IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 83803-2-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v.
CODY JAMES SHIELDS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant,
BRITTANY SHANE DANIELS,
Defendant.
BOWMAN, J. — Cody James Shields appeals his jury conviction for second
degree manslaughter of his infant son. Shields argues that the trial court erred
by instructing the jury that the State can prove criminal negligence by
establishing a person acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, that the
State’s charging document was deficient, and that the court erred by allowing
irrelevant testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 25, 2015, Lucian was born to 23-year-old Shields and 21-year-
old Brittany Shane Daniels. At the time, Daniels and Shields shared a home with
B.D., Daniels’ 2-year-old child from a prior relationship. Shields and Daniels
used separate bedrooms, and B.D. slept with Daniels in her room while Lucian
slept in Shields’ room. Shields mostly slept on the couch in the living room. He No. 83803-2-I/2
had trouble sleeping and often stayed up at night playing video games and
watching television. He would then sleep for several hours during the day while
Daniels was at work.
Daniels breastfed Lucian for the first month of his life but then had to move
to bottle feeding. She and Shields had trouble feeding Lucian, who often cried
for long periods and took “upwards of 45 minutes to just finish five to six ounces
of formula.” Lucian would sometimes go unfed for up to eight hours and had
infrequent bowel movements every few days. Shields ignored Lucian’s cries and
often drowned them out by wearing headphones while playing video games.
In late October 2015, Daniels had two major surgeries, and Shields
became Lucian’s primary caregiver. Shields grew frustrated with Lucian and
often left the child alone in his bedroom with a bottle propped on a rolled-up
blanket. Shields knew that the bottle would fall from Lucian’s mouth if he moved
but left the infant unsupervised with a bottle for hours.1 In the weeks before
Lucian’s death, Shields and Daniels exchanged several Facebook messages in
which Shields expressed his anger and frustration toward Lucian. Shields
described Lucian as “being a dick,” that he was “annoying” and needed to “[s]hut
the fuck up,” and that Shields did not “give a fuck” if he killed Lucian.
On December 7, 2015, Shields stayed up “the entire night” playing video
games and watching television. Daniels fed Lucian in the bathroom at about
4:30 a.m. on December 8, unaware that Shields was still awake in the living
1 At least one of the bottles that Shields and Daniels regularly used to feed Lucian had “a gaping hole” in the nipple.
2 No. 83803-2-I/3
room. She then went back to bed. Shields claims he fed Lucian in his bedroom
at about 7:00 a.m. by propping a bottle in front of him with a blanket. Shields
then returned to the living room and fell asleep on the couch. Daniels got up at
about 9:30 a.m. and quickly left for work because she was “running late.” She
saw Shields asleep on the couch when she left.
Shields woke up at 2:00 p.m. but did not check on Lucian. Instead, he
“found [B.D.] playing in his bedroom” and the two watched cartoons in the living
room for another three hours. Shields finally checked on Lucian at 5:00 p.m. and
found him dead in his bassinette. Shields started CPR2 and contacted Daniels
by Facebook message instead of calling 911 because he had no working phone.
Daniels then called 911 and police responded to the home.
Whatcom County Medical Examiner Dr. Gary Goldfogel conducted
Lucian’s autopsy on December 9, 2015 and issued an autopsy report on January
20, 2016. He concluded that Lucian died of chronic malnutrition and dehydration.
On February 22, 2016, the State charged Shields and Daniels with second
degree manslaughter.
In December 2019, Daniels pleaded guilty as charged and started serving
her sentence the next month. Before his trial, Shields moved to exclude
evidence of Daniels’ guilty plea, arguing that it was irrelevant under ER 402. The
State argued that it was “permitted to inquire of the co-defendant witness as to
the plea agreement she entered into because her decision to plead guilty to the
2 Cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
3 No. 83803-2-I/4
related charge is relevant to her credibility.” The court denied Shields’ motion,
ruling that “it would be inappropriate for this witness . . . not to be able to talk
about her resolving her case.” The court also ruled Daniels should not use “the
word ‘guilty’ ” during her testimony, but she could say she “resolved her case.”
Shields’ jury trial began in June 2021. The State admitted several of the
Facebook messages between Shields and Daniels to show that Shields
neglected Lucian’s care. The State also called Dr. Goldfogel, who testified about
his January 2016 autopsy report.
Dr. Goldfogel testified that he has conducted “thousands” of autopsies in
his 33 years as medical examiner, including “[h]undreds” of infants, and this “was
a very memorable autopsy for him” because it was “quite abnormal.” He noted
that Lucian weighed 8.6 pounds at birth and 9.45 pounds at death. Lucian
should have been over 15 pounds but gained only 1 pound over the course of his
three-month life, showing he was “a starved child.” Dr. Goldfogel testified that
Lucian also was “not growing” in length and dehydrated. His “entire
[gastrointestinal] tract [was] empty,” which was “highly unusual.” Dr. Goldfogel
found Lucian was otherwise “physically, anatomically normal” with no signs of
blunt force trauma, disease, or infection, supporting the conclusion that Lucian’s
cause of death was “specifically [chronic] malnutrition and dehydration, neglect of
ordinary care of [an] infant,” and that “the manner of death [was] homicide.”
4 No. 83803-2-I/5
At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury that to find Shields guilty
of second degree manslaughter, the State must prove:
(1) That between the dates of August 25, 2015 and December 8, 2015, the defendant engaged in conduct of criminal negligence; [and] (2) That [Lucian Shields] DOB: 8/25/2015, died as a result of defendant’s negligent acts.
The State asked the court to also instruct the jury that “[w]hen criminal
negligence as to a particular result is required to establish an element of a crime,
the element is also established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly as to that result.” And it requested that the court include instructions
on the definitions of the mental states “intentional,” “knowing,” and “reckless.”
Shields objected to the instructions, arguing that they were “confusing to the jury
as to what is the mens rea when we are telling them a negligent act but then we
start throwing in other mens rea.” The court gave the State’s proposed
instructions.
On July 14, 2021, the jury convicted Shields as charged. The court
sentenced him to 24 months in custody followed by 18 months of community
supervision.
Shields appeals.
ANALYSIS
Shields argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the
State can prove criminal negligence by establishing a person acted intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly, that the State’s charging document was deficient, and
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 83803-2-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v.
CODY JAMES SHIELDS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant,
BRITTANY SHANE DANIELS,
Defendant.
BOWMAN, J. — Cody James Shields appeals his jury conviction for second
degree manslaughter of his infant son. Shields argues that the trial court erred
by instructing the jury that the State can prove criminal negligence by
establishing a person acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, that the
State’s charging document was deficient, and that the court erred by allowing
irrelevant testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 25, 2015, Lucian was born to 23-year-old Shields and 21-year-
old Brittany Shane Daniels. At the time, Daniels and Shields shared a home with
B.D., Daniels’ 2-year-old child from a prior relationship. Shields and Daniels
used separate bedrooms, and B.D. slept with Daniels in her room while Lucian
slept in Shields’ room. Shields mostly slept on the couch in the living room. He No. 83803-2-I/2
had trouble sleeping and often stayed up at night playing video games and
watching television. He would then sleep for several hours during the day while
Daniels was at work.
Daniels breastfed Lucian for the first month of his life but then had to move
to bottle feeding. She and Shields had trouble feeding Lucian, who often cried
for long periods and took “upwards of 45 minutes to just finish five to six ounces
of formula.” Lucian would sometimes go unfed for up to eight hours and had
infrequent bowel movements every few days. Shields ignored Lucian’s cries and
often drowned them out by wearing headphones while playing video games.
In late October 2015, Daniels had two major surgeries, and Shields
became Lucian’s primary caregiver. Shields grew frustrated with Lucian and
often left the child alone in his bedroom with a bottle propped on a rolled-up
blanket. Shields knew that the bottle would fall from Lucian’s mouth if he moved
but left the infant unsupervised with a bottle for hours.1 In the weeks before
Lucian’s death, Shields and Daniels exchanged several Facebook messages in
which Shields expressed his anger and frustration toward Lucian. Shields
described Lucian as “being a dick,” that he was “annoying” and needed to “[s]hut
the fuck up,” and that Shields did not “give a fuck” if he killed Lucian.
On December 7, 2015, Shields stayed up “the entire night” playing video
games and watching television. Daniels fed Lucian in the bathroom at about
4:30 a.m. on December 8, unaware that Shields was still awake in the living
1 At least one of the bottles that Shields and Daniels regularly used to feed Lucian had “a gaping hole” in the nipple.
2 No. 83803-2-I/3
room. She then went back to bed. Shields claims he fed Lucian in his bedroom
at about 7:00 a.m. by propping a bottle in front of him with a blanket. Shields
then returned to the living room and fell asleep on the couch. Daniels got up at
about 9:30 a.m. and quickly left for work because she was “running late.” She
saw Shields asleep on the couch when she left.
Shields woke up at 2:00 p.m. but did not check on Lucian. Instead, he
“found [B.D.] playing in his bedroom” and the two watched cartoons in the living
room for another three hours. Shields finally checked on Lucian at 5:00 p.m. and
found him dead in his bassinette. Shields started CPR2 and contacted Daniels
by Facebook message instead of calling 911 because he had no working phone.
Daniels then called 911 and police responded to the home.
Whatcom County Medical Examiner Dr. Gary Goldfogel conducted
Lucian’s autopsy on December 9, 2015 and issued an autopsy report on January
20, 2016. He concluded that Lucian died of chronic malnutrition and dehydration.
On February 22, 2016, the State charged Shields and Daniels with second
degree manslaughter.
In December 2019, Daniels pleaded guilty as charged and started serving
her sentence the next month. Before his trial, Shields moved to exclude
evidence of Daniels’ guilty plea, arguing that it was irrelevant under ER 402. The
State argued that it was “permitted to inquire of the co-defendant witness as to
the plea agreement she entered into because her decision to plead guilty to the
2 Cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
3 No. 83803-2-I/4
related charge is relevant to her credibility.” The court denied Shields’ motion,
ruling that “it would be inappropriate for this witness . . . not to be able to talk
about her resolving her case.” The court also ruled Daniels should not use “the
word ‘guilty’ ” during her testimony, but she could say she “resolved her case.”
Shields’ jury trial began in June 2021. The State admitted several of the
Facebook messages between Shields and Daniels to show that Shields
neglected Lucian’s care. The State also called Dr. Goldfogel, who testified about
his January 2016 autopsy report.
Dr. Goldfogel testified that he has conducted “thousands” of autopsies in
his 33 years as medical examiner, including “[h]undreds” of infants, and this “was
a very memorable autopsy for him” because it was “quite abnormal.” He noted
that Lucian weighed 8.6 pounds at birth and 9.45 pounds at death. Lucian
should have been over 15 pounds but gained only 1 pound over the course of his
three-month life, showing he was “a starved child.” Dr. Goldfogel testified that
Lucian also was “not growing” in length and dehydrated. His “entire
[gastrointestinal] tract [was] empty,” which was “highly unusual.” Dr. Goldfogel
found Lucian was otherwise “physically, anatomically normal” with no signs of
blunt force trauma, disease, or infection, supporting the conclusion that Lucian’s
cause of death was “specifically [chronic] malnutrition and dehydration, neglect of
ordinary care of [an] infant,” and that “the manner of death [was] homicide.”
4 No. 83803-2-I/5
At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury that to find Shields guilty
of second degree manslaughter, the State must prove:
(1) That between the dates of August 25, 2015 and December 8, 2015, the defendant engaged in conduct of criminal negligence; [and] (2) That [Lucian Shields] DOB: 8/25/2015, died as a result of defendant’s negligent acts.
The State asked the court to also instruct the jury that “[w]hen criminal
negligence as to a particular result is required to establish an element of a crime,
the element is also established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly as to that result.” And it requested that the court include instructions
on the definitions of the mental states “intentional,” “knowing,” and “reckless.”
Shields objected to the instructions, arguing that they were “confusing to the jury
as to what is the mens rea when we are telling them a negligent act but then we
start throwing in other mens rea.” The court gave the State’s proposed
instructions.
On July 14, 2021, the jury convicted Shields as charged. The court
sentenced him to 24 months in custody followed by 18 months of community
supervision.
Shields appeals.
ANALYSIS
Shields argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the
State can prove criminal negligence by establishing a person acted intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly, that the State’s charging document was deficient, and
that the trial court erred by allowing irrelevant testimony.
5 No. 83803-2-I/6
Jury Instructions
Shields argues that the court erred by instructing the jury that criminal
negligence is established when a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly, “none of which were elements of the charged offense.” We disagree.
We review the adequacy of jury instructions de novo. State v. Levy, 156
Wn.2d 709, 721, 132 P.3d 1076 (2006). Jury instructions are sufficient “if they
are supported by substantial evidence, allow the parties to argue their theories of
the case, and when read as a whole properly inform the jury of the applicable
law.”3 State v. Irons, 101 Wn. App. 544, 549, 4 P.3d 174 (2000). We also review
issues of statutory interpretation de novo, looking to a statute’s plain language
and meaning as an expression of legislative intent. State v. Velasquez, 176
Wn.2d 333, 336, 292 P.3d 92 (2013). We discern a statute’s plain meaning from
the text of the provision, the context of the statute in which the provision is found,
related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Evans, 177
Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013).
RCW 9A.08.010(1) establishes and defines a hierarchy of culpable mental
states, ranging from “intent” and “knowledge” to “recklessness” and “criminal
negligence.” Proof of a higher mental state is necessarily proof of a lower mental
state.4 State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 618, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984), abrogated
on other grounds by State v. Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631, 781 P.2d 483 (1989);
3 Shields argues only that the instructions are an incorrect statement of the law. So, we do not address the first two factors. 4 This principle holds true so long as the mental states are evaluated with respect to the same fact. See State v. Goble, 131 Wn. App. 194, 202-03, 126 P.3d 821 (2005).
6 No. 83803-2-I/7
RCW 9A.08.010(2). As a result, when a statute provides that the State must
establish “criminal negligence” as an element of an offense, “such element also
is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.” RCW
9A.08.010(2).
The State charged Shields with second degree manslaughter in violation
of RCW 9A.32.070. The court instructed the jury that to convict Shields of
second degree manslaughter, the State must prove that Shields “engaged in
conduct of criminal negligence,” and that Lucian “died as a result of [Shields’]
negligent acts.” See RCW 9A.32.070(1). At the State’s request, the court also
instructed the jury:
When criminal negligence as to a particular result is required to establish an element of a crime, the element is also established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly as to that result.
And the court defined each of the culpable mental states of intentional, knowing,
and reckless.
Shields argues that providing “all the definitions of culpability was not a
correct statement of the law.” He suggests the instructions were appropriate only
if the State also charged Shields with an offense for which he must form a higher
culpable mental state; “[f]or example, where the government has alleged a higher
degree of homicide.” But Shields cites no authority in support of his argument.
So, we presume that “ ‘after diligent research,’ ” he found none. See State v.
Arredondo, 188 Wn.2d 244, 262, 394 P.3d 348 (2017)5 (quoting State v. Young,
89 Wn.2d 613, 625, 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)); see also RAP 10.3(a)(6).
5 Internal quotation marks omitted.
7 No. 83803-2-I/8
In any event, Shields’ argument conflicts with the plain language of the
statute. RCW 9A.08.010(2) is titled “Substitutes for Criminal Negligence” and
provides that the element of criminal negligence “also is established” if a person
acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. The statute does not limit the concept
to those cases in which the State also charges the defendant with a more serious
crime.
Shields fails to show the court committed instructional error.6
Charging Document
Shields argues that the trial court “deprived [him] of a fair trial by
instructing the jury on elements of culpability not contained in the information or
required to prove the charged offense.” We disagree.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to notice of the alleged
crime the State intends to prove. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, §
22. The State provides notice through the information. State v. Kosewicz, 174
Wn.2d 683, 691, 278 P.3d 184 (2012). The State must include all essential
elements of an alleged crime in the information to apprise the defendant
sufficiently of the charges against him so that he may prepare a defense. Id.
(citing State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 101-02, 812 P.2d 86 (1991)). But “[t]he
State need not include definitions of elements in the information.” State v.
Johnson, 180 Wn.2d 295, 302, 325 P.3d 135 (2014).
6 Shields also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument by arguing that Shields’ conduct satisfied a higher culpable mental state. But a prosecutor’s statement does not amount to misconduct when it is an accurate statement of the law and accords with the jury instructions. See State v. Anderson, 153 Wn. App. 417, 430, 220 P.3d 1273 (2009).
8 No. 83803-2-I/9
When, as here, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an information
for the first time on appeal, we apply the liberal construction rule. State v. Brown,
169 Wn.2d 195, 197, 234 P.3d 212 (2010) (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 102).
Under that rule, we determine (1) whether the essential elements of the crime
appear in any form or can be found by any fair construction in the information
and, if so, (2) whether language in the document actually prejudiced the
defendant. Id. at 197-98. In applying the liberal construction rule, we construe
the charging document liberally in favor of validity. Id. at 197.
Here, the State provided Shields with notice of each essential element of
second degree manslaughter in the information. The charging document reads:
That on or about . . . August 25, 2015 to December 8, 2015, the said defendants, CODY JAMES SHIELDS, and BRITTANY SHANE DANIELS, and each of them, then and there being in said county and state, with criminal negligence, did cause the death of another person, to-wit: Lucian Shields, in violation of RCW 9A.32.070, which violation is a class B felony.
Shields argues the information is deficient because it does not explain that
the State planned to show that he acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness.
But these higher culpable mental states are not elements of second degree
manslaughter. See RCW 9A.32.070. Instead, they are states of mind that also
establish “criminal negligence”—an element of manslaughter. RCW
9A.32.070(1); RCW 9A.08.010. And the State was not required to define what
amounts to criminal negligence in its charging document. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d
at 302.
The information was not deficient.
9 No. 83803-2-I/10
Irrelevant Testimony
Shields argues that the trial court erred by “permitting the jury to learn that
Ms. Daniels resolved her charges relating to the death of their son.” Shields
claims the testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. While we agree the
testimony specific to Daniels’ case may not have been relevant, any error in
allowing the testimony was harmless.
Trial courts determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible, and
we review the court’s rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Brockob, 159
Wn.2d 311, 348, 150 P.3d 59 (2006). Evidence is “relevant” if it tends “to make
the existence of any fact . . . of consequence to the determination of the action
more . . . or less probable.” ER 401. The threshold to admit relevant evidence
is very low. State v. Briejer, 172 Wn. App. 209, 225, 289 P.3d 698 (2012). Even
minimally relevant evidence is admissible. Id.
A defendant may impeach a witness on cross-examination by referencing
any agreements or promises made by the State in exchange for the witness’
testimony. State v. Ish, 170 Wn.2d 189, 198, 241 P.3d 389 (2010). Evidence of
plea agreements allows the jury to be privy to any possible bias a witness may
have in testifying against a defendant. State v. Farnsworth, 185 Wn.2d 768, 781-
82, 374 P.3d 1152 (2016); State v. Jessup, 31 Wn. App. 304, 316, 641 P.2d
1185 (1982). The right of cross-examination guarantees the defendant an
opportunity to show specific reasons why a witness testifying under a plea
bargain might be biased in a particular case. State v. Portnoy, 43 Wn. App. 455,
461, 718 P.2d 805 (1986). And the State may elicit testimony about a witness’
10 No. 83803-2-I/11
plea agreement in its case-in-chief to “ ‘pull the sting’ of the defense’s cross-
examination.” State v. Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d 389, 402, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997).
The State argues it properly elicited testimony from Daniels about the
resolution of her criminal case to “pull the sting” from the inevitable cross-
examination challenging her credibility. But nothing in the record suggests that
Daniels agreed to testify in return for a favorable plea agreement. Indeed, she
pleaded guilty as charged and began her prison sentence in January 2020, over
a year before Shields’ trial. So, the danger of bias central to a witness testifying
in exchange for leniency is not present here, and there was no “sting” for the
State to pull from cross-examination.
Even so, any error in permitting Daniels’ testimony was harmless.
Evidentiary error is grounds for reversal only if it results in prejudice. Bourgeois,
133 Wn.2d at 403. An error is prejudicial if within reasonable probabilities, had
the error not occurred, the trial’s outcome would have been materially affected.
State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 780, 725 P.2d 951 (1986). Here, the trial court
told the jury that in its determination of Shields’ guilt, it should disregard Daniels’
statement about resolving her case. The court instructed the jury that “[y]ou have
heard evidence that Brittany Daniels has resolved her involvement in the matter.
That evidence shall not be considered when rendering a verdict.” We presume
that juries follow the court’s instructions. State v. Stein, 144 Wn.2d 236, 247, 27
P.3d 184 (2001).
In sum, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that proving
intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct satisfies the criminal negligence mental
11 No. 83803-2-I/12
state, the State’s charging document was not deficient, and Shields suffered no
prejudice from the trial court allowing Daniels’ testimony. We affirm his
conviction.
WE CONCUR: