State of Washington v. Earl Phillips, III

562 P.3d 1265

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 30, 2025
• Docket: 39857-9
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED JANUARY 30, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 39857-9-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) PUBLISHED OPINION EARL PHILLIPS, III, ) ) Appellant. )

FEARING, J. — Appellant Earl Phillips resided in a county jail for 164 days

between the time of his arrest for burglary and assault and the superior court’s entry of a

finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. For thirteen of those days, a court order

detained Phillips for a competency evaluation pursuant to RCW 10.77. This appeal raises No. 39857-9-III State v. Phillips

the unique question about the number of days for which Phillips should receive credit,

under RCW 10.77.025, toward the maximum time allowed for his detainment for

treatment. Phillips argues he should receive credit for all 164 days in jail. The State

contends Phillips should receive credit only for the thirteen days of detainment

specifically for the competency evaluation. The superior court agreed with the State. We

do too.

FACTS

Appellant Earl Phillips, III, has suffered from mental illness, including hearing

voices, since six years of age. As of March 11, 2017, Phillips had failed to take his

medications for years.

On March 11, 2017, Earl Phillips entered an empty Walla Walla home undergoing

a remodel. Phillips then believed the government owned the house and “mobile

command” had told him that he was in the United States military. Phillips bore on his

person two large knives, respectively ten and eighteen inches in length.

Law enforcement journeyed to the residence as a result of reports of an individual

trespassing into the house. As the officers entered the home, Earl Phillips stood at the top

of a steep staircase leading from the first floor to the second floor.

Earl Phillips yelled to the officers that they were trespassing on his command nest.

Phillips raved about being in charge of the universe as he urinated over the stairs in the

direction of the officers. Phillips expressed an interest in killing the officers. The

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officers sought to reason with Phillips but received incomprehensible replies. Phillips

refused to discard his knives.

The police officers arrested Earl Phillips and transported him to Saint Mary’s

Medical Center. In response to questions, at the hospital, about his family, Phillips

answered: “ ‘I ate my family. I have no son.’ ” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 21. Saint Mary’s

lacked a bed for Phillips, so officers transferred him to the Walla Walla County jail.

Phillips remained in the jail for 164 days or until August 14, 2017.

When speaking in March 2017, with Dr. Philip G. Barnard, a clinical psychologist,

Earl Phillips reported that “everything seemed like a dream at the time.” CP at 4.

Phillips denied resisting the officers. Phillips did not recall having a weapon and claimed

he only sought to protect himself and his property.

The State of Washington charged Earl Phillips with one count of second degree

assault, one count of second degree burglary, and one count of obstructing a law

enforcement officer. On May 3, 2017, the superior court ordered a competency

evaluation of Phillips. The evaluator filed a report with the court on May 16.

On August 9, 2017, Earl Phillips moved for judgment of acquittal by reason of

insanity. On August 14, 2017, the trial court found Phillips not guilty of all three crimes

by reason of insanity and ordered his commitment to the State Department of Social and

Health Services (DSHS) for treatment. DSHS admitted Phillips to Eastern State Hospital

on August 22.

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On May 17, 2021, the trial court ordered that Earl Phillips be partially and

conditionally released from Eastern State Hospital, but only to the extent of hospital staff-

escorted community outings and unescorted ground privileges. On June 13, 2022,

Phillips petitioned the court for full conditional release. On December 14, 2022, the trial

court granted the petition, in part.

On March 10, 2023, DSHS sent its semi-annual progress report about Earl

Phillips’ treatment to the Walla Walla County Superior Court. As will be discussed later,

the State may hold an individual found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) a

maximum length of time commensurate with the maximum sentence attended to the

charged crime. Because the court could impose a maximum sentence of ten years on

Phillips for his alleged crimes, DSHS, in its March 10 report, informed the superior court

that he had a maximum commitment date of ten years, or until August 14, 2027. DSHS

gained custody of Phillips on August 14, 2017. The August 14, 2027 date did not give

Phillips any credit for time he spent in the Walla Walla County jail before the court’s

entry of the NGRI verdict. Phillips disagreed with DSHS’ calculation of the maximum

commitment time. He contended his maximum commitment date should be March 11,

2027, ten years from his jailing.

PROCEDURE

Earl Phillips moved the superior court for an order to credit him time toward his

maximum commitment date. Phillips requested that he be credited for the entire 164

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days he spent in the county jail before entering his NGRI plea and before his custody

transfer to DSHS. DSHS resisted the motion.

By the time of the superior court hearing on Earl Phillips’ motion, DSHS

conceded that Phillips should be credited with thirteen days from the time he spent in the

Walla Walla County jail. Those thirteen days represented the length of time between

May 3, 2017, when the superior court ordered a competency evaluation of Phillips, and

May 16, when the evaluator filed a report to the court. At the end of the motion hearing,

the superior court accepted DSHS’ position and granted Phillips a thirteen-day credit, not

a 164-day credit. The court established the new maximum date of commitment to be

August 1, 2027.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Earl Phillips challenges the superior court’s decision on appeal. He repeats his

request for a 164-day credit. He contends the governing statute, RCW 10.77.025(1),

affords him a credit for the entire time spent in the Walla Walla County jail awaiting

disposition of his prosecution. In addition to relying on language in RCW 10.77.025(1)

and a related statute, Phillips forwards the policy disfavoring indeterminate stays in

mental health treatment facilities. According to Phillips, a contrary reading of the statute

also disincentives the State from timely agreeing to entry of an insanity plea.

Insanity acquittees constitute a special class treated differently from other

candidates for commitment. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370, 103 S. Ct. 3043,

5 No. 39857-9-III State v. Phillips

77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983). When a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance of

the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, the United States

Constitution permits the State to confine him to a mental health institution until such time

as he regains his sanity or no longer endangers himself or society. Jones v. United States,

463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983).

The order of commitment following a NGRI plea generally imposes an indefinite

length of commitment because neither the judge nor the State can predict the timespan

needed for recovery. RCW 10.77.200. Still, a Washington statute, RCW 10.77.025,

restricts commitment to the maximum sentence for the crime charged. The statute

recognizes that confinement in a mental health facility entails a massive curtailment of

liberty. In re Personal Restraint of Knapp, 102 Wn.2d 466, 475, 687 P.2d 1145 (1984).

The acquittee may earlier petition for good cause for an earlier release. RCW

10.77.200(5).

This appeal requires an exegesis of RCW 10.77.025(1) and its companion

definitional statute, RCW 10.77.010(4). The former statute declares:

Whenever any person has been: (a) Committed to a correctional facility or inpatient treatment under any provision of this chapter; or (b) ordered to undergo alternative treatment following his or her acquittal by reason of insanity of a crime charged, such commitment or treatment cannot exceed the maximum possible penal sentence for any offense charged for which the person was committed, or was acquitted by reason of insanity.

6 No. 39857-9-III State v. Phillips

RCW 10.77.010(4) defines “commitment,” for purposes of RCW 10.77.025(1) as:

the determination by a court that a person should be detained for a period of either evaluation or treatment, or both, in an inpatient or a less- restrictive setting.

Earl Phillips contends RCW 10.77.025(1) and RCW 10.77.010(4) are ambiguous.

This contention focuses on the term “commitment” as defined in the latter statute. He

requests that this court appraise the legislative purpose behind the statutes, consider the

constitutional prohibition on indeterminate sentences for the criminally insane, and apply

the rule of lenity in order to credit him for the 151 days spent in the custody of Walla

Walla County jail before the finding of NGRI toward his maximum commitment date in

addition to the thirteen days spent detained for the competency evaluation. We discern

no ambiguity. We conclude, as did the superior court, that Phillips may only receive

credit for thirteen days.

This court lacks a copy of the May 3, 2017 superior court order for a competency

evaluation of Earl Phillips and the May 16, 2017 evaluator’s report. We do not know

whether Phillips remained in the Walla Walla County jail from May 3 until the evaluator

completed the assessment or if the jail transported him to another location for purposes of

the evaluation. Regardless, both parties agree that the order for the competency ran from

May 3 until the filing of the evaluator’s report on May 16.

Earl Phillips argues RCW 10.77.025 and RCW 10.77.010, specifically the term

“commitment” as used and defined in the statutes, are ambiguous as they do not render

7 No. 39857-9-III State v. Phillips

clear whether time served in jail before a defendant is found not guilty by reason of

insanity should be credited toward the acquitted defendant’s maximum commitment date.

He argues that, because the statutes are ambiguous, this court must look to the rule of

lenity and the constitutional prohibition on indeterminate sentences for the criminally

insane to interpret the statutes.

We apply fundamental and familiar rules of statutory interpretation. In construing

statutes, we ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent. State v. Keller, 2 Wn.3d 887,

910, 545 P.3d 790 (2024). If the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, we must give

effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Department of Ecology

v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 910, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We glean the plain

meaning of a statute by considering the text of the provision in question, the context of

the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the

provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Association of Washington Spirits &

Wine Distributors v. Washington State Liquor Control Board, 182 Wn.2d 342, 350, 340

P.3d 849 (2015). If a statute is open to more than one interpretation, we may resort to

statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in

discerning legislative intent. State v. Keller, 2 Wn.3d 887, 910 (2024).

Earl Phillips highlights that RCW 10.77.025 and RCW 10.77.010 do not explicitly

deny an accused credit for the time spent in court-ordered treatment or evaluation.

Phillips asserts that the time spent in court-ordered competency evaluation proceedings

8 No. 39857-9-III State v. Phillips

includes any time in pretrial custody that informs the court whether a person should be

detained for evaluation and treatment pursuant to an insanity plea. Relatedly, according

to Phillips, time spent by the court and the State’s and defense counsel evaluating the

prosecution between the jailing and before trial should also be considered commitment

for purposes of RCW 10.77.025(1) and RCW 10.77.010(4). In essence, according to

Phillips, any time spent detained, regardless of whether the location is the county jail, a

state prison, or a state mental hospital, must be credited against the maximum time the

State may hold him for commitment or treatment as a result of the finding of insanity. In

response, the State argues that the statutes at issue, without equivocation, only allow a

credit for time detained by court order for evaluation or treatment.

To repeat, RCW 10.77.010(4) defines “commitment” as “the determination by a

court that a person should be detained for a period of either evaluation or treatment, or

both, in an inpatient or a less-restrictive setting.” RCW 10.77.010(4). This definition

limits the time of commitment to the time detained by a court order for treatment or

evaluation. No court order detained Earl Phillips for evaluation or treatment between his

arrest and the superior court’s finding of insanity other than the order that detained

Phillips for thirteen days for the competency evaluation. During the remaining 151 days,

counsel for the State and the defense may have ruminated and discussed the case and the

ramifications of the competency evaluation report. The court may have even reviewed

9 No. 39857-9-III State v. Phillips

the superior court file, including the report. But no court order directed the court, defense

counsel, or the State’s attorney to perform these tasks.

Earl Phillips argues that the ambiguities in RCW 10.77.025 and RCW

10.77.010(4) in light of this appeal’s facts encourage, if not compel, employment of the

rule of lenity. Because we perceive no ambiguity in the language that answers the

question on review, we decline to apply the rule. The rule of lenity applies only if the

plain language of the statute is ambiguous and traditional statutory interpretation rules do

not help clarify the ambiguity. State v. McDaniel, 185 Wn. App. 932, 936, 344 P.3d

1241 (2015).

Earl Phillips argues that denying credit for pretrial incarceration when an

individual subsequently enters an insanity plea conflicts with the legislature’s recognition

of the constitutional prohibition on indeterminate commitment and disincentivizes the

State to timely consent to an insanity plea for a mentally ill individual. We recognize

these potential harms, but must be guided by the statutes’ language.

We mention some cases cited by Earl Phillips in support of his appeal. These

cases favor the acquitee, but entail different circumstances, if not a different statute.

In Jong Choon Lee v. Hamilton, 56 Wn. App. 880, 785 P.2d 1156 (1990), this

court interpreted language then found in RCW 10.77.020(3) similar to today’s RCW

10.77.025. The court determined that the language demands credit for time for

hospitalization incurred before acquittal. The court reasoned, in Jong Choon Lee, that,

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because RCW 10.77.020(3) refers to commitment “under any provision of this chapter,”

it embraces pre-acquittal commitment. Jong Choon Lee v. Hamilton, 56 Wn. App. 880,

884 (1990). The legislature has not extended this credit to time spent in jail not related to

a competency evaluation.

In State v. Lewis, 184 Wn.2d 201, 205, 355 P.3d 1148 (2015), the Washington

State Supreme Court concluded that a defendant was entitled to credit for the 387 days he

served awaiting trial on multiple charges, but not constitutionally entitled to credit for

time served on his burglary and assault sentences after he began serving his sentence for

failure to register as a sex offender.

We recognize, as acknowledged by State v. Lewis, that, because a defendant

entering a guilty plea must be credited with pretrial incarceration time toward the

imposed sentence, an acquittee might reasonably expect to also receive credit for time

spent in pretrial detention toward the maximum time spent in a mental health facility.

The legislature might someday agree with this expectation. In the meantime, the

legislature may distinguish between a criminal sentence after conviction and a

commitment to a mental health hospital for treatment after an NGRI because the

legislature wishes to insure sufficient treatment before release to the community. The

acquittee also retains the right to petition early for release.

11 No. 39857-9-III State v. Phillips

CONCLUSION

We affirm the superior court’s credit to Earl Phillips of only the thirteen days he

spent under the order for an RCW 10.77 competency evaluation.

Fearing, J.

WE CONCUR:

Cooney, J. Korsmo, J.P.T. 1

1 Kevin M. Korsmo, a retired judge of the Washington State Court of Appeals, is serving as a judge pro tempore of this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150(1).