State Of Washington, V Francisco Salgado Rojas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: May 1, 2023
• Docket: 85046-6
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 85046-6-I

Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FRANCISCO SALGADO ROJAS,

Appellant.

BOWMAN, J. — Francisco Salgado Rojas appeals the trial court’s order

refusing to consider his postconviction motion for discovery. Because the trial

court applied an incorrect legal standard when it declined to consider Salgado

Rojas’ motion, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

In 2008, a jury convicted Salgado Rojas of attempted murder in the first

degree while armed with a firearm. The court imposed a standard-range

sentence of 270 months, which included the mandatory 60-month firearm

enhancement. Salgado Rojas appealed. Division Two of our court affirmed the

conviction1 and issued a mandate on June 29, 2010.

On April 28, 2022, Salgado Rojas moved the superior court to order the

State to “reveal and produce any and all material which may be exculpatory and

1 State v. Salgado Rojas, noted at 152 Wn. App. 1066, 2009 WL 3723000, review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1040, 233 P.3d 888 (2010).

This opinion bases the citations and pin cites on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 85046-6-I/2

mitigating.” He asked that “[i]n the event that any of the above requested

evidence exists,” the State produce it for inspection “at the earliest possible time.”

Salgado Rojas also asked the court to set the matter for a hearing with oral

argument “[f]or the adjudication” of the motion.

On June 2, 2022, the trial court issued an order refusing to set a hearing

or otherwise consider Salgado Rojas’ request for discovery. The order states:

[T]he Defendant’s Motion to Produce Any and all Exculpatory and Mitigating Material is denied without need of a hearing. The Defendant’s Motion is not intended nor does it present a collateral attack on the July 6, 2010 Judgment and Sentence. With the Judgment and Sentence remaining in place there is no basis to consider the Defendant’s Motion.

Salgado Rojas appeals.

ANALYSIS

Salgado Rojas argues the trial court abused its discretion and violated his

due process rights when it refused to set a hearing and consider his motion for

postconviction discovery.

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel discovery for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Norby, 122 Wn.2d 258, 268, 858 P.2d 210 (1993).

A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or

based on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Haq, 166 Wn.

App. 221, 261-62, 268 P.3d 997 (2012). A court’s decision is untenable if based

on an incorrect legal standard. State v. Horn, 3 Wn. App. 2d 302, 312, 415 P.3d

1225 (2018). A trial court also abuses its discretion if it categorically refuses to

exercise its discretion. See State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 341-42, 111 P.3d

1183 (2005).

2 No. 85046-6-I/3

CrR 4.7(a) compels the State to disclose materials to the defendant in a

pending criminal case. But postconviction, a defendant is not ordinarily entitled

to discovery. State v. Asaeli, 17 Wn. App. 2d 697, 700, 491 P.3d 245, review

denied, 198 Wn.2d 1026, 498 P.3d 955 (2021) (CrR 4.7 applies to only “pretrial

discovery procedures”); In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 137 Wn.2d 378, 390-91,

972 P.2d 1250 (1999). Rather, a defendant may obtain postconviction discovery

“only to the extent they can show good cause to believe the discovery would

prove entitlement to relief.” Gentry, 137 Wn.2d at 390-91. The claim of good

cause must be specific to the petitioner’s case and cannot be speculative or

conclusory. Id. at 391 n.5 (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904, 908, 117

S. Ct. 1793, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997); Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 417 (5th

Cir. 1995)).

Here, the trial court refused to consider whether Salgado Rojas showed

good cause to support his motion for postconviction discovery. Instead, the court

concluded that Salgado Rojas’ motion does not “present a collateral attack on the

July 6, 2010 Judgment and Sentence,” so, “[w]ith the Judgment and Sentence

remaining in place there is no basis to consider the Defendant’s motion.” The

trial court appears to have predicated consideration of Salgado Rojas’ discovery

motion on a showing that he is entitled to relief from his judgment under CrR

7.8.2 But Salgado Rojas did not seek relief from his judgment under CrR 7.8.

2 CrR 7.8 lists several bases on which a defendant may seek relief from a judgment. The trial court cannot consider such a motion unless it is timely and “the defendant has made a substantial showing that they are entitled to relief.” CrR 7.8(c)(2).

3 No. 85046-6-I/4

Because a defendant need not show that they are entitled to relief from their

judgment to seek postconviction discovery, the trial court abused its discretion.3

We reverse and remand for the trial court to consider Salgado Rojas’

motion for postconviction discovery.

WE CONCUR:

3 We do not address the sufficiency of Salgado Rojas’ discovery motion. And as much as Salgado Rojas suggests due process entitles him to a hearing on his motion, he is incorrect. A trial court has discretion to decide whether a motion warrants a hearing based on “the moving papers.” State v. Frohs, 22 Wn. App. 2d 88, 93, 511 P.3d 1288 (2022); CrR 8.2, 3.6(a).