Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
January 23, 2024
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 57320-2-II
Respondent,
v.
CURTIS MORGAN SWORD, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, C.J. — Curtis Morgan Sword pointed a gun at two people who intervened when
they believed he was trying to steal their neighbor’s motorcycle. Police recovered the gun when
they arrested him. Law enforcement testimony in Sword’s trial primarily addressed the search for
Sword based on witnesses’ descriptions, his arrest, and the recovery of the gun from his person. A
jury convicted Sword of two counts of second degree assault while armed with a firearm and one
count of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm.
Sword appeals his convictions and sentence. He argues that the trial court erred by seating
a biased juror who stated that she thought police officers were more likely to tell the truth than
other people and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance when they failed to further
question or challenge that juror. Sword asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of multiple prior serious offense convictions. Sword also contends that defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a revived self-defense instruction. And he argues
that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the State’s burden of proof in closing No. 57320-2-II
argument and that cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. Sword also raises several issues related
to legal financial obligations and alleged errors in his judgment and sentence.
Although the prosecutor made improper remarks about the State’s burden of proof in
closing argument, we conclude that Sword has failed to establish prejudice. We remand for the
trial court to strike the filing fee, supervision fee, and crime victim penalty assessment from
Sword’s judgment and sentence and correct a scrivener’s error. We otherwise affirm.
FACTS
After receiving a call about a man brandishing a gun, police arrested Sword and found a
gun when they frisked him during the arrest. A witness reported that Sword was trying to steal a
motorcycle, and when neighbors intervened, he pointed a gun at them. The State eventually
charged Sword with two counts of second degree assault and one count of first degree unlawful
possession of a firearm. The second degree assault charges each carried a firearm sentencing
enhancement.
I. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
A. Motions in Limine
A person commits first degree unlawful possession of a firearm if they possess a firearm
after being convicted of a serious offense. Former RCW 9.41.040(1)(a) (2021). Any violent crime
is a serious offense. Former RCW 9.41.010(26)(a) (2019). Sword had two prior convictions for
second degree assault arising from the same incident and one prior conviction for residential
burglary, which were all violent crimes and therefore serious offenses. Former RCW
9.41.010(4)(a). Sword did not stipulate that he had previously been convicted of a serious offense
2 No. 57320-2-II
for the purposes of the unlawful possession of a firearm charge, requiring the State to prove this
fact at trial.
During motions in limine, Sword sought to limit what the jury would learn about his
criminal history. Sword moved to require the State to elect a single offense to use as evidence that
he had previously been convicted of a serious offense for purposes of the unlawful possession of
a firearm charge. The State responded that it was entitled to present evidence of multiple serious
offenses because Sword had not stipulated to committing a prior serious offense. It also asserted
that there was a risk after State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021), that future court
rulings might similarly invalidate one of the prior convictions.
The trial court denied the motion to limit the State to offering evidence of a single prior
conviction. The trial court emphasized that Sword could have chosen to stipulate to having
committed a serious offense. “While there will always be some prejudice when criminal history is
used as evidence, in this case, the probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 83.
B. Jury Selection
During voir dire, the judge, the State, and defense counsel each asked questions of panels
of 24 prospective jurors. Defense counsel queried the first panel about their opinions of law
enforcement, asking, “Are police officers more likely to tell the truth than other people . . . on the
stand?” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Feb. 28, 2022) at 108. Juror 1 answered, “Yes,” as did
prospective jurors 6 and 8. Id. at 108-09. In response to other questions, prospective jurors 6 and
8 reported that they had close friends and family who worked in law enforcement. Juror 1 did not
say that she or any of her close family or friends worked in law enforcement.
3 No. 57320-2-II
Sword has tattoos on his neck. When defense counsel asked the panel, juror 1 did not
express a negative reaction to face or neck tattoos, though other prospective jurors did so. She did
not have “any strong feelings about crimes against people” or about people charged with assault.
Id. at 46. She did not report knowing anyone who had been assaulted. Juror 1 did not raise any
concerns about the allegation that Sword had previously been convicted of a serious offense. And
she did not report any strong feelings about homeless people.
Defense counsel did not ask the second panel of jurors their opinion about law enforcement
honesty. But defense counsel challenged two prospective jurors from the second panel for cause
based on counsel’s view that they had expressed a bias in favor of police in their answers to other
questions. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss one prospective juror for bias but denied
the other.
The State and defense counsel each received six peremptory challenges. Defense counsel
exercised peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors 6 and 8 from the panel. Counsel
also exercised peremptory challenges against four other prospective jurors, exhausting their six
challenges. Juror 1 was seated on Sword’s jury.
II. TRIAL
A. Evidence Presented
1. The incident
At trial, Melissa Miller and Nicholas Ketchum explained that they were siblings who lived
together in a first-floor apartment. One of their neighbors parked his motorcycle outside Miller’s
bedroom window on the backside of the apartment.
4 No. 57320-2-II
The night of the incident, Miller saw a man who was not the owner “messing with” the
motorcycle outside her bedroom window. VRP (Mar. 1, 2022) at 392. Miller and Ketchum had
seen the same man around the apartment complex and around the motorcycle before. They later
identified the man as Sword. The motorcycle’s owner testified that he never gave anyone
permission to borrow his motorcycle. And he did not recognize Sword.
Miller testified that she began yelling at Sword through the window to leave the motorcycle
alone, and she alerted her brother to what was going on. Ketchum testified that he confronted
Sword outside near the motorcycle. Sword claimed to own the motorcycle, which Ketchum knew
was not true. Ketchum explained that Sword began to fumble with his waistband and said
something about a gun, so Ketchum returned to the apartment to grab a hammer.
A neighbor who watched part of the incident from her doorway never heard Ketchum
physically threaten Sword while they were near the motorcycle. She heard Ketchum and Miller
say that they were going to call the police but did not hear Sword say the same.
Miller testified that when she told Sword she was going to call police, he threatened to
shoot her, so she began recording him on her phone through her bedroom window. She did not see
any gun when Sword made the threat. Sword then began walking around the side of Miller and
Ketchum’s apartment in the direction of their front door.
The trial court admitted cell phone videos taken by Miller and the neighbor. The videos
showed Sword walking away from the motorcycle and around the side of the apartment while
Miller filmed him. In one of the videos, Miller yelled at Sword for threatening her with a gun,
while Ketchum asked where his hammer was in the background audio.
5 No. 57320-2-II
Ketchum testified that Sword followed him away from the motorcycle and was standing
near the front door when Ketchum returned outside with the hammer. When Sword saw the
hammer, he pulled out a gun and pointed it at Ketchum. Miller testified that she followed Ketchum
outside because he had “a very assertive voice” and Miller believed that if she “let [Ketchum]
handle” the situation then “it would have escalated even further.” Id. at 406. “[M]y brother has a
very dominant, assertive voice, his voice can come across very aggressive, and I didn’t want just
his tone of voice or actions to escalate the situation.” Id. at 407. Miller stated that Ketchum opened
the front door to Sword “standing there with his gun pointed at us.” Id. at 396. The neighbor also
reported that she saw Sword pull out a gun when he neared the front door, at which point the
neighbor stopped filming to retreat indoors.
Miller, who was unfamiliar with firearms, did not know the brand of the gun or what color
it was but testified that it was a handgun, not a rifle, and was a pistol instead of a revolver. Ketchum
testified that the gun was a silver 9-millimeter handgun and was a pistol instead of a revolver. The
neighbor also recalled a silver handgun.
When she saw the gun, Miller shoved Ketchum back inside the house and yelled at Sword
to leave. She testified, “I told [Sword] that if he didn’t leave and I got my hands on his gun I was
going to shoot him.” Id. at 398. Sword began backing away while still pointing the gun at Miller.
The siblings agreed that Sword did not ever venture past a line of flower pots that marked the
beginning of their property and that he remained in a common area of the apartment complex.
After Sword was out of sight, Miller and Ketchum contacted police.
6 No. 57320-2-II
2. Arrest
Law enforcement arrested Sword at an apartment complex a few hundred yards away
approximately 20 minutes after the incident. Police then escorted Miller and Ketchum to the scene
of the arrest, where they both identified Sword as the man with the gun. Each of them said that
Sword was wearing the same clothes that he had on during the incident outside their apartment.
One police officer testified that he found a silver pistol while frisking Sword during the
arrest. Several other officers testified that they watched the gun being removed from Sword’s
person. The gun was unloaded, had no ammunition, and had debris in the barrel, but it was
operational once cleaned.
The trial court admitted redacted versions of two of Sword’s prior judgment and sentences,
which showed that he had previously been convicted of two counts of second degree assault and
one count of residential burglary. The jury did not learn anything about the context of the
convictions, only that Sword had three prior convictions for those offenses.
Sword did not testify at trial.
B. Jury Instructions and Closing Arguments
The trial court provided the jury with an instruction explaining the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. The instruction referenced the concept of abiding belief:
A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such a doubt as would exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly, and carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence. If, from such consideration, you have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
CP at 95.
7 No. 57320-2-II
The trial court also instructed the jury that it could consider Sword’s prior convictions for
second degree assault and residential burglary “only for the purpose of determining whether the
defendant had previously been convicted of a serious offense.” CP at 106. And the instructions
stated that second degree assault and residential burglary were serious offenses.
Next, the jury received several instructions about self-defense. First was a general
instruction explaining that the use of reasonable force is lawful if someone believes that they are
about to be injured. See 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL 17.02 (5th ed. 2021) (WPIC). The jury instructions also explained that “[a]ctual danger
is not necessary for the use of force to be lawful” as long as the defendant “believes in good faith
and on reasonable grounds that he is in actual danger of injury,” even if they are later shown to be
“mistaken as to the extent of the danger.” CP at 116; see WPIC 17.04. Further, “[i]t is lawful for a
person who is in a place where that person has a right to be and who has reasonable grounds for
believing that he is being attacked to stand his ground and defend against such attack by the use
of lawful force.” CP at 117; see WPIC 17.05. And the jury instructions cautioned that “the law
does not impose a duty to retreat” in such circumstances. Id.
The State addressed its burden of proof during closing argument:
[PROSECUTOR]: An abiding belief in the truth of the charge . . . is how we talk in the law. So[,] what does that mean? Abiding, long lasting. Right? Enduring. So it means when you come out of here at the end of all of this, you’ve evaluated the evidence, do you have an abiding, an enduring belief in the truth of the charge that the defendant has done the things that the State has charged him with, that the witnesses have testified about, that the exhibits demonstrate, do you believe that today, do you believe that tomorrow, do you believe that a year from now. And it is not uncommon, I would say, sometimes to hear a juror say, well, I really believe that she did this thing she was charged with, but I just felt like I didn’t get enough proof. I submit to you if that is the statement being made, then that juror’s holding the State to a standard they have not been instructed upon.
8 No. 57320-2-II
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m going to [make an] objection. ....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, not abiding belief.
THE COURT: Objection noted. The jury has been instructed that they are to follow the instructions that they received from the Court and anything that [the prosecutor] says that’s not supported they will disregard. [Prosecutor], you may continue.
[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you. As I was saying, reasonable doubt is defined for you right here and that includes the abiding belief instruction. So[,] when you come out of here and you are having -- if you have that conversation, what I submit to you is that you have held the State to a standard beyond what I am required to prove to you. Certainly[,] do not hold me to less than that standard. My standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. But do not hold me to more either. This is your instruction. You came in here, you didn’t know anything about the case, you were a blank slate, zero information. So[,] I submit to you when you are walking out of this courtroom, if you believe that the defendant, in fact, did the things that he has been charged with, you believe that because of the information that you received in this courtroom and that is the only reason that you believe he did those things because prior to that you did not have that information. So[,] when you’re talking about has the State proved this beyond a reasonable doubt, I direct you back to this instruction and ask you to hold me to the standard I am required to prove to you but not more or higher than that standard.
VRP (Mar. 7, 2022) at 911-13.
The State also contended that Ketchum grabbed the hammer “directly in response to the
defendant’s behaviors” and that Sword’s actions put “[Ketchum] in self-defense mode in defense
of others,” which was “completely reasonable.” Id. at 925. Similarly, the State argued that Miller’s
“words alone [were] insufficient to indicate that the defendant was reasonable in holding either
her or [Ketchum] at gunpoint.” Id. at 929. “They acted in self-defense to the defendant on their
own property.” Id. at 930.
9 No. 57320-2-II
The State also briefly discussed Sword’s prior convictions. The State directed the jury’s
attention to Sword’s name and date of birth on each judgment and sentence, the type of conviction,
the date of the offense, and Sword’s signature and fingerprints.
During Sword’s closing argument, counsel emphasized the evidence that supported
Sword’s claim of self-defense. Counsel argued that when Ketchum went inside to retrieve his
hammer, Sword was walking away from the altercation. Counsel contended that Ketchum’s
reappearance with the hammer startled Sword and made him fear injury, prompting him to pull
out the gun. In particular, Sword argued that it was reasonable to fear a man such as Ketchum
“com[ing] at you with a hammer, screaming and yelling at you, his sister in tow, [when] they are
advancing on you.” Id. at 965. Counsel emphasized that Sword had no duty to retreat from the
common area of the apartment complex. Counsel also reasoned that Sword kept the gun only as a
tool to ward off danger and did not intend to harm Miller or Ketchum, because there was no
ammunition in the weapon and the barrel was clogged with debris.
C. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury convicted Sword on all counts and found that he was armed with a firearm during
the assaults.
At sentencing, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences at or near the low end of the
standard range for each count. The longest sentence was 87 months for unlawful possession of a
firearm. The trial court also imposed 72 months of mandatory consecutive firearm sentencing
enhancements, for a total sentence of 159 months of confinement. The judgment and sentence
contained a scrivener’s error erroneously stating that Sword had been convicted of second degree
assault under RCW 9.94A.833(3), which addresses gang-related felonies involving minors.
10 No. 57320-2-II
The trial court found that Sword was indigent under RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c) but
nevertheless imposed a criminal filing fee and community custody supervision fees. The trial court
also imposed a crime victim penalty assessment.
Sword appeals his convictions and sentence.
ANALYSIS
I. JUROR BIAS
A. Trial Court
Several police officers testified about the search for Sword, his arrest, and the retrieval of
the firearm from his person. Sword argues that the trial court violated his right to a trial by an
impartial jury by placing juror 1 on the jury after she stated that she thought police officers were
more likely to tell the truth than other people. He reasons that juror 1 “made an unequivocal
statement of bias.” Br. of Appellant at 18. Thus, he asserts that the trial court had an independent
obligation to question or remove juror 1 regardless of whether defense counsel sought to further
question or challenge the juror. He insists absent rehabilitation, or at least equivocation about her
bias, juror 1 could not properly be placed on the jury. Because juror 1 was never questioned further
to establish whether she could remain impartial, Sword insists that we must remand for a new trial.
We disagree.
1. Cases discussing juror bias
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution guarantee defendants “the right to a fair and impartial jury.” State v.
Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 157, 892 P.2d 29 (1995). RCW 2.36.110 provides that judges have a duty
to excuse “any juror, who in the opinion of the judge, has manifested unfitness as a juror” for a list
11 No. 57320-2-II
of reasons including bias and prejudice. See CrR 6.4(c)(1) (explaining that a judge should excuse
a juror if “grounds for challenge are present,” and that if the juror is not excused, then “any party
may challenge the juror for cause”).
We review a trial court’s decision to not dismiss a juror for cause for manifest abuse of
discretion. State v. Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App. 2d 843, 856, 456 P.3d 869 (2020). “A trial court
abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on untenable grounds or reasons,” and the court’s
“‘broad discretion in the conduct of voir dire is nevertheless subject to essential demands of
fairness.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453,
457 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Trial courts should be cautious about intervening in jury selection. “Whether to keep a
prospective juror on the jury panel or whether to dismiss a juror often is based on the trial counsel’s
experience, intuition, strategy, and discretion.” State v. Lawler, 194 Wn. App. 275, 285, 374 P.3d
278 (2016). Because “[t]rial counsel may have legitimate, tactical reasons not to challenge a juror
who may have given responses that suggest some bias,” a “trial court that sua sponte excuses a
juror runs the risk of disrupting trial counsel’s jury selection strategy.” Id. And trial courts are in a
much better position to evaluate prospective jurors than this court because they can observe jurors’
“tone of voice, facial expressions, body language, or other forms of nonverbal communication,”
while we must rely on transcribed answers. Id. at 287. But “[t]he trial court must excuse a juror
for cause if actual bias is shown.” State v. Grenning, 142 Wn. App. 518, 540, 174 P.3d 706 (2008).
“Actual bias” is “the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the
action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged person cannot try the issue
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party.” RCW 4.44.170(2). If a
12 No. 57320-2-II
juror has demonstrated actual bias “‘without a subsequent assurance of impartiality,’ a court should
‘always’ presume juror bias.” Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 855 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666, 674 (6th Cir. 2004)).
“A defendant must prove actual bias.” Grenning, 142 Wn. App. at 540. This means that
they “must show ‘more than a mere possibility that the juror was prejudiced.’” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Noltie, 116 Wn.2d 831, 840, 809 P.2d 190 (1991)).
“The trial judge is in the best position upon observation of the juror’s demeanor to evaluate the
responses and determine if the juror would be impartial.” Brett, 126 Wn.2d at 158. For example,
Division One held that a juror expressed actual bias when she answered that she would like to say
the defendant was guilty and she was not questioned further. State v. Irby, 187 Wn. App. 183, 196,
347 P.3d 1103 (2015). Likewise, Division One determined that a juror’s answer in a questionnaire
that she could not be fair to both sides in a trial for sexual assault showed actual bias when the
defendant was charged with second degree rape and neither the trial court nor defense counsel
individually questioned the juror about her answer. Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 846.
In contrast, a showing of only the possibility of prejudice will not constitute actual bias.
Grenning, 142 Wn. App. at 540. Significantly, “[a] prospective juror’s expression of preference in
favor of police testimony does not, standing alone, conclusively demonstrate bias.” State v.
Gonzales, 111 Wn. App. 276, 281, 45 P.3d 205 (2002), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Talbott, 200 Wn.2d 731, 521 P.3d 948 (2022). “However, if this stated preference rises to a
preconceived opinion or belief about the issues, then actual bias is established.” State v. Griepsma,
17 Wn. App. 2d 606, 614, 490 P.3d 239 (2021). The juror in Gonzales “not only admitted that she
would have a ‘very difficult’ time disbelieving a police officer, she admitted she was not sure she
13 No. 57320-2-II
could afford Gonzales the presumption of innocence if an officer testified.” 111 Wn. App. at 282.
Division One held that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Gonzales’ challenge for
cause. Id. In contrast, this court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a
challenge for cause against a former police officer whose answers to certain questions suggested
“a preference in favor of a police officer’s testimony” when that juror also asserted “that he had
an open mind as to the issue of guilt.” State v. Gosser, 33 Wn. App. 428, 434, 656 P.2d 514 (1982).
2. Juror 1 did not express actual bias
Sword insists that the trial court had an obligation to question juror 1 further to see if she
could remain fair and impartial regarding the issues presented at trial despite her expressed
preference for law enforcement testimony. But juror 1 did not identify as working in law
enforcement or having family who worked in law enforcement. She did not answer any questions
seeking to identify strong feelings about crime in general, people charged with assault, or people
sharing key characteristics of the defendant—people with face or neck tattoos, homeless people,
or people who have been convicted of serious offenses. Unlike the jurors in Irby, Guevara Diaz,
and Gonzales, she never stated or implied that she would have trouble judging Sword fairly, nor
did she opine on any ultimate issue before the jury. She did not say that law enforcement officers
always testify truthfully. She stated only that she believed that police officers were more likely to
tell the truth than other witnesses. In the context of her other answers, this did not rise to “a
preconceived opinion or belief about the issues” in the case and was not enough to constitute actual
bias, despite the lack of individual questioning. Griepsma, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 614. See Noltie, 116
Wn.2d at 838; Grenning, 142 Wn. App. at 540.
14 No. 57320-2-II
Significantly, the law enforcement testimony in this case primarily addressed the search
for Sword based on the description provided by Miller and Ketchum, and the removal of a firearm
from Sword’s person during his arrest. Sword does not raise any assignment of error related to the
procedures used by the police in this case. To the extent that identity was an issue at trial, the jury’s
determination of that issue turned on their assessment of testimony from Miller and Ketchum, not
law enforcement officers. And although the recovery of the firearm was relevant to the unlawful
possession of a firearm charge, Miller, Ketchum, and their neighbor all testified that they saw
Sword with a gun that matched the description of the one police recovered. Thus, the law
enforcement testimony in this case was duplicative and not contested. A feeling that law
enforcement officers were more likely to testify truthfully than other people would not have
resulted in actual bias in this case.
The trial court did not err when it did not second guess defense counsel’s jury selection
strategy and sua sponte intervene to question or remove a witness who expressed a preference for
police testimony but had no other strong opinions relevant to issues or parties in the case.
B. Defense Counsel
In the alternative, Sword argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to further question juror 1, “move to excuse her for cause, or use a peremptory challenge to remove
her from the jury.” Br. of Appellant at 22. He relies on the assertion that juror 1 expressed actual
bias to conclude that counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate further. Sword further
contends that “the presence of a biased juror cannot be considered harmless and requires a new
trial without a showing of prejudice.” Id. at 25. We disagree.
15 No. 57320-2-II
“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Grier, 171
Wn.2d 17, 32, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show both
that counsel performed deficiently and that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at
32-33. The failure to demonstrate either prong of the test will end our inquiry. State v. Classen, 4
Wn. App. 2d 520, 535, 422 P.3d 489 (2018).
We strongly presume that counsel’s performance was not deficient. State v. Kyllo, 166
Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009). And we will not find ineffective assistance if “the actions
of counsel complained of go to the theory of the case or to trial tactics” unless there is no
conceivable legitimate tactic to explain counsel’s decision. State v. Renfro, 96 Wn.2d 902, 909,
639 P.2d 737 (1982); Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 33. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different.” Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862.
“Jury selection involves strategic and tactical decisions for defense counsel.” Lawler, 194
Wn. App. at 290. Trial counsel may think a prospective juror would be “a good juror despite [their]
voir dire responses because of [their] background, other personal characteristics, mannerisms, or
nonverbal communication.” Id. Or defense counsel may prefer one prospective juror over the
person who would be seated in their place if that prospective juror was excused. Id. In sum, trial
counsel may have legitimate tactical reasons for not challenging a juror who gives “responses that
suggest some bias” but does not demonstrate actual bias. Id. at 285.
Here, several other prospective jurors also thought that police were more likely to tell the
truth than other witnesses. Each of those other prospective jurors then admitted to having close
16 No. 57320-2-II
friends or family in law enforcement, and trial counsel exercised peremptory challenges against
those jurors. Counsel also challenged for cause other jurors that counsel argued had favorable
biases towards police witnesses, with partial success. Juror 1 did not articulate any actual bias or
make any statements implying that she held biases against people who were homeless, had face
and neck tattoos, were charged with a crime, or had prior convictions for serious offenses. And the
case primarily turned on the jury’s assessment of Miller and Ketchum’s credibility. Police
testimony was limited, addressing primarily uncontested facts: the search for the person Ketchum
and Miller confronted, Sword’s arrest, and the presence of a firearm on his person.
Given the more explicit biases articulated by other prospective jurors and the limited role
of law enforcement testimony in the case, there were legitimate tactical reasons for trial counsel
not to further question juror 1, challenge her for cause, or exercise a peremptory challenge against
her even though her response “sugget[ed] some bias.” Lawler, 194 Wn. App. at 285. As discussed
above, Sword has not proved actual bias. And we defer to counsel’s assessment of factors that this
court cannot review from a trial transcript, like body language and demeanor. Id. at 290. Because
essentially all police testimony in this case was duplicative of that provided by other witnesses,
Sword does not show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been
different but for the seating of juror 1. Thus, he also cannot show prejudice.
We hold that Sword was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel stemming from his
attorney’s decision not to challenge the seating of juror 1.
II. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR SERIOUS OFFENSE CONVICTIONS
First degree unlawful possession of a firearm requires proof of a prior serious offense.
Former RCW 9.41.040(1)(a). Sword next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
17 No. 57320-2-II
admitting evidence that Sword had been convicted of three prior serious offenses. The prior
convictions were admitted as evidence of the unlawful possession of a firearm charge because
Sword refused to stipulate that he had been convicted of a serious offense. Sword asserts that
admitting three prior convictions, instead of only one, was “unduly prejudicial and unnecessarily
cumulative evidence” that violated ER 403. Br. of Appellant at 26. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. State v. Demery, 144
Wn.2d 753, 758, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court bases its
decision on untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 619, 41 P.3d 1189
(2002). Where reasonable people “could take differing views regarding the propriety of the trial
court’s actions, the trial court has not abused its discretion.” Demery, 144 Wn.2d at 758.
ER 403 provides that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
A person commits first degree unlawful possession of a firearm if they possess a firearm
after being convicted of a serious offense. Former RCW 9.41.040(1)(a). If a defendant offers to
stipulate to their prior serious offenses as an element of unlawful possession of a firearm, the State
must accept the stipulation. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191, 117 S. Ct. 644, 136 L.
Ed. 2d 574 (1997); State v. Johnson, 90 Wn. App. 54, 63, 950 P.2d 981 (1998). But if a defendant
does not offer to stipulate to the fact of their prior conviction, the State may offer evidence that is
probative to prove that the defendant was convicted of a serious offense. State v. Gladden, 116
Wn. App. 561, 566, 66 P.3d 1095 (2003).
18 No. 57320-2-II
Sword relies on State v. Young, where the defendant made an Old Chief stipulation but the
trial court then accidentally disclosed to the jury venire that the conviction was for second degree
assault. 129 Wn. App. 468, 472, 119 P.3d 870 (2005). The trial court did not “instruct the jury that
it could not consider the prior act for any purpose other than determining Young’s guilt on the
[unlawful possession of a firearm] charge.” Id. at 476. “Thus, even if one assumes that any
instruction could have cured this trial irregularity, the jury was never told to disregard the
disclosure.” Id.
Young is distinguishable. Here, Sword declined to stipulate to his prior convictions under
Old Chief. The trial court admitted two prior judgment and sentences containing three convictions:
one for two counts of second degree assault, and one for a single count of residential burglary. The
trial court also gave a limiting instruction directing the jury to consider those prior convictions
only for the purpose of determining whether Sword had previously been convicted of a serious
offense.
A defendant may not dictate how the State proves its case as long as the State operates
within the bounds of the state and federal constitution, applicable statutes, and rules of evidence.
The State did not belabor Sword’s prior convictions or provide unnecessary details, arguing in
closing only that the convictions existed. And the jury could have found issue with the proof of
one of Sword’s prior judgment and sentences. Once a defendant has declined to make an Old Chief
stipulation after being charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, the State is entitled to prove
that the defendant has been convicted of a serious offense. And Sword cites no authority holding
that the State is limited to proof of a single prior serious offense in the absence of an Old Chief
stipulation.
19 No. 57320-2-II
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that Sword
had multiple prior serious offense convictions.
III. REVIVED SELF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION
Sword also asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a jury
instruction on revived self-defense. He reasons that the evidence supported the instruction and trial
counsel argued the theory in closing. But “counsel failed to request an instruction to guide the
jury’s evaluation of that theory,” which Sword contends was deficient performance. Br. of
Appellant at 44. And Sword insists that the lack of that instruction “effectively prevented the jury
from finding” that Sword acted in self-defense, constituting prejudice. Id. at 47. We disagree.
Where the ineffective assistance claim is based on counsel’s failure to request a jury
instruction, the defendant must show they were “entitled to the instruction, counsel’s performance
was deficient in failing to request it, and the failure to request the instruction caused prejudice.”
Classen, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 540. “‘Jury instructions are sufficient if they permit each party to argue
his theory of the case and properly inform the jury of the applicable law.’” State v. Riley, 137
Wn.2d 904, 909, 976 P.2d 624 (1999) (quoting State v. Bowerman, 115 Wn.2d 794, 809, 802 P.2d
116 (1990)).
The Washington Supreme Court has provided that someone who was the first aggressor or
provoked an altercation cannot assert self-defense “unless he in good faith had first withdrawn
from the combat at such a time and in such a manner as to have clearly apprised his adversary that
he in good faith was desisting, or intended to desist, from further aggressive action.” State v. Craig,
82 Wn.2d 777, 783, 514 P.2d 151 (1973). “If there is credible evidence that the defendant made
20 No. 57320-2-II
the first move by drawing a weapon, the evidence supports the giving of an aggressor instruction.”
Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 910.
To be entitled to a revived self-defense instruction, the defendant must show clear intent to
withdraw from the confrontation. The Supreme Court has held that demonstrating intent to
withdraw from a confrontation involving a gun requires dropping the gun or surrendering. State v.
Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 618, 801 P.2d 193 (1990). In Dennison, “[b]ecause Dennison still had
his gun, although pointed to the ground, this action did not clearly manifest a good faith intention
to withdraw from the burglary or remove the decedent’s fear.” Id. Thus, the trial court properly
refused to issue Dennison’s proposed revived self-defense instruction.
In contrast, Division One recently held that a defense attorney rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to request a revived self-defense instruction. State v. Fleeks, 25 Wn. App. 2d
341, 356, 523 P.3d 220, review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1014, 530 P.3d 185 (2023). In that case, after
Fleeks initially attacked his victim, surveillance video showed that he walked away while the
victim followed him. Id. at 355-56. The victim cornered Fleeks against a wall while making throat-
slashing gestures and eventually punched him, after which Fleeks shot the victim. Id. at 356. The
jury in Fleeks received a first aggressor instruction, which provided that “[n]o person may, by any
intentional act reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response, create a necessity for acting in
self-defense and thereupon kill another person.” Id. at 353 (citing 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE:
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 16.04 (5th ed. 2021)). Thus, if the jury
found that Fleeks “was the aggressor, and that [his] acts and conduct provoked or commenced the
fight, then self-defense [was] not available as a defense.” Id. at 353-54 (citing 11 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 16.04 (5th ed. 2021)). Because
21 No. 57320-2-II
the jury in Fleeks did not receive a revived self-defense instruction, Division One held that “Fleeks
could not argue his defense based on either self-defense or revived self-defense theories.” Id. at
356. “Thus, counsel was deficient in not putting forth a revived self-defense instruction with no
tactical reason for doing so.” Id.
Here, both parties argued theories of the case based on self-defense, without the aid of a
first aggressor or a revived self-defense instruction. The State asserted that Sword’s aggression
triggered Ketchum’s actions with the hammer and Miller’s threat to shoot Sword if she gained
control of his gun. Defense counsel argued that Sword disengaged and was walking away from the
confrontation when Ketchum charged out of the house with the hammer, causing Sword to fear
injury and raise the gun in response.
Even assuming the evidence would have supported a revived self-defense instruction, there
were tactical reasons for counsel to avoid seeking the instruction. Unlike Fleeks, there was no first
aggressor instruction given in this case. But the jury received numerous other instructions about
the nuances of self-defense that allowed both sides to adequately argue their theory of the case.
Seeking a revived self-defense instruction could have resulted in the State pursuing a first
aggressor instruction, which it would likely have been entitled to, and there were tactical reasons
to avoid informing the jury of first aggressor concepts given the conflicting testimony on whether
Sword pulled his gun before or after he saw Ketchum wielding a hammer. As given, the
instructions allowed Sword to argue that he acted in self-defense without the problematic addition
of the first aggressor instruction. Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 909. Thus, counsel did not perform
deficiently by electing not to seek a separate instruction on revived self-defense.
22 No. 57320-2-II
We hold that Sword did not receive ineffective assistance when his attorney did not seek a
revived self-defense instruction.
IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
During closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to explain the reasonable doubt
standard to the jury by stating, “[I]t is not uncommon . . . to hear a juror say, well, I really believe
that she did this thing she was charged with, but I just felt like I didn’t get enough proof.” VRP
(Mar. 7, 2022) at 911. “I submit to you if that is the statement being made, then that juror’s holding
the State to a standard they have not been instructed upon.” Id. at 911-12.
Sword argues this statement was misconduct because it mischaracterized the State’s burden
of proof in closing argument. He reasons that the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to “decide
the case based on gut feeling rather than evidence.” Br. of Appellant at 47-48. He asserts that
defense counsel’s objection and the trial court’s curative instruction were insufficient to remedy
the ensuing prejudice. We agree that the prosecutor’s argument was improper but we conclude that
Sword has failed to show prejudice.
Prosecutorial misconduct can violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington State Constitution. In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 703-04, 286
P.3d 673 (2012). When the defendant objected to the prosecutor’s remarks at trial, the defendant
must show both that the remarks were improper, and that there is a substantial likelihood the
misconduct affected the jury’s verdict. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 (2012).
We evaluate prosecutor’s remarks “in the context of the record and all of the circumstances
of the trial.” Glassman, 175 Wn.2d at 704. “Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant is
23 No. 57320-2-II
improper argument” that constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 713. More specifically,
“[m]isstating the basis on which a jury can acquit insidiously shifts the requirement that the State
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” and violates due process. Id.
The State points to State v. Feely, where Division One held that a prosecutor did not commit
misconduct when they “told the jury that ‘[i]t can be very frustrating to have a jury come back and
say we all knew he was guilty, but you didn’t prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Those are
inconsistent.’” 192 Wn. App. 751, 763, 368 P.3d 514 (2016) (alteration in original). The State’s
reliance on Feely is unhelpful on the issue of whether misconduct occurred because in that case,
Division One did not address whether the comment was improper. Rather, because Feely did not
object to the comment, Division One concluded that the prosecutorial misconduct claim was
waived because any prejudice that may have ensued from the prosecutor’s argument could have
been neutralized by a curative instruction. Id. at 763-64.
Here, the prosecutor argued that the jury would hold “the State to a standard they have not
been instructed upon” if they believed that Sword “did this thing [he] was charged with,” but “felt
like [they] didn’t get enough proof” to convict him. VRP (Mar. 7, 2022) at 911-12. Sword objected
and the trial court directed the jury “to follow the instructions that they received from the Court”
and to disregard “anything that [the prosecutor] says that’s not supported” by those instructions.
Id. at 912. The prosecutor then returned its improper argument despite the court’s ruling, stating
that “if you have that conversation, what I submit to you is that you have held the State to a
standard beyond what I am required to prove to you.” Id. (emphasis added). She continued, “if you
believe that the defendant, in fact, did the things that he has been charged with, you believe that
24 No. 57320-2-II
because of the information that you received in this courtroom,” that would constitute belief
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 913.
The prosecutor’s statements were improper because they clearly implied that the jury had
a duty to convict Sword even if the jurors did not feel that they had been presented with proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Glassman, 175 Wn.2d at 713. If the State has not met its burden of
proof, a jury should not convict a defendant based solely on their belief that the defendant is guilty.
Implying otherwise is blatantly improper. In general, adding words to the reasonable doubt
instruction or trying to explain the standard to the jury using language other than that in the
instruction itself risks shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. This practice should be
avoided.
Here, although the remarks of the prosecutor were improper, they nevertheless fall short of
the trivialization of the burden of proof that requires reversal. The trial court intervened to refer
the jury back to their instructions and told the jury to disregard any argument that was inconsistent
with the instruction. The prosecutor also then referred back to the reasonable doubt instruction,
asking the jury to hold the State to the standard it was “required to prove to you but not more or
higher than that standard.” VRP (Mar. 7, 2022) at 913. This was sufficient correction to remedy
any prejudice from the improper statement. Therefore, Sword cannot show a substantial likelihood
that the misconduct affected the jury’s verdict. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760. Thus, we decline to
reverse Sword’s convictions on this basis.
Finally, Sword argues that an accumulation of errors prejudiced him and require a new trial
under the cumulative error doctrine. Here, the prosecutor’s misstatement in closing was the only
error, so the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable.
25 No. 57320-2-II
V. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE ISSUES
A. Whether the Trial Court Imposed an Exceptional Sentence
Sword asserts that the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence based on the “free
crimes” aggravator in RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c) but failed to attach written findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the judgment and sentence. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences at
or near the bottom of the standard sentencing range for each charge, and imposed consecutive
firearm sentencing enhancements for a total sentence of 159 months. “[A]ll firearm enhancements
. . . are mandatory, shall be served in total confinement, and shall run consecutively to all other
sentencing provisions, including other firearm or deadly weapon enhancements.” RCW
9.94A.533(3)(e). Because firearm sentencing enhancements increase the length of the standard
sentencing range, this was not an exceptional sentence.
B. Legal Financial Obligations and Scrivener’s Error
Sword argues, and the State concedes, that we should remand for the trial court to strike
the criminal filing fee, community custody supervision fees, and crime victim penalty assessment
from Sword’s judgment and sentence. Sword also asserts, and the State concedes, that we should
remand to correct a scrivener’s error in the judgment and sentence.
Trial courts may no longer impose the criminal filing fee, community custody supervision
fees, or crime victim penalty assessment on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 29, §§ 7, 8;
LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, §§ 1, 4; see RCW 7.68.035(4)-(5); see RCW 9.94A.703; see RCW
43.43.7541(2). A new statute applies to all cases that were pending on direct appeal when the
statute took effect. State v. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d 225, 246, 429 P.3d 467 (2018). The trial court
26 No. 57320-2-II
found Sword indigent under RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c) at sentencing, so those legal financial
obligations should no longer be imposed.
Additionally, the judgment and sentence states that Sword was convicted of second degree
assault while armed with a firearm under several statutes including RCW 9.94A.833(3). That
statute addresses gang-related felonies involving minors and does not have a subsection (3). The
State acknowledges that this “was clearly a typographical error” and concedes that we should
remand to correct the citation to RCW 9.94A.533(3), which addresses firearm sentencing
enhancements. Br. of Resp’t at 55. We accept the State’s concessions and remand for correction
of this scrivener’s error.
CONCLUSION
We remand for the trial court to strike the criminal filing fee, community custody
supervision fees, and crime victim penalty assessment from Sword’s judgment and sentence. On
remand, the trial court must also correct the scrivener’s error in Sword’s judgment and sentence.
We otherwise affirm.
27 No. 57320-2-II
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Glasgow, C.J. We concur:
Maxa, J.
Cruser, J.