FILED MAY 21, 2020 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 36295-7-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) CHRISTOPHER LEE MURPHY, ) ) Appellant. )
PENNELL, C.J. — Christopher Murphy appeals his conviction for second degree
unlawful possession of a firearm. He argues the firearm should have been suppressed as
the fruit of an unlawful seizure. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS 1
Richland police responded to a Motel 6 after a clerk called 911. The clerk reported
a man and woman were refusing to leave the property after being denied a room. The pair
was associated with a distinctive pickup truck pulling a flatbed trailer. By the time the
police arrived, the man and woman were no longer at the motel. However, their truck was
observed across the street in a parking lot. Officers went to make contact.
1 The following facts are taken from the suppression hearing in Mr. Murphy’s case and the trial court’s factual findings. Mr. Murphy has not challenged the court’s findings. They are thus deemed verities on appeal. State v. Tamblyn, 167 Wn. App. 332, 336-37, 273 P.3d 459 (2012). No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
As law enforcement approached, the man from the truck started walking toward
the officers in an aggressive manner. The man was wearing baggy clothes and his hands
were in his pockets. Officers tried to keep their distance. The man was instructed to stop
and to keep his hands out of his pockets. The man stopped, but continued to move his
hands in and out of his pockets. The man was asked for his name and he stated he was
Christopher Murphy. At some point, the motel clerk called back to 911 and reported the
police were talking to the right person.
Officers ran Mr. Murphy’s name through dispatch. They discovered he had no
warrants, but his driver’s license was suspended and he had a prior felony conviction
rendering him ineligible to possess firearms. Officers began talking to Mr. Murphy about
the Motel 6 incident and other subjects, including his truck. Officers believed the truck
was similar to a suspicious vehicle reported the evening before, and possibly stolen.
Various items in the truck bed and an attached trailer were suggestive of stolen property.
During the interaction with the officers, Mr. Murphy was fidgety and continued to dig
around in his pockets despite repeated instructions to keep his hands out.
Mr. Murphy’s repeated behavior of placing his hands in his pockets caused the
officers to be concerned for their safety. Mr. Murphy was advised that if he continued to
disobey instructions to keep his hands visible, he would be handcuffed. Mr. Murphy did
not heed this warning. Officers then placed Mr. Murphy in handcuffs and performed a
2 No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
pat-down search. This search occurred approximately 19 minutes after the initial police
contact. The pat-down uncovered a firearm and Mr. Murphy was arrested for unlawful
possession of a firearm. The State later filed charges.
Prior to trial, Mr. Murphy filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing
the firearm had been unlawfully seized. The parties agreed Mr. Murphy “was detained
and was not free to leave within seconds of the initial contact” with the officers. Clerk’s
Papers at 53. The issue, therefore, was whether the 911 call and Mr. Murphy’s initial
reaction to law enforcement was sufficient to justify a seizure.
The trial court denied Mr. Murphy’s suppression motion. It held that reasonable
suspicion justified the initial police stop. In addition, Mr. Murphy’s continued
noncompliance with instructions and suspicious behavior provided adequate grounds
for prolonging the scope of the stop. The court subsequently found Mr. Murphy guilty of
unlawful firearm possession at a stipulated facts bench trial.
Mr. Murphy timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
Initial seizure
Mr. Murphy contends he was illegally seized because officers lacked reasonable
suspicion that he committed trespass, or any other crime, at the Motel 6. We disagree.
3 No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
Law enforcement may perform warrantless stops when faced with reasonable
suspicion that a person “has been or is about to be involved in a crime.” State v. Acrey,
148 Wn.2d 738, 746-47, 64 P.3d 594 (2003). Reasonable suspicion can be supported by
an informant’s tip, so long as it is reliable under the circumstances. State v. Z.U.E.,
183 Wn.2d 610, 618, 352 P.3d 796 (2015). A known citizen informant calling 911 to
report contemporaneous events is generally considered truthful. Navarette v. California,
572 U.S. 393, 399-400, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 188 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2014).
Mr. Murphy does not challenge the truthfulness of the motel clerk’s tip. He instead
argues the contents of the tip were insufficient to support an apparent crime of trespass.
See State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980). We disagree. The motel clerk
did not simply report that Mr. Murphy and his companion failed to leave. She clarified
Mr. Murphy refused to leave after being asked to do so “several times.” Report of
Proceedings (RP) (Aug. 2, 2018) at 6. Dispatch relayed this information to the responding
officers by noting Mr. Murphy was refusing to leave. These circumstances were sufficient
to create reasonable suspicion of trespass. RCW 9A.52.080 (trespass includes unlawful
entry or remaining on the premises of another); State v. Kutch, 90 Wn. App. 244, 247,
951 P.2d 1139 (1998) (authorized person may revoke an individual’s license to remain in
a building that is otherwise open to the public). The police did not need to investigate a
4 No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
possible defense to trespass before performing a stop. State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn.
App. 326, 331, 734 P.2d 966 (1987).
Scope of investigation
Mr. Murphy also appears to claim the officers improperly expanded the scope of
their investigation to include criminal activity other than trespass. 2 The State contends
the officers appropriately expanded their investigation due to Mr. Murphy’s suspicious
behavior, the appearance of the truck and trailer, and the brevity of the investigation.
We agree with the State.
A stop may be prolonged when interaction with a suspect “‘arouses further
suspicions.’” State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 785, 801 P.2d 975 (1990) (quoting
Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App. at 332). That is what happened here. Although officers
initially sought contact with Mr. Murphy in response to a fairly minor offense, Mr.
Murphy’s behavior quickly aroused suspicions that something more serious was afoot.
Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED MAY 21, 2020 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 36295-7-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) CHRISTOPHER LEE MURPHY, ) ) Appellant. )
PENNELL, C.J. — Christopher Murphy appeals his conviction for second degree
unlawful possession of a firearm. He argues the firearm should have been suppressed as
the fruit of an unlawful seizure. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS 1
Richland police responded to a Motel 6 after a clerk called 911. The clerk reported
a man and woman were refusing to leave the property after being denied a room. The pair
was associated with a distinctive pickup truck pulling a flatbed trailer. By the time the
police arrived, the man and woman were no longer at the motel. However, their truck was
observed across the street in a parking lot. Officers went to make contact.
1 The following facts are taken from the suppression hearing in Mr. Murphy’s case and the trial court’s factual findings. Mr. Murphy has not challenged the court’s findings. They are thus deemed verities on appeal. State v. Tamblyn, 167 Wn. App. 332, 336-37, 273 P.3d 459 (2012). No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
As law enforcement approached, the man from the truck started walking toward
the officers in an aggressive manner. The man was wearing baggy clothes and his hands
were in his pockets. Officers tried to keep their distance. The man was instructed to stop
and to keep his hands out of his pockets. The man stopped, but continued to move his
hands in and out of his pockets. The man was asked for his name and he stated he was
Christopher Murphy. At some point, the motel clerk called back to 911 and reported the
police were talking to the right person.
Officers ran Mr. Murphy’s name through dispatch. They discovered he had no
warrants, but his driver’s license was suspended and he had a prior felony conviction
rendering him ineligible to possess firearms. Officers began talking to Mr. Murphy about
the Motel 6 incident and other subjects, including his truck. Officers believed the truck
was similar to a suspicious vehicle reported the evening before, and possibly stolen.
Various items in the truck bed and an attached trailer were suggestive of stolen property.
During the interaction with the officers, Mr. Murphy was fidgety and continued to dig
around in his pockets despite repeated instructions to keep his hands out.
Mr. Murphy’s repeated behavior of placing his hands in his pockets caused the
officers to be concerned for their safety. Mr. Murphy was advised that if he continued to
disobey instructions to keep his hands visible, he would be handcuffed. Mr. Murphy did
not heed this warning. Officers then placed Mr. Murphy in handcuffs and performed a
2 No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
pat-down search. This search occurred approximately 19 minutes after the initial police
contact. The pat-down uncovered a firearm and Mr. Murphy was arrested for unlawful
possession of a firearm. The State later filed charges.
Prior to trial, Mr. Murphy filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing
the firearm had been unlawfully seized. The parties agreed Mr. Murphy “was detained
and was not free to leave within seconds of the initial contact” with the officers. Clerk’s
Papers at 53. The issue, therefore, was whether the 911 call and Mr. Murphy’s initial
reaction to law enforcement was sufficient to justify a seizure.
The trial court denied Mr. Murphy’s suppression motion. It held that reasonable
suspicion justified the initial police stop. In addition, Mr. Murphy’s continued
noncompliance with instructions and suspicious behavior provided adequate grounds
for prolonging the scope of the stop. The court subsequently found Mr. Murphy guilty of
unlawful firearm possession at a stipulated facts bench trial.
Mr. Murphy timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
Initial seizure
Mr. Murphy contends he was illegally seized because officers lacked reasonable
suspicion that he committed trespass, or any other crime, at the Motel 6. We disagree.
3 No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
Law enforcement may perform warrantless stops when faced with reasonable
suspicion that a person “has been or is about to be involved in a crime.” State v. Acrey,
148 Wn.2d 738, 746-47, 64 P.3d 594 (2003). Reasonable suspicion can be supported by
an informant’s tip, so long as it is reliable under the circumstances. State v. Z.U.E.,
183 Wn.2d 610, 618, 352 P.3d 796 (2015). A known citizen informant calling 911 to
report contemporaneous events is generally considered truthful. Navarette v. California,
572 U.S. 393, 399-400, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 188 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2014).
Mr. Murphy does not challenge the truthfulness of the motel clerk’s tip. He instead
argues the contents of the tip were insufficient to support an apparent crime of trespass.
See State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980). We disagree. The motel clerk
did not simply report that Mr. Murphy and his companion failed to leave. She clarified
Mr. Murphy refused to leave after being asked to do so “several times.” Report of
Proceedings (RP) (Aug. 2, 2018) at 6. Dispatch relayed this information to the responding
officers by noting Mr. Murphy was refusing to leave. These circumstances were sufficient
to create reasonable suspicion of trespass. RCW 9A.52.080 (trespass includes unlawful
entry or remaining on the premises of another); State v. Kutch, 90 Wn. App. 244, 247,
951 P.2d 1139 (1998) (authorized person may revoke an individual’s license to remain in
a building that is otherwise open to the public). The police did not need to investigate a
4 No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
possible defense to trespass before performing a stop. State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn.
App. 326, 331, 734 P.2d 966 (1987).
Scope of investigation
Mr. Murphy also appears to claim the officers improperly expanded the scope of
their investigation to include criminal activity other than trespass. 2 The State contends
the officers appropriately expanded their investigation due to Mr. Murphy’s suspicious
behavior, the appearance of the truck and trailer, and the brevity of the investigation.
We agree with the State.
A stop may be prolonged when interaction with a suspect “‘arouses further
suspicions.’” State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 785, 801 P.2d 975 (1990) (quoting
Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App. at 332). That is what happened here. Although officers
initially sought contact with Mr. Murphy in response to a fairly minor offense, Mr.
Murphy’s behavior quickly aroused suspicions that something more serious was afoot.
Mr. Murphy’s aggressive conduct, and noncompliance with instructions to keep his
hands out of his pockets, raised a reasonable concern that he was armed and posed a
current danger. See State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984).
2 Mr. Murphy’s brief focuses almost entirely on whether there was an initial basis for the stop. He does not specifically argue that, even if the stop was warranted at the outset, officers exceeded the proper scope.
5 No. 36295-7-III State v. Murphy
Nineteen minutes was not a particularly long period of detention, see id. at 741 n.4,
particularly given Mr. Murphy’s failure to provide consistent information about what
happened at the Motel 6. Indeed, Mr. Murphy’s companion testified she felt it was only a
“couple minutes” before Mr. Murphy was handcuffed. RP (Aug. 2, 2018) at 21. Given the
totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had sufficient justification for detaining
Mr. Murphy up through the pat-down search and seizure of the firearm.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Pennell, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ Korsmo, J.
______________________________ Fearing, J.