State of Washington v. H.P.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: March 12, 2024
• Docket: 40005-1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED MARCH 12, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40005-1-III Respondent, ) ) vs. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) H.P.,† ) ) Petitioner. )

COONEY, J. — Fifteen-year-old H.P. is pending trial in Benton County on

charges of murder in the first degree. After extensive proceedings, the juvenile court

declined jurisdiction and transfered the prosecution to superior court for H.P. to be tried

as an adult. At the request of the parties, we reverse and remand for additional

declination proceedings.

FACTS

The State alleges H.P., then 14, murdered 19-year-old Julian Chavez by shooting

him multiple times in the back. The State further alleges the murder was premeditated,

unprovoked, and that Mr. Chavez and H.P. did not know each other. Based on video

† The case name has been changed to State v. H.P. in accordance with an amendment to RAP 3.4 and General Order of Division III, In Re Changes to Case Title (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018). No. 40005-1-III State v. H.P.

surveillance of the incident, the juvenile court characterized the murder as “violent and

senseless.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 220.

The State moved to have H.P. tried as an adult in superior court. To decide the

State’s motion, the court considered legal memoranda filed by the parties and took

evidence over two days. The court admitted 49 exhibits and heard testimony from eight

witnesses. The witnesses included law enforcement officers, H.P.’s mother, his principal,

juvenile detention staff, a gang expert, and an expert forensic psychologist who evaluated

H.P.’s upbringing, youthfulness, maturity, and risk of dangerousness.

After considering the arguments and evidence, the court issued a 52-page letter

decision granting the State’s motion, which it subsequently incorporated into a written

order. The letter decision identified the applicable legal standards and relevant case law,

including Kent,1 Division One of this court’s opinion in Quijas,2 and our state’s recent

1 In Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme Court discussed eight factors to consider when declining juvenile court jurisdiction. 383 U.S. 541, 566-68, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). The Washington State Supreme Court later mandated consideration of these factors in Washington’s state courts. See State v. Holland, 98 Wn.2d 507, 515-16, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983). 2 In State v. Quijas, Division One of this court held that the Kent factors are not exclusive and that juvenile courts must also consider questions of systemic racial bias when raised by the defendant and “supported by some evidence in the record.” 12 Wn. App. 2d 363, 375, 457 P.3d 1241 (2020).

2 No. 40005-1-III State v. H.P.

series of cases concerning youthful offenders. The decision identified the material facts,

summarized the parties’ arguments, and applied the law to the facts.

Disagreeing with the trial court’s decision, H.P. sought discretionary review from

this court. We granted discretionary review of the juvenile court’s application of Quijas

and denied review of other issues raised by H.P. After we granted discretionary review,

the State filed a motion to summarily remand to the trial court for a determination of

whether the juvenile declination process is unconstitutionally discriminatory against

youth of color. H.P. joined the State’s motion for immediate relief, but the parties

disagree as to the scope of remand. We exercise our discretion to decide this motion

through a written opinion. RAP 17.6(b).

ANALYSIS

The State titled its motion as a “motion for remand.” In character, the motion is a

motion on the merits. The motion on the merits procedure used to permit appellate court

commissioners and individual Court of Appeals judges to unilaterally affirm or reverse

cases that were “clearly with merit” or “clearly without merit.” RAP 18.14(e)(1), (2).

We suspended use of the procedure in 2015. Gen. Ord. of Div. III, In re Mot. on the

Merits Under RAP 18.14 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015). Because we suspended use of

RAP 18.14, this court’s commissioner referred the State’s motion to a panel for decision.

RAP 17.2(b).

3 No. 40005-1-III State v. H.P.

While we grant the State’s motion, this court’s general order remains in effect.

Because of the time-sensitive nature of juvenile court declination decisions and appellate

courts’ historic inability to provide an effective remedy for improper declination, we

exercise our discretion to waive our general order in this case “to serve the ends of

justice.” RAP 1.2(c). This opinion is not an endorsement or revival of the motion on the

merits procedure or RAP 18.14.

We grant the State’s motion because the juvenile court’s declination order and

letter ruling did not resolve the racial bias factor. The juvenile court’s letter ruling

summarized H.P.’s argument concerning this factor and summarized the relevant case

law. CP at 214-15, 230-31, 242-43. However, the trial court did not apply the law to the

facts with respect to this factor like it did for the Kent factors. The court did not discuss

the extent to which racial bias might be present in this case either explicitly or implicitly

on an individual or systemic level. The court also did not address whether its potential

presence or lack of presence weighs in favor of declination, weighs against declination,

or is neutral. The failure to resolve this factor requires remand for further proceedings.

Quijas, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 376.

Having determined that remand is required, the next question is the scope of

remand. In Quijas, the court remanded for a Dillenburg hearing. Id. (discussing

Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d 331, 422 P.2d 783 (1967)). A Dillenburg hearing

4 No. 40005-1-III State v. H.P.

occurs when the juvenile defendant has reached adulthood and it is later determined that

there was a defective declination proceeding. Id. Dillenburg does not apply here because

H.P. is still a juvenile. The State asks that remand be limited solely to resolving the

question of racial bias. H.P. urges us to vacate the declination order and remand for a full

de novo declination hearing.

Because this case is at a different procedural stage than Dillenburg and related

cases, we are free to fashion an appropriate remedy. “The appellate court may reverse,

affirm, or modify the decision being reviewed and take any other action as the merits of

the case and the interest of justice may require.” RAP 12.2. The juvenile court is already

well-versed in the facts of this case and facts concerning H.P.’s life and upbringing. The

declination hearing was also recent in time, having been decided on August 21, 2023.

Therefore, it is not necessary to remand for a de novo declination hearing. The juvenile

court need only conduct a continued declination hearing on the racial bias question and

amend its ruling to the extent necessary to incorporate its additional findings and

conclusions. At this hearing, the court should reopen the record to additional evidence

from the parties on this factor. Evidence that has already been admitted does not need to

be presented again. In its discretion, the court may also reopen the record to take

additional evidence related to the other factors.

5 No. 40005-1-III State v. H.P.

CONCLUSION

The juvenile court’s declination order is reversed, and we remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in

the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with

RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Cooney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Pennell, J.

Staab, J.