Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
September 23, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59525-7-II
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DENNIS CLARKE WILSON, JR.,
Appellant.
CHE, J. ⎯ After receiving a CyberTip about potential child sexual exploitation materials,
law enforcement searched Dennis Wilson’s property and interrogated him. Wilson was later
found guilty of four counts of first degree possession of depictions of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.
Wilson appeals his convictions, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, he argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that
Wilson’s statements during his interrogation were inadmissible because the detective improperly
proceeded with questioning after Wilson invoked his right to remain silent. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTS
In 2021, law enforcement received a CyberTip containing images depicting child sexual
exploitation, an IP address, telephone numbers, and potential subscriber information. Upon
receiving the tip, Detective Chadd Nolan investigated the information and determined that the No. 59525-7-II
information was associated with a real person—Wilson. Detective Nolan obtained a search
warrant for Wilson’s home, person, and computer devices including his cellphone.
Law enforcement went to Wilson’s residence and took him into custody. Wilson had
recently finished a graveyard shift and indicated that he was tired. Detective Nolan advised
Wilson of his Miranda rights and Wilson agreed to proceed with an interview. Detective Nolan
questioned Wilson for approximately 45 minutes before transferring him to the police station for
further questioning. At the station, Wilson signed a waiver acknowledging that he had been
advised of, and understood, his Miranda rights.1
The State charged Wilson with four counts of first degree possession of depictions of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
The trial court held a CrR 3.5 hearing on the admissibility of Wilson’s statements to law
enforcement. At the hearing, Detective Nolan testified that he and other officers went to
Wilson’s home as part of their investigation. Detective Nolan testified that before he
interviewed Wilson, he read him his Miranda rights from a pre-printed card, Wilson affirmed
that he understood them and that Wilson did not invoke any of those rights. Detective Nolan
testified that Wilson indicated he was tired but that, after a few minutes of talking, Wilson
became more alert and forthcoming with information.
The State played approximately two minutes of the recording of the interview with
Wilson. In the recording, Detective Nolan reads Wilson his rights. Wilson repeatedly comments
that he is tired but that he understands his rights. Wilson also told Detective Nolan that he is
supposed to be on insulin.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
2 No. 59525-7-II
Wilson testified at the CrR 3.5 hearing. He stated that he “kind of” felt like he was
forced into the interview. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 40. Wilson argued that his statements were not
voluntary because he was tired and was not feeling well because he needed insulin at the time of
the interview, but he did not argue that he had invoked his right to remain silent.
The trial court found that there were no disputed facts. The trial court concluded that
Wilson was properly read his Miranda warnings and that he knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his rights. The trial court also concluded that “[d]espite an indication that the
defendant was tired, the totality of the circumstances show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant’s statements [] were voluntary.” Clerk’s Papers at 71. The trial court ruled
that the statements were admissible.
During trial, the recording of Wilson’s interview was played for the jury. Early in the
interview, Wilson identified his phone number and email addresses, which match the number
and addresses associated with the accounts used to access and download the child sex abuse
materials. At one point during the interview, during a portion not played at the CrR 3.5 hearing,
Detective Nolan turned the conversation to screenshots Wilson had taken. The trial court’s
transcript of Wilson’s statements to Detective Nolan, as played for the jury reads as follows:
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: Okay. What else, man? I mean, why else would I be here—Google’s saying that they found some screenshots that you took, that you saved to your Google Drive, Google Photos account. What happened there?
[WILSON]: I don’t know.
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: What do you mean, you don’t know?
[WILSON]: I’m tired.
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: I get that you’re tired.
3 No. 59525-7-II
[WILSON]: That’s all I’m going to say. I’m really tired. That’s all I’ll say. Sorry.
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: It’s okay. But I will tell you this: I’m not going away. All right?
[WILSON]: I know you’re not.
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: And I will tell you that—you know, you’re a smart guy. You know, you’re able to answer my questions. I do feel—I’m not calling you a liar or anything, but I do feel like you’re playing the tiredness thing.
[WILSON]: No, I’m just really tired.
RP at 95-96.
The State contends that the transcript is flawed and that Wilson actually said “I’m sorry
but I don’t know what else to say. Ah f []ck it’s hot in here. (sound of zipper zipping). Just
want to sleep, (laugh noise). Sorry, I (crosstalk/indecipherable).” Br. of Resp’t at 5. The State
designated the recording as part of the record on appeal, enabling this court to review the audio
itself.
Upon review of the audio, the first part of Wilson’s answer is indiscernible; he says he is
tired and then mumbles something quietly before the sound of a zipper is heard, followed by “I
just want to sleep” and a laughing sound. Ex. 22 at 15:50 min. through 16:13 min. The
transcription of the interview contained in the verbatim report of proceedings is also clearly
inaccurate at several other points during the interview, beyond the examples identified in the
State’s brief.
The interview continued, and Wilson explained that he was not actively seeking out
pictures of children but that around nine to ten percent of the time masturbates to depictions of
4 No. 59525-7-II
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.2 The State introduced evidence of multiple images
of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct that were found on Wilson’s devices.
The jury found Wilson guilty as charged.
Wilson appeals.
ANALYSIS
Wilson argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s
failure to argue that his interview statements were inadmissible because Detective Nolan refused
to honor Wilson’s invocation of his right to remain silent. We disagree.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that their attorney’s
performance was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the appellant. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984); In re Pers. Restraint of
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
September 23, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59525-7-II
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DENNIS CLARKE WILSON, JR.,
Appellant.
CHE, J. ⎯ After receiving a CyberTip about potential child sexual exploitation materials,
law enforcement searched Dennis Wilson’s property and interrogated him. Wilson was later
found guilty of four counts of first degree possession of depictions of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.
Wilson appeals his convictions, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, he argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that
Wilson’s statements during his interrogation were inadmissible because the detective improperly
proceeded with questioning after Wilson invoked his right to remain silent. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTS
In 2021, law enforcement received a CyberTip containing images depicting child sexual
exploitation, an IP address, telephone numbers, and potential subscriber information. Upon
receiving the tip, Detective Chadd Nolan investigated the information and determined that the No. 59525-7-II
information was associated with a real person—Wilson. Detective Nolan obtained a search
warrant for Wilson’s home, person, and computer devices including his cellphone.
Law enforcement went to Wilson’s residence and took him into custody. Wilson had
recently finished a graveyard shift and indicated that he was tired. Detective Nolan advised
Wilson of his Miranda rights and Wilson agreed to proceed with an interview. Detective Nolan
questioned Wilson for approximately 45 minutes before transferring him to the police station for
further questioning. At the station, Wilson signed a waiver acknowledging that he had been
advised of, and understood, his Miranda rights.1
The State charged Wilson with four counts of first degree possession of depictions of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
The trial court held a CrR 3.5 hearing on the admissibility of Wilson’s statements to law
enforcement. At the hearing, Detective Nolan testified that he and other officers went to
Wilson’s home as part of their investigation. Detective Nolan testified that before he
interviewed Wilson, he read him his Miranda rights from a pre-printed card, Wilson affirmed
that he understood them and that Wilson did not invoke any of those rights. Detective Nolan
testified that Wilson indicated he was tired but that, after a few minutes of talking, Wilson
became more alert and forthcoming with information.
The State played approximately two minutes of the recording of the interview with
Wilson. In the recording, Detective Nolan reads Wilson his rights. Wilson repeatedly comments
that he is tired but that he understands his rights. Wilson also told Detective Nolan that he is
supposed to be on insulin.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
2 No. 59525-7-II
Wilson testified at the CrR 3.5 hearing. He stated that he “kind of” felt like he was
forced into the interview. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 40. Wilson argued that his statements were not
voluntary because he was tired and was not feeling well because he needed insulin at the time of
the interview, but he did not argue that he had invoked his right to remain silent.
The trial court found that there were no disputed facts. The trial court concluded that
Wilson was properly read his Miranda warnings and that he knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his rights. The trial court also concluded that “[d]espite an indication that the
defendant was tired, the totality of the circumstances show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant’s statements [] were voluntary.” Clerk’s Papers at 71. The trial court ruled
that the statements were admissible.
During trial, the recording of Wilson’s interview was played for the jury. Early in the
interview, Wilson identified his phone number and email addresses, which match the number
and addresses associated with the accounts used to access and download the child sex abuse
materials. At one point during the interview, during a portion not played at the CrR 3.5 hearing,
Detective Nolan turned the conversation to screenshots Wilson had taken. The trial court’s
transcript of Wilson’s statements to Detective Nolan, as played for the jury reads as follows:
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: Okay. What else, man? I mean, why else would I be here—Google’s saying that they found some screenshots that you took, that you saved to your Google Drive, Google Photos account. What happened there?
[WILSON]: I don’t know.
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: What do you mean, you don’t know?
[WILSON]: I’m tired.
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: I get that you’re tired.
3 No. 59525-7-II
[WILSON]: That’s all I’m going to say. I’m really tired. That’s all I’ll say. Sorry.
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: It’s okay. But I will tell you this: I’m not going away. All right?
[WILSON]: I know you’re not.
[SERGEANT NOLAN]: And I will tell you that—you know, you’re a smart guy. You know, you’re able to answer my questions. I do feel—I’m not calling you a liar or anything, but I do feel like you’re playing the tiredness thing.
[WILSON]: No, I’m just really tired.
RP at 95-96.
The State contends that the transcript is flawed and that Wilson actually said “I’m sorry
but I don’t know what else to say. Ah f []ck it’s hot in here. (sound of zipper zipping). Just
want to sleep, (laugh noise). Sorry, I (crosstalk/indecipherable).” Br. of Resp’t at 5. The State
designated the recording as part of the record on appeal, enabling this court to review the audio
itself.
Upon review of the audio, the first part of Wilson’s answer is indiscernible; he says he is
tired and then mumbles something quietly before the sound of a zipper is heard, followed by “I
just want to sleep” and a laughing sound. Ex. 22 at 15:50 min. through 16:13 min. The
transcription of the interview contained in the verbatim report of proceedings is also clearly
inaccurate at several other points during the interview, beyond the examples identified in the
State’s brief.
The interview continued, and Wilson explained that he was not actively seeking out
pictures of children but that around nine to ten percent of the time masturbates to depictions of
4 No. 59525-7-II
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.2 The State introduced evidence of multiple images
of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct that were found on Wilson’s devices.
The jury found Wilson guilty as charged.
Wilson appeals.
ANALYSIS
Wilson argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s
failure to argue that his interview statements were inadmissible because Detective Nolan refused
to honor Wilson’s invocation of his right to remain silent. We disagree.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that their attorney’s
performance was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the appellant. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984); In re Pers. Restraint of
Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 35, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). Failure to establish either prong is fatal to the
claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
To prove the first prong, deficient performance, the petitioner must prove that counsel’s
performance fell “below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all
the circumstances.” State v. Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 457, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017) (quoting State v.
McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). We begin by strongly presuming
that defense counsel’s performance was not deficient. Id. at 458. To overcome this presumption
“a defendant must establish an absence of any legitimate trial tactic that would explain counsel’s
performance.” In re Pers. Restraint of Lui, 188 Wn.2d 525, 539, 397 P.3d 90 (2017). We apply
2 The State contends that “nine to ten percent” is an error in the transcription at trial and that Wilson actually said “not even ten percent of the time.” Br. of Resp’t at 9.
5 No. 59525-7-II
“exceptional deference” when “evaluating counsel’s strategic decisions,” and “[i]f trial counsel’s
conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy or tactics, it cannot” form the basis of an
ineffective assistance claim. State v. McNeal, 145 Wn.2d 352, 362, 37 P.3d 280 (2002).
If an appellant argues that their trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
move to suppress evidence, the appellant will prevail only if they show “that the motion likely
would have been granted.” State v. D.E.D., 200 Wn. App. 484, 490, 402 P.3d 851 (2017). “Not
every possible motion to suppress has to be made,” and “[c]ounsel may legitimately decline to
move for suppression on a particular ground if the motion is unfounded.” State v. Nichols, 161
Wn.2d 1, 14, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007). “[A] claim of ineffectiveness due to failure to move to
suppress on a particular basis can be undermined to some degree if counsel moved to suppress on
another ground” because a motion brought on one basis but not another suggests that counsel
made a reasoned, strategic decision. Id. at 15.
Here, counsel made the reasoned, strategic decision to challenge the admissibility of
Wilson’s statements on the basis of voluntariness instead of arguing that Wilson invoked his
right to remain silent. During the beginning of the interview, Wilson repeatedly told Detective
Nolan he was tired instead of directly answering questions. At the CrR 3.5 hearing, Wilson
testified that he had gotten very little sleep before being woken up by Detective Nolan, that he
had not taken his medication, and that he felt like he was forced to participate in the interview.
These facts supported an argument, albeit unsuccessfully, that Wilson’s statements were not
made voluntarily. See id. at 15.
In contrast, Wilson testified at the CrR 3.5 hearing but did not testify that he intended to
remain silent or at any point invoked his right to remain silent. And the record is unclear
6 No. 59525-7-II
whether Wilson actually said at one point “that’s all I will say” or if he said “I don’t know what
else to say.” At best, Wilson mumbled something incoherent, reiterated that he was tired, and
then continued to talk to Detective Nolan. Ex. 22 at 15:50 min. through 16:13 min. Under these
circumstances, counsel’s decision to challenge the admissibility of his statements based on
voluntariness and not Wilson’s alleged invocation of his right to remain silent was a legitimate
strategic decision that does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Che, J. We concur:
Glasgow, P.J.
Price, J.