Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
July 12, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 47418-2-II
Respondent,
v.
DIKITA ADE TYRELL, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, P.J. — Dikita Tyrell appeals his conviction for resisting arrest. He argues
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
Washington State Patrol Trooper Justin Eisfeldt stopped Tyrell for speeding in Thurston
County. When Trooper Eisfeldt approached Tyrell’s vehicle, he smelled a “strong odor of
intoxicants coming from within the vehicle.” 1 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 111.
Trooper Eisfeldt suspected that Tyrell was intoxicated in part because Tyrell was unresponsive to
the trooper’s requests. Tyrell stated that he wanted to use his phone to contact an attorney.
Trooper Eisfeldt informed Tyrell that he did not have the right to contact an attorney at that time
because he was not under arrest.
Trooper Eisfeldt radioed for a second trooper to assist him at the scene. Then, for
roughly 25 seconds, Trooper Eisfeldt instructed Tyrell to exit the car, repeating the request
roughly 3 times. Tyrell did not comply. Trooper Eisfeldt asked the second trooper to respond No. 47418-2-II
more quickly to the call. Roughly 5 seconds later, Tyrell agreed to exit the vehicle, using a racial
epithet toward the trooper. Tyrell began to open the vehicle’s door to exit. But Trooper Eisfeldt
closed the door and told Tyrell not to exit the vehicle. Trooper Eisfeldt refused to let Tyrell exit
the vehicle because he was concerned for his safety until the second trooper arrived.
Trooper Eisfeldt held Tyrell’s door closed and waited for the second trooper to arrive.
When the second trooper arrived, Trooper Eisfeldt again told Tyrell to exit the vehicle, and
Tyrell refused. During the next minute, Trooper Eisfeldt told Tyrell 5 times to exit the vehicle.
Tyrell did not comply; instead, he locked the door.
Trooper Eisfeldt then decided to remove Tyrell from the vehicle. He reached into the
vehicle, unlocked the door, and removed Tyrell’s seatbelt as Tyrell slapped his hand away. The
two men struggled. About 15 seconds later, Trooper Eisfeldt forcibly removed Tyrell from the
vehicle by placing his arm in a “goose neck” pain compliance maneuver. 1 VRP at 123. For
five seconds, Trooper Eisfeldt kept Tyrell in the goose neck while instructing him to “get on the
ground.” 1 VRP at 128. Despite Trooper Eisfeldt’s instructions to get on the ground, however,
Tyrell kept his feet under him and was pulling away. Tyrell “r[an] through the movement,” so
that instead of falling to the ground in the goose neck, Tyrell and Trooper Eisfeldt swung around
in a half-moon shape. The two men spun around until Tyrell’s face and upper body came into
contact with the trunk, splitting his lip.
Trooper Eisfeldt pressed Tyrell against the trunk and tried to handcuff him, but Tyrell
pulled his hands apart and attempted to put them under his body so that they could not be cuffed.
While handcuffing Tyrell, Trooper Eisfeldt informed him that he was under arrest for driving
under the influence and obstruction. The State charged Tyrell with resisting arrest in violation of
2 No. 47418-2-II
RCW 9A.76.040.1 At trial, multiple witnesses, including Trooper Eisfeldt, testified to the above
facts. The trial court admitted a video from Trooper Eisfeldt’s dashboard camera, which showed
the traffic stop and subsequent arrest. The jury found Tyrell guilty of resisting arrest. Tyrell
appeals.
ANALYSIS
Tyrell argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed
the crime of resisting arrest, because there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation that
he did anything to intentionally resist his arrest. We disagree.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State. State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577, 586, 183 P.2d 267
(2008). If any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt from the evidence, we will affirm the conviction. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d at
586. A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
II. RESISTING ARREST
Tyrell argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of resisting arrest, because at no time did Tyrell
act intentionally to resist arrest. We disagree.
1 Tyrell was also charged with driving under the influence, first degree driving with a suspended license, and third degree assault. Tyrell pleaded guilty to the charge of driving with a suspended license and proceeded to trial on the remaining three counts. At trial, the jury found Tyrell guilty of driving under the influence, but found him not guilty of third degree assault. These charges are not pertinent to this appeal. 3 No. 47418-2-II
A “person is guilty of resisting arrest if he or she intentionally prevents or attempts to
prevent a peace officer from lawfully arresting him or her.” RCW 9A.76.040(1). “A person acts
with intent or intentionally when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a
result which constitutes a crime.” RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a). A person’s specific criminal intent to
resist a lawful arrest may be inferred from his conduct “where it is plainly indicated as a matter
of logical probability.” State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
By acting intentionally, a person by law also acts knowingly. State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d
510, 518, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980). Thus, to intentionally resist an arrest, the arrested person must
know he is under arrest. See State v. Calvin, 176 Wn. App. 1, 13, 316 P.3d 496 (2013), review
granted on other grounds, 183 Wn.2d 1013, 353 P.3d 640 (2015). The officer need not formally
tell the person that he or she is under arrest, but there must be sufficient evidence that the
arrested person knew he or she was under arrest. Calvin, 176 Wn. App. at 13. In general, an
arrest occurs when an officer manifests intent to detain a suspect in custody and seizes him or her
in such a manner as to cause a reasonable person in the circumstances to believe he or she is
“under a custodial arrest” and “not free to leave.” State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 135,
101 P.3d 80 (2004); State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 387,
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
July 12, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 47418-2-II
Respondent,
v.
DIKITA ADE TYRELL, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, P.J. — Dikita Tyrell appeals his conviction for resisting arrest. He argues
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
Washington State Patrol Trooper Justin Eisfeldt stopped Tyrell for speeding in Thurston
County. When Trooper Eisfeldt approached Tyrell’s vehicle, he smelled a “strong odor of
intoxicants coming from within the vehicle.” 1 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 111.
Trooper Eisfeldt suspected that Tyrell was intoxicated in part because Tyrell was unresponsive to
the trooper’s requests. Tyrell stated that he wanted to use his phone to contact an attorney.
Trooper Eisfeldt informed Tyrell that he did not have the right to contact an attorney at that time
because he was not under arrest.
Trooper Eisfeldt radioed for a second trooper to assist him at the scene. Then, for
roughly 25 seconds, Trooper Eisfeldt instructed Tyrell to exit the car, repeating the request
roughly 3 times. Tyrell did not comply. Trooper Eisfeldt asked the second trooper to respond No. 47418-2-II
more quickly to the call. Roughly 5 seconds later, Tyrell agreed to exit the vehicle, using a racial
epithet toward the trooper. Tyrell began to open the vehicle’s door to exit. But Trooper Eisfeldt
closed the door and told Tyrell not to exit the vehicle. Trooper Eisfeldt refused to let Tyrell exit
the vehicle because he was concerned for his safety until the second trooper arrived.
Trooper Eisfeldt held Tyrell’s door closed and waited for the second trooper to arrive.
When the second trooper arrived, Trooper Eisfeldt again told Tyrell to exit the vehicle, and
Tyrell refused. During the next minute, Trooper Eisfeldt told Tyrell 5 times to exit the vehicle.
Tyrell did not comply; instead, he locked the door.
Trooper Eisfeldt then decided to remove Tyrell from the vehicle. He reached into the
vehicle, unlocked the door, and removed Tyrell’s seatbelt as Tyrell slapped his hand away. The
two men struggled. About 15 seconds later, Trooper Eisfeldt forcibly removed Tyrell from the
vehicle by placing his arm in a “goose neck” pain compliance maneuver. 1 VRP at 123. For
five seconds, Trooper Eisfeldt kept Tyrell in the goose neck while instructing him to “get on the
ground.” 1 VRP at 128. Despite Trooper Eisfeldt’s instructions to get on the ground, however,
Tyrell kept his feet under him and was pulling away. Tyrell “r[an] through the movement,” so
that instead of falling to the ground in the goose neck, Tyrell and Trooper Eisfeldt swung around
in a half-moon shape. The two men spun around until Tyrell’s face and upper body came into
contact with the trunk, splitting his lip.
Trooper Eisfeldt pressed Tyrell against the trunk and tried to handcuff him, but Tyrell
pulled his hands apart and attempted to put them under his body so that they could not be cuffed.
While handcuffing Tyrell, Trooper Eisfeldt informed him that he was under arrest for driving
under the influence and obstruction. The State charged Tyrell with resisting arrest in violation of
2 No. 47418-2-II
RCW 9A.76.040.1 At trial, multiple witnesses, including Trooper Eisfeldt, testified to the above
facts. The trial court admitted a video from Trooper Eisfeldt’s dashboard camera, which showed
the traffic stop and subsequent arrest. The jury found Tyrell guilty of resisting arrest. Tyrell
appeals.
ANALYSIS
Tyrell argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed
the crime of resisting arrest, because there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation that
he did anything to intentionally resist his arrest. We disagree.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State. State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577, 586, 183 P.2d 267
(2008). If any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt from the evidence, we will affirm the conviction. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d at
586. A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
II. RESISTING ARREST
Tyrell argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of resisting arrest, because at no time did Tyrell
act intentionally to resist arrest. We disagree.
1 Tyrell was also charged with driving under the influence, first degree driving with a suspended license, and third degree assault. Tyrell pleaded guilty to the charge of driving with a suspended license and proceeded to trial on the remaining three counts. At trial, the jury found Tyrell guilty of driving under the influence, but found him not guilty of third degree assault. These charges are not pertinent to this appeal. 3 No. 47418-2-II
A “person is guilty of resisting arrest if he or she intentionally prevents or attempts to
prevent a peace officer from lawfully arresting him or her.” RCW 9A.76.040(1). “A person acts
with intent or intentionally when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a
result which constitutes a crime.” RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a). A person’s specific criminal intent to
resist a lawful arrest may be inferred from his conduct “where it is plainly indicated as a matter
of logical probability.” State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
By acting intentionally, a person by law also acts knowingly. State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d
510, 518, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980). Thus, to intentionally resist an arrest, the arrested person must
know he is under arrest. See State v. Calvin, 176 Wn. App. 1, 13, 316 P.3d 496 (2013), review
granted on other grounds, 183 Wn.2d 1013, 353 P.3d 640 (2015). The officer need not formally
tell the person that he or she is under arrest, but there must be sufficient evidence that the
arrested person knew he or she was under arrest. Calvin, 176 Wn. App. at 13. In general, an
arrest occurs when an officer manifests intent to detain a suspect in custody and seizes him or her
in such a manner as to cause a reasonable person in the circumstances to believe he or she is
“under a custodial arrest” and “not free to leave.” State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 135,
101 P.3d 80 (2004); State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 387, 219 P.3d 651 (2009).
Here, there is sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Tyrell
intentionally resisted arrest. After the second trooper arrived, Trooper Eisfeldt instructed Tyrell
three times to exit the vehicle, but Tyrell locked his car door instead. When Trooper Eisfeldt
reached in to unlock the door, Tyrell slapped at Trooper Eisfeldt’s arm to prevent him from
unlocking the door.
At this point, a rational jury could find that Tyrell reasonably believed he was under a
custodial arrest. See Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d at 135. Thus, Tyrell’s uncooperative actions
4 No. 47418-2-II
became those of intentionally resisting an arrest. Upon removing Tyrell from the vehicle,
Trooper Eisfeldt instructed Tyrell to get on the ground, but Tyrell did not comply. Trooper
Eisfeldt attempted to force Tyrell to the ground, but Tyrell kept his feet under him despite the
goose neck maneuver, and pulled away from Trooper Eisfeldt. When Trooper Eisfeldt attempted
to handcuff Tyrell, Tyrell repeatedly pulled his hands away, attempting to prevent the trooper
from handcuffing him.
Tyrell argues that he could not have intended to resist arrest, in part because he was not
informed that he was under arrest until after he was handcuffed. But sufficient evidence exists to
show that Tyrell knew that he was being arrested when Trooper Eisfeldt removed him from the
car, attempted to subdue him, and handcuffed him. State v. Bravo Ortega, 177 Wn.2d 116, 128,
297 P.3d 57 (2013) (“Examples of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe he or
she was under arrest include handcuffing the suspect.”). A jury could have reasonably inferred
that Tyrell was attempting to resist arrest when he “r[an] through the [goose neck] movement”
and repeatedly pulled his hands away during Trooper Eisfeldt’s attempts to handcuff him. 1
VRP at 131.
Tyrell points out that Trooper Eisfeldt told Tyrell immediately after pulling him over that
Tyrell was not under arrest. However, Trooper Eisfeldt stated that Tyrell was not under arrest as
he sat in his car, for actions that he had only done up to that point. Indeed, it was after Trooper
Eisfeldt made these statements that Tyrell escalated his obstructive behavior by locking the car
door, slapping the trooper’s hand, refusing repeated requests to exit the vehicle, and refusing to
comply with the trooper’s orders to get on the ground after being forcibly removed from the
vehicle. Trooper Eisfeldt’s earlier statements that Tyrell was not under arrest applied only to
5 No. 47418-2-II
Tyrell’s actions up to that point, and they did not bind the trooper’s future ability make an arrest
as Tyrell’s obstructive behavior escalated throughout the encounter.
These facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would permit a rational
trier of fact to conclude that Tyrell intentionally attempted to prevent Trooper Eisfeldt from
lawfully arresting him. Therefore, sufficient evidence supports Tyrell’s conviction. We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, J. We concur:
Maxa, A.C.J.
Sutton, J.