Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
October 25, 2022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 56129-8-II
Appellant,
v.
DAVID WAYNE TURNER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent.
GLASGOW, C.J.—Officers pulled over David Wayne Turner because he was on probation
and had an active warrant for failing to report to his community corrections officer. Turner
continued to drive for approximately 20 seconds before stopping the car, bypassing areas where
he could safely pull over. During that time, he appeared to be moving around and trying to conceal
something. A community corrections officer searched the area of the car that was within Turner’s
reach and found plastic baggies in a backpack behind the center console. The officer then expanded
his search and found various controlled substances and a firearm in the trunk.
Turner moved to suppress the evidence seized from the trunk, arguing his only known
probation violation was for failing to report and the officer did not have reasonable cause to believe
Turner committed any additional violations that would justify a warrantless search of his entire
car. The trial court granted Turner’s motion, suppressed the evidence found in the trunk, and
dismissed the case without prejudice.
On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred when it granted Turner’s motion to suppress
because a community corrections officer can require an offender to submit to a search if the officer No. 56129-8-II
has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the offender has violated a condition of community
custody and there is a nexus between the suspected violation and the property searched. The State
contends the community corrections officer here had reasonable suspicion to believe Turner was
violating the condition prohibiting him from possessing controlled substances. Further, there was
a nexus between Turner’s car and the suspected violation.
We agree with the State and reverse both the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence
and its order dismissing the charges against Turner.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
On March 29, 2021, community corrections specialist Brett Curtright was in Centralia with
Detective Tyson Shenkel. They were specifically searching for a person named Kermit. While
searching for Kermit, Curtright and Shenkel saw Turner leave a house and get into “an unoccupied
and parked vehicle.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 87. Turner was on probation and had an active warrant
for failing to report to his community corrections officer.
Curtright “was familiar with” Turner because he had come into contact with and arrested
Turner three times in 2020. Id. All three times, controlled substances were involved. The most
recent contact had occurred six months prior to this arrest, in September 2020. Because of these
prior contacts, Curtright was aware that it was a condition of Turner’s probation not to possess or
consume controlled substances.1
1 Our record does not include the specific conditions of Turner’s community custody, but Turner does not contest that he was prohibited from possessing or consuming controlled substances.
2 No. 56129-8-II
The officers decided they would arrest Turner on the warrant after he left the house.
Curtright confirmed that the warrant was active but did not review the basis for it.
Turner began to drive and turned right onto Old Highway 99, a two-lane highway. The
officers initiated a traffic stop once they turned onto Old Highway 99 behind Turner. According
to Curtright, this portion of the highway had “a really large shoulder” where Turner could have
pulled over safely, followed by some gravel parking lots for businesses on the right-hand side of
the road. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (June 28, 2021) at 25. But rather than stop at
these places, Turner “continued roughly a quarter of a mile” before turning left into the parking
lot of the Great Wolf Lodge. CP at 87. He stopped “approximately twenty seconds” after the
officers initiated the stop. Id. According to a Google Maps printout that Turner submitted, he drove
a total of 0.6 miles and 2 minutes from the residence before stopping at Great Wolf Lodge. The
officers then detained Turner “without incident,” and a search of his person did not reveal anything
of evidentiary value. CP at 88. He was handcuffed and moved away from the car.
Before Turner stopped the car, he was “moving around in the vehicle” in a way that made
Curtright suspect “Turner might be trying to conceal something.” CP at 87. Shenkel did not
document any furtive movements in his report.
“[B]ecause Mr. Turner did not immediately stop his vehicle along the highway, but rather
waited until he got to a parking lot,” Curtright requested approval from a supervisor to search
Turner’s car. CP at 88. He also suggested that Turner’s “movements in the car” provided a nexus
to support the search. VRP (June 28, 2021) at 73. A supervisor approved Curtright to search the
“‘[l]unge area’” of the car, meaning “the immediate area where [Turner] can reach from the
driver’s seat.” Id. at 28. Directly behind the center console, Curtright found a backpack with plastic
3 No. 56129-8-II
baggies inside it. He recognized the baggies “from [his] training and experience as items that are
used for trafficking narcotics.” Id. at 29.
Curtright then expanded his search from the lunge area and eventually searched the trunk
of the car. The record does not show that Curtright obtained approval from a supervisor before
expanding his search, nor did he obtain a warrant. He found various controlled substances and a
firearm in the trunk.
The State charged Turner with three counts of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver based on his possession of three different controlled substances.
Each of these three counts “further alleged that during the commission of this offense, the
defendant or an accomplice was armed with a firearm.” CP at 4. The State separately charged
Turner with first degree unlawful possession of a firearm.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Turner moved to suppress “all evidence obtained by the government during the unlawful
warrantless search of the vehicle.” CP. at 6. He argued, “The officers did not have an articulable
and reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity nor that the place searched would
yield evidence of such a crime.” CP at 11. Turner maintained that because his arrest warrant was
for a failure to report and the State’s search was based on “some generalized suspicion that he was
violating conditions of his sentence during that ten to twelve seconds” before he stopped the car,
Curtright should have gotten a search warrant. VRP (June 28, 2021) at 78.
The State acknowledged that Turner’s failure to report did not support a warrantless search
of his car, but it argued that reasonable cause was established under RCW 9.94A.631(1) based on
4 No. 56129-8-II
Turner’s failure to promptly yield, furtive movements inside the car, and the nature of his prior
contacts with Curtright.
Curtright testified at the hearing consistent with the facts stated above. When describing
the initial search of the passenger compartment, he testified, “[A]ll I was really looking at was the
lunge area because that’s where his movements were while I was . . . attempting to stop him.” Id.
at 28. “I continued my search based on the fact of the baggies that were . . . right around where he
was reaching.” Id. at 29. Curtright explained that if he had not found anything of possible
evidentiary value when searching the lunge area, he would not have expanded his search to the
rest of the car. And if Turner had pulled over more promptly, he would not have had a basis to
search the car at all.
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court put its ruling on the record. The trial court
concluded that the search of the passenger area was appropriate to ensure officer safety but the
search of the trunk was conducted without lawful authority. In explaining its decision, the trial
court commented that typically officers who wish to “proceed further in their searches” will call
the court and seek a warrant in order to “request access to the trunk.” VRP (July 16, 2021) at 7.
The trial court concluded the search of the car’s trunk was unlawful because the officers failed to
express “a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity that would allow them to get into
the trunk.” Id. at 8.
In its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court noted that Curtright
“was familiar with Mr. Turner from three previous work-related contacts” in May, June, and
September 2020. CP at 87. “In each [of] those prior contacts, . . . [Curtright] believed Mr. Turner
was in possession of a controlled substance.” Id.
5 No. 56129-8-II
The trial court found that when Turner turned onto Old Highway 99, the officers turned
behind him and “activated the emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop within a short period of
time.” Id. “Turner did not immediately stop along the side of Old Highway 99, but continued
roughly a quarter of a mile until he stopped his vehicle at the Great Wolf Lodge parking lot.” Id.
“[Curtright] estimated that the total time that lapsed between when the emergency lights were
activated and when Mr. Turner stopped the vehicle [was] . . . approximately twenty seconds.” Id.
“[Curtright] testified that he saw Mr. Turner moving around in the vehicle during the twenty
seconds before he brought the vehicle to a stop . . . [and] suspected Mr. Turner might be trying to
conceal something.” Id.
The trial court also found that after Turner stopped the car, he was detained “without
incident.” CP at 88. The officers arrested him based on the warrant and searched his person, and
nothing of evidentiary value was discovered. Curtright “then conducted a warrantless search of the
vehicle. During the search, small Ziploc-style baggies were located inside of a backpack behind
the center console area of the vehicle. In the trunk, narcotics were located inside of a black purse
and a firearm was also found.” Id. “When the vehicle was searched, Mr. Turner had been removed
from the vehicle and was detained in handcuff[]s away from the vehicle.” Id.
The trial court found, based on Curtright’s testimony, that Curtright searched Turner’s car
based on the following factors:
a. [H]is knowledge that Mr. Turner was not in compliance with his [Department of Corrections] reporting requirements; b. Mr. Turner[’s] behavior, making furtive moments in the vehicle, as he failed to yield which is indicative of attempting to hide an item; c. Mr. Turner’s failure to yield for approximately 1/4 mile, which was estimated to be about 20 seconds[;] and d. . . . his 3 prior contacts with Mr. Turner, all of which included the discovery of narcotics in Mr. Turner’s possession.
6 No. 56129-8-II
Id. The trial court did not include a finding explaining that Curtright expanded his search to the
trunk because he found plastic baggies when searching the lunge area.
The trial court concluded Curtright “did not have reliable information to provide an
articulable suspicion that Mr. Turner was engaged in any particular criminal activity . . . [or]
violating any particular condition of probation, other than the existence of the arrest warrant.” CP
at 89. It concluded that neither Turner’s failure to report, nor his furtive movements as alleged by
Curtright, nor his failure to yield, alone, gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that would
have supported a search of the vehicle. Additionally, Curtright’s knowledge from his prior contacts
with Turner was “stale,” and “a warrantless search based on knowledge that Mr. Turner had, in
the past, been involved in criminal activity was not justified under these circumstances.” CP at 90.
Ultimately, the trial court concluded Curtright’s “search of the lunge area and passenger
compartment was lawful for officer safety reasons,” but the warrantless search of the trunk was
unlawful. CP at 89. After concluding that the warrantless search of the trunk was conducted
without authority of law, in violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, the
trial court ordered all evidence seized from the trunk of the car must be suppressed, including the
controlled substances and firearm. “Based on the State’s admission that all evidence of the charged
criminal activity was in the trunk of the vehicle,” the trial court dismissed the charges against
Turner without prejudice. CP at 90.
The State appeals the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence and its order dismissing
the charges against Turner.
7 No. 56129-8-II
ANALYSIS
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF TURNER’S CAR
The State argues the trial court applied the wrong standard and erred when it granted
Turner’s motion to suppress. The State relies on Turner’s failure to promptly yield and furtive
movements to support Curtright’s search of the car. It contends, “The fact that each time . . .
Curtright had encountered Turner narcotics were involved further justified the reasonableness of
. . . Curtright’s suspicion that evidence of a probation violation would be found in the vehicle.” Br.
of Appellant at 16. After Curtright observed plastic baggies behind the center console, “he had a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that further evidence of a probation violation may be found
in the remainder of the vehicle.” Id. at 17. In sum, “he had a sufficient reasonable suspicion that
Turner was possessing controlled substances and there was a nexus between that suspicion [and]
the search of the vehicle.” Id. at 21-22.
The State challenges only finding of fact 14, which it says contains an “incomplete” list of
the bases Curtright listed to justify the search. Id. at 2. The State does not specifically challenge
any other findings.
Relying primarily on State v. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d 296, 412 P.3d 1265 (2018), Turner
argues the trial court correctly suppressed the evidence after concluding there was an insufficient
nexus between the search of the trunk and his probation violation of failure to report. According
to Turner, “[t]he officer was aware of no actual, articulable facts to suggest Mr. Turner had drugs
in the car or trunk, or that drugs or a gun would be found in the car.” Br. of Resp’t at 7. And
Turner’s furtive movements “could physically not involve the trunk area of the car.” Id. at 15.
8 No. 56129-8-II
When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we consider whether the
court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether those findings support the
court’s conclusions. State v. Rooney, 190 Wn. App. 653, 658, 360 P.3d 913 (2015). “Unchallenged
findings of fact are verities on appeal.” Id. We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo.
Id.
Article I, section 7 states, “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law.” This constitutional provision provides “a robust privacy right”
and generally prohibits warrantless searches. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d at 301. “However, individuals
on probation are not entitled to the full protection of article I, section 7.” Id. “[T]he State may
supervise and scrutinize a probationer or parolee closely” because they have been sentenced to
confinement but “are serving their time outside the prison walls.” State v. Jardinez, 184 Wn. App.
518, 523, 338 P.3d 292 (2014).
A. Reasonable Cause Requirement
Because they are still in the State’s custody, a person under Department of Corrections
supervision “may be searched on the basis of a well-founded or reasonable suspicion of a probation
violation,” instead of a warrant supported by probable cause. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620,
628, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); see also RCW 9.94A.631(1) (“If there is reasonable cause to believe
that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a community corrections
officer may require an offender to submit to a search and seizure of the offender’s person,
residence, automobile, or other personal property.”). This standard is comparable to the Terry2
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
9 No. 56129-8-II
reasonable suspicion standard. Jardinez, 184 Wn. App. at 524. The officer’s suspicion of a
probation violation must be based on specific and articulable facts and rational inferences. Id.
“This threshold requirement protects an individual from random, suspicionless searches.”
Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d at 306.
The State argues the trial court applied the wrong standard when evaluating the lawfulness
of the search. The trial court’s comments from the bench about its experience with the duty phone
suggest that the court may have been thinking in terms of a probable cause standard necessary to
support a warrant when issuing its oral ruling. And it focused on whether Curtright articulated a
reasonable suspicion that Turner was engaged in criminal activity, rather than a reasonable
suspicion that Turner was violating a condition of his community custody. But in its written
findings and conclusions, the trial court applied the correct standard and considered whether
Curtright had “reliable information to provide an articulable suspicion that Mr. Turner was
violating any particular condition of probation, other than the existence of the arrest warrant.” CP
at 89. We consider the trial court’s written decision to be its “‘ultimate understanding’ of the issue
presented.” State v. Dailey, 93 Wn.2d 454, 459, 610 P.2d 357 (1980) (quoting Diel v. Beekman, 7
Wn. App. 139, 149, 499 P.2d 37 (1972), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin v. Sanders, 100
Wn.2d 853 (1984)).
We conclude Curtright had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Turner possessed
controlled substances and was violating an additional condition of his community custody beyond
the failure to report. Curtright knew that Turner was on community custody and was not permitted
to possess controlled substances as a condition of his community custody. He also knew that
Turner had a history of possessing controlled substances in violation of his community custody
10 No. 56129-8-II
conditions. Within the prior year, Curtright had encountered Turner three times, and each time,
Turner had possessed controlled substances.
After the officers activated their emergency lights, Turner continued for approximately a
quarter of a mile and took at least 20 seconds to pull over, even though there were areas where
Turner could have stopped on the right-hand side of the road. Additionally, Turner appeared to be
“trying to conceal something” during this time. CP at 87. While the fact that Turner continued for
approximately 20 seconds would not establish a well-founded and reasonable suspicion of a
probation violation on its own, it was reasonable for Curtright to suspect that Turner was
attempting to hide contraband when considering all of these facts together. Curtright had
“reasonable cause to believe” Turner was violating a condition of his community custody, so the
warrantless search of the lunge area was lawful under RCW 9.94A.631(1).3
Curtright originally limited his search to the area of the car that Turner could reach because
he was searching for whatever Turner might have been trying to hide before stopping the car. In
the area where Turner had been reaching, Curtright found empty Ziploc baggies, which he
recognized as “items that are used for trafficking narcotics.” VRP (June 28, 2021) at 29. This
3 Although it was not challenged by either party, we note that the trial court erred when it concluded the “search of the lunge area and passenger compartment was lawful for officer safety reasons.” CP at 89. Once the person who has been arrested is detained and distanced from the car, so that they can no longer access any contraband or weapons within the car, officer safety concerns cannot justify a search of the car. See State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 384, 395, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). Here, the trial court found that “[w]hen the vehicle was searched, Mr. Turner had been removed from the vehicle and was detained in handcuff[]s away from the vehicle.” CP at 88. This finding was not challenged and is therefore a verity on appeal. Rooney, 190 Wn. App. at 658. The trial court’s conclusion that the “search of the lunge area and passenger compartment was lawful for officer safety reasons” was incorrect. CP at 89; see Rooney, 190 Wn. App. at 658.
11 No. 56129-8-II
discovery bolstered Curtright’s suspicion that Turner was in possession of controlled substances
in violation of his community custody conditions.
Because plastic baggies have lawful uses, “the mere possession of a few empty, unused
plastic baggies” does not provide probable cause to search a car. State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177,
185, 196 P.3d 658 (2008). But “[p]ossession of a number of small baggies may well create
reasonable suspicion justifying further investigation.” Id. at 185 n.3 (emphasis added). And when
an individual is on probation, they may be required to submit to a search based only on “a well-
founded or reasonable suspicion.” Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 628. Here, Turner’s possession of
plastic baggies was one of several facts that, when combined, met the reasonable suspicion
standard to support a search of the car under RCW 9.94A.631(1), including the trunk. The search
of Turner’s car was not random or suspicionless. See Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d at 306.
And although Turner’s past violations alone could not have justified a search, it was
reasonable for Curtright to consider that Turner had unlawfully possessed controlled substances
on at least three separate occasions within the past year when evaluating all of the facts. The
Supreme Court has recognized, “If a prior conviction, not to mention a prior arrest, should afford
grounds for believing that an individual is engaging in criminal activity at any given time
thereafter, that person would never be free of harassment, no matter how completely he had
reformed.” State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446-47, 617 P.2d 429 (1980). But when an individual
remains in community custody, the State has a strong interest in supervising that particular
individual more closely to ensure both the individual’s rehabilitation and the community’s safety.
See, e.g., State v. Olsen, 189 Wn.2d 118, 128-29, 399 P.3d 1141 (2017) (discussing this interest
where the individual was convicted of driving under the influence).
12 No. 56129-8-II
The Supreme Court has evaluated the reasonableness of a search of a probationer’s
property in light of the “facts and knowledge available to the officer at the time of the search.”
Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 630; cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (“[W]ould the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925))). Because of his prior contacts with Turner, Curtright
had relevant knowledge of Turner’s conditions of community custody, as well as Turner’s
violations of those conditions involving controlled substances within the prior year. Prior
community custody violations alone would not support a search, but they are facts that can be
considered when evaluating the totality of the circumstances. The trial court erred when it
concluded that Curtright’s knowledge from prior contacts with Turner was “stale” and could not
justify a search, to the extent it was concluding that Curtright’s knowledge could not be considered
alongside other specific and articulable facts. CP at 97.
The trial court also erred when it concluded that Curtright “did not have reliable
information to provide an articulable suspicion that Mr. Turner was violating any particular
condition of probation, other than the existence of the arrest warrant.” CP at 89. Turner had been
found in possession of controlled substances in violation of his community custody conditions on
three occasions within the past year, and Turner had moved around within his car and delayed
stopping for approximately 20 seconds after the officers activated their emergency lights, despite
having opportunities to safely pull over. Considering the totality of the circumstances, it was
reasonable for Curtright to suspect that Turner possessed controlled substances in violation of his
13 No. 56129-8-II
community custody conditions. The discovery of plastic baggies behind the center console further
bolstered Curtright’s suspicion.
B. Nexus Requirement
In addition to the reasonable cause requirement, there must be “a nexus between the
property searched and the alleged probation violation.” Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d at 306. The privacy
right of the person on probation “is diminished only to the extent necessary for the State to monitor
compliance with the particular condition that gave rise to the search.” Id. at 304. Article I, section
7 prohibits “sweeping searches.” Id. at 305. “Limiting the scope of a [community corrections
officer’s] search to property reasonably believed to have a nexus with the suspected probation
violation protects the privacy and dignity of individuals on probation while still allowing the State
ample supervision.” Id. at 306.
In Cornwell, the defendant had borrowed a car from someone who wanted it back, and
officers saw the car “outside a house suspected of being a site for drug sales and prostitution.” Id.
at 298. Cornwell was on probation and had an active warrant for failing to report to the Department
of Corrections. Id. Officers planned to pull Cornwell over based on this outstanding warrant, not
because they believed his car contained evidence of a further probation violation. Id. But before
the officers activated their police lights, Cornwell pulled into a driveway and ignored police
commands to stay in the car. Id. at 299. Despite being ordered to the ground, Cornwell attempted
to run. Id. Officers detained Cornwell, found over $1,500 on his person, and summoned a
community corrections officer who searched his car. Id.
The community corrections officer justified the search by saying, “‘He’s driving the
vehicle, he has the ability to access to enter the vehicle, so I’m searching the car to make sure
14 No. 56129-8-II
there’s no further violations of his probation.’” Id. The officer did not offer any other suspicion of
a probation violation to justify the search, saying he “searched the vehicle only because Cornwell
‘ha[d] a felony warrant for his arrest . . . in violation of his probation [and] [h]e’s driving the
vehicle.’” Id. at 306 (emphasis added) (alterations in original). The Supreme Court concluded that
although the community corrections officer “may have suspected Cornwell violated other
probation conditions, the only probation violation supported by the record” was his failure to
report. Id. “[T]here is no nexus between property and the crime of failure to report,” so the search
was unlawful. Id.
Like the defendant in Cornwell, officers decided to pull Turner over because he had an
active warrant for failing to report to his community corrections officer. But unlike in Cornwell,
by the time Turner stopped his car, Curtright had a reasonable suspicion that Turner was violating
an additional condition of his probation prohibiting him from possessing controlled substances.
Because a specific additional probation violation was reasonably suspected, Cornwell does not
determine the outcome here. Cf. State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 299, 290 P.3d 983 (2012) (“[A]
police officer cannot and should not be expected to simply ignore the fact that an appropriate and
reasonably necessary traffic stop might also advance a related and more important police
investigation.”).
The language of RCW 9.94A.631(1) broadly permits a search of “the offender’s . . .
automobile” upon reasonable cause to believe the offender has violated a condition of community
custody. But the scope of this search must also be limited to the property that has a nexus with, or
relation to, the suspected violation. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d at 306. In other words, like with searches
supported by probable cause, the nature of the suspected violation informs the appropriate scope
15 No. 56129-8-II
of the search. Compare State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 395, 219 P.3d 651 (2009) (concluding
that where the defendant was arrested on a warrant for failing to appear in court, “there was no
basis to believe evidence relating to [the defendant’s] arrest would have been found in the car”),
with State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 526, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (Guy, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] police
officer who has probable cause to search a car, believing it to contain contraband, may
constitutionally search the small containers within a passenger’s closed purse.”); see also
Jardinez, 184 Wn. App. at 523, 528 (holding search of probationer’s iPod was unlawful because
the officer “did not expect the search to yield evidence related to” Jardinez’s failure to appear or
admitted marijuana use and “had no reason to believe” the search would yield evidence that
Jardinez possessed a firearm).
Here, because Turner appeared to be trying to conceal something within his car before he
stopped, there was a nexus between the car and the suspected violation of possessing controlled
substances. The plastic baggies found in the area within Turner’s reach reinforced that there was
a nexus between the suspected violation—possession of controlled substances—and the car. It was
reasonable for Curtright to believe that there may be additional evidence related to this suspected
violation in the rest of Turner’s car, including in the trunk.
We conclude that Curtright had lawful authority to search Turner’s car, including its trunk,
under RCW 9.94A.631(1) because he articulated a reasonable suspicion that Turner possessed
controlled substances in violation of his community custody conditions and there was a nexus
between the suspected violation and Turner’s car. The search did not violate article I, section 7,
and the trial court erred when it suppressed the evidence seized from the trunk.
16 No. 56129-8-II
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence and its order dismissing the
charges against Turner and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Glasgow, C.J. We concur:
Worswick, J.
Maxa, J.