FILED
SEPTEMBER 10, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40543-5-III )
Respondent, )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION )
DUARTE A. CORDERO, )
)
Appellant. )
MURPHY, J. —A jury found Duarte Cordero guilty of murder in the second degree with a firearm enhancement. Cordero now appeals, arguing (1) law enforcement’s investigation violated his due process rights, (2) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication, (3) his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a voluntary intoxication instruction, (4) the admission of hearsay statements violated his right to confrontation, and (5) cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial.
Initially, Cordero also claimed the trial court erred with respect to a CrR 3.5 hearing and the speedy trial calculation. However, Cordero conceded that those claims were not viable after reviewing the State’s response. We accept his concession.
Cordero raises two additional claims of error in a statement of additional grounds for review.
Finding no error, we affirm.
State v. Cordero FACTS
On August 21, 2022, Chelsey James called 911 and reported Joseph (Joey) Cortez had been shot at a residence on West Shannon Avenue in Spokane, Washington. Cortez did not survive.
Kristin Hillsman lived at the residence on West Shannon with her children as well as Chelsey James, Guillermo Gerena, and Joey Cortez. Ty Gardipe, a friend of Hillsman, who lived in Montana and often traveled to Spokane, was also present at the West Shannon residence on August 21, helping to collect and haul trash away.
James was in a relationship with Cortez. She was also involved with Cordero.
Cordero and James’s relationship was intimate and transactional; Cordero paid James’s rent and otherwise supported her as her “sugar daddy.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (May 15, 2024) at 474.
Before the shooting on August 21, Cordero entered Hillsman’s home to deliver James’s dog to her. Cordero discovered Cortez in James’s bedroom. This upset Cordero, who later slapped James “really hard”—loud enough to be heard through the walls by Hillsman and Gerena. VRP (May 15, 2024) at 589. James cried and was “hysterical.” VRP (May 15, 2024) at 591. Hillsman told Cordero to leave, and he did.
Several hours after leaving Hillsman’s home, Cordero called Hillsman to say he wrecked his car. Hillsman, Gardipe, and Gerena picked up Cordero from the crash scene
3
State v. Cordero between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Cordero was very intoxicated when they arrived. The group brought Cordero back to Hillsman’s home.
Cordero remained upset and hostile while at Hillman’s residence and directed his anger at James for the earlier interaction with Cortez. At one point, he stated he wanted Cortez to come into the living room so “he could do something to him.” VRP (May 16, 2024) at 56. Hillsman tried to de-escalate the situation and called a friend of Cordero’s to pick him up. Cordero left with his friend between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.
Later that same night, Hillsman was working inside the residence while Gerena was in the attic ingesting drugs. Gardipe and Cortez had finished filling Gardipe’s truck and were preparing to leave Hillsman’s residence to dispose of the trash. As Gardipe and Cortez exited the home, Gardipe heard a “pop” and Cortez screaming. VRP (May 15, 2024) at 479.
Cordero walked out of the home holding a gun, pointed it at Gardipe, and then moved to shoot Cortez a second time. Gardipe ran back inside the home.
Hillsman’s children and James ran into Hillsman’s room, saying, “[Cortez] had been shot.” VRP (May 15, 2024) at 598. Hillsman grabbed a flashlight to look for Cortez but could not find him. She heard Cordero at James’s bedroom door (an additional entrance into the residence) and shut the door. Hillsman and James pushed against the door to prevent Cordero from entering the residence.
4
State v. Cordero Gerena went downstairs to investigate after he heard gunshots from his position in the attic. He saw a “small trail of blood” outside and Cordero, holding a revolver, trying to enter the home. VRP (May 16, 2024) at 60-61. Gerena tried to take the gun away from Cordero, but Cordero kept control of the gun, saying, “Chill, buddy, chill, chill; this has nothing to do with you.” VRP (May 16, 2024) at 62. Gerena told Cordero to leave. Cordero left the property and moved toward the alley with the gun.
Hillsman’s neighbor, Corinne Carter, awoke around 11:00 p.m. to the sound of her children screaming. Carter saw Cortez in her room with blood covering his face, and his speech was unintelligible. Cortez then walked to the front of the house and laid down between the kitchen and dining room. Carter called 911.
When Officer Daniel Morley arrived at the scene, he saw “terrified” and “frantic”
people outside. VRP (May 14, 2024) at 408. Inside Carter’s home, he found Cortez face down on the floor with blood coming from his head.
Corporal Kevin Busch arrived on scene and heard a woman scream, “He has a gun. He shot my friend.” VRP (May 20, 2024) at 824. The woman directed Busch’s attention to a man, later identified as Cordero, walking down the street. Cordero did not have the gun on his person when he was arrested. Carter provided law enforcement with surveillance video from the inside of her home.
5
State v. Cordero Evidence collected Law enforcement collected Cordero’s gray Reebok sweatshirt, buccal swabs, and swabs from his hands. Sergeant Jason Uberuaga helped search for the gun. Sergeant Nicholas Geren canvassed the area to look for any other houses that had relevant video surveillance. He found two cameras that showed an individual matching the description of the suspect wearing a hooded sweatshirt walking through the alley. The suspect was seen “manipulating a cloth object in his hands” in one of the videos. VRP (May 20, 2024) at 732.
Within minutes of searching the area seen on the surveillance footage, law enforcement located a black revolver with a wooden handle and unfired ammunition in dead grass along the alley. They also found a pair of rolled-up socks in a recycling bin. Cordero was not wearing socks when detained.
The medical examiner determined Cortez died from multiple gunshot wounds to the face and chest. A bullet from his body was collected as evidence.
The firearm, ammunition, and socks were sent to the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory (Crime Lab) for DNA testing. The grip of the revolver had a mixture of DNA that was consistent with four contributors, with “limited support for the inclusion of Cordero.” VRP (May 16, 2024) at 157. The DNA profile obtained from “the hammer, trigger, cylinder, and barrel of the revolver was interpreted as originating from at least
6
State v. Cordero five individuals,” but they were not suitable for comparisons. VRP (May 16, 2024) at 158. Likewise, the Crime Lab did not find any detectable male DNA on the ammunition cartridges. The revolver was tested at the Crime Lab and compared to the bullet removed from Cortez’s body. The analyst determined the bullet removed from Cortez’s body was fired from that revolver.
The DNA profile obtained from the inside of the socks was consistent with four individuals. The analyst did not test the hair embedded in the fabric of the socks.
Several other items were either photographed or collected as evidence. The collected evidence that was not tested for DNA included: two cigarette butts, a cylindrical flashlight, a glass device used for smoking, a small work light, and AA batteries. Law enforcement opted to not collect a soda can for evidence that was in the recycling bin next to the rolled-up socks.
Cordero was charged with murder in the second degree for the death of Cortez.
His case proceeded to trial. Pretrial motion in limine The State moved to admit nontestimonial excited utterance statements. Officer Morley’s body camera footage recorded a child in Carter’s home yelling, “He’s got a gun, he’s got a gun, hurry, hurry!” while directing law enforcement to Cordero. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 178; VRP (May 13, 2024) at 75-76.
7
State v. Cordero The defense objected on the basis that the child was never formally interviewed or named. Therefore, the State could not demonstrate the child had personal knowledge that could qualify the statements as an excited utterance.
At the hearing, the State produced footage from Officer Morley’s body camera and video surveillance footage from inside Carter’s home. The State argued that the footage showed a child looking out the window when gunshots were heard, a group of children running outside, and the children running back inside accompanied by Cortez. The child who made the statement at issue was a young, shirtless male seen in both videos.
After considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing the recordings, the trial court ruled the child’s statements admissible. The court ruled:
The court will allow the—the testimony of the child via the video to come in under [ER] 602 and 801. My review of the video—and that was helpful. I needed to watch that in order to make a rational decision here.
But here’s what the videos, P-94 and P-93, showed, is that there was a male child inside of a residence; there are gunshots that can be heard on the video. Within—and I counted it. Within three to four seconds, the children, accompanied by the adults, were running outside the house immediately after the shooting took place. And there would then be a basis of knowledge that the child had to indicate by reasonable inference that the child observed potentially the individual that he later identified as having a gun. There is a basis of knowledge there based on the immediate proximity of the child immediately after the shooting.
Clearly, the excited part is very clear. The child is—is in an excited state when he makes the statement, “The guy has a gun.” And the circumstances do support that the child would likely have a first-hand basis
8
State v. Cordero
of knowledge, even though it’s debatable. But the court finds it’s more likely than not that the child did have a basis of knowledge. And, of course, this would meet the exception for hearsay. It also meets the basis of [ER]
602, having first-hand personal knowledge, again, based on the child being immediately present after the shooting, within four—four seconds.
Thank you. I’m going to allow that to come in as an excited utterance, and I find that it meets the threshold for [ER] 602.
VRP (May 13, 2024) at 93-94. Trial The facts above were presented at trial, including the videos from Officer Morley’s body camera and Carter’s home. Additionally, several people testified that Cordero was under the influence of alcohol before the murder. Gardipe testified Cordero was under the influence when they arrived to pick him up from downtown. Hillsman stated Cordero was “very, very intoxicated” and “very drunk.” VRP (May 16, 2024) at 592, 612. Gerena testified Cordero got drunk and crashed his car while under the influence.
Defense counsel proposed alternative suspects for the shooting, and the court limited the suspects to Gerena and Gardipe. Defense counsel also argued that the law enforcement investigation was flawed and biased and lacked DNA evidence because law enforcement failed to test all of the evidence collected for DNA, e.g., the cigarette butts, flashlight, and smoking devices.
Defense counsel did not request any instruction on voluntary intoxication.
9
State v. Cordero Verdict The jury found Cordero guilty of murder in the second degree with a firearm enhancement. He was sentenced to 316 months for the murder conviction and 60 months for the firearm enhancement, for a total of 376 months.
Cordero now appeals.
ANALYSIS
1. Due process regarding law enforcement’s investigation Cordero contends law enforcement’s failure to collect items from the crime scene and request testing on those items violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution. He claims that doing so would have potentially implicated others in the shooting or undermined witness credibility.
Cordero identified “a smoking device, cigarette butts, a flashlight, and a shattered small work light with batteries” from photographs admitted at trial. Br. of Appellant at 18. These items may or may not have been collected but were not tested by the Crime Lab. In addition, he argues defense counsel sought to question witnesses about the untested items to demonstrate an inadequate investigation had occurred but the trial court
10
State v. Cordero did not permit that line of questioning. 1 Cordero argues no comprehensive analysis was performed on the hairs found inside the socks. Additionally, Cordero argues no DNA profiles were collected for Ty Gardipe, Guillermo Gerena, or Kristin Hillsman, even though all three were present at the scene, thus creating a due process violation. Finally, he points out that a forensic scientist with the Crime Lab did not know if the DNA from the grip of the gun was from “touch, transfer or tertiary.” Br. of Appellant at 22.
As a general rule, this court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal unless they are a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a)(3). This exception to the general rule does not, however, permit all claims of constitutional error to be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 934, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). Rather, we look at the claim and assess if a constitutional interest is implicated as compared to another form of trial error. State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). If the claimed error is of a constitutional magnitude, then we look to see if the alleged error actually affected the defendant’s rights in the context of the
1 Cordero frames his argument in the context that the trial court limited cross-
examination. Debatably, he is making a challenge under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article 1, section 22 of the Washington Constitution to the trial court’s ruling. However, such a challenge was not directly stated as an assignment of error on appeal. Under RAP 10.3(g) we review only assignments of error. We therefore review Cordero’s contention of what items were collected or not at the time of autopsy in the context in which he raised it: a due process argument that the investigation was flawed with evidence that was not collected or tested.
11
State v. Cordero trial. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). It is the showing of actual prejudice that makes an error “manifest,” allowing appellate review. Id.
Cordero did not raise these issues in trial court about what items were collected and what evidence was tested. At trial, defense counsel argued there were investigative deficiencies but did not move to dismiss or suppress evidence. Cordero now invokes RAP 2.5(a)(3) to assert manifest constitutional error.
Cordero’s due process claims fail on the merits. It is correct that due process requires the State to disclose material exculpatory evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). However, “[t]he minimal guarantees of due process do not require the prosecution to conduct an independent investigation in the hopes of bolstering potentially exculpatory defense theories.” State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881, 902, 259 P.3d 158 (2011). Cordero identifies no lost or destroyed exculpatory evidence. Rather, his criticisms relate to the thoroughness of the investigation. Such claims do not rise to a constitutional violation. State v. Jones, 26 Wn. App. 551, 554, 614 P.2d 190 (1980).
Here, the jury heard extensive cross-examination on investigative shortcomings, and defense counsel vigorously argued those deficiencies. Cordero fails to establish what material exculpatory evidence, if any, was suppressed as required by a Brady violation, or that the State failed to preserve potentially useful evidence required to establish a
12
State v. Cordero Youngblood 2 violation. Cordero further fails to establish bad faith by the State. Given the overall context, Cordero does not make an affirmative showing of actual prejudice, thus the issue is not a manifest constitutional error reviewable under RAP 2.5(a)(3). 2. Voluntary intoxication instruction Cordero contends the trial court erred by not sua sponte instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication and defense counsel was ineffective for not requesting this instruction. He argues that the lack of a voluntary intoxication instruction undermined the jury’s ability to properly assess his mental state.
A. Trial court instruction Jury instructions are reviewed de novo for legal accuracy. State v. Kindell, 181 Wn. App. 844, 850, 326 P.3d 876 (2014). We review a trial court’s decision to give or not give a particular instruction for abuse of discretion. Stiley v. Block, 130 Wn.2d 486, 498, 925 P.2d 194 (1996). Unpreserved instructional errors are reviewed under RAP 2.5(a)(3) only if constitutional and manifest. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 98.
Cordero did not request a voluntary intoxication instruction, so we review this claim for manifest constitutional error. “‘No error can be predicated on the failure of the trial court to give an instruction when no request for such an instruction was ever
2 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988).
13
State v. Cordero made.’” State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 686, 757 P.2d 492 (1988) (quoting State v. Kroll, 87 Wn.2d 829, 843, 558 P.2d 173 (1976)). There is no error predicated on the trial court’s failure to sua sponte give the instruction. We do not assume Cordero’s challenge is of constitutional magnitude. There is no recognized constitutional error for a trial court to not sua sponte provide a voluntary intoxication instruction. We are not satisfied that Cordero presented an error that is truly of constitutional magnitude. With no constitutional error, we do not review this unpreserved claim of error.
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed de novo. State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239, 249, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). Cordero must show both deficient performance and prejudice to be entitled to relief. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Representation is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness with a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). Prejudice occurs when there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 77-78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). The defendant has the burden to show defense counsel’s performance was deficient based on the trial record. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d at 247-48.
14
State v. Cordero Cordero argues that there was more than enough evidence to support a voluntary intoxication instruction. We disagree.
A jury may be instructed on voluntary intoxication only if there is substantial evidence that the defendant’s drinking affected their ability to form the necessary mental state to commit the charged crime. State v. Gabryschak, 83 Wn. App. 249, 252-53, 921 P.2d 549 (1996). “A defendant is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction when (1) the crime charged includes a mental state, (2) there is substantial evidence of drinking, and (3) there is evidence that the drinking affected the defendant’s ability to form the requisite intent or mental state.” State v. Kruger, 116 Wn. App. 685, 691, 67 P.3d 1147 (2003).
Here, the evidence of intoxication was limited; witnesses described Cordero was drinking hours before the shooting, but no evidence tied intoxication to impaired intent at the time of the crime. A defendant must show more than the consumption of alcohol. Instead, the defendant must establish there is substantial evidence that the level of intoxication affected their ability to form intent. Id. at 692.
It is the third element Cordero has not established through the trial record. There was testimony at trial that Cordero was picked up after going to a bar, drinking alcohol, and wrecking his car hours before the shooting. He was described in that testimony as
15
State v. Cordero “very, very intoxicated” and having trouble walking between 4:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., hours before the 11:00 p.m. shooting. VRP (May 15, 2024) at 592.
There was no evidence presented that alcohol affected Cordero’s ability to form the mental state to act with intent. There was no testimony that Cordero was unable to communicate clearly, or that he responded inappropriately to questions and commands at the time of the shooting or upon his arrest. There was no testimony that his body movements were impaired or that he demonstrated any physical signs or symptoms of extreme intoxication.
Moreover, the defense theory included an alternative suspect argument. At closing, defense counsel focused on the possibility that another person committed the crime and law enforcement’s investigation was biased. Pursuing voluntary intoxication could have undermined the primary defense of complete denial and misidentification. To accomplish the objective of arguing Cordero was so affected by intoxicants that he could not form the requisite mental state, it would have required that he admit that he shot Cortez, once in the abdomen and once in the head.
Because there was no substantial evidence of the level of intoxication that would support giving an instruction on voluntary intoxication, Cordero was not entitled to the voluntary intoxication instruction. Therefore, he cannot show that his defense counsel
16
State v. Cordero was deficient for failing to request a voluntary intoxication instruction, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 3. Right to confrontation Cordero challenges the admission of a nontestifying child’s excited utterance, arguing the trial court’s evidentiary ruling violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 22 of Washington’s Constitution. He contends there was an insufficient foundation to establish the statement was an excited utterance and that the statement was testimonial. We disagree.
Confrontation clause claims are reviewed de novo. State v. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d 96, 108, 271 P.3d 876 (2012). Criminal defendants have the right to confront and cross- examine witnesses against them. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12. The confrontation clause prohibits testimonial hearsay unless the declarant testifies at trial or is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). Whether a statement is testimonial depends on whether the speaker’s primary purpose was to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. State v. Scanlan, 193 Wn.2d 753, 766, 445 P.3d 960 (2019). Testimonial statements include those made under circumstances that
17
State v. Cordero would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the statement would later be available for use at trial. State v. Fisher, 130 Wn. App. 1, 13, 108 P.3d 1262 (2005).
Here, the trial court admitted the child’s statement as an excited utterance under ER 803(a)(2). A trial court’s decision to admit a hearsay statement as an excited utterance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Young, 160 Wn.2d 799, 805, 161 P.3d 967 (2007). “Under ER 803(a)(2), a statement is not excluded as hearsay if it is an excited utterance ‘relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’” Id. at 806 (quoting ER 803(a)(2)). Thus, there are three aspects a proponent to the admission of an excited utterance must satisfy: “(1) a startling event or condition occurred, (2) the declarant made the statement while under the stress of the startling event or condition, and (3) the statement related to the startling event or condition.” Id.
Here, the surveillance footage from inside Carter’s home shows a male child look out the window after hearing gunshots, a group of children running outside, and the children running back inside with Cortez. As seen on Office Morley’s body camera footage, the same male child reacts to a law enforcement officer by exclaiming, “He’s got a gun, he’s got a gun, hurry, hurry!” while pointing toward Cordero, who was walking outside. Ex. P-93 at 02:36-02:45; CP at 178. The child’s behavior and the timing of the statement demonstrate that this statement was made under the stress of a startling event
18
State v. Cordero and relate directly to that event. The child had personal knowledge of the event, as can be circumstantially inferred from the context of what was recorded. The requirements of ER 803(a)(2) are satisfied, and this child’s statement was not testimonial.
For the first time on appeal, Cordero contends that this child’s statement violated his right to confrontation. Not all of those who are questioned by law enforcement or who make statements to law enforcement are subject to the confrontation clause. “Where the police are involved in procuring an unconfronted statement, whether the statement is testimonial depends upon the ‘primary purpose’ for the interrogation during which the statement was made.” State v. Reed, 168 Wn. App. 553, 562, 278 P.3d 203 (2012) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2003)). “[S]tatements are nontestimonial when made ‘under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’” Id. at 562-63 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). Thus, whether there is an ongoing emergency when the individual makes the statement to the police “‘is among the most important circumstances informing the “primary purpose” of an interrogation.’” Id. at 563 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011)).
Here, the child’s spontaneous utterance was not made in response to police interrogation. It was made while police were responding to an ongoing emergency: the
19
State v. Cordero shooting resulting in Cortez’s death. The statement was made to assist police in an immediate threat. Therefore, the statement was nontestimonial, and no confrontation clause violation occurred. 4. Conceded claims: CrR 3.5 and CrR 3.1 In his opening brief, Cordero argued the trial court erred in its ruling after a CrR 3.5 hearing and claimed there was an CrR 3.1 violation as to the timing of his arrest and appearance before the court. After reviewing the State’s response to these claims, Cordero conceded that these assignments of error were not viable. We accept Cordero’s concession and do not address these claims. 5. Cumulative error Cordero argues the inadequate investigation by law enforcement, defense counsel’s failure to request a voluntary intoxication instruction, and erroneous evidentiary rulings made by the trial court are more than sufficient for cumulative error to deprive him of a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and article I, sections 3 and 22 of Washington’s Constitution.
The cumulative error doctrine applies when several errors occurred during trial that would not individually merit reversal but together effectively deny a defendant a fair trial. State v. Greiff, 141 Wn.2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390 (2000).
20
State v. Cordero Here, Cordero has not shown error occurred. Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GOUNDS FOR REVIEW Cordero submitted two additional grounds for review: (1) the trial court erred in admitting statements made after his arrest because officers violated his Miranda 3 rights by not translating them into Spanish, and (2) his defense counsel was ineffective by not objecting during the CrR 3.5 hearing to the officers using department-issued Miranda cards.
At the CrR 3.5 hearing, Officer Galen McBeth testified about his conversation with Cordero while Cordero was sitting in the back of a patrol car. Using his preprinted rights card, McBeth advised Cordero of his rights in English. McBeth testified Cordero appeared to understand, responded to questions with clear and cogent answers, and did not express any difficulty in understanding or speaking English.
At the police station, Detective Jordan Brown spoke with Cordero in an interview room. Brown read Cordero his rights from a preprinted card that Cordero appeared to understand and waive. Present in the interview room was Officer Daniel Valencia, who is fluent in Spanish and English. Valencia testified at the CrR 3.5 hearing that he observed
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
21
State v. Cordero Brown read Cordero his Miranda rights, and Cordero indicated he understood his rights and did not express any confusion about his rights or that he chose to waive his rights.
We review a trial court’s CrR 3.5 findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Rosas-Miranda, 176 Wn. App. 773, 779, 309, P.3d 728 (2013). “The State bears the burden of showing a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 380, 158 P.3d 27 (2007).
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination. Officers testified that Cordero understood the English warnings, as evidenced by his responses, demeanor, and interactions. One officer was fluent in English and Spanish and confirmed Cordero’s comprehension. Miranda requires that warnings reasonably convey the rights; it does not mandate a specific language for relaying the rights when the suspect demonstrates comprehension. The focus remains on the totality of the circumstances. No evidence suggests Cordero expressed confusion, requested Spanish advisement or an interpreter, or otherwise indicated a lack of understanding. The trial court properly credited the officers’ testimony. We find no error in the admission of the statements.
Cordero also claims ineffective assistance because his counsel did not object to the officers reading Miranda warnings from department-issued cards. To prevail, he must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Grier,
22
State v. Cordero 171 Wn.2d at 33-34. We presume reasonable performance and review the claim on the existing record. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335-36.
Counsel’s failure to object was not deficient. Reading from a Miranda card is a widely accepted and recommended practice that promotes accuracy and consistency. Miranda focuses on the substance of the warnings, not the delivery method. There is no constitutional, evidentiary, or procedural basis for a meritorious objection. A reasonable attorney would forego objecting to routine, reliable evidence. Cordero’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection. Id. at 337 n.4.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Murphy, J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, J. Hill, J.