FILED
MARCH 13, 2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 31224-1-111 ) Respondent, ) ) v. )
I ) EULOGIO CASTRO ROMERO, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )
J Brown, J.-Eulogio Castro Romero appeals his convictions for possessing I methamphetamine and possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He I contends the trial court erred in admitting his custodial interrogation statements to a
federal immigration agent and insufficient evidence supports his conviction for
possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. We affirm.
FACTS
Law enforcement executed a search warrant at Mr. Romero's residence on July
15,2012 around 10:30 p.m. Moses Lake Police Officer Raymond Bernard read Mr.
Romero his Miranda1 rights from a department issued card. Mr. Romero responded that
he understood and gave statements. The search results partly included
methamphetamine on Mr. Romero's bedside table and a firearm under his mattress.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero
The next day, around 10 to 18 hours later, United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agent Jaime Waite took additional statements from Mr. Romero while he
was in jail without giving fresh Miranda warnings. The trial court admitted these
statements at trial after denying Mr. Romero's CrR 3.5 motion to suppress them. A jury
found him guilty as charged of possessing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm
without an alien firearm license. He appealed.
ANALYSIS
A. Miranda Warnings
The issue is whether the trial court erred in admitting Mr. Romero's custodial
interrogation statements to Agent Waite. Mr. Romero solely contends his statements
are inadmissible because Agent Waite obtained them without giving fresh Miranda
warnings. We review the adequacy of Miranda warnings de novo. State v. Campos-
Cerna, 154 Wn. App. 702, 708, 226 P.3d 185 (2010). We review CrR 3.5 factual
findings for substantial evidence. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 131,942 P.2d
363 (1997). Substantial evidence supports a factual finding if "a sufficient quantity of
evidence [exists] in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of
the finding." State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641,644,870 P.2d 313 (1994).
Generally, in addition to due process protections against use of coerced
statements, the State may not admit as trial evidence any statements a suspect makes
during custodial interrogation unless it proves, by a preponderance of evidence, the
suspect received fully effective Miranda warnings and knowingly, intelligently, and
No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero
voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights before making the statements. 2 Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). Mr. Romero
does not invoke due process protections here. The State does not dispute that his
conversation with Agent Waite constituted custodial interrogation. 3
"[C]ourts have generally rejected a per se rule as to when a suspect must be
readvised of his rights after the passage of time or a change in questioners." United
States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1312 (1995) (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42,
49,103 S. Ct. 394, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982». Instead, courts evaluate the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether law enforcement needed to give the suspect
fresh Miranda warnings. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F .3d
1118, 1128-30 (9th. Cir. 2005) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after 16
hours); Guam v. Dela Pena, 72 F.3d 767,769-70 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding Miranda
warnings were still effective after 15 hours); Puplampu v. United States, 422 F.2d 870,
870 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after two days);
Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327,331 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding Miranda warnings
2 At a minimum, Miranda warnings must inform a suspect "that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him." 384 U.S. at 479. 3 A suspect is in custody when law enforcement formally arrests the suspect or similarly restrains his or her freedom so that a reasonable person under the circumstances would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,112, 116 S. Ct. 457,133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995). A suspect is subject to interrogation when law enforcement expressly questions the suspect or initiates some functional equivalent, including words or conduct that law enforcement
were still effective after three days); State v. Blanchey, 75 Wn.2d 926, 931, 454 P.2d
841 (1969) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after four days).
Considering these judicial opinions, we conclude the original Miranda warnings
were still effective 10 to 18 hours later, when Mr. Romero made his custodial
interrogation statements to Agent Waite. A sufficient quantity of evidence exists in the
record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that Mr. Romero received fully
effective Miranda warnings and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights before making his statements. Substantial evidence supports the CrR
3.5 factual findings. The trial court did not err in admitting Mr. Romero's custodial
interrogation statements to Agent Waite.
B. Evidence Sufficiency
The issue is whether sufficient evidence supports Mr. Romero's conviction for
possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He contends the State did not
prove he lacked the license.
The State must prove all essential elements of a charged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty finding if '''after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d
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FILED
MARCH 13, 2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 31224-1-111 ) Respondent, ) ) v. )
I ) EULOGIO CASTRO ROMERO, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )
J Brown, J.-Eulogio Castro Romero appeals his convictions for possessing I methamphetamine and possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He I contends the trial court erred in admitting his custodial interrogation statements to a
federal immigration agent and insufficient evidence supports his conviction for
possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. We affirm.
FACTS
Law enforcement executed a search warrant at Mr. Romero's residence on July
15,2012 around 10:30 p.m. Moses Lake Police Officer Raymond Bernard read Mr.
Romero his Miranda1 rights from a department issued card. Mr. Romero responded that
he understood and gave statements. The search results partly included
methamphetamine on Mr. Romero's bedside table and a firearm under his mattress.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero
The next day, around 10 to 18 hours later, United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agent Jaime Waite took additional statements from Mr. Romero while he
was in jail without giving fresh Miranda warnings. The trial court admitted these
statements at trial after denying Mr. Romero's CrR 3.5 motion to suppress them. A jury
found him guilty as charged of possessing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm
without an alien firearm license. He appealed.
ANALYSIS
A. Miranda Warnings
The issue is whether the trial court erred in admitting Mr. Romero's custodial
interrogation statements to Agent Waite. Mr. Romero solely contends his statements
are inadmissible because Agent Waite obtained them without giving fresh Miranda
warnings. We review the adequacy of Miranda warnings de novo. State v. Campos-
Cerna, 154 Wn. App. 702, 708, 226 P.3d 185 (2010). We review CrR 3.5 factual
findings for substantial evidence. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 131,942 P.2d
363 (1997). Substantial evidence supports a factual finding if "a sufficient quantity of
evidence [exists] in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of
the finding." State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641,644,870 P.2d 313 (1994).
Generally, in addition to due process protections against use of coerced
statements, the State may not admit as trial evidence any statements a suspect makes
during custodial interrogation unless it proves, by a preponderance of evidence, the
suspect received fully effective Miranda warnings and knowingly, intelligently, and
No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero
voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights before making the statements. 2 Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). Mr. Romero
does not invoke due process protections here. The State does not dispute that his
conversation with Agent Waite constituted custodial interrogation. 3
"[C]ourts have generally rejected a per se rule as to when a suspect must be
readvised of his rights after the passage of time or a change in questioners." United
States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1312 (1995) (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42,
49,103 S. Ct. 394, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982». Instead, courts evaluate the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether law enforcement needed to give the suspect
fresh Miranda warnings. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F .3d
1118, 1128-30 (9th. Cir. 2005) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after 16
hours); Guam v. Dela Pena, 72 F.3d 767,769-70 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding Miranda
warnings were still effective after 15 hours); Puplampu v. United States, 422 F.2d 870,
870 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after two days);
Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327,331 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding Miranda warnings
2 At a minimum, Miranda warnings must inform a suspect "that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him." 384 U.S. at 479. 3 A suspect is in custody when law enforcement formally arrests the suspect or similarly restrains his or her freedom so that a reasonable person under the circumstances would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,112, 116 S. Ct. 457,133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995). A suspect is subject to interrogation when law enforcement expressly questions the suspect or initiates some functional equivalent, including words or conduct that law enforcement
were still effective after three days); State v. Blanchey, 75 Wn.2d 926, 931, 454 P.2d
841 (1969) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after four days).
Considering these judicial opinions, we conclude the original Miranda warnings
were still effective 10 to 18 hours later, when Mr. Romero made his custodial
interrogation statements to Agent Waite. A sufficient quantity of evidence exists in the
record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that Mr. Romero received fully
effective Miranda warnings and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights before making his statements. Substantial evidence supports the CrR
3.5 factual findings. The trial court did not err in admitting Mr. Romero's custodial
interrogation statements to Agent Waite.
B. Evidence Sufficiency
The issue is whether sufficient evidence supports Mr. Romero's conviction for
possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He contends the State did not
prove he lacked the license.
The State must prove all essential elements of a charged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty finding if '''after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d
216,221,616 P.2d 628 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979». An evidence sufficiency
should know are reasonably likely to elicit his or her incriminating response. Rhode
4 No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero
challenge "admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably
can be drawn therefrom." State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192,201,829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
We defer to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and evidence weight. State v. CafVer, 113 Wn.2d 591, 604, 781 P.2d 1308,789 P.2d 306 (1989).
A person is guilty of possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license if the
person "carr[ies] or possess[es] any firearm," is not "a lawful permanent resident," and
has not "obtained a valid alien firearm license." RCW 9.41.171. To apply for an alien
firearm license, a person must provide "a copy of the applicant's passport and visa
showing the applicant is in the country legally." RCW 9.41.173(4). Because Mr.
Romero admitted he lacked any "papers" authorizing him to be in the country, a rational
jury could reasonably infer he could not provide a copy of his passport and visa showing
he was in the country legally. Report of Proceedings at 136. It was impossible for him
to have obtained a valid alien firearm license because his immigration status
categorically prohibited him from doing so. Therefore, the State produced sufficient
evidence for the jury to find he lacked the license. In sum, sufficient evidence supports
Mr. Romero's conviction for possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682,64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980).
5 1 t t ! ~ No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero
j Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Brown, J.
WE CONCUR:
orsrno.C.J.