State of Washington v. Douglas Glenn Campbell
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Opinion
FILED JANUARY 15, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40305-0-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) DOUGLAS GLENN CAMPBELL ) ) Appellant. )
FEARING, J.P.T. † — Douglas Campbell appeals, on pretrial discovery and
evidentiary grounds, three convictions of first degree child molestation of a step-
grandson. Campbell also appeals the trial court’s denial of a Special Sex Offender
Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA). We affirm Campbell’s convictions and sentence.
FACTS
The prosecution of Douglas Campbell arises from his interaction with W.R.A., a
step-grandson. W.R.A. accused Campbell of touching W.R.A.’s penis and having
W.R.A. touch his penis. We take the facts from trial testimony.
Douglas Campbell is married to Cathy Campbell. Because Douglas and Catherine
(Cathy) Campbell share the same surname, we refer to Cathy by her first name but refer
to Douglas using his surname. Campbell’s marriage to Cathy is his fourth marriage.
† George B. Fearing, a retired judge of the Washington State Court of Appeals, is serving as a judge pro tempore of this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150(1). No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Campbell has two biological children from his first marriage, Jessica and Hollie Moreno,
and two step-children from his second and third marriages, Mark Andrews and Shannon
Stewart. Campbell’s marriage to Cathy brought him two step-sons, Matthew and
Michael Alverson. Matthew is married to Lindsey Alverson. Because Matthew,
Michael, and Lindsey share the same surname, we refer to each of them by their first
names.
In either late 2017 or early 2018, Cathy and Douglas Campbell moved to Spokane
to be closer to Matthew Alverson and Matthew’s two children, W.R.A. and E.A. W.R.A.
was born on May 1, 2012, and E.A. was born in 2015. The Campbells frequently babysat
W.R.A. and E.A., and these grandchildren occasionally stayed at their house for
overnight visits.
On July 29, 2021, Camela Davies, Lindsey Alverson’s mother and W.R.A.’s
maternal grandmother, played with W.R.A. at Lindsey and Matthew’s residence. W.R.A.
was then nine years old. Davies had slept at the Alverson residence the previous night.
W.R.A. asked Davies why she did not sleep in his bed. This conversation led to W.R.A.
mentioning Douglas Campbell, his paternal step-grandfather. W.R.A. told Davies that he
and Campbell slept naked when he spent the night at his grandparents’ house, that
Campbell taught him how to play with his penis, and that Campbell taught him how to
2 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
play with Campbell’s penis. W.R.A. told Davies that “playing with his penis felt good.”
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 5. When Davies told W.R.A. that Campbell should not be doing
that, W.R.A’s face turned red, and he told her Campbell said not to tell anyone.
Camela Davies immediately relayed W.R.A.’s disclosure to W.R.A.’s mother,
Lindsey Alverson. Lindsey then spoke with W.R.A. W.R.A. told her that Douglas
Campbell had touched his privates and told him to keep it a secret. The mother did not
ask W.R.A. about any details of the touching.
On August 1, 2021, Spokane County Deputy Sheriff David Bratton visited
Lindsey and Matthew Alverson’s residence in response to a report of child molestation.
After interviewing both Matthew and Lindsey, Sheriff Deputy Bratton forwarded his case
report to Spokane County Sheriff’s Department Detective Michael Wall, who assumed
supervision of the investigation. Detective Wall scheduled a forensic interview, for
W.R.A., with Meghan Davidson at Partners with Families and Children. Davidson
interviewed W.R.A. and his sister, E.A., on August 24, 2021.
PROCEDURE
On December 15, 2021, the state of Washington charged Douglas Campbell with
three counts of first degree child molestation. The charging information alleged
Campbell committed these crimes against W.R.A. sometime between January 1, 2020,
3 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
and March 31, 2021. W.R.A. turned 8-years-old on May 1, 2020, and 9 years old on May
1, 2021.
On January 11, 2022, the State filed notice to present child hearsay testimony at
trial. The notice declared the State’s intent to admit statements W.R.A. made to Camela
Davies, Lindsey Alverson, Matthew Alverson, and Meghan Davidson.
On December 21, 2022, Douglas Campbell filed a motion and memorandum to
admit reputation and good conduct evidence under ER 404(a)(1) and 405(a), (b) from
Mark Andrews, Jacob Andrews, Shannon Stuart, Wyatt Shaw, Dakoda Gonzalezz,
Matthew Alverson, Michael Alverson, Deborah Allen, Victoria Fischer, Pamela Lux-
Archer, Sophia Lux-Archer, and Devon Lux-Archer. All of these individuals are family
members of Campbell, except for the Lux-Archers. The Lux-Archers were neighbors of
the Campbells. Campbell argued that, because of the difficulty of defending W.R.A.’s
vague accusations, the trial court should permit testimony from individuals who, for
years, had uniquely observed his propensity or lack thereof to have sexual contact with a
child. Campbell wrote that his proposed witnesses belonged to a family community that
interacted with him for many years. Campbell declared that these individuals would have
testified that he lacked any propensity to touch a child for his sexual gratification and that
he had a reputation within the community for good sexual morality. Nevertheless, when
4 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
outlining the expected testimony of each witness, the outline mentioned only the
witnesses’ contact with Campbell and their observations of his interactions with children.
The outlines did not specify that any witness knew of a reputation of Campbell for good
sexual morality, how the witness knew of that reputation, and the community in which
the reputation arose.
The State opposed Douglas Campbell’s motion to introduce evidence of good
reputation and conduct for two reasons. First, all proffered witnesses lacked neutrality
because of being family members or close friends. Second, no party may introduce
evidence of prior acts merely to demonstrate a person’s character or propensity for
engaging in charged conduct when character is not an element of the criminal charge.
On February 17, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on Douglas Campbell’s
motion to admit reputation and good conduct evidence. During the hearing, Campbell
talked about wishing to introduce reputation evidence, but Campbell never identified any
witness who would testify to a community in which Campbell held a reputation.
After hearing testimony, the trial court denied Douglas Campbell’s motion for
introduction of evidence. The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which read in part:
5 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
II. Findings of Fact
A. Evidence Rule 404(a)(1)—Reputation Evidence
1. Defendant proffered a list of approximately a dozen proposed witnesses to testify about the sexual morality of Defendant. .... 3. These witnesses, with the exception of Pamela, Sophia, and Devon Lux-Archer, are related to Defendant by blood or marriage and constitutes [sic] a large and extended family. 4.
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FILED JANUARY 15, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40305-0-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) DOUGLAS GLENN CAMPBELL ) ) Appellant. )
FEARING, J.P.T. † — Douglas Campbell appeals, on pretrial discovery and
evidentiary grounds, three convictions of first degree child molestation of a step-
grandson. Campbell also appeals the trial court’s denial of a Special Sex Offender
Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA). We affirm Campbell’s convictions and sentence.
FACTS
The prosecution of Douglas Campbell arises from his interaction with W.R.A., a
step-grandson. W.R.A. accused Campbell of touching W.R.A.’s penis and having
W.R.A. touch his penis. We take the facts from trial testimony.
Douglas Campbell is married to Cathy Campbell. Because Douglas and Catherine
(Cathy) Campbell share the same surname, we refer to Cathy by her first name but refer
to Douglas using his surname. Campbell’s marriage to Cathy is his fourth marriage.
† George B. Fearing, a retired judge of the Washington State Court of Appeals, is serving as a judge pro tempore of this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150(1). No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Campbell has two biological children from his first marriage, Jessica and Hollie Moreno,
and two step-children from his second and third marriages, Mark Andrews and Shannon
Stewart. Campbell’s marriage to Cathy brought him two step-sons, Matthew and
Michael Alverson. Matthew is married to Lindsey Alverson. Because Matthew,
Michael, and Lindsey share the same surname, we refer to each of them by their first
names.
In either late 2017 or early 2018, Cathy and Douglas Campbell moved to Spokane
to be closer to Matthew Alverson and Matthew’s two children, W.R.A. and E.A. W.R.A.
was born on May 1, 2012, and E.A. was born in 2015. The Campbells frequently babysat
W.R.A. and E.A., and these grandchildren occasionally stayed at their house for
overnight visits.
On July 29, 2021, Camela Davies, Lindsey Alverson’s mother and W.R.A.’s
maternal grandmother, played with W.R.A. at Lindsey and Matthew’s residence. W.R.A.
was then nine years old. Davies had slept at the Alverson residence the previous night.
W.R.A. asked Davies why she did not sleep in his bed. This conversation led to W.R.A.
mentioning Douglas Campbell, his paternal step-grandfather. W.R.A. told Davies that he
and Campbell slept naked when he spent the night at his grandparents’ house, that
Campbell taught him how to play with his penis, and that Campbell taught him how to
2 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
play with Campbell’s penis. W.R.A. told Davies that “playing with his penis felt good.”
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 5. When Davies told W.R.A. that Campbell should not be doing
that, W.R.A’s face turned red, and he told her Campbell said not to tell anyone.
Camela Davies immediately relayed W.R.A.’s disclosure to W.R.A.’s mother,
Lindsey Alverson. Lindsey then spoke with W.R.A. W.R.A. told her that Douglas
Campbell had touched his privates and told him to keep it a secret. The mother did not
ask W.R.A. about any details of the touching.
On August 1, 2021, Spokane County Deputy Sheriff David Bratton visited
Lindsey and Matthew Alverson’s residence in response to a report of child molestation.
After interviewing both Matthew and Lindsey, Sheriff Deputy Bratton forwarded his case
report to Spokane County Sheriff’s Department Detective Michael Wall, who assumed
supervision of the investigation. Detective Wall scheduled a forensic interview, for
W.R.A., with Meghan Davidson at Partners with Families and Children. Davidson
interviewed W.R.A. and his sister, E.A., on August 24, 2021.
PROCEDURE
On December 15, 2021, the state of Washington charged Douglas Campbell with
three counts of first degree child molestation. The charging information alleged
Campbell committed these crimes against W.R.A. sometime between January 1, 2020,
3 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
and March 31, 2021. W.R.A. turned 8-years-old on May 1, 2020, and 9 years old on May
1, 2021.
On January 11, 2022, the State filed notice to present child hearsay testimony at
trial. The notice declared the State’s intent to admit statements W.R.A. made to Camela
Davies, Lindsey Alverson, Matthew Alverson, and Meghan Davidson.
On December 21, 2022, Douglas Campbell filed a motion and memorandum to
admit reputation and good conduct evidence under ER 404(a)(1) and 405(a), (b) from
Mark Andrews, Jacob Andrews, Shannon Stuart, Wyatt Shaw, Dakoda Gonzalezz,
Matthew Alverson, Michael Alverson, Deborah Allen, Victoria Fischer, Pamela Lux-
Archer, Sophia Lux-Archer, and Devon Lux-Archer. All of these individuals are family
members of Campbell, except for the Lux-Archers. The Lux-Archers were neighbors of
the Campbells. Campbell argued that, because of the difficulty of defending W.R.A.’s
vague accusations, the trial court should permit testimony from individuals who, for
years, had uniquely observed his propensity or lack thereof to have sexual contact with a
child. Campbell wrote that his proposed witnesses belonged to a family community that
interacted with him for many years. Campbell declared that these individuals would have
testified that he lacked any propensity to touch a child for his sexual gratification and that
he had a reputation within the community for good sexual morality. Nevertheless, when
4 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
outlining the expected testimony of each witness, the outline mentioned only the
witnesses’ contact with Campbell and their observations of his interactions with children.
The outlines did not specify that any witness knew of a reputation of Campbell for good
sexual morality, how the witness knew of that reputation, and the community in which
the reputation arose.
The State opposed Douglas Campbell’s motion to introduce evidence of good
reputation and conduct for two reasons. First, all proffered witnesses lacked neutrality
because of being family members or close friends. Second, no party may introduce
evidence of prior acts merely to demonstrate a person’s character or propensity for
engaging in charged conduct when character is not an element of the criminal charge.
On February 17, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on Douglas Campbell’s
motion to admit reputation and good conduct evidence. During the hearing, Campbell
talked about wishing to introduce reputation evidence, but Campbell never identified any
witness who would testify to a community in which Campbell held a reputation.
After hearing testimony, the trial court denied Douglas Campbell’s motion for
introduction of evidence. The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which read in part:
5 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
II. Findings of Fact
A. Evidence Rule 404(a)(1)—Reputation Evidence
1. Defendant proffered a list of approximately a dozen proposed witnesses to testify about the sexual morality of Defendant. .... 3. These witnesses, with the exception of Pamela, Sophia, and Devon Lux-Archer, are related to Defendant by blood or marriage and constitutes [sic] a large and extended family. 4. This group cannot form a neutral and general community based on the inherent nature of family relationship. 5. The Lux-Archers were once neighbors of Defendant and the three proposed witnesses all lived within one household. 6. Neighbors, such as the Lux-Archers, could potentially comprise a more general community based on the nature of the relationship, but there is not a proper foundation at this time due to the limited group that has been proffered. 7. Other communities who could potentially form a neutral and general community would include, but not be limited to, a business community, neighborhood community, and a school community.
B. Evidence Rule 405—Specific Instances of Conduct
1. Defendant summarizes potential testimony of specific instances of conduct to include the following: a. A camping trip with proposed witness Mark Andrews and Defendant where nothing sexual happened; and b. An overnight off-road adventure with proposed witness Wyatt Shaw here nothing sexual happened; and c. A time when Defendant would not get out of bed naked specifically so that W.R.A. would not see him naked through proposed witness Matt Alverson.
6 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
III. Conclusions of Law
A. Evidence Rule 404(1)(a)—Reputation Evidence
1. State v. Cox, 17 Wash. App. 2d 178 (2021) found that reputation for good sexual morality is relevant so long as the proper foundation can be laid. 2. The facts in Cox are relevant. Defendant proffered four coworkers as well as friends to testify about his reputation within that community and the anticipated testimony would be that they had never heard anything negative about Defendant’s sexual morality. Id. 3. Cox found that, subject to the proper foundation, Defendant can introduce reputation evidence of good sexual morality. Id. 4. In order to establish the proper foundation, the moving party must show that the community is both neutral and general. 5. It is important for the Court to consider the types of people and the number of people purported to constitute the community. 6. Based on State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 147 P.2d [P.3d] 1201 (2006), a community must comprise of more than two people. 7. Based on case law, family cannot comprise a neutral and general community based on the inherent nature of the familial relationships.
[B.] Evidence Rule 405—Specific Instances of Conduct
1. Based on State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 93 P.3d 133 (2004), sexual gratification is not an essential element of Child Molestation because it does not appear in the Child Molestation statute, but is in the definitions section. 2. Sexual gratification is not an essential element of Child Molestation and specific instances of conduct cannot be offered under ER 405.
CP at 55-57.
On May 11, 2023, Douglas Campbell filed a second motion and memorandum to
7 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
admit evidence under ER 404(a)(1). In the motion, Campbell wrote that the trial court
had previously ruled that his family did not form a credible community and thence denied
his request for testimony from family members about his reputation for good sexual
morality. Campbell insisted, however, that the trial court had earlier concluded that
neighbors or other communities could comprise a more neutral and general community
with the proper foundation. Therefore, the court should grant his second motion to admit
evidence concerning his reputation for good moral sexuality from a group of neighbors
and from a group of Ford Bronco enthusiasts. The State did not object to the introduction
of reputation evidence from the neighbor group or the Ford Bronco group if Campbell
limited the testimony. The trial court granted the motion, subject to limitations.
W.R.A.’s mother disclosed to Cathy Campbell that W.R.A. suffered significant
bullying at school. As a result, Douglas Campbell subpoenaed W.R.A.’s school records.
Our clerk’s papers do not include the subpoena.
The State filed a motion to quash the subpoena issued by Douglas Campbell for
W.R.A.’s school records. The State argued in its motion to quash that Campbell neither
offered any information relating to the purpose of the subpoena nor identified the
relevance of the records to his defense.
The superior court entertained oral argument in support of approving and in
8 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
support of quashing the subpoena. The court asked Douglas Campbell’s counsel about
the connection between the school records and the defense of Campbell. Counsel
contended that W.R.A. suffered bullying at school. The trial court also asked about the
relationship between school bullying and possible false accusations of sexual
molestation:
THE COURT: Couple of questions for you, because I’m trying to understand the nexus here. I understand you have an expert, and I think you’ve told me that the expert—part of what you anticipate your expert testifying to is why children may make a late disclosure. Is that correct; did I understand that correctly? MR. PARTOVI [defense counsel]: I mean, I certainly think that’s within the scope of it. But I wouldn’t limit it to late disclosure. THE COURT: No, no, but that’s why—I’m trying to understand why bullying at school has anything to do with an alleged molestation at home. MR. PARTOVI: We don’t know what the scope of the bullying is. We know it’s taking place. What if somebody is squeezing his penis and he doesn’t want to talk about to the kids at school because he’s scared of them, so he’s blaming his father and his step-grandfather, two that he knows are on his side and won’t bully him? I don’t know. I’m saying we’ve got him alleging multiple men are squeezing his penis and he’s getting bulled at school. THE COURT: But I’m not seeing the nexus, though, between the bullying at school and an allegation of molestation. I’m just not seeing how the two are linked. MR. PARTOVI: Of course not. THE COURT: So make the link for me. MR. PARTOVI: You haven’t seen the records, how could you possibly make the link? THE COURT: But I need you to make the link how they are relevant.
9 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
MR. PARTOVI: I haven’t seen the records either. I know he’s being bullied, I think it’s legitimate to investigate the scope of the bullying. Let’s say, for example, that we look at it and he’s getting bullied because he told some teacher that these kids squeezed his penis and therefore they’re giving him a hard time, how dare you accuse us of that, and mom sees it and she doesn’t know the details and so she’s sad. Right? Then if we read that, if we know those details about the bullying, then, boom, huge nexus. Let’s say we look at the records and the bullying is because he wore pink shoes and the boys don’t think he should wear pink shoes and they’re calling him names and they’re pushing him around. Now there’s no nexus. You know, I mean, the nexus is he’s getting bullied at school and that’s a significant factor. I mean, in any place where there’s not an oppressive system trying to send my client to prison, in any other world in this society bullying is a significant problem in the school. But because we’re so intent on filling the God damn prisons with people that didn’t do anything wrong, now it’s show me the nexus to the record you haven’t seen. I can’t give you that. I can give you multiple witnesses that say this kid is getting bullied at school. All I want to do is know what that means. It’s beyond a reasonable request. There is a specific nexus. We know he’s getting bullied at school, I want to see what that means.
2 Report of Proceedings (2 RP) at 58-60.
The trial court granted the motion to quash the subpoena for school records. The
order quoted language contained in the initial subpoena, which sought:
Copies of and all records, educational and behavioral, included by not limited to attendance records, demographics forms, grades, student contact information records, account notes and/or letters, emails, other forms of communication related to changes in contact information, related to: W.R.A. DOB 05/12/2012 for the duration of his education with your school district.
CP at 107. The court’s order explained that Campbell failed to establish relevance.
10 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
On November 6, 2023, the trial court conducted a child hearsay hearing. W.R.A.,
Lindsey Alverson, Matthew Alverson, Camela Davies, and Meghan Davidson testified at
the hearing. The Alversons testified to the truthfulness of their son, W.R.A. All
witnesses testified to statements uttered by W.R.A. to them about sexual contact between
W.R.A. and Douglas Campbell. Campbell’s defense counsel did not oppose admission at
trial of the hearsay evidence. Counsel mentioned near the close of the hearing that some
of the hearsay testimony would benefit Campbell because of its inconsistency with other
statements of W.R.A. The superior court granted the State’s motion to admit the child
hearsay statements.
Trial on Douglas Campbell’s child molestation charges began the following day,
November 7, 2023. Individuals testifying at trial included Camela Davies, W.R.A,
Lindsey Alverson, Matthew Alverson, Deputy Sheriff David Bratton, Sergeant Michael
Wall, Meghan Davidson, and Cathy Campbell. Douglas Campbell testified in his
defense. The State played, for the jury, the videos of W.R.A.’s and E.A.’s forensic
interviews with Davidson. During trial, the defense attacked the thoroughness of law
enforcement’s investigation, the lack of corroboration of W.R.A.’s allegations, and the
unreasonableness and inconsistency of W.R.A.’s various statements.
Ted Pulver, a private investigator and polygrapher, testified on behalf of Douglas
11 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Campbell. Pulver worked on sex offender management boards and considered himself
successful in catching sex offenders. Pulver testified he believed investigations should
begin with a hypothesis, which an investigator should seek to disprove. If the hypothesis
cannot be disproved, that hypothesis most likely occurred. Engaging in a scientific type
investigation forced an investigator to review the entire situation with an open mind.
During trial, Ted Pulver averred that many sex offenders have common attributes.
Thus, the investigator should scrutinize the background, history, and personal
relationships of a suspect. In his investigations, Pulver also investigated whether others
influenced information presented by the accuser about sexual molestation. This task
included probing the potential suggestibility of the purported victim.
Douglas Campbell also called to testify Brent DeuPree, a private investigator and
former law enforcement sex offense investigator. DeuPree reviewed the evidence against
Campbell, including the forensic interviews. He perused background reports on
Campbell. He conducted social media searches, google searches, and open-source
searches on Campbell. He separately interviewed Campbell and his wife. DeuPree
pursued other potential victims of Campbell. He interviewed the State’s witnesses. After
viewing E.A.’s interview in which she talked about Grandpa “Al” or “Owl,” DeuPree
performed a background check on Kenneth Alverson (Grandpa Al), but could not
12 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
interview him because of his death. Interviews of defense witnesses included questioning
about uncomfortable subjects. Some of these witnesses had spent time with Campbell
when they were children. DeuPree toured the Campbell home.
Brent DeuPree learned at Douglas Campbell’s initial interview that W.R.A. had
grabbed Campbell’s hand and placed it on W.R.A.’s crotch, that W.R.A. and E.A. uttered
off handed comments while at the Campbells’ home, and that W.R.A. alleged to Cathy
that his father disciplined him by squeezing his penis. When DeuPree interviewed
Matthew Alverson, W.R.A.’s father, Alverson did not immediately deny the allegation
about punishment, but eventually did so. DeuPree testified about W.R.A.’s desire to
“catch people naked.” This desire loomed important in the investigation. 1 RP at 1137.
Brent DeuPree investigated the background of Douglas Campbell by interviewing
26 people who knew Campbell, including step-children. No one corroborated that
Campbell sexually molested a child. Even Campbell’s former wife made no such
allegation.
Dr. Jason Dickinson, a psychology professor, specializes in eyewitness memory,
child eyewitness testimony, and forensic interviewing. He testified for Douglas
Campbell that, in cases when a child delays disclosure, a forensic interview may be
affected by memory decay. A child’s memory may be contaminated or subject to post-
13 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
event suggestibility. Emotions may shape memory and W.R.A.’s concern about facing
discipline could influence his memory. Suggestibility, resulting from exposure to sexual
content or conversations between adults or peers, can occur before a child undergoes a
forensic interview. Concerned, well-meaning parents may question a child in a
potentially suggestive way.
Dr. Jason Dickinson conducted research into suggestibility. In a study of 300
children, one third of the children made unintentional false reports attributed to a false
memory about touching suggested by the researchers but not experienced by the child.
According to Dickinson, child witness’ memories tend to be less accurate than adult
memories, and children have a propensity for false recognition. Children tend to answer
“yes” to a question even if they do not know the answer. 1 RP at 1236.
Dr. Jason Dickinson opined that the “gold standard” demanded an interview of the
child within 24 hours of disclosure. Meghan Davidson interviewed W.R.A. 27 days after
disclosure, a length of time Dickinson described as “unusual.” 1 RP at 1244. Dickinson
reviewed W.R.A.’s forensic interview by Davidson. Dickinson highlighted examples of
potential miscommunication between W.R.A. and the interviewer, including questions
the interviewer asked that might have “overlayed” her “subjective understanding” of the
alleged event to the conversation. 1 RP at 1240. Dickinson opined Davidson may not
14 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
have adequately explored alternative explanations for W.R.A.’s allegation.
During trial testimony, Jason Dickinson opined W.R.A. might have interpreted
grandmother Camela Davies’ comment that Douglas Campbell should not have touched
him as an admonishment to W.R.A., potentially impacting his memory and later forensic
interview. Similarly, Lindsey Alverson’s emotional response to W.R.A.’s allegations
could have affected his interview responses.
During closing argument, Douglas Campbell’s counsel commented about
W.R.A.’s comments during his forensic interview regarding the alleged touching by
Campbell: “In the forensic interview that I imagine you will watch again, [W.R.A.]
doesn’t say it was three times. He says it was two or three times.” 1 RP at 1360.
The jury began deliberating on November 15, 2023. The next day, on November
16 at 10:15 a.m., during deliberations, the jury submitted the following question to the
trial court: “Can we watch [W.R.A.]’s & [E.A.]’s interviews?” CP at 328. The trial court
granted the request. The record does not indicate whether the trial court discussed the
question with counsel before answering the jury and under what circumstances the jury
viewed the interviews. During trial, Douglas Campbell never objected to the trial court
allowing the jury to view the recordings.
On November 16, the jury found Douglas Campbell guilty of all three charges of
15 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
first degree child molestation.
On January 5, 2024, defense counsel filed a motion for furlough requesting that
Douglas Campbell’s sentencing be continued to allow him to obtain a special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) evaluation. The State agreed to a continuance
of sentencing and an evaluation.
Priscilla Hannon, certified sex offender treatment provider and licensed mental
health counselor, conducted an examination of Douglas Campbell to determine whether
Campbell was amenable to treatment and to assess his relative risk to the community.
The psychosexual evaluation conducted by Hannon scored Campbell in the low risk
category for being charged or convicted of another sex offense. Hannon found Campbell
an appropriate candidate for a SSOSA and amenable to treatment, despite his denial of
the offense. A Department of Corrections pre-sentence investigation report
recommended rejection of a SSOSA because of Campbell’s denial of guilt.
At sentencing, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed Priscilla Hannon’s
report. The court proceeded to outline the statutory factors required in determining
whether to grant or deny a SSOSA. The court acknowledged that W.R.A. and his family
did not support a SSOSA. The court expressed concern that the SSOSA was too lenient.
The court addressed the risk Campbell would present to the community, to W.R.A., or to
16 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
persons of similar age. The court further expressed a belief that Campbell would abide
by the restrictions of the SSOSA, if ordered.
During the sentencing hearing, the sentencing court emphasized amenability as
important. The court mentioned that Priscilla Hannon’s report helped it understand that
an individual who denies the underlying offense can still be subject to and amenable to
treatment. The court noted that Douglas Campbell was low on Hannon’s scale for
reoffending. Still, the court denied Campbell’ request for a SSOSA because the sentence
would be too lenient, W.R.A. disfavored a SSOSA, a SSOSA would not benefit
Campbell or the community, Campbell did not believe he suffered from a sexual
dysfunction, and Campbell denied any inappropriate conduct. The court explained:
[U]ltimately the Court has to make the determination regardless of the generalized belief that an individual who does not accept responsibility or acknowledge the issue can perhaps benefit from treatment. When the Court applies its own analysis here and then considers the factors to amenability, the Court is looking at the background, history, social economic circumstances, psychological condition, and that both he and the community benefit from a community-based treatment under the SSOSA. I think based on the concerns the Court has with the abuse of trust issue undercutting the factor as identified in terms of whether this would be too lenient, the Court believes that disfavors granting of it. This Court weighs the victim’s position and heavily weighs it pursuant to the statutory requirements that disfavors this option for resolution. And the Court cannot find and be comfortable that given all the information provided here that treatment is in the best interest of both Mr. Campbell and the community.
17 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
And I will make it clear for the record the Court’s concern is that the background, history, social and economic circumstances as identified in the report of Ms. Hannon do not demonstrate that Mr. Campbell believes he has an issue. I do accept and I listened very carefully in his—Mr. Campbell did say it’s all because of me, and that was a good statement to indicate in his recitation. But in terms of acknowledging that he has an issue with something that requires the treatment for a sex offense when he denies that this even occurred or that he has that issue, and I’m not as concerned under the subsection the six part two, the two Subsection 26 [sic] parts analyzation for the acceptance of responsibility. I am concerned with his amenability based on denial that he has this issue, denial that this occurred. And I appreciate that he accepts the jury’s verdict as indicated in both the briefing and his statements. The Court believes that that given that background, history, the social circumstances the Court has identified in terms of his family support network, that I don’t believe the—and I don’t find that he and the community benefit from a community-based treatment when the underlying issue is denied. .... But when I look at this specific case under those factors, Mr. Campbell still denies that this occurred and that he has this issue. And that from this Court’s perspective and analyzing all the information does not make this an appropriate resolution for both he and the community and the benefit standpoint. Also highlighting the concern about whether this would be too lenient based on the abuse of trust issue and the wishes of the victim, which is in opposition to this, which the Court has to greatly weigh. So considering all the statutory and other factors, the Court is going to not grant the request for the SSOSA alternative. And I believe that is appropriate based on the facts specific to this case and the law as the Court is required to apply it.
2 RP at 120-25.
18 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, Douglas Campbell complains that the State and the trial court
prevented him from defending himself by presenting evidence of his spotless character
around children while the State unfairly bolstered the credibility of his accuser, W.R.A.
Therefore, Campbell assigns error to the trial court’s exclusion of testimony from family
members and neighbors of his reputation for sexual morality with children, the State’s
introduction of child hearsay testimony, the court’s quashing of a subpoena for school
records, and the jury viewing an interview of W.R.A. in the jury room. He also protests
that his trial counsel did little to prevent these injustices. Thus, Campbell also seeks
reversal of his convictions because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally,
Campbell asks that we direct the superior court to sentence him to a SSOSA alternative.
We reject all assignments of error.
Reputation for Sexual Morality with Children
Douglas Campbell argues that the trial court erred when excluding testimony from
witnesses vital to his defense based solely on their status as family members or
neighbors. When forwarding this argument, Campbell relies both on evidentiary rules
and the constitutional right to present a defense.
The State of Washington faults Douglas Campbell’s offer of proof for reputation
19 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
evidence as insufficient. The State further argues that Campbell failed to adequately brief
his constitutional right and any violation of that right does not qualify as manifest.
Finally, the State contends that, even if the court erred in excluding the reputation
evidence, any error was harmless.
Evidentiary Error
We begin by addressing whether the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence
amounted to evidentiary error. Later we address whether Douglas Campbell adequately
argued in his opening brief the contention that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence
rose to constitutional error.
This court reviews a trial court’s interpretation of an evidentiary rule de novo.
State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d 11, 17, 74 P.3d 119 (2003). If the trial court correctly
interpreted the rule, we review the court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion. State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d 11, 17 (2003); State v. Land, 121
Wn.2d 494, 500, 851 P.2d 678 (1993); State v. Callahan, 87 Wn. App. 925, 934, 943
P.2d 676 (1997). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner manifestly
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Land, 121 Wn.2d 494,
500 (1993).
Douglas Campbell relies on ER 404 and 405, which allow a criminal defendant to
20 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
introduce evidence of a relevant trait or character. ER 404 reads, in relevant part:
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same.
ER 404(a)(1) (emphasis omitted) (boldface omitted). ER 405(a) provides that,
[i]n all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(Boldface omitted) (alteration added). Although ER 404(a)(1) reads that proof “may” be
introduced by testimony of reputation, the rule demands that the accused introduce
evidence of a germane character trait only by reputation testimony.
A witness offering reputation testimony must lay a foundation establishing that the
subject’s reputation lies on perceptions in the community. ER 608(a). Personal opinion
does not suffice. State v. Callahan, 87 Wn. App. 925, 935 (1997). In addition, the party
seeking to admit reputation evidence must demonstrate that the community is both
neutral and general in order to establish the community as valid. State v. Land, 121
Wn.2d 494, 500 (1993). Factors trial courts consider in determining the validity of the
proposed community include (1) the frequency of contact between members of the
community, (2) the amount of time a person is known in the community, (3) the role a
21 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
person plays in the community, and (4) the number of people in the community. State v.
Land, 121 Wn.2d 494, 500 (1993).
The parties argue over whether family members and neighbors consist of a
community sufficient to present reputation evidence. We need not answer this question,
although case law probably answers that question in the negative. State v. Lord, 117
Wn.2d, 829, 874, 822 P.2d 177 (1991); State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 805, 147 P.3d
1201 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d
1134 (2014). We agree with the State’s observation that Douglas Campbell has not
identified any proposed family or neighbor witness who would testify to a reputation of
Campbell in a defined community.
Douglas Campbell failed to lay the proper foundation to enable his family
members and three neighbors to testify about his reputation for good sexual morality.
His motion to introduce evidence listed witnesses, but specified no witness who knew of
any reputation of Campbell in an identifiable community. His appeal brief also fails to
mention any witness with knowledge of a reputation or how the witness gained such
knowledge.
Constitutional Error
The State contends that Douglas Campbell, in his opening brief, insufficiently
22 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
argued that the trial court’s exclusion of reputation evidence amounted to constitutional
error. We agree.
This court may decline to review issues not raised before the trial court.
RAP 2.5(a); State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 97-98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). The section of
Douglas Campbell’s opening brief dedicated to arguing the trial court erred in excluding
the reputation evidence regarding his good sexual morality lacked any constitutional
argument. Campbell argued in his reply brief that the trial court’s ruling amounted to
constitutional error and cites to legal authority to support his position. An appellate court
will not consider a constitutional argument raised for first time in a party’s appellate reply
brief. Oostra v. Holstine, 86 Wn. App. 536, 543, 937 P.2d 195 (1997).
In addition, Douglas Campbell did not contend before the trial court that exclusion
of the reputation evidence violated his constitutional right to present a defense.
Therefore, he would need to show manifest constitutional error before we reviewed the
assigned error on appeal. RAP 2.5(a). Campbell does not claim manifest constitutional
error.
School Records
Douglas Campbell next argues the trial court abused its discretion by requiring
direct proof of a relationship between W.R.A.’s bullying at school and W.R.A.’s
23 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
allegations of sexual abuse in order to merit a subpoena of school records. According to
Campbell, the court did not properly balance Campbell’s right to investigate and present
a defense against W.R.A.’s privacy interests in his own school records. Also, Campbell
argues that school records hold no discovery privilege. In addition to disagreeing on the
merits of Campbell’s assignment of error, the State argues that Campbell shows no
prejudice by the denial of the subpoena.
CrR 4.7(e) applies when a defendant requests disclosure beyond the requirements
on the prosecutor to disclose under CrR 4.7(a), (c), or (d). State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d
822, 828, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993); State v. Putman, 21 Wn. App. 2d 36, 50, 504 P.3d 868
(2022). CrR 4.7(e) reads, in relevant part:
Upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense, and if the request is reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure to the defendant of the relevant material and information not covered by sections (a), (c) and (d).
CrR 4.7(e)(1). Under the rule, a discovery request must satisfy two elements: (1) the
information sought must be material, and (2) the discovery request must be reasonable.
State v. Norby, 122 Wn.2d 258, 266, 858 P.2d 210 (1993). Upon the satisfaction of both
of these elements, the trial court possesses discretion to condition or deny the disclosure
request if a substantial risk of harm or unnecessary annoyance to any person outweighs
the disclosure’s usefulness. State v. Norby, 122 Wn.2d 258, 266 (1993); CrR 4.7(e)(2).
24 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might help the defense
or might affect the outcome of the trial does not establish materiality in the constitutional
sense. In re personal restraint of Lui, 188 Wn.2d 525, 566, 397 P.3d 90 (2017). A
defendant who wishes to conduct additional discovery must advance some factual
predicate which makes it reasonably likely the requested file will bear information
material to his or her defense. State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 830 (1993). A bare
assertion that a document might bear such fruit is insufficient. State v. Blackwell, 120
Wn.2d 822, 830 (1993).
A related rule, CrR 4.8(b)(4), provides:
On timely motion, the court may quash or modify a subpoena for production if it (A) fails to allow reasonable time for compliance; (B) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies; (C) is unreasonable, oppressive, or unduly burdensome; or (D) exceeds the scope of discovery otherwise permitted under the criminal rules.
During oral argument before the superior court, Douglas Campbell’s counsel
conceded that the defense did not know that any school records would bolster Campbell’s
defense. Counsel astutely argued that Campbell could not begin to determine if the
records contained any pertinent information until he reviewed them. Counsel also could
not promise the court that, assuming the records mentioned bullying, the nature of the
bullying bore relevance to false allegations of sexual abuse. Thus, the trial court did not
25 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
abuse its discretion when quashing the subpoena. Campbell could not show the
information sought was material. Campbell’s subpoena mirrored a fishing expedition and
thus did not constitute a reasonable request.
On appeal, Douglas Campbell emphasizes three foreign decisions. In People v.
Bachofer, 192 P.3d 454 (Colo. 2008), the reviewing court ruled that the trial court
properly quashed a subpoena after an in camera review prompted by the accused’s claim
that school records might impeach the credibility of a child witness. In Zaal v. State, 602
A.2d 1247 (Md. 1992), the court ruled that the defendant, accused of molesting his
granddaughter, was entitled to review of school records when the records could show a
pattern of acting out to get attention, or of lying, and would be relevant to effectively
cross-examine concerning motivation, bias, and veracity. In State v. Van Dyke, 825 A.2d
1163 (N.J. 2003), the appellate court reversed the trial court’s refusal to conduct in
camera review of a juvenile victim’s school records in sexual assault prosecution. The
records raised serious questions concerning the credibility of the victim’s mother, who
testified that, prior to the alleged offense, her child was pleasant and helpful, while
records described the victim as an angry young boy who engaged in misbehavior toward
adults. Contrary to the cited decisions, Campbell showed no connection between W.R.A.
being a victim of bullying and W.R.A.’s lack of credibility.
26 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Child Hearsay
Douglas Campbell argues that, although the trial court properly conducted the
mandatory Ryan hearing before trial, the court abused its discretion by admitting
statements that did not qualify for admission under the child hearsay statute,
RCW 9A.44.120. He insists that Matthew and Lindsey Alverson, W.R.A.’s parents,
testified only to what Camela Davies told them, not to any statement uttered directly by
their son to them. He also advocates for the unfairness of the State being able to
repetitively describe W.R.A.’s allegations through the testimony of numerous people.
The State responds, in part, that Campbell did not preserve the error at trial and
inadequately briefed the assignment of error on appeal.
This court reviews a trial court’s admission of child hearsay statements under
RCW 9A.44.120 for an abuse of discretion. State v. Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 665, 790
P.2d 610 (1990). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manifestly
unreasonable manner, on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. State v. Land, 121
Wn.2d 494, 500 (1993).
RCW 9A.44.120(1) declares, in relevant part:
(1) A statement not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in . . . criminal proceedings . . . in the courts of the state of Washington if: (a)(i) It is made by a child when under the age of ten describing any
27 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, describing any attempted act of sexual contact with or on the child by another, or describing any act of physical abuse of the child by another that results in substantial bodily harm as defined by RCW 9A.04.110. .... (b) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.
RCW 9A.44.120(1)(a)(i), (b). The law labels the hearing mentioned in subsection (b) as
a Ryan hearing. State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 175-76, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
At such a hearing, trial courts must consider the following factors to determine the
reliability of the hearsay statements (1) any motive of the child to lie, (2) the general
character of the child, (3) the number of persons hearing the child’s statement, (4) the
spontaneity or lack of spontaneity of the child’s statement, (5) the timing of the child’s
statement, (6) the relationship between the child and the witness, (7) whether the
statement contains an express assertion about a past fact, (8) the ability of cross-
examination to show the child’s lack of knowledge, (9) the possibility of the child’s
recollection being faulty, and (10) the circumstances surrounding the statement
demonstrate that the child did not misrepresent defendant’s conduct. State v. Ryan,
103 Wn.2d 165, 175-76 (1984).
We note that both Matthew and Lindsey Alverson testified that each respectively
28 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
asked W.R.A. if he told grandma Camela Davies the truth. Nevertheless, W.R.A., in
addition to answering “yes,” directly told his mother that Douglas Campbell touched his
privates.
Douglas Campbell acknowledges that his trial counsel did not object to any
inadmissible child hearsay. He suggests he can challenge the ruling anyway because the
trial court must enter findings of fact before admitting the child hearsay. We know of no
rule that waives the requirement of an objection to evidence when the trial court must
later issue findings of fact. Such a rule would allow a challenge to the admissibility of
evidence for the first time on appeal in all bench trials.
This court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal unless they
constitute manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a); State v. O’Hara,
167 Wn.2d 91, 97-98 (2009). Douglas Campbell does not assert manifest constitutional
Allowing Jury Viewing of Recording
Douglas Campbell argues the trial court abused its discretion when, during jury
deliberations, it provided the jury with the videos of W.R.A.’s and E.A.’s forensic
interviews. Campbell contends the court did not meaningfully analyze whether the
interviews bore directly on the charges or whether they were unduly prejudicial. The
29 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
court, according to Campbell, also failed to control playback of the footage to prevent the
jury from overanalyzing the evidence.
The State asks that we decline to review this assignment of error because Douglas
Campbell did not object to the viewing of the forensic interview during jury
deliberations. To the contrary, during closing argument, trial defense counsel suggested
that the jury review some of the video to recall comments uttered by W.R.A. We grant
the State’s request. This court may decline to review issues not raised before the trial
court. RAP 2.5(a); State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 97-98 (2009).
Assistance of Counsel
Douglas Campbell argues trial counsel provided ineffective legal assistance. In so
arguing, Campbell notes impediments the accused faces when charged with a sex crime
against a child. The trial pits the word of the child against the word of the adult
defendant. The jury holds pity for the child. The child hearsay statute allows the
prosecution to repeatedly introduce the same statements of the child. The accused may
be an upstanding citizen with a spotless life story but the jury may never hear of the
defendant’s background or the prosecution effectively downplays the untarnished record.
With these hindrances to success in mind, we have reviewed the entire trial transcript and
clerk’s papers and conclude defense counsel performed admirably when cross-examining
30 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
W.R.A. and other State witnesses, submitting testimony from Douglas Campbell and his
witnesses, hiring specialists and presenting opinion testimony of experts on children’s
memories and forensic interviews, and summarizing the case in the light favorable to
Campbell.
Still, Douglas Campbell attributes seven deficiencies to his trial counsel. First, his
counsel conceded the credibility of W.R.A. Second, counsel failed to object to
inadmissible child hearsay. Third, defense counsel presented inconsistent, contradictory,
and illogical defense theories. Fourth, trial counsel presented evidence inconsistent to his
concession of W.R.A.’s credibility when introducing evidence of other incidents showing
W.R.A. lacked boundaries and credibility in relation to those events. Fifth, counsel
ineffectively presented a strategy of competing investigations. Sixth, defense counsel
failed to challenge the State’s motion in limine prohibiting evidence on an alternate
suspect. Seventh, defense counsel was generally unprepared, unfamiliar with the trial
process, and made repeated evidentiary errors. Campbell argues he was prejudiced by
defense counsel’s deficient performance, given the seriousness of these errors, when
considered individually or cumulatively.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of
the Washington Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. State
31 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
v. Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 457, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017); U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CONST.
art. I, § 22. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make two
showings, (1) defense counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., the performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the
circumstances, and (2) defense counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the
defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. McFarland, 127
Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Because the defendant must satisfy both
prongs, a failure to show either prong ends the inquiry. State v. Classen, 4 Wn. App. 2d
520, 535, 422 P.3d 489 (2018).
Courts in the Evergreen State apply a strong presumption of the reasonableness of
counsel’s representation. State v. Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 458 (2017). Trial strategy and
tactics cannot form the basis of a finding of deficient performance. State v. Crow, 8 Wn.
App. 2d 480, 508, 438 P.3d 541 (2019). Therefore, a defendant asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel has the burden of establishing the absence of a legitimate strategic
or tactical reason supporting the challenged conduct or omission by counsel. State v.
Crow, 8 Wn. App. 2d 480, 508 (2019).
32 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Credibility of W.R.A.
Douglas Campbell argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by repeatedly conceding the credibility of W.R.A. Counsel commented on the
credibility during the child hearsay hearing. Counsel also commented on credibility
during voir dire, opening, and closing.
In arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, Douglas Campbell stretches the extent
to which his trial counsel conceded W.R.A.’s credibility. Counsel only occasionally
mentioned that W.R.A. appeared credible, but counsel never expressly stated that W.R.A.
told the truth when he accused Campbell of a crime.
Trial counsel observed W.R.A. testify both during the child hearsay hearing and at
trial and could determine better than us how W.R.A. appeared to the jury. Oftentimes,
conceding the credibility of a witness, while finding other ways to attack the witness’
story, serves the client’s best interest. Douglas Campbell’s trial counsel effectively cross-
examined the child and demonstrated inconsistencies in his testimony. Trial counsel
advanced multiple reasons W.R.A.’s allegations could not sustain a guilty verdict.
Through Brent DeuPree, counsel offered evidence of an unsullied reputation and
background of Campbell. Counsel introduced evidence suggesting an insufficient police
investigation led police to arrest the wrong person. “Grandpa Al” or another individual
33 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
may have been involved. The defense presented, to the jury, testimony from Douglas and
Cathy Campbell as to W.R.A.’s preoccupation with nudity and genitals. The jury could
have inferred from this evidence that W.R.A. asserted his allegation in response to getting
in trouble for trying to pull Campbell’s towel from his body, something W.R.A. and
Campbell were questioned about during trial. Through the aid of counsel, the jury heard
experts testify that suggestibility by others tainted W.R.A.’s seemingly credible
allegations.
The jury never knew that Douglas Campbell, through counsel, conceded
credibility of W.R.A. during the child hearsay hearing. When conducting voir dire,
counsel asked potential jurors a sound question: if W.R.A. appeared credible and caused
an emotional tug, could each juror keep an open mind before hearing all of the evidence.
Conceding credibility of W.R.A. to a limited and tactical extent lies within the
category of trial strategy to which we defer to counsel’s decisions. Reviewing courts do
not second guess concession strategies. State v. Molina, 16 Wn. App. 2d 908, 917, 485
P.3d 963 (2021). When arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, Douglas Campbell
cites no legal authority establishing that defense counsel performs ineffectively by
occasionally conceding the credibility of a credible seeming victim as a tactic for the
counsel and his client to gain credibility with the jury.
34 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Child Hearsay Testimony
Douglas Campbell argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to object to inadmissible child hearsay. When so arguing, Campbell
cites no legal authority establishing that defense counsel performs ineffectively by
conceding the credibility of the victim or by failing to object to the admission of child
hearsay. Instead, he outlines instances when defense counsel attested to the credibility of
W.R.A. and when defense counsel welcomed the admission of the child hearsay. He fails
to explain, however, how these instances amount to deficient performance. He fails to
criticize counsel’s performance as a tactical error.
RAP 10.3(6) requires the argument section of an appeal brief to include “argument
in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and
references to relevant parts of the record.” This court routinely declines to review issues
when arguments lack citation to legal authority. Helmbreck v. McPhee, 15 Wn. App. 2d
41, 68, 476 P.3d 589 (2020); Johnson v. Lake Cushman Maintenance Co., 5 Wn. App. 2d
765, 781, 425 P.3d 560 (2018); Norcon Builders, LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn.
App. 474, 486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011). We do so here.
Douglas Campbell may fault trial counsel for permitting W.R.A.’s parents to
testify to statements uttered by W.R.A. when W.R.A. only told his parents what he told
35 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Camela Davies was true. This argument may be accurate as to the father, Matthew
Alverson. On this point, defense counsel effectively cross-examined Matthew. But
W.R.A. directly told his mother, Lindsey Alverson, that Campbell touched his private
parts.
Inconsistent Evidence
Douglas Campbell argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by presenting evidence of other incidents to show W.R.A. lacked boundaries and
thereby lacked credibility in relation to those other incidents. According to Campbell,
this introduction of evidence made no sense because it contradicted defense counsel’s
concession of W.R.A.’s credibility regarding the allegations against Campbell. We
consider Campbell’s contention to make no sense. As we reasoned above, counsel
employed a wise tactic of indirectly challenging the credibility of W.R.A. by using
W.R.A.’s other inconsistent statements and misbehavior. We will not second guess trial
counsel’s strategy even if the strategy loses.
Competing Investigation Strategy
Douglas Campbell next argues that defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by employing a strategy that consisted of challenging the adequacy
of the State’s investigator and comparing the prosecution’s investigator to the
36 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
investigator for the defense. Yet again, he fails to cite to any legal authority to support
this argument. Campbell fails to show why this strategy lacked reason.
Motions In Limine
Douglas Campbell argues that defense counsel performed ineffectively by failing
to object to the State’s motion in limine prohibiting evidence on an alternative suspect.
We reject this contention for many reasons. First, Campbell fails to cite to the record
when referring to the State’s motion in limine and when referring to the trial court’s
ruling on the motion in limine. Campbell needed to include citation to both the motion in
limine and the court’s ruling on the motion in limine pursuant to RAP 10.3(6).
Second, Douglas Campbell cites to State v. Franklin, 180 Wn.2d 371, 381-83, 325
P.3d 159 (2014), for the rule that Washington does not require direct evidence of
another’s guilt, but only circumstantial evidence tending to connect someone other than
the defendant with the crime. Franklin does not, however, establish that defense counsel
performed deficiently by failing to object to the State’s motion in limine preventing
evidence of an alternative suspect and by failing to object to the trial court’s ruling on the
motion.
Lack of Preparation
Finally, Douglas Campbell argues that defense counsel performed ineffectively by
37 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
being unprepared, unfamiliar with the relevant legal process, and repeatedly making
evidentiary errors. Our review of the record shows otherwise. Also, Campbell does not
explain how any lack of preparation prejudiced his case.
Cumulative Error
Douglas Campbell argues that the cumulative effect of the deficiencies in defense
counsel’s performance combined with other errors identified on appeal requires reversal.
Even when individual error standing alone may otherwise be harmless, cumulative errors
taken in total may produce a trial that is fundamentally unfair, and warrant reversal. State
v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 766, 278 P.3d 653 (2012); State v. Weber, 159 Wn.2d 252,
279, 149 P.3d 646 (2006). Because no errors occurred, the cumulative error doctrine
does not apply.
SSOSA
The superior court denied Douglas Campbell’s request for a SSOSA sentence. On
appeal, Campbell contends that the court erred by denying his request on the
impermissible basis that he denied guilt for the offense. We reject Campbell’s
assumption that the court primarily rejected the alternative sentence based on his denial
of guilt and that rejection on this basis is necessarily impermissible.
RCW 9.94A.670 governs the issuance of a Special Sexual Offender Sentencing
38 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Alternative. A SSOSA is a special procedure authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act,
RCW 9.94A of 1981 whereby a sentencing judge may suspend a sex offender’s felony
sentence if the offender meets certain eligibility criteria defined in the statute. State v.
Canfield, 154 Wn.2d 698, 702, 116 P.3d 391 (2005); RCW 9.94A.670(2). If the trial
court determines the defendant is eligible for a SSOSA, the court, on its own motion or
the motion of the State or the offender, may order an examination to determine whether
the offender is amenable to treatment and the offender’s relative risk to the community.
RCW 9.94A.670(3)(b).
RCW 9.9A.670(3)(a) outlines the information that must be included in the
examination report and demands that the examiner opine as to the offender’s amenability
to treatment:
(a) The report of the examination shall include at a minimum the following: (i) The offender’s version of the facts and the official version of the facts; (ii) The offender’s offense history; (iii) An assessment of problems in addition to alleged deviant behaviors; (iv) The offender’s social and employment situation; and (v) Other evaluation measures used. The report shall set forth the sources of the examiner’s information. (b) The examiner shall assess and report regarding the offender’s amenability to treatment and relative risk to the community.
After reviewing the examination report, the sentencing court must decide whether
39 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
to grant the SSOSA based on factors listed in RCW 9.9A.670(4):
(4) After receipt of the reports, the court shall consider whether the offender and the community will benefit from use of this alternative, consider whether the alternative is too lenient in light of the extent and circumstances of the offense, consider whether the offender has victims in addition to the victim of the offense, consider whether the offender is amenable to treatment, consider the risk the offender would present to the community, to the victim, or to persons of similar age and circumstances as the victim, and consider the victim’s opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section. The court shall give great weight to the victim’s opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section . . . The fact that the offender admits to his or her offense does not, by itself, constitute amenability to treatment.
The decision to grant or deny a SSOSA is discretionary with the trial court. State
v. Montgomery, 105 Wn. App. 442, 444, 17 P.3d 1237 (2001). This court reviews such
decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Frazier, 84 Wn. App. 752, 753, 930 P.2d
345 (1997). An abuse of discretion exists if the sentencing court categorically refuses to
impose a particular sentence or if it denies a sentencing request on an impermissible
basis. State v. Osman, 157 Wn. 2d 474, 482, 139 P.3d 334 (2006). Douglas Campbell
promotes his denial of guilt as an impermissible basis.
This court’s decision in State v. Montgomery, 105 Wn. App. 442 (2001) bears
relevance. The sentencing court denied Steven Montgomery’s petition for a SSOSA after
his conviction for rape of a child and child molestation. The court concluded that
40 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
Montgomery was eligible for the alternative sentence but still denied the sentence
because Montgomery made the victim to go to trial. The sentencing court reasoned that
Montgomery’s taking the case to trial indicated his unwillingness to acknowledge his
problem and thus his lack of amenability to treatment. On appeal, this court held that
Montgomery lacked eligibility for a SSOSA and affirmed the denial on this basis. Then,
this court, in dicta, declared that the sentencing court denied Montgomery his
constitutional right by denying the SSOSA based on causing his victim the trauma of a
trial. The sentencing court thereby subjected Montgomery to more severe punishment for
exercising his constitutional right to stand trial.
State v. Montgomery almost persuades us to reverse the superior court’s denial of
Douglas Campbell’s request for a SSOSA but we distinguish Montgomery on two
grounds. First, although the sentencing court in Montgomery mentioned a lack of
amenability of Steven Montgomery, the sentencing court focused more on the child
victim facing the ordeal of trial. Campbell’s sentencing court made no mention of
rejecting a SSOSA because of W.R.A. having faced trial or because of Campbell
demanding trial. Instead, Campbell’s sentencing court emphasized Campbell’s continued
denial of guilt after the jury verdict, something unmentioned in State v. Montgomery.
Campbell’s sentencing court did not express umbrage to Campbell exercising his right to
41 No. 40305-0-III State v. Campbell
a trial but rather expressed concern of his attitude after trial. Campbell’s posttrial attitude
would impact his amenability to treatment, a key factor for consideration when
addressing a potential SSOSA.
Second, Douglas Campbell’s sentencing court based its denial of a SSOSA also on
other factors. The sentencing court denied the alternative sentence because the sentence
would be too lenient, W.R.A. opposed the issuance of a SSOSA, and neither the
community nor Campbell would benefit from the SSOSA. Thus, we conclude the
sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when denying a SSOSA.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the convictions and sentence of Douglas Campbell.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Fearing, J.P.T.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. Murphy, J.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
State of Washington v. Douglas Glenn Campbell, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-washington-v-douglas-glenn-campbell-washctapp-2026.