IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 74526-3-1 Respondent, V. DIVISION ONE
DONALD JANEL LEGRONE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: June 12, 2017
LEACH, J. — Donald Legrone appeals his conviction for first degree burglary and
fourth degree assault. He contends he was denied his constitutional right to a unanimous
jury verdict because the State failed to prove one of the charged alternative means of first
degree burglary and the trial court did not instruct the jury that it must be unanimous as
to the means.
A defendant is entitled to jury unanimity as to guilt on the crime charged. But the
jury need not be unanimous about the means when substantial evidence supports each
of the means by which the State charged the crime. Here, substantial evidence supported
each means.
Legrone contends, and the State concedes, that his conviction for fourth degree
assault incorrectly contains a domestic violence designation. This designation does not
impact his sentence. Thus, we remand this case to superior court to amend the judgment
and sentence by deleting the domestic violence designation for the fourth degree assault
conviction. In all other respects we affirm the judgment and sentence. No. 74526-3-1 /2
FACTS
On October 23, 2013, Briana Lensegrav, a heroin addict who supported her habit
by working as a prostitute, arranged a date with Peter Smith, a repeat client, at the Garden
Suites Motel where she had been staying.
As Lensegrav and Smith concluded their date, Charles Rodriguez and Legrone
entered the room through a window without permission. Smith testified that Rodriquez
was angry and grabbed Lensegrav's hair, throwing her onto the bed. Legrone indicated
that Smith should head to the bathroom. Smith complied. But when Legrone was
distracted, Smith ran for the motel door. Legrone kicked the door, smashing Smith's arm
and head. Legrone grabbed Smith's jacket, ripping it, but Smith was able to escape.
Legrone said that they should leave because Smith was probably going to call the
police. Legrone led Lensegrav out through the front door to his car. As Legrone was
pulling out of the motel driveway, he stopped for Rodriguez, who got in the back seat.
They drove to a rural area. As they were driving up a gravel road, Rodriguez told
Lensegrav that she was going to die.
After the car stopped, Rodriguez started hitting Lensegrav and repeated that she
was going to die. When Rodriquez stopped, Legrone began to hit her. While Legrone
was hitting her, Legrone told Lensegrav to pull her pants down and masturbate. Both
threatened Lensegrav's family and son if she were to run or go to the authorities.
Afterward, Legrone drove Rodriquez to another motel. Lensegrav slept in the car
and awoke when they were transferring cars. After providing Lensegrav with heroin,
Legrone took her to her motel and gave her $100.
-2- No. 74526-3-1 / 3
At her mother's urging, Lensegrav called the police who took her to a hospital
where she was diagnosed with a fractured cheekbone.
The State charged Legrone and Rodriquez with first degree burglary, first degree
kidnapping, and second degree assault.1 The jury found Legrone guilty of first degree
burglary and a lesser included charge of fourth degree assault. The jury could not reach
a unanimous verdict on the kidnapping charge.
Legrone appeals. He contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to
prove his conviction for first degree burglary. He also alleges his conviction for the
misdemeanor fourth degree assault was improperly designated as a domestic violence
crime.
ANALYSIS
Sufficient evidence
Legrone contends his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict under article
1, section 21 of the Washington Constitution was violated because the State failed to prove
one of the charged alternative means of first degree burglary and the trial court did not
instruct the jury that it must be unanimous as to the means.
First degree burglary is an alternative means crime. It can be committed by
entering a building unlawfully with intent to commit a crime or by remaining unlawfully with
this intent.2 Legrone does not dispute that he entered the motel unlawfully, only that the
1 Legrone was also charged with two counts of possession of heroin on October 25, 2013, with intent to deliver in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. That charge was severed. 2 RCW 9A.52.020(1); State v. Allen, 127 Wn. App. 125, 131,110 P.3d 849 (2005).
-3- No. 74526-3-1/ 4
State failed to prove that he did so with the intent to commit a crime. Where sufficient
evidence supports both means, the jury need not decide unanimously on one means.3
Sufficient evidence supports a conviction if, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. By making this challenge, Legrone "admits the truth of the State's evidence and
all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom."
Here, the State charged Legrone as both a principal and an accomplice to
Rodriguez. RCW 9A.52.020 provides,
(1) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, the actor or another participant in the crime (a) is armed with a deadly weapon, or (b) assaults any person.
While mere presence at the crime is insufficient to prove accomplice liability, the evidence
here supports a jury finding that Legrone was "ready to assist in the crime."5 The State
presented evidence of threatening texts that Rodriguez sent to Lensegrav shortly before
breaking in. Although Lensegrav told Rodrigues that she would contact him after her date
left, Rodriguez replied that he was going to "come break that window out if you don't
answer that phone, and come in there and beat your ass." Minutes later, Rodriguez and
Legrone both entered through the rear window of the motel room. This startled both
Lensegrav and Smith. Legrone intimidated Smith by ordering him to the bathroom, while
3 State v. Ortega-Martinez, 124 Wn.2d 702, 707-09, 881 P.2d 231 (1994); State v Armstrong, No. 93119-4, slip op. at 6(Wash. May 11, 2017), http://www.courts.wa.gov/ opinions/pdf/931194.pdf. 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 5 State v. Luna, 71 Wn. App. 755, 759, 862 P.2d 620(1993).
-4- No. 74526-3-1 / 5
Rodriguez grabbed Lensegrav by the hair and threw her down. When Smith ran for the
door, Legrone chased him, kicking the door to try and prevent him from leaving. The door
struck Smith, causing him pain. Legrone then tried to stop Smith by grabbing his jacket.
Smith managed to escape.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 74526-3-1 Respondent, V. DIVISION ONE
DONALD JANEL LEGRONE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: June 12, 2017
LEACH, J. — Donald Legrone appeals his conviction for first degree burglary and
fourth degree assault. He contends he was denied his constitutional right to a unanimous
jury verdict because the State failed to prove one of the charged alternative means of first
degree burglary and the trial court did not instruct the jury that it must be unanimous as
to the means.
A defendant is entitled to jury unanimity as to guilt on the crime charged. But the
jury need not be unanimous about the means when substantial evidence supports each
of the means by which the State charged the crime. Here, substantial evidence supported
each means.
Legrone contends, and the State concedes, that his conviction for fourth degree
assault incorrectly contains a domestic violence designation. This designation does not
impact his sentence. Thus, we remand this case to superior court to amend the judgment
and sentence by deleting the domestic violence designation for the fourth degree assault
conviction. In all other respects we affirm the judgment and sentence. No. 74526-3-1 /2
FACTS
On October 23, 2013, Briana Lensegrav, a heroin addict who supported her habit
by working as a prostitute, arranged a date with Peter Smith, a repeat client, at the Garden
Suites Motel where she had been staying.
As Lensegrav and Smith concluded their date, Charles Rodriguez and Legrone
entered the room through a window without permission. Smith testified that Rodriquez
was angry and grabbed Lensegrav's hair, throwing her onto the bed. Legrone indicated
that Smith should head to the bathroom. Smith complied. But when Legrone was
distracted, Smith ran for the motel door. Legrone kicked the door, smashing Smith's arm
and head. Legrone grabbed Smith's jacket, ripping it, but Smith was able to escape.
Legrone said that they should leave because Smith was probably going to call the
police. Legrone led Lensegrav out through the front door to his car. As Legrone was
pulling out of the motel driveway, he stopped for Rodriguez, who got in the back seat.
They drove to a rural area. As they were driving up a gravel road, Rodriguez told
Lensegrav that she was going to die.
After the car stopped, Rodriguez started hitting Lensegrav and repeated that she
was going to die. When Rodriquez stopped, Legrone began to hit her. While Legrone
was hitting her, Legrone told Lensegrav to pull her pants down and masturbate. Both
threatened Lensegrav's family and son if she were to run or go to the authorities.
Afterward, Legrone drove Rodriquez to another motel. Lensegrav slept in the car
and awoke when they were transferring cars. After providing Lensegrav with heroin,
Legrone took her to her motel and gave her $100.
-2- No. 74526-3-1 / 3
At her mother's urging, Lensegrav called the police who took her to a hospital
where she was diagnosed with a fractured cheekbone.
The State charged Legrone and Rodriquez with first degree burglary, first degree
kidnapping, and second degree assault.1 The jury found Legrone guilty of first degree
burglary and a lesser included charge of fourth degree assault. The jury could not reach
a unanimous verdict on the kidnapping charge.
Legrone appeals. He contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to
prove his conviction for first degree burglary. He also alleges his conviction for the
misdemeanor fourth degree assault was improperly designated as a domestic violence
crime.
ANALYSIS
Sufficient evidence
Legrone contends his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict under article
1, section 21 of the Washington Constitution was violated because the State failed to prove
one of the charged alternative means of first degree burglary and the trial court did not
instruct the jury that it must be unanimous as to the means.
First degree burglary is an alternative means crime. It can be committed by
entering a building unlawfully with intent to commit a crime or by remaining unlawfully with
this intent.2 Legrone does not dispute that he entered the motel unlawfully, only that the
1 Legrone was also charged with two counts of possession of heroin on October 25, 2013, with intent to deliver in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. That charge was severed. 2 RCW 9A.52.020(1); State v. Allen, 127 Wn. App. 125, 131,110 P.3d 849 (2005).
-3- No. 74526-3-1/ 4
State failed to prove that he did so with the intent to commit a crime. Where sufficient
evidence supports both means, the jury need not decide unanimously on one means.3
Sufficient evidence supports a conviction if, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. By making this challenge, Legrone "admits the truth of the State's evidence and
all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom."
Here, the State charged Legrone as both a principal and an accomplice to
Rodriguez. RCW 9A.52.020 provides,
(1) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, the actor or another participant in the crime (a) is armed with a deadly weapon, or (b) assaults any person.
While mere presence at the crime is insufficient to prove accomplice liability, the evidence
here supports a jury finding that Legrone was "ready to assist in the crime."5 The State
presented evidence of threatening texts that Rodriguez sent to Lensegrav shortly before
breaking in. Although Lensegrav told Rodrigues that she would contact him after her date
left, Rodriguez replied that he was going to "come break that window out if you don't
answer that phone, and come in there and beat your ass." Minutes later, Rodriguez and
Legrone both entered through the rear window of the motel room. This startled both
Lensegrav and Smith. Legrone intimidated Smith by ordering him to the bathroom, while
3 State v. Ortega-Martinez, 124 Wn.2d 702, 707-09, 881 P.2d 231 (1994); State v Armstrong, No. 93119-4, slip op. at 6(Wash. May 11, 2017), http://www.courts.wa.gov/ opinions/pdf/931194.pdf. 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 5 State v. Luna, 71 Wn. App. 755, 759, 862 P.2d 620(1993).
-4- No. 74526-3-1 / 5
Rodriguez grabbed Lensegrav by the hair and threw her down. When Smith ran for the
door, Legrone chased him, kicking the door to try and prevent him from leaving. The door
struck Smith, causing him pain. Legrone then tried to stop Smith by grabbing his jacket.
Smith managed to escape.
A rationale trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that Legrone meant to
enter the room to help Rodriquez attack Lensegrav. Legrone's actions to contain Smith
could reasonably be seen as helping Rodriguez by keeping Smith from aiding Lensegrav
or escaping to contact the authorities for help. Sufficient evidence supports the conviction
for first degree burglary.
Misdemeanor Judgment and Sentence
Legrone contends, and the State concedes, that the judgment and sentence for
fourth degree assault incorrectly contained a domestic violence designation as there was
no evidence that Legrone had a relationship with Lensegrav. We accept the State's
concession.
Statement of Additional Grounds
In a statement of additional grounds, Legrone alleges violations of the court's
witness exclusion ruling, the confrontation clause, prosecutorial misconduct, inadmissible
testimony, and ineffective assistance of counsel. None of these claims has any merit.
Appellate Costs
Finally, Legrone asks this court to deny the State appellate costs based on his
indigency. We generally award appellate costs to the substantially prevailing party on
review. However, when a trial court makes a finding of indigency, that finding continues
-5- No. 74526-3-1 /6
throughout review "unless the commissioner or clerk determines by a preponderance of
the evidence that the offender's financial circumstances have significantly improved since
the last determination of indigency."6 Here, the trial court found Legrone indigent. If the
State has evidence indicating significant improvement in Legrone's financial
circumstances since the trial court's finding, it may file a motion for costs with the
commissioner.
In conclusion, we remand the matter to superior court to amend the judgment and
sentence by deleting the domestic violence designation for the fourth degree assault
conviction. In all other respects we affirm the judgment and sentence.
WE CONCUR:
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6 RAP 14.2. -6-