State of Washington v. Daniel Clayton Turley, Jr.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 9, 2026
• Docket: 40562-1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED APRIL 9, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40562-1-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) DANIEL CLAYTON TURLEY, JR, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )

STAAB, J. — Daniel Clayton Turley, Jr. pleaded guilty to second degree burglary.

He appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay restitution for a sawmill that was

taken from the same property. Although he raises several arguments with respect to the

restitution order, we agree that the facts used to support Turley’s plea to one count of

burglary fail to establish a causal connection between Turley’s crime and the missing

sawmill. As a result, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by including the

missing sawmill in its order of restitution.

BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2021, Roy Bennett reported to the Stevens County Sheriff’s Office that

his uninhabited, rural property near Colville, Washington, had been burglarized. Bennett

told the responding deputy that a large sawmill and other items were missing. Bennett No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

also told the deputy that he purchased the sawmill for approximately $8,000 and added

that it was large and would take a trailer to haul away.

On August 25, detectives went to Daniel Turley’s residence for an unrelated

matter. Turley was not home, but the detective observed several plastic barrels in his

yard that resembled items that had been reported stolen from Bennett’s property.

The detectives next went to Victoria Enright’s residence, knowing Turley spent

much of his time there. Upon arrival, the detectives saw a black plastic pond insert

matching an item reported stolen from Bennett’s property. Suspicious, one of the

detectives returned to the office and reviewed the deputy’s earlier report and security

camera video recorded from Bennett’s property. The video showed Dan and what

appeared to be Enright driving onto Bennett’s property. The video also showed Turley

leaving Bennett’s property in Turley’s pickup with plastic barrels, the pond insert, and

other items. The report made no mention that the video showed Turley hauling away the

sawmill or pulling a trailer. Based on this evidence, a detective obtained a search warrant

for Turley’s and Enright’s properties.

The sheriff’s office first executed the warrant to search Turley’s property. During

the search, Turley waived his Miranda1 rights and admitted he and Enright took items

from Bennett’s property. He stated that Enright showed him the property and that she

and another individual, Caleb Howes, had been stealing from it for over a year. Turley

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

2 No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

further explained that Enright and another man, Charles Moreau, stole the sawmill and

moved it to another property on Deep Lake Boundary Road belonging to David Etzel.

Turley then led officers around his property, identifying several items taken from

Bennett’s property. The sawmill was not found on Turley’s property.

That same day, the sheriff’s office executed the warrant to search Enright’s

property. Enright admitted that she went with Turley and Moreau to Bennett’s property

on several occasions and that Howes had also taken items over the preceding year.

Enright also told deputies that she was “busy taking other items while Chuck [Moreau]

loaded up the Sawmill” [sic] and took it to Etzel’s property. The report does not make it

clear whether Turley was present when the sawmill was taken.

The next day, the detectives contacted Etzel at his Deep Lake Boundary Road

property. Etzel confirmed that Moreau brought the sawmill there and used it to mill

lumber, but said Moreau removed it hours before the detectives arrived. The detectives

photographed the location where the sawmill had been kept, along with the fresh tire

tracks consistent with recent removal of the sawmill.

Approximately two months later, a detective received a tip from Turley’s neighbor

that he could hear a sawmill being operated on Turley’s property. However, by the time

a deputy responded, the sound had stopped.

3 No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

Procedure

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Turley agreed to plead guilty to four counts2

including second degree burglary. At the guilty plea hearing, Turley declined to make a

factual statement of guilt to support his guilty plea. Instead, Turley agreed the court

could review the police reports to establish a factual basis for his plea.

At sentencing, the State requested additional time to seek information related to

restitution. The court granted the State’s request and left restitution open to be

determined at a later hearing. Subsequently, the State filed a “Motion and Affidavit for

Order of Restitution,” requesting $11,440.03 to compensate Bennett. Attached to the

motion were several documents including an invoice showing that Bennett paid $5,116

for the sawmill in 2015. CP at 90. Turley filed a response to the State’s request for

restitution, arguing the sawmill had been stolen outside the charging period in the

information, and that there was not a causal connection between the burglary to which he

pleaded guilty and the stolen sawmill.

The court held a restitution hearing. Turley waived his appearance at the hearing.

Following a discussion about the date range of the crime included in the information, the

court ruled on Turley’s objection:

And I do believe that I can hold Mr. Turley responsible for [the sawmill] because again, he pled guilty to a burglary that was connected to

2 The other counts were the result of the State consolidating all of Turley’s pending criminal cases.

4 No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

this property. And also, when Mr. Turley was interviewed, he had an awful lot of information about the sawmill. Who had been involved in it and where it had been going and then ultimately, as [the prosecuting attorney] remined [sic] me, that in October they interviewed a neighbor of Mr. Bennett’s or at least of the property of Brian Brooke and he indicated that he was able to hear a sawmill being operated on Mr. Turley’s property.

So between Mr. Turley’s presence on the property, the knowledge that he has about it’s [sic] movements and whereabouts and then the circumstantial evidence of the neighbor seeing it, I think I can conclude reasonably that Mr. Turley is responsible for that. And as [the prosecuting attorney] indicated, I do have discretion to double the victim’s loss or the defendant’s gain, so in this situation I will use that discretion and I’ll double that to $10,500.00.

RP at 79-80. Following the hearing, the court entered a written order of restitution,

ordering Turley to pay $10,500 to Bennett. The order did not include a breakdown of

how the court reached that amount.

Turley timely appeals the restitution order.

ANALYSIS

Turley raises several issues with respect to his challenge of the restitution order

including that the court erred in concluding that the date range in the information was a

scrivener’s error. Because we conclude that the facts used to support Turley’s plea fail to

establish a causal connection to the missing sawmill, we do not address the other issues

raised by Turley.

5 No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

A. Standard of Review and Restitution Legal Principles

A court’s decision ordering restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v.

Tobin, 161 Wn.2d 517, 523, 166 P.3d 1167 (2007). “We will reverse such an order only

if it is manifestly unreasonable or the sentencing court exercised its discretion on

untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” State v. Woods, 90 Wn. App. 904, 906, 953

P.2d 834 (1998).

A court’s authority to impose restitution is derived from statute. State v. Griffith,

164 Wn.2d 960, 965, 195 P.3d 506 (2008). The trial court must order restitution

“whenever the offender is convicted of an offense which results in injury to any person or

damage to or loss of property.” RCW 9.94A.753(5). In addition, the court can order

restitution up to double the amount of the victim’s loss. See RCW 9.94A.753(3)(a).

There must be a causal connection between a victim’s losses and the defendant's

offense. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at 965. “Losses are causally connected if, but for the

charged crime, the victim would not have incurred the loss.” Id. at 966. When

determining causation, the court looks to “ʻthe underlying facts of the charged offense,

not the name of the crime to which the defendant entered a plea.’” Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at

966 (quotating State v. Landrum, 66 Wn. App. 791, 799, 832 P.2d 1359 (1992)).

The restitution amount must be based on “easily ascertainable damages” and

supported by “substantial credible evidence.” RCW 9.94A.753(3)(a); State v. Fleming,

75 Wn. App. 270, 274-75, 877 P.2d 243 (1994). If the defendant disputes the amount of

6 No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

restitution, the State bears the burden of proving the damages by a preponderance of the

evidence. State v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272, 285, 119 P.3d 350 (2005). Evidence is

sufficient to support a restitution order if it provides a reasonable basis, other than

conjecture or speculation, to estimate the loss. Id.

“ʻThe general rule is that restitution may be ordered only for losses incurred as a

result of the precise offense charged. Restitution cannot be imposed based on the

defendant’s “general scheme” or acts “connected with” the crime charged, when those

acts are not part of the charge.’” Woods, 90 Wn. App. at 907-08 (quoting State v.

Miszak, 69 Wn. App. 426, 428, 848 P.2d 1329 (1993)).

At the restitution hearing, defense counsel argued that Turley’s case was similar to

Mizack to support his argument that Turley could only be held responsible for the

burglary as charged. In Miszak, the defendant was charged with second degree theft for

taking jewelry from a victim “on or about February 27, 1989.” 69 Wn. App. at 426.

Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty to an amended information charging him with

attempted second degree theft. Id. at 426-27. In his statement on plea of guilty, the

defendant admitted that, on February 27, 1989, he took one piece of jewelry valued at

least $250. Miszak, 69 Wn. App. at 427. However, “the trial court ordered Miszak to

pay $4,517 in restitution,” representing the total loss claimed by the victim from 13 items

of jewelry she claimed were stolen. Id.

7 No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

On appeal, this court held that the restitution order violated the rule that

“[r]estitution cannot be imposed based on the defendant’s ‘general scheme’ or acts

‘connected with’ the crime charged when those acts are not part of the charge.” Id. at

428. The court explained that the defendant

“was charged with and adjudged guilty of attempted theft of jewelry on February 27, 1989, the date designated in the information. At the restitution hearing, the State offered no evidence whatsoever to prove that the 13 items had been taken during commission of the charged crime. In fact, the evidence tended to prove the contrary. The victim’s letter, which was the sole evidence of loss offered by the State, affirmatively established that the losses took place ‘systematically’ over a period of ‘months.’ Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support the restitution order for the entire loss claimed by the victim.”

Miszak, 69 Wn. App. at 428.

Because the record did not show which item Miszak took on February 27, and

because he had not agreed to pay restitution for losses incurred due to uncharged crimes,

the court vacated the ordered restitution and remanded. Miszak, 69 Wn. App. at 430.

The court held that the victim’s loss was “limited to the one item of jewelry that [the

defendant] actually admitted taking.” Miszak, 69 Wn. App. at 430.

B. Analysis

Applying these principles to this case, we conclude the State failed to show that

but for the single burglary crime to which Turley participated and pleaded guilty, the

property owner would not have lost the sawmill. Instead, the police reports show that

the property was burglarized numerous times over the course of several months by

8 No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

different people. Turley was charged with and pleaded guilty to only one of these

burglaries. Both Turley and Enright told deputies that Moreau took the sawmill, but the

description of the security video of Turley’s crime does not mention Moreau’s presence.

The security video also shows Turley and Enright leaving the property in Turley’s truck,

which contained several items including black barrels and a fishpond, but there is no

mention that the video shows Turley’s truck pulling a trailer or leaving with the sawmill.

The trial court relied on Turley’s knowledge of who took the sawmill and where it

was taken. But Turley was not charged with conspiracy, and the State does not suggest

that his knowledge of the sawmill makes him culpable for its loss. Instead, the State

argues that Turley can be held liable whether he was acting as a principal or accomplice.

Respondent’s Br. at 25. But this is only true if Turley participated in the specific crime

that resulted in the loss of the sawmill. Turley cannot be held liable for a “general

scheme” of thefts spanning multiple burglaries.

The court also relied on a witness’s statement that a sawmill could be heard on

Turley’s property several months after the burglaries. But this vague statement is

similarly insufficient to create a causal connection between Turley’s burglary and the

missing sawmill. The statement was simply that a witness heard a sawmill being

operated. There is no evidence that it was the stolen sawmill. Even if it was, Turley’s

subsequent use of a stolen sawmill does not support a finding that Turley participated in

the burglary that resulted in the sawmill being stolen.

9 No. 40562-1-III State v. Turley

The evidence used to support Turley’s plea did not establish a causal connection

between his crime and the loss of the sawmill. Therefore, the trial court abused its

discretion by including the stolen sawmill in the order of restitution. We reverse the

order of restitution and remand with instructions for the trial court to recalculate the

restitution amount without the sawmill.

Reversed and remanded.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

_________________________________ Staab, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J.

_________________________________ Murphy, J.