IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 82524-1-I
C.I. DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUN, J. — Cascade Behavioral Health Hospital (Cascade) petitioned for
a 14-day involuntary commitment of C.I. under the involuntary treatment act
(ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. The trial court denied C.I.’s motion to dismiss the petition
based on lack of statutory compliance and ordered commitment. C.I. appeals,
arguing that reversal is required because the individual who signed the petition
did not testify at the commitment hearing. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Police transported C.I. to the Swedish Edmonds emergency department
for a mental health evaluation after he left his adult family home and began
wandering in neighbors’ yards. At the time of his admission, C.I. was “agitated,
tangential, religiously preoccupied, and hypersexual.” A Snohomish County
designated crisis responder filed an emergency petition to detain C.I. for an initial
120-hour evaluation and treatment under RCW 71.05.153. Cascade later
petitioned for 14-day involuntary treatment, alleging that C.I. presented a
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 82524-1-I/2
likelihood of serious harm to others and that he was gravely disabled.1 The
petition was signed by Cascade staff member Patrick Swann and a second
individual whose name and title are illegible.
On March 31, 2021, the superior court held a probable cause hearing on
the 14-day commitment petition. C.I. was present at the outset of the hearing but
waived his presence soon after. The State presented three witnesses. Sirgut
Ashenaffi, the operator of the adult family home where C.I. resided, testified that
C.I. behaved appropriately at first but deteriorated into erratic behaviors over
time. The second witness, C.I.’s brother Justin Bedford, described similar
changes in C.I.’s behaviors during the same period and stated that this has
happened before.
The State’s third and final witness was Dr. Robert Beatty, a licensed
clinical psychologist who works for Cascade as a court evaluator. Beatty testified
that C.I. has a behavioral health disorder with a working diagnosis of
schizoaffective disorder and that the impairment has a substantial adverse effect
on C.I.’s cognitive and volitional functioning. In evaluating C.I.’s mental health,
Beatty reviewed C.I.’s medical records from Cascade, conferred with C.I.’s
treatment team, and observed the testimony of Ashenaffi and Bedford as well as
C.I.’s behavior in the courtroom. Beatty noted that C.I.’s behavioral health
1 RCW 71.05.020(24) defines “gravely disabled” as “a condition in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder: (a) Is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety; or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety.” A person is gravely disabled if either prong of the statute is met. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 202, 728 P.2d 138 (1986).
2 No. 82524-1-I/3
disorder presented with symptoms of both mania (elevated and labile mood,
hypersexuality, decreased sleep, and an elevation in goal-directed behavior) and
psychosis (delusions, hyperverbal and tangential speech, and disinhibited
behaviors). Beatty opined that, as a result of a mental disorder, C.I. posed a
substantial risk of harm to others and that he was gravely disabled under RCW
71.05.020(24)(a) and (b).
During cross-examination of Beatty, the State acknowledged that Swann
was the individual who filed the commitment petition. When C.I.’s attorney asked
whether Swann is a testifying court evaluator, Beatty explained, “He’s new. He
has been working with us for eight days, so he has not yet testified in a hearing.”
C.I.’s attorney moved to dismiss the petition because RCW 71.05.230 requires
that a petitioner be prepared to testify and that Swann, by Beatty’s own
admission, was not prepared to testify. The court denied the motion, stating that
Beatty’s testimony did not establish that Swann was unprepared to testify but
rather that Beatty was testifying because Swann was new.
At the end of the hearing, the court ruled that C.I. had a behavioral health
disorder and was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(24)(b). The court
ordered that C.I. be involuntarily committed for 14 days.
C.I. appeals.2
2 C.I. states that the appeal is not moot even though the commitment period has expired. The State does not dispute C.I.’s argument. We agree with C.I. See In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 626, 279 P.3d 897 (2012) (when orders have adverse consequences in future commitment proceedings, an appeal is not moot).
3 No. 82524-1-I/4
II. ANALYSIS
C.I. contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
because Swann, the individual who signed the 14-day commitment petition, was
not present at the hearing or prepared to testify in favor of commitment. C.I.
contends that this deficiency constituted a total disregard for the ITA, warranting
reversal of the commitment order. See RCW 71.05.010(2) (courts must focus on
the merits of a petition for involuntary commitment unless statutory requirements
were “totally disregarded”). The State responds that Beatty’s testimony satisfied
all pertinent statutory requirements. We agree with the State.
Statutory construction presents a question of law reviewed de novo. In re
Det. of R.H., 178 Wn. App. 941, 948, 316 P.3d 535 (2014). When construing a
statute, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used by
the legislature. In re Det. of T.A.H.-L., 123 Wn. App. 172, 183, 97 P.3d 767
(2004). Because the ITA affects liberty interests, it must be strictly construed. In
re Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Svcs., 181 Wn.2d 201, 207, 332 P.3d
423 (2014). But “we will not import requirements into the ITA when the plain
language of the statute demonstrates no legislative intent to impose such
requirements.” In re Det. of B.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 914, 920, 492 P.3d 837
(2021).
RCW 71.05.230 describes the steps that must be followed in filing a 14-
day commitment petition.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 82524-1-I
C.I. DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUN, J. — Cascade Behavioral Health Hospital (Cascade) petitioned for
a 14-day involuntary commitment of C.I. under the involuntary treatment act
(ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. The trial court denied C.I.’s motion to dismiss the petition
based on lack of statutory compliance and ordered commitment. C.I. appeals,
arguing that reversal is required because the individual who signed the petition
did not testify at the commitment hearing. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Police transported C.I. to the Swedish Edmonds emergency department
for a mental health evaluation after he left his adult family home and began
wandering in neighbors’ yards. At the time of his admission, C.I. was “agitated,
tangential, religiously preoccupied, and hypersexual.” A Snohomish County
designated crisis responder filed an emergency petition to detain C.I. for an initial
120-hour evaluation and treatment under RCW 71.05.153. Cascade later
petitioned for 14-day involuntary treatment, alleging that C.I. presented a
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 82524-1-I/2
likelihood of serious harm to others and that he was gravely disabled.1 The
petition was signed by Cascade staff member Patrick Swann and a second
individual whose name and title are illegible.
On March 31, 2021, the superior court held a probable cause hearing on
the 14-day commitment petition. C.I. was present at the outset of the hearing but
waived his presence soon after. The State presented three witnesses. Sirgut
Ashenaffi, the operator of the adult family home where C.I. resided, testified that
C.I. behaved appropriately at first but deteriorated into erratic behaviors over
time. The second witness, C.I.’s brother Justin Bedford, described similar
changes in C.I.’s behaviors during the same period and stated that this has
happened before.
The State’s third and final witness was Dr. Robert Beatty, a licensed
clinical psychologist who works for Cascade as a court evaluator. Beatty testified
that C.I. has a behavioral health disorder with a working diagnosis of
schizoaffective disorder and that the impairment has a substantial adverse effect
on C.I.’s cognitive and volitional functioning. In evaluating C.I.’s mental health,
Beatty reviewed C.I.’s medical records from Cascade, conferred with C.I.’s
treatment team, and observed the testimony of Ashenaffi and Bedford as well as
C.I.’s behavior in the courtroom. Beatty noted that C.I.’s behavioral health
1 RCW 71.05.020(24) defines “gravely disabled” as “a condition in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder: (a) Is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety; or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety.” A person is gravely disabled if either prong of the statute is met. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 202, 728 P.2d 138 (1986).
2 No. 82524-1-I/3
disorder presented with symptoms of both mania (elevated and labile mood,
hypersexuality, decreased sleep, and an elevation in goal-directed behavior) and
psychosis (delusions, hyperverbal and tangential speech, and disinhibited
behaviors). Beatty opined that, as a result of a mental disorder, C.I. posed a
substantial risk of harm to others and that he was gravely disabled under RCW
71.05.020(24)(a) and (b).
During cross-examination of Beatty, the State acknowledged that Swann
was the individual who filed the commitment petition. When C.I.’s attorney asked
whether Swann is a testifying court evaluator, Beatty explained, “He’s new. He
has been working with us for eight days, so he has not yet testified in a hearing.”
C.I.’s attorney moved to dismiss the petition because RCW 71.05.230 requires
that a petitioner be prepared to testify and that Swann, by Beatty’s own
admission, was not prepared to testify. The court denied the motion, stating that
Beatty’s testimony did not establish that Swann was unprepared to testify but
rather that Beatty was testifying because Swann was new.
At the end of the hearing, the court ruled that C.I. had a behavioral health
disorder and was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(24)(b). The court
ordered that C.I. be involuntarily committed for 14 days.
C.I. appeals.2
2 C.I. states that the appeal is not moot even though the commitment period has expired. The State does not dispute C.I.’s argument. We agree with C.I. See In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 626, 279 P.3d 897 (2012) (when orders have adverse consequences in future commitment proceedings, an appeal is not moot).
3 No. 82524-1-I/4
II. ANALYSIS
C.I. contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
because Swann, the individual who signed the 14-day commitment petition, was
not present at the hearing or prepared to testify in favor of commitment. C.I.
contends that this deficiency constituted a total disregard for the ITA, warranting
reversal of the commitment order. See RCW 71.05.010(2) (courts must focus on
the merits of a petition for involuntary commitment unless statutory requirements
were “totally disregarded”). The State responds that Beatty’s testimony satisfied
all pertinent statutory requirements. We agree with the State.
Statutory construction presents a question of law reviewed de novo. In re
Det. of R.H., 178 Wn. App. 941, 948, 316 P.3d 535 (2014). When construing a
statute, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used by
the legislature. In re Det. of T.A.H.-L., 123 Wn. App. 172, 183, 97 P.3d 767
(2004). Because the ITA affects liberty interests, it must be strictly construed. In
re Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Svcs., 181 Wn.2d 201, 207, 332 P.3d
423 (2014). But “we will not import requirements into the ITA when the plain
language of the statute demonstrates no legislative intent to impose such
requirements.” In re Det. of B.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 914, 920, 492 P.3d 837
(2021).
RCW 71.05.230 describes the steps that must be followed in filing a 14-
day commitment petition. Under RCW 71.05.230(1), a petition may be filed only
if “[t]he professional staff of the facility providing evaluation services has
analyzed the person's condition and finds that the condition is caused by a
4 No. 82524-1-I/5
behavioral health disorder and results in: (a) A likelihood of serious harm; (b) the
person being gravely disabled; or (c) the person being in need of assisted
outpatient behavioral health treatment; and are prepared to testify those
conditions are met.” RCW 71.05.230(4)(a)(i) further requires that the petition be
filed by “[t]he professional staff of the facility or the designated crisis responder”
and must be signed by “[o]ne physician, physician assistant, or psychiatric
advanced registered nurse practitioner” and “[o]ne physician, physician assistant,
psychiatric advanced registered nurse practitioner, or mental health
professional.”
C.I. contends that Beatty’s testimony established that Swann was not
“prepared” to testify, as required by RCW 71.05.230. We disagree. Absent any
specific statutory definition, words in a statute are given their plain ordinary
meaning ascertained from a standard dictionary. In re Marriage of Ruff and
Worthley, 198 Wn. App. 419, 425, 393 P.3d 859 (2017). “Prepare” means “to
make ready beforehand for some purpose: put into condition for a particular use,
application, or disposition.” W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1790 (1993). When asked why Swann was not testifying, Beatty explained that
Swann was new and had not yet testified at a hearing. Beatty did not state that
Swann was unqualified, incapable, or unprepared to do so.
We also reject C.I.’s argument that Beatty’s testimony was an inadequate
substitute for that of Swann. RCW 71.05.230 states that “the professional staff of
the facility providing evaluation services” must be prepared to testify. It also
specifies that the “professional staff” who sign the petition must fall into certain
5 No. 82524-1-I/6
categories. But nothing in the language of the statute suggests a requirement
that the professional staff member who signed the petition must testify at the
hearing. Such a limitation would create unnecessary delay while doing nothing
to further the determination of whether a patient is currently needing treatment.
See RCW 71.05.010(c) (legislative intent of ITA is to “provide prompt evaluation
and timely appropriate treatment of persons with serious behavioral health
disorders”).
C.I. says that In re Detention of K.R., 195 Wn. App. 843, 381 P.3d 158
(2016) is instructive, but that case is readily distinguishable. In K.R., the
designated mental health professional (DMHP) who sought K.R.’s detention
failed to consult an examining physician, as required by RCW 71.05.154. 195
Wn. App. at 847-48. Division Two of this court agreed with K.R. that reversal
was required because the DMHP exhibited “total disregard” for statutory
requirements. 195 Wn. App. at 848. Here, in contrast, there was actual
compliance with the applicable statute. RCW 71.05.230 does not require that the
author of the petition be the person who testifies. Beatty, a professional staff
member of the facility that evaluated C.I., properly testified at the hearing.
Thus, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: