State of Washington v. Craig Frederick Clark
Opinion
FILED
SEPTEMBER 20, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 35041-0-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
CRAIG FREDRICK CLARK, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION )
Appellant. )
SIDDOWAY, J. — Craig Clark appeals his conviction for third degree rape, contending that the trial court erred in admitting an incriminating recorded interview. He claims he incriminated himself only as a result of police deception.
The deception by police was not as coercively misleading as argued by Mr. Clark and the record supports the trial court’s findings that the behavior of law enforcement did not overbear his will to resist. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Craig Clark was contacted at his place of employment one workday in March 2015 by two police detectives, who told him he was a suspect in a crime and they wished
State v. Clark
to speak to him about it. They offered him the option of being interviewed at his workplace or at their office, only a few blocks away, where he would have more privacy. Mr. Clark preferred to be questioned at the detectives’ quarters and told them he would meet them there. He walked the couple of blocks to their offices and on arrival was escorted to an interview room. He agreed to have the interview recorded and was told that if he wished to stop the interview at any point, he could. He was read Miranda1 warnings, agreed to speak with the detectives, and signed an advisement of rights card.
After some unrelated background questioning, one of the detectives explained that Mr. Clark’s 81-year-old stepmother, S.C., alleged that approximately six weeks earlier, when Mr. Clark was visiting her at her home, he had vaginally raped her. After only a few questions, Mr. Clark confessed to having engaged in sexual intercourse with his stepmother, but claimed it was consensual. According to him, he had driven S.C. on errands in the afternoon and had taken her to her home, where they visited in her bedroom. He claimed that they hugged, he became aroused, she began touching his penis, and before he left her home she had performed oral sex on him and they had vaginal intercourse. Mr. Clark was questioned for approximately an hour and 40 minutes, mostly about the details of the sexual contact.
The detectives had obtained a search warrant to obtain a buccal swab from Mr.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
State v. Clark
Clark, which they executed at the conclusion of his interview. A couple of weeks later, he was charged with third degree rape, with the aggravating circumstance that he knew or should have known that S.C., who suffers some dementia, was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance.
Mr. Clark waived his right to a jury trial, and the CrR 3.5 hearing on the State’s intent to offer his recorded interview began on the Thursday before a Monday trial date. Both detectives testified, as did Mr. Clark, and the beginning of the recorded interview was played. Among issues that came up during the hearing was the fact, conceded by the State, that at least one of the detectives lied to Mr. Clark during the interview when she represented that some DNA2 evidence testing had already been completed. The CrR 3.5 hearing was suspended so that the parties could provide the court with briefing on the significance of the detective’s lie.
On the morning of the second day of the bench trial, the trial court announced that it was finding Mr. Clark’s recorded interview to be voluntary. It explained that it had reviewed the interview multiple times, looking closely at the “15 or 20 places . . . where I think that there is an argument to varying degrees as to whether law enforcement was completely candid with Mr. Clark about things that they had.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 166-67. Summarizing its ruling, the court said:
2 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
State v. Clark
This doesn’t appear to be some elaborate ruse. . . .
I’m satisfied that this was a reasonable investigative technique by Detective Robertson and Detective Koerner. It was a free and voluntary decision by Mr. Clark to engage in this interview. He was not unreasonably coerced.
RP at 191.
At the conclusion of trial, the court found Mr. Clark guilty and specially found that S.C. was particularly vulnerable and incapable of resistance. It sentenced Mr. Clark to 12 months’ confinement and 36 months’ community custody. He appeals.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Clark’s only assignment of error on appeal is to the trial court admitting into evidence the recorded interview, which he contends was “involuntary, in particular due to the fact that Mr. Clark’s interrogators lied to him regarding the DNA evidence in the State’s possession.” Br. of Appellant at iv.
Washington courts have long held that “[w]hile we do not condone deception, that alone does not make a confession inadmissible as a matter of law.” State v. Braun, 82 Wn.2d 157, 161, 509 P.2d 742 (1973) (citing State v. Thompson, 38 Wn.2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951)). The question whether admission of a confession violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Washington State Constitution depends on whether the confession was involuntary, and for this purpose “‘coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession
State v. Clark
is not “voluntary.”’” State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 101, 196 P.3d 645 (2008).3 The inquiry is whether the defendant’s will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 132, 942 P.2d 363 (1997). “[B]oth the conduct of law enforcement officers in exerting pressure on the defendant to confess and the defendant’s ability to resist the pressure are important.” Unga, 165 Wn.2d at 101.
“When determining whether a self-incriminating statement was compelled or made voluntarily, courts look to the totality of the circumstances.” State v. DeLeon, 185 Wn.2d 478, 486, 374 P.3d 95 (2016). Relevant circumstances include “the ‘crucial element of police coercion’; the length of the interrogation; its location; its continuity; the defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health; and whether the police advised the defendant of the rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.” Unga, 165 Wn.2d at 101 (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-94, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993)).
In reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit a defendant’s confession, we look to the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered after the CrR 3.5 hearing. State v.
3 Mr. Clark devotes a portion of his brief to arguing that we should construe the Washington Constitution as more protective, but the Washington Supreme Court has found that the state and federal constitutional provisions are coextensive. Unga, 165 Wn.2d at 100.
State v. Clark
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
State of Washington v. Craig Frederick Clark (State of Washington v. Craig Frederick Clark) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.