FILED MAY 21, 2019 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 35841-1-III ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) EDWARD L. JEGLUM, ) ) Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Edward Jeglum violated a condition of his cash bail
by failing to appear at multiple court hearings. The State requested forfeiture of the cash
bail. The trial court reserved ruling on the request. Eventually, Mr. Jeglum pleaded
guilty and was sentenced. More than one year later, the trial court denied the State’s
request. In denying the State’s request, the trial court construed existing law as
preventing forfeiture of cash bail once an accused reappears in court.
The question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
misconstruing existing law. We conclude it did. We hold that if an accused has violated
a condition of cash bail, a trial court has discretion to forfeit cash bail even after the
accused reappears in court and even after entry of the judgment and sentence. No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion
to determine whether to forfeit Mr. Jeglum’s cash bail and, if so, the appropriate amount.
FACTS
On February 10, 2015, the State charged Edward Jeglum with felony stalking and
two misdemeanor counts of violation of a no-contact order. The trial court set bail at
$100,000. Mr. Jeglum posted $100,000 cash bail and was warned that failure to appear in
court would result in the immediate forfeiture of the bail money.
On August 31, the trial court signed an order modifying Mr. Jeglum’s release
conditions to allow him to travel to Arizona in November to attend scheduled medical
appointments. The order provided that further requests for out-of-state travel would
require prior court approval.
On November 30, Mr. Jeglum appeared in court and the court reset his trial
readiness hearing to January 20, 2016, and his trial date to February 9, 2016. Mr. Jeglum
failed to appear for his January readiness hearing.
On February 17, 2016, the trial court held a hearing to discuss Mr. Jeglum’s
absence. At the hearing, defense counsel submitted a letter ostensibly signed by a nurse
practitioner and a physician stating that Mr. Jeglum was currently residing in a licensed
assisted living home and that travel was not recommended. Defense counsel told the
2 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
court he had been in contact with the doctor, and the doctor was Mr. Jeglum’s primary
care physician.
Later, when the State called the telephone number on the letter, the State learned
that the number was for a storage unit company. The State requested a warrant and bail
forfeiture. The trial court reserved ruling on the State’s requests and scheduled a hearing
for March 3, for Mr. Jeglum to provide more specific information. The trial court ordered
that Mr. Jeglum’s doctor be available by telephone to testify at the hearing.
Mr. Jeglum sent a facsimile to the court an hour before the March hearing. Mr.
Jeglum confirmed his knowledge of the hearing, but asserted that the doctor who had
earlier signed the letter was not his doctor, the doctor had never spoken to him or
examined him, and he did not consent to releasing any patient healthcare information.
The facsimile made it clear that Mr. Jeglum had committed a fraud on the court.
The trial court granted the State’s request for a warrant, but again reserved ruling
on the State’s request for bail forfeiture. A bail bondsman for Mr. Jeglum’s other
pending felony matters flew to Arizona, took Mr. Jeglum into custody, and surrendered
him to the Chelan County jail.
On March 14, the State once again requested bail forfeiture. The trial court
reserved ruling on the State’s request, but substantially increased bail.
3 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
Mr. Jeglum soon after pleaded guilty and the parties recommended one month in
jail. The trial court refused to accept the recommendation and sentenced Mr. Jeglum to
nine months in jail. The court explained, “Frankly, Mr. Jeglum, I feel like you have made
a mockery of the legal system. You have dragged out these legal proceedings beyond a
point that I would have thought would have been possible.” Report of Proceedings
(3/3/16, 3/14/16, 3/22/16, 1/18/18) (RP) at 57. Once again the court reserved ruling on
the State’s bail forfeiture request. It directed defense counsel to set a hearing so it could
hear from both parties and consider costs incurred by the bondsman in retrieving Mr.
Jeglum.
Before the trial court could hear the forfeiture request, Mr. Jeglum filed a
declaration of candidacy against the judge. The judge disqualified herself from Mr.
Jeglum’s case. The State eventually succeeded in removing Mr. Jeglum from the ballot
on the basis that he failed to meet the legal requirements to serve as a judge.
In January 2018, a successor judge heard arguments on the State’s bail forfeiture
request. The court ordered the cash bail to be returned to Mr. Jeglum, citing State v.
Paul1 as the controlling case. The court reasoned,
1 95 Wn. App. 775, 976 P.2d 1272 (1999).
4 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
So I think the Court has the discretion to forfeit all or a portion of that cash bail at any time, after [a defendant] fails to appear, but before he shows back up, and has the case resolved. Once he’s shown up—and in this case, he did, eventually—and was sentenced—irregardless of why he showed up, he was here—then I don’t believe this Court has any discretion, but must refund the bail money to the defendant. .... . . . I don’t think I have discretion, at this point. I did, up until the time he appeared in court. But, once he appeared, I don’t believe the Court has any—any discretion.
RP at 74, 81. The trial court stayed the order 30 days to permit the State to appeal, which
it did.
ANALYSIS
The State argues the trial court had discretion to forfeit the cash bail and asks this
court to remand with instructions for the trial court to exercise its discretion.
Standard of review
The decision whether to forfeit bail is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Banuelos, 91 Wn. App. 860, 861-62, 960 P.2d 952 (1998); In re Marriage of Bralley, 70
Wn. App. 646, 651, 855 P.2d 1174 (1993); State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 552, 507
P.2d 909 (1973). “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the decision of the court is
‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’”
State v. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d 689, 706, 213 P.3d 32 (2009) (quoting State ex rel.
5 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). A trial court’s decision is
based on untenable reasons when it is based on the wrong legal standard. State v.
Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 623, 290 P.3d 942 (2012).
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FILED MAY 21, 2019 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 35841-1-III ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) EDWARD L. JEGLUM, ) ) Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Edward Jeglum violated a condition of his cash bail
by failing to appear at multiple court hearings. The State requested forfeiture of the cash
bail. The trial court reserved ruling on the request. Eventually, Mr. Jeglum pleaded
guilty and was sentenced. More than one year later, the trial court denied the State’s
request. In denying the State’s request, the trial court construed existing law as
preventing forfeiture of cash bail once an accused reappears in court.
The question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
misconstruing existing law. We conclude it did. We hold that if an accused has violated
a condition of cash bail, a trial court has discretion to forfeit cash bail even after the
accused reappears in court and even after entry of the judgment and sentence. No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion
to determine whether to forfeit Mr. Jeglum’s cash bail and, if so, the appropriate amount.
FACTS
On February 10, 2015, the State charged Edward Jeglum with felony stalking and
two misdemeanor counts of violation of a no-contact order. The trial court set bail at
$100,000. Mr. Jeglum posted $100,000 cash bail and was warned that failure to appear in
court would result in the immediate forfeiture of the bail money.
On August 31, the trial court signed an order modifying Mr. Jeglum’s release
conditions to allow him to travel to Arizona in November to attend scheduled medical
appointments. The order provided that further requests for out-of-state travel would
require prior court approval.
On November 30, Mr. Jeglum appeared in court and the court reset his trial
readiness hearing to January 20, 2016, and his trial date to February 9, 2016. Mr. Jeglum
failed to appear for his January readiness hearing.
On February 17, 2016, the trial court held a hearing to discuss Mr. Jeglum’s
absence. At the hearing, defense counsel submitted a letter ostensibly signed by a nurse
practitioner and a physician stating that Mr. Jeglum was currently residing in a licensed
assisted living home and that travel was not recommended. Defense counsel told the
2 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
court he had been in contact with the doctor, and the doctor was Mr. Jeglum’s primary
care physician.
Later, when the State called the telephone number on the letter, the State learned
that the number was for a storage unit company. The State requested a warrant and bail
forfeiture. The trial court reserved ruling on the State’s requests and scheduled a hearing
for March 3, for Mr. Jeglum to provide more specific information. The trial court ordered
that Mr. Jeglum’s doctor be available by telephone to testify at the hearing.
Mr. Jeglum sent a facsimile to the court an hour before the March hearing. Mr.
Jeglum confirmed his knowledge of the hearing, but asserted that the doctor who had
earlier signed the letter was not his doctor, the doctor had never spoken to him or
examined him, and he did not consent to releasing any patient healthcare information.
The facsimile made it clear that Mr. Jeglum had committed a fraud on the court.
The trial court granted the State’s request for a warrant, but again reserved ruling
on the State’s request for bail forfeiture. A bail bondsman for Mr. Jeglum’s other
pending felony matters flew to Arizona, took Mr. Jeglum into custody, and surrendered
him to the Chelan County jail.
On March 14, the State once again requested bail forfeiture. The trial court
reserved ruling on the State’s request, but substantially increased bail.
3 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
Mr. Jeglum soon after pleaded guilty and the parties recommended one month in
jail. The trial court refused to accept the recommendation and sentenced Mr. Jeglum to
nine months in jail. The court explained, “Frankly, Mr. Jeglum, I feel like you have made
a mockery of the legal system. You have dragged out these legal proceedings beyond a
point that I would have thought would have been possible.” Report of Proceedings
(3/3/16, 3/14/16, 3/22/16, 1/18/18) (RP) at 57. Once again the court reserved ruling on
the State’s bail forfeiture request. It directed defense counsel to set a hearing so it could
hear from both parties and consider costs incurred by the bondsman in retrieving Mr.
Jeglum.
Before the trial court could hear the forfeiture request, Mr. Jeglum filed a
declaration of candidacy against the judge. The judge disqualified herself from Mr.
Jeglum’s case. The State eventually succeeded in removing Mr. Jeglum from the ballot
on the basis that he failed to meet the legal requirements to serve as a judge.
In January 2018, a successor judge heard arguments on the State’s bail forfeiture
request. The court ordered the cash bail to be returned to Mr. Jeglum, citing State v.
Paul1 as the controlling case. The court reasoned,
1 95 Wn. App. 775, 976 P.2d 1272 (1999).
4 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
So I think the Court has the discretion to forfeit all or a portion of that cash bail at any time, after [a defendant] fails to appear, but before he shows back up, and has the case resolved. Once he’s shown up—and in this case, he did, eventually—and was sentenced—irregardless of why he showed up, he was here—then I don’t believe this Court has any discretion, but must refund the bail money to the defendant. .... . . . I don’t think I have discretion, at this point. I did, up until the time he appeared in court. But, once he appeared, I don’t believe the Court has any—any discretion.
RP at 74, 81. The trial court stayed the order 30 days to permit the State to appeal, which
it did.
ANALYSIS
The State argues the trial court had discretion to forfeit the cash bail and asks this
court to remand with instructions for the trial court to exercise its discretion.
Standard of review
The decision whether to forfeit bail is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Banuelos, 91 Wn. App. 860, 861-62, 960 P.2d 952 (1998); In re Marriage of Bralley, 70
Wn. App. 646, 651, 855 P.2d 1174 (1993); State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 552, 507
P.2d 909 (1973). “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the decision of the court is
‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’”
State v. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d 689, 706, 213 P.3d 32 (2009) (quoting State ex rel.
5 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). A trial court’s decision is
based on untenable reasons when it is based on the wrong legal standard. State v.
Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 623, 290 P.3d 942 (2012).
The State argues the trial court abused its discretion by misconstruing Paul. We
agree and take this opportunity to clarify the law of cash bail.
1. Cash bail is forfeitable if the accused fails to appear or otherwise violates a condition of release
At the outset, we note there is no constitutional or statutory authority governing
forfeiture of cash bail. Article I, section 20 of the Washington State Constitution requires
that all criminal defendants “be bailable by sufficient sureties.” However, that provision
only applies to bail posted by third parties, not cash bail posted by the defendant. State v.
Barton, 181 Wn.2d 148, 156, 331 P.3d 50 (2014). Barton explains:
“‘The underlying legal theories behind bail bonds and cash bail are different; in bail bonds the law looks to the surety to guarantee the defendant’s appearance, while in cash bail the law looks to the money already in the hands of the state to insure defendant’s appearance.’”
Id. (quoting Bralley, 70 Wn. App. at 653 (quoting 8 C.J.S. Bail § 88, at 109 (1988)). In
Bralley, we held that RCW 10.19.090, which governs forfeiture of bail bonds, does not
apply to cash bail posted by the subject of the bail. Bralley, 70 Wn. App. at 654.
6 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
CrR 3.2(o), however, applies to cash bail; that rule provides:
If the accused has been released on the accused’s own recognizance, on bail, or has deposited money instead thereof, and does not appear when the accused’s personal appearance is necessary or violated conditions of release, the court, in addition to the forfeiture of the recognizance, or of the money deposited, may direct the clerk to issue a bench warrant for the accused’s arrest.
This provision authorizes a trial court to forfeit cash bail whenever an accused fails to
appear in court or otherwise violates a condition of release. But it does not answer the
questions presented here—whether forfeiture of cash bail is permitted after the accused
reappears in court or after entry of judgment and sentence.
2. Cash bail is forfeitable even after the accused appears back in court and even after entry of judgment and sentence
In Paul, Anita Paul was convicted of first degree theft of public assistance and
ordered to pay restitution. Paul, 95 Wn. App. at 776. She failed to make payments, and
she was arrested and charged with failure to make restitution payments and failing to
report to her community corrections officer. Id. at 776-77. The trial court set bail at
$2,500, and her parents posted cash bail. Id. at 777. Proceedings continued, and Ms.
Paul always appeared at the hearings. Id. Yet, because she had trouble making her
restitution payments, the trial court forfeited the cash bail. Id. It stated, “‘The bail is
forfeited for restitution. I can forfeit it. It doesn’t matter whose it is.’” Id.
7 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
We disagreed with the trial court and held that cash bail could not be forfeited
when the accused has satisfied the bail conditions. Id. at 777-79. We explained, “If the
[accused] does not appear, the cash bail is forfeited. If the [accused] is subsequently
apprehended, the court has the discretion to vacate the bail for forfeiture or not.” Id. at
778 (citing Bralley, 70 Wn. App. at 651). Using unartful language, we also explained,
“When the accused appears, the conditions of the bail have been fulfilled, and the court
must give the money back.” Id. (citing State v. Ransom, 34 Wn. App. 819, 822-24, 664
P.2d 521 (1983)). Given our earlier explanation of cash bail and the fact that Ms. Paul
had attended all of her court hearings, the preceding quote should not be construed as
applying to accused persons who have missed one or more court hearings. Thus
construed, Paul does not preclude the trial court from forfeiting Mr. Jeglum’s cash bail.
In Ransom, Mr. Ransom posted $10,000 in cash bail in his pending first degree
robbery case. Ransom, 34 Wn. App. at 820. Mr. Ransom’s mother and brother supplied
the funds. Id. Mr. Ransom appeared for trial and was found guilty. Id. The court
sentenced Mr. Ransom to a term of not more than 10 years’ imprisonment and remanded
Mr. Ransom to the custody of the State. Id. The deputy prosecutor called for a deputy,
but before one arrived, Mr. Ransom fled. Id. at 821. The trial court subsequently ordered
forfeiture of the $10,000 cash bail. Id. We reversed the trial court’s order. Id. at 825.
8 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
We held that the cash bail was exonerated once the trial court entered its judgment and
sentence. Id. at 823-24. And because Mr. Ransom had complied with the conditions of
his cash bail prior to its exoneration, the trial court lacked authority to forfeit it. Id. at
824-25.
Paul and Ransom are distinguishable from the case now before us. In those cases,
the accused persons did not violate the conditions of their cash bail. Here, Mr. Jeglum
did. Not only did Mr. Jeglum fail to appear for court hearings, he perpetrated a fraud on
the court by affirmatively misrepresenting he was unable to attend court because of his
medical condition.
Moreover, the State requested forfeiture of the cash bail before Mr. Jeglum was
apprehended and returned, again prior to his plea, and again at the plea and sentence
hearing. The trial court reserved ruling on the State’s multiple requests mostly because it
wished to give Mr. Jeglum an opportunity to rebut the State’s factual and legal arguments.
Were we to conclude that these multiple delays for Mr. Jeglum’s benefit somehow
deprived the trial court of its authority to forfeit cash bail, our conclusion would
inequitably benefit a wrongdoer.
We conclude that the trial court had authority to forfeit Mr. Jeglum’s cash bail
even after he reappeared in court and even after entry of the judgment and sentence. The
9 No. 35841-1-III State v. Jeglum
trial court misconstrued Paul and, in so doing, abused its discretion. We remand this
matter to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion to determine whether to forfeit Mr.
Jeglum's cash bail and, if so, the appropriate amount.
Reversed and remanded.
WE CONCUR:
Pennell, J.