 2d 544, 548, 492 P .3d 218 (2021 ). Accused persons have the
constitutional dght to know the charges against them. U.S. CONST. amend .. VI; CONST.
art. I, § 22. "' Pursuant to this right, [t]he accused ... has a constitutional right to be
apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. . . . This doctrine is
elementary and of universal application, and is founded on the plainest principle of
justice."' State v. Pry, 194 Wn.2d 745,751,452 P.3d 536 (2019) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Gehrke, 193 Wn.2d 1, 6, 434 P.3d 522 (2019)). These
constitutional principles are satisfied only if the charging document "states all the
essential elements of the crime charged, both statutory and nonstatutory." Stdte v.
McCarty, 140 Wn.2d 420, 425,; 998 P.2d 296 (2000). · If the charging document is
constitutionally deficient, the remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Pry, 194 Wn.2d at
752.
Ozasa did not challenge the sufficiency of the information before a verdict was
reached. If the "charging document is challenged for the first time on appeal, we
construe it liberally." Id. "' [I]fthe document cannot be construed to give notice of or to
contain in some manner the essential elements of a crime, the most liberal reading cannot
cure it."' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McCarty, 140 Wn.2d at 425).
4 No. 40928-7-III State v. Ozasa
We use a two-pronged test to analyze challenges to the sufficiency of the charging
document: "( 1) do the necessary facts appear' in any form, or by fair construction can they
be found, on the face of the cha~girig document and, if so, (2) can the defendant show that
he or she was nonetheless actually prejudiced by the inarlful language that caused a lack
of notice?" Id. at 752-53 "We do not look past the face of the document ... until the
second prong inK.jorsvik." Id. at 753. "Ifthe necessary elements are not found or fairly
implied, we presume prejudice and reverse without reaching the second prong and the
question of prejudice." Id.
The State charged Ozasa witli felony violation of an NCO under.RCW
10.99.050(2)(a) and RCW 7.105.450(5). ·Rew 10.99.050(2)(a) provides that a "[w]illful
violation of a court order issued ... is punishable under RCW 7.105.450." The
"requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly
with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further
requirements plainly appears." RCW 9A.08.010(4). Under RCW 7.105.450(5), "[a]
violation of a domestic violence protection order ... is a class C felony if the offender
has at least two previous convictions for violating the provisions of [certain orders]."
The crime of violation of a no-contact order has three essential elements:
"(l) the willful contact with another (2) that a valid NCO prohibits and (3) defendant's
5 No.
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FILED FEBRUARY 5, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40928-7-111 ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) IAN CONNOR TAKESH OZASA, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. -Ian Ozasa appeals his conviction of felony violation
of a no-contact order. For the first time on appeal, he argues the information was
constitutionally deficient. The State concedes error but urges us to not follow State v.
Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 812 P.2d 86 (1991), and adopt a harmless error test. We accept
the State's concession, reject its invitation to ignore binding authority, and direct the trial
court to dismiss Ozasa' s conviction without prejudice.
FACTS
In June 2023, the Thurston County Superior Court issued an amended no-contact
order (NCO) against Ian Ozasa to protect his wife, Amanda Ozasa. The NCO expires in
March 2028. No. 40928-7-III State v. Ozasa
In August 2024, a neighbor saw Ozasa and his wife outdoors in a heated
discussion. Ozasa was standing behind Ms. Ozasa as she sat on a bench and had his
hands on her shoulder while she was upset and crying. From the neighbor's perspective,
it· appeared Ozasa was angrily restraining her. When the neighbor approached, Ozasa
left. The neighbor called 911.
Officer Michael Sirenko was the first officer to arrive. During his investigation,
he discovered the existing NCO between Ozasa and Ms. Ozasa. Officer Sirenko
confirmed the NCO was valid; that if had been served on· Ozasa, and reviewed its terms.
By amended information, the State charged Ozasa with residential burglary and
three counts of felony violation of an NCO. In relevant part, the amended information
stated that Ozasa "with knowledge that he was the subject ofa ..·. no contact·otcler ...
protecting Amanda Kay Ozasa,' 'and said order being valid and in effect, did violate the
order." Clerks Papers (CP) at 18.
The parties tried their case to a jury. During opening statements, both the
prosecutor and defense counsel explained that an NCO violation must be knowingly
committed. Before jury deliberations, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss
the burglary charge.
The court instructed the jury that it must find Ozasa "knowingly violated a
provision of [a no-contact] order" to convict him. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 3579. In closing,
2 No. 40928-7-III State v. Ozasa
the prosecutor reviewed the court's definition of "knowingly" and reminded the jury that
"Ozasa knew there was a no-contact order in place" and, when Ozasa saw the neighbor
approaching, he left. RP at 3596. The defense argued in closing the State had to prove
Ozasa knowingly violated the NCO, meaning that "he knew about the order, about the
specific provision, and when he acted he knew that what he was doing violated the
order." RP at 3602.
The jury convicted Ozasa of only one of the three felony counts of violating an
NCO. At sentencing, the court imposed the standard-range 60-month sentence
recommended by the State.
Ozasa appeals to this court.
ANALYSIS
DEFICIENCY OF THE CHARGING DOCUMENT
Ozasa argues his conviction should be reversed and remanded for dismissal of the
NCO charge because the amended information failed to include the essential element that
he knowingly violated a provision of the NCO. The State concedes the amended
information was constitutionally deficient but urges us to not follow Kjorsvikand instead
apply a constitutional harmless error test. We agree with Ozasa and decline to depart
from binding precedent.
3 No. 40928-7-111 State v. Ozasa
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of a charging document de novo. · State v.
Briggs, 18 Wn. App. 2d 544, 548, 492 P .3d 218 (2021 ). Accused persons have the
constitutional dght to know the charges against them. U.S. CONST. amend .. VI; CONST.
art. I, § 22. "' Pursuant to this right, [t]he accused ... has a constitutional right to be
apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. . . . This doctrine is
elementary and of universal application, and is founded on the plainest principle of
justice."' State v. Pry, 194 Wn.2d 745,751,452 P.3d 536 (2019) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Gehrke, 193 Wn.2d 1, 6, 434 P.3d 522 (2019)). These
constitutional principles are satisfied only if the charging document "states all the
essential elements of the crime charged, both statutory and nonstatutory." Stdte v.
McCarty, 140 Wn.2d 420, 425,; 998 P.2d 296 (2000). · If the charging document is
constitutionally deficient, the remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Pry, 194 Wn.2d at
752.
Ozasa did not challenge the sufficiency of the information before a verdict was
reached. If the "charging document is challenged for the first time on appeal, we
construe it liberally." Id. "' [I]fthe document cannot be construed to give notice of or to
contain in some manner the essential elements of a crime, the most liberal reading cannot
cure it."' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McCarty, 140 Wn.2d at 425).
4 No. 40928-7-III State v. Ozasa
We use a two-pronged test to analyze challenges to the sufficiency of the charging
document: "( 1) do the necessary facts appear' in any form, or by fair construction can they
be found, on the face of the cha~girig document and, if so, (2) can the defendant show that
he or she was nonetheless actually prejudiced by the inarlful language that caused a lack
of notice?" Id. at 752-53 "We do not look past the face of the document ... until the
second prong inK.jorsvik." Id. at 753. "Ifthe necessary elements are not found or fairly
implied, we presume prejudice and reverse without reaching the second prong and the
question of prejudice." Id.
The State charged Ozasa witli felony violation of an NCO under.RCW
10.99.050(2)(a) and RCW 7.105.450(5). ·Rew 10.99.050(2)(a) provides that a "[w]illful
violation of a court order issued ... is punishable under RCW 7.105.450." The
"requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly
with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further
requirements plainly appears." RCW 9A.08.010(4). Under RCW 7.105.450(5), "[a]
violation of a domestic violence protection order ... is a class C felony if the offender
has at least two previous convictions for violating the provisions of [certain orders]."
The crime of violation of a no-contact order has three essential elements:
"(l) the willful contact with another (2) that a valid NCO prohibits and (3) defendant's
5 No. 40928-7-111 State v. Ozasa
knowledge of the NCO." Briggs, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 550. "All three essential elements
must appear in some form, or by fair construction, in the charging document." Id. at 551.
In Briggs, the State charged the defendant with various crimes, including felony
violation of an NCO. Id. at 546-47. The relevant language in the information stated the
defendant "' with knowledge that he was the subject of a ... no contact order ... did
violate the order."' Id. at 551 (some alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).· The
court determined that the information could not liberally be construed as alleging that the
defendant knowingly violated the NCO. Id. at 553. Accordingly, the ·court reversed the
defendant's conviction. Id. at 555.
Here, the amended information charging Ozasa with felony violation of an NCO
stated that Ozasa "with knowledge·that he was the subject of a ... no contact order ...
did violate the order." CP at 5~ This is the same language Briggs rejected because it
failed to provide the defendant notice that willful contact with the protected party was an
element of the charged crime. Here, because the charging information lacked the
essential element of willful contact, it was constitutionally deficient, we presume ·
prejudice, and the remedy is reversal and dismissal without prejudice.
The State correctly concedes that the amended information was constitutionally
deficient. However, it argues the Kjorsvik remedy of dismissal without prejudice
effectively treats a one-word omission in a charging document as structural error.
6 No. 40928-7-III State v. Ozasa
Resp't's Br. at 17-18. It argues that such treatment is inconsistent with how the United
States Supreme Court currently analyzes most constitutional errors and urges us to apply
the constitutional harmless error test. Resp't's Br. at 18-20. Even were we persuaded by
the State's arguments, it is beyond our authority to ignore Kjorsvik. When "the state
Supreme Court has decided an issue of state law, we are bound by that interpretation until
it is overruled by [our] Supreme Court." Twin W Owners' Ass'n v. Murphy, 26 Wn. App.
2d 494, 507, 529 P.3d 410 (2023).
Accordingly, we reverse Ozasa' s conviction of felony violation of an NCO and
direct the trial court to dismiss that charge without prejudice.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Cooney, J. Murphy, J.