IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE Respondent, No. 79607-1-I v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SEAVOY,
Appellant.
DWYER, J. — Christopher Michael Seavoy was convicted of child
molestation in the first degree and rape of a child in the first degree. On appeal,
he contends that his counsel’s representation during his sentencing was
constitutionally deficient, and that this substandard representation resulted in the
sentencing court rejecting his request to be sentenced under a special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA). Because Seavoy fails to show that he
was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, we affirm.
I
From August 2011 through October 2014, Seavoy sexually abused P.K.,
his then-girlfriend’s daughter. At the time, P.K. was between five and eight years
old. No. 79607-1-I/2
After learning about child abuse in school, P.K. reported what she had
endured to her teacher. The school referred the matter to Child Protective
Services, which then referred it to the Snohomish County Sheriff.
When interviewed by a detective, P.K. asserted that Seavoy had touched
her breasts and genitals. Seavoy had also made P.K. manually stimulate his
penis until he ejaculated. P.K. reported that this had happened many times
between 2011 and 2014. P.K. also reported that Seavoy once began to perform
oral sex on her, but that he stopped after P.K. asked him to quit.
The State charged Seavoy with child molestation in the first degree and
rape of a child in the first degree. He agreed to forego a jury trial in favor of a
stipulated bench trial on documentary evidence. This evidence included a pair of
statements in which Seavoy admitted that he had engaged in sexual contact and
sexual intercourse with P.K. The trial court found Seavoy guilty of both offenses.
Seavoy then sought a SSOSA, which would have significantly reduced the
amount of time that he would be incarcerated.
At Seavoy’s sentencing hearing, P.K.’s mother addressed the court. She
spoke about the harm Seavoy had done to her child and said, “I don’t think the
SSOSA is appropriate at all. I want justice served. . . . [I]f you give him a SSOSA
it says that his comfort and his new life is more important than my daughter’s
well-being, and how my daughter is going to grow up.”
During his allocution, Seavoy expressed his regret for what he had done
and his belief that it was important for him to take responsibility for his actions.
However, he also stated that during the time period when he molested P.K., he
2 No. 79607-1-I/3
was “battling a drug addiction and methamphetamines and coming out of steroid
use.”
Having heard these and other statements, the superior court denied
Seavoy’s request for a SSOSA. The court explained its decision, noting first that
Seavoy’s examination report did not contain his own version of the facts,
rendering it statutorily deficient. The court also expressed concerns about other
sections of the report that, while not statutorily deficient, could have contained
additional relevant information, particularly regarding Seavoy’s polygraph
examination.
The court further explained that “even if this report met the statutory
criteria, I would find that a SSOSA in this case is not appropriate for a variety of
different reasons.” It noted that Seavoy had linked his abuse of P.K. to his drug
addiction in his statement to the court. The court observed that this blame
shifting was in keeping with what the examiner’s report noted about Seavoy’s
personality type: that people with it “tend[] to blame others or the environment for
their problems.” The report also noted that Seavoy had what the court
characterized as “boundary and judgement issues related to sexual activity . . .
regardless of the abuse issues.” These factors, when considered alongside the
fact that the abuse “took place . . . over the protracted period of time and the
number of different types of instances that were referenced in the documentary
evidence,” led the court to find that “the risk to the community would be too
substantial to permit the defendant to be granted a SSOSA.”
3 No. 79607-1-I/4
Finally, the court observed that P.K.’s mother ardently opposed granting
Seavoy the SSOSA. The judge explained that “the statute is clear” that a judge
should give the victim’s opinion as to whether a SSOSA should be granted “the
most, the greatest weight.” Because the statute also provided that the mother
was herself a victim for sentencing purposes, the court gave the greatest weight
to her opinion.
The court summarized its decision by stating:
[Seavoy] abused his position of trust with this young child over a long period of time. He acted on impulse consistent with the personality issues addressed. The incidents themselves did not stop of his own volition but because the relationship ended. As a result of that, even if the report satisfied the statutory requirements, I would not grant the request for the SSOSA.
The court then sentenced Seavoy to serve 78 months of
confinement with a lifetime of community custody for the child molestation
conviction and 140 months of confinement with a lifetime of community
custody for the rape of a child conviction, with the sentences to be served
concurrently. These represented “intermediate” sentences within the
standard sentencing range.
Seavoy appeals.
II
Seavoy contends that he was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel during sentencing. This is so, Seavoy avers, because his
counsel failed to file necessary documentation that would have supported his
request for a SSOSA. We reject this contention. Seavoy cannot prove that he
suffered prejudice from his counsel’s failure to file additional documentation; the
4 No. 79607-1-I/5
court plainly stated that it based its decision on factors that the provision of the
missing documentation would not have altered.
Both the United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution
guarantee criminal defendants the assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend.
VI; W ASH. CONST. art I, § 22. The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the guarantee of assistance of counsel is, in fact, a “‘right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 n.14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970)). This right extends to all
critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing. State v. Robinson,
153 Wn.2d 689, 694, 107 P.3d 90 (2005).
Contentions of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel present
mixed questions of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. A.N.J, 168
Wn.2d 91, 109, 225 P.3d 956 (2010). We base our determination on the record
established in the superior court. In re Pers. Restraint of Hutchinson, 147 Wn.2d
197, 206, 53 P.3d 17 (2002).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE Respondent, No. 79607-1-I v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SEAVOY,
Appellant.
DWYER, J. — Christopher Michael Seavoy was convicted of child
molestation in the first degree and rape of a child in the first degree. On appeal,
he contends that his counsel’s representation during his sentencing was
constitutionally deficient, and that this substandard representation resulted in the
sentencing court rejecting his request to be sentenced under a special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA). Because Seavoy fails to show that he
was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, we affirm.
I
From August 2011 through October 2014, Seavoy sexually abused P.K.,
his then-girlfriend’s daughter. At the time, P.K. was between five and eight years
old. No. 79607-1-I/2
After learning about child abuse in school, P.K. reported what she had
endured to her teacher. The school referred the matter to Child Protective
Services, which then referred it to the Snohomish County Sheriff.
When interviewed by a detective, P.K. asserted that Seavoy had touched
her breasts and genitals. Seavoy had also made P.K. manually stimulate his
penis until he ejaculated. P.K. reported that this had happened many times
between 2011 and 2014. P.K. also reported that Seavoy once began to perform
oral sex on her, but that he stopped after P.K. asked him to quit.
The State charged Seavoy with child molestation in the first degree and
rape of a child in the first degree. He agreed to forego a jury trial in favor of a
stipulated bench trial on documentary evidence. This evidence included a pair of
statements in which Seavoy admitted that he had engaged in sexual contact and
sexual intercourse with P.K. The trial court found Seavoy guilty of both offenses.
Seavoy then sought a SSOSA, which would have significantly reduced the
amount of time that he would be incarcerated.
At Seavoy’s sentencing hearing, P.K.’s mother addressed the court. She
spoke about the harm Seavoy had done to her child and said, “I don’t think the
SSOSA is appropriate at all. I want justice served. . . . [I]f you give him a SSOSA
it says that his comfort and his new life is more important than my daughter’s
well-being, and how my daughter is going to grow up.”
During his allocution, Seavoy expressed his regret for what he had done
and his belief that it was important for him to take responsibility for his actions.
However, he also stated that during the time period when he molested P.K., he
2 No. 79607-1-I/3
was “battling a drug addiction and methamphetamines and coming out of steroid
use.”
Having heard these and other statements, the superior court denied
Seavoy’s request for a SSOSA. The court explained its decision, noting first that
Seavoy’s examination report did not contain his own version of the facts,
rendering it statutorily deficient. The court also expressed concerns about other
sections of the report that, while not statutorily deficient, could have contained
additional relevant information, particularly regarding Seavoy’s polygraph
examination.
The court further explained that “even if this report met the statutory
criteria, I would find that a SSOSA in this case is not appropriate for a variety of
different reasons.” It noted that Seavoy had linked his abuse of P.K. to his drug
addiction in his statement to the court. The court observed that this blame
shifting was in keeping with what the examiner’s report noted about Seavoy’s
personality type: that people with it “tend[] to blame others or the environment for
their problems.” The report also noted that Seavoy had what the court
characterized as “boundary and judgement issues related to sexual activity . . .
regardless of the abuse issues.” These factors, when considered alongside the
fact that the abuse “took place . . . over the protracted period of time and the
number of different types of instances that were referenced in the documentary
evidence,” led the court to find that “the risk to the community would be too
substantial to permit the defendant to be granted a SSOSA.”
3 No. 79607-1-I/4
Finally, the court observed that P.K.’s mother ardently opposed granting
Seavoy the SSOSA. The judge explained that “the statute is clear” that a judge
should give the victim’s opinion as to whether a SSOSA should be granted “the
most, the greatest weight.” Because the statute also provided that the mother
was herself a victim for sentencing purposes, the court gave the greatest weight
to her opinion.
The court summarized its decision by stating:
[Seavoy] abused his position of trust with this young child over a long period of time. He acted on impulse consistent with the personality issues addressed. The incidents themselves did not stop of his own volition but because the relationship ended. As a result of that, even if the report satisfied the statutory requirements, I would not grant the request for the SSOSA.
The court then sentenced Seavoy to serve 78 months of
confinement with a lifetime of community custody for the child molestation
conviction and 140 months of confinement with a lifetime of community
custody for the rape of a child conviction, with the sentences to be served
concurrently. These represented “intermediate” sentences within the
standard sentencing range.
Seavoy appeals.
II
Seavoy contends that he was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel during sentencing. This is so, Seavoy avers, because his
counsel failed to file necessary documentation that would have supported his
request for a SSOSA. We reject this contention. Seavoy cannot prove that he
suffered prejudice from his counsel’s failure to file additional documentation; the
4 No. 79607-1-I/5
court plainly stated that it based its decision on factors that the provision of the
missing documentation would not have altered.
Both the United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution
guarantee criminal defendants the assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend.
VI; W ASH. CONST. art I, § 22. The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the guarantee of assistance of counsel is, in fact, a “‘right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 n.14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970)). This right extends to all
critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing. State v. Robinson,
153 Wn.2d 689, 694, 107 P.3d 90 (2005).
Contentions of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel present
mixed questions of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. A.N.J, 168
Wn.2d 91, 109, 225 P.3d 956 (2010). We base our determination on the record
established in the superior court. In re Pers. Restraint of Hutchinson, 147 Wn.2d
197, 206, 53 P.3d 17 (2002). “[T]he defendant must show both (1) deficient
performance and (2) resulting prejudice to prevail on an ineffective assistance
claim.” State v. Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 457-58, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
While courts often determine whether a defense attorney’s performance
was deficient before addressing prejudice,
there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in [that] order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether
5 No. 79607-1-I/6
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
To establish that any errors made by his counsel were prejudicial, “[i]t is
not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Instead,
Seavoy must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 226, 743 P.2d 816 (1987) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694).
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Thomas, 109 Wn.2d at 226; [State v. ]Garrett, 124 Wn.2d [504,] 519[, 881 P.2d 185 (1994)]. In assessing prejudice, “a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to the law” and must “exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification’ and the like.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 34, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011).
A SSOSA allows a court to conditionally suspend the full sentence of a
qualifying sexual offender in favor of the defendant undergoing treatment, serving
a much shorter term of confinement, and serving the remaining sentence in
community custody. RCW 9.94A.670(4), (5). To be eligible for a SSOSA, the
defendant must have been convicted of a qualifying sex offense with a sentence
6 No. 79607-1-I/7
range that allows for confinement for less than 11 years. RCW 9.94A.670(2)(a),
(f). The defendant must have had an established relationship with the victim, and
the offense must not have resulted in substantial bodily harm to the victim. RCW
9.94A.670(2)(d), (e). The defendant also must not have any prior convictions for
sex offenses or recent adult convictions for violent offenses. RCW
9.94A.670(2)(b), (c).
If a defendant is eligible for a SSOSA, as all parties agree Seavoy was,
the court “may order an examination to determine whether the offender is
amenable to treatment.” RCW 9.94A.670(3). The resulting examination report
must contain, among other information, the offender’s version of the facts, “[a]n
assessment of problems in addition to alleged deviant behaviors,” and an
appraisal of the “offender’s amenability to treatment and relative risk to the
community.” RCW 9.94A.670(3)(a)(iii), (b).
After receipt of the reports, the court shall consider whether the offender and the community will benefit from use of this alternative, consider whether the alternative is too lenient in light of the extent and circumstances of the offense, consider whether the offender has victims in addition to the victim of the offense, consider whether the offender is amenable to treatment, consider the risk the offender would present to the community, to the victim, or to persons of similar age and circumstances as the victim, and consider the victim’s opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section.
RCW 9.94A.670(4).
The statute further requires that the court “give great weight to the victim’s
opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this
section.” RCW 9.94A.670(4). It also provides that the parent of a minor child
7 No. 79607-1-I/8
victim is herself a victim for the purposes of RCW 9.94A.670. RCW
9.94A.670(1)(c).
The sentencing court herein plainly stated its reasons for denying Seavoy
a SSOSA: P.K.’s mother’s expressed wishes, Seavoy’s underlying personality
issues—which suggested he posed a danger to the community—and the
examination report’s statutory inadequacies. Among these, the court
acknowledged that the statute required it to place “the most, the greatest weight”
on P.K.’s mother’s stated opinion that Seavoy should not receive the SSOSA.
The court then stated that it would have made the same decision “even if
the report satisfied the statutory requirements.” Because we presume that the
judge acted according to the law, and we exclude the possibility of arbitrariness
or caprice, we take the court at its word that a more complete report would not
have changed the outcome.1 Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 34 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694-95).
Seavoy does not establish that he was prejudiced by the fact that his
counsel did not provide more complete documentation.2 Thus, his contention
that he was deprived of his right to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel
fails. Estes, 188 Wn.2d at 457-58 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
1 For the same reasons, we also reject Seavoy’s contentions that his counsel’s failure to supply the court with a complete polygraph report or “any other documentary support for the SSOSA recommendation” prejudiced him. The court plainly stated that, as required by statute, it gave greatest weight to P.K.’s mother’s opinion that the request for a SSOSA should be rejected and stated that rectifying documentary deficiencies would not have changed the outcome. 2 Because Seavoy has not established that he suffered prejudice, we do not consider
whether his counsel’s conduct constituted constitutionally deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
8 No. 79607-1-I/9
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: