State of Washington v. Christopher Edward Dodson
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Opinion
FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39755-6-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) CHRISTOPHER EDWARD DODSON, ) ) Appellant. )
FEARING, J.P.T.† — In Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 219 L. Ed.
2d 420 (2024), the United States Supreme Court clarified that the confrontation clause
bars a testifying expert from relying on the work prepared by a nontestifying expert when
the testifying expert renders an opinion for the jury. In State v. Hall-Haught, 4 Wn.3d
810, 569 P.3d 315 (2025), the Washington Supreme Court, bound by United States
Supreme Court precedent, joined the nation’s high Court in the same ruling. In this case,
tried before the release of Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught, the trial court, over
the objection of appellant Christopher Dodson, allowed Washington State Patrol
† George B. Fearing, a retired judge of the Washington State Court of Appeals, is serving as a judge pro tempore of this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150(1). No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Toxicology Laboratory scientist Andrew Gingras to testify to blood content test results
emanating from tests conducted by a second scientist, Kelly Daniel, who did not testify.
On appeal, Dodson seeks reversal of his conviction for vehicular homicide based on a
State breach of the confrontation clause. The State, in turn, seeks to distinguish the facts
in Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught. This effort by the State demands that we
submerge ourselves into the intricacies of blood testing. Christopher Dodson also
contends the trial court should not have allowed into evidence any test results because of
the storing of blood in a vial beyond the vial’s expiration date.
We conclude that Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught control. Andrew
Gingras’ testimony breached the confrontation clause. We, nonetheless, find the error
harmless and affirm the conviction. We do not address the assignment of error stemming
from the toxicology laboratory’s use of an expired vial because Christopher Dodson did
not seek to exclude evidence at trial on this basis.
FACTS
The prosecution of Christopher Dodson arises from the death of his girlfriend,
Carrie Martin, from an automobile accident. The State alleged that Dodson drove the car,
in which Martin rode as a passenger. Because of Dodson’s right to remain silent, we
know little about events leading to the dreadful accident. Some evidence suggests that
both Carrie Martin and Dodson consumed methamphetamine and cannabis in the days
2 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
and hours before Martin’s demise.
We begin the story with testimony of those who approached the scene of the
accident after the tragedy. On March 6, 2021, at 3 a.m., William Sexton drove on
Government Way in Spokane County to begin his job as a truck driver. His wife Molly
accompanied him. The couple noticed a vehicle off the road and a man flagging them
down. William Sexton stopped his vehicle. The flagger, later identified as Christopher
Dodson, told the Sextons that he had walked along the road, saw the vehicle off the road,
and he noticed a female inside the vehicle. William Sexton examined the female
passenger. She had suffered a head injury, was unconscious, and lacked a pulse. Molly
Sexton called 9-1-1. The passenger was Carrie Martin. Dodson commented to the
Sextons that the couple “seem to have this [situation] under control.” Rep. of Proc. (RP)
at 441. Dodson announced he would leave the scene and allow the Sextons to care for
the predicament.
Law enforcement arrived on the scene before Christopher Dodson sauntered away.
Officers noticed Dodson’s vehicle was severely damaged, and one officer administered
CPR on Carrie Martin. Another officer approached Dodson, who declared that the driver
of the wrecked vehicle had jumped out of the car and exited the scene. Dodson, however,
later admitted he drove the automobile. Dodson initially told law enforcement that a deer
scampered across the road, and he swerved to avoid the animal. According to Dodson,
3 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
after he veered from the animal, his car struck a utility pole and a tree.
A later investigation at the accident scene revealed that Christopher Dodson did
not apply the car brakes. Tire impressions showed no sliding, skidding, or digging.
Other individuals gathered at the accident site. At trial, these witnesses testified
that Christopher Dodson exhibited slurred speech, droopy eyes, anxiety, and restlessness
that early morning. Dodson kept moving and repeatedly placed his hands in and out of
his sweatshirt pockets. One witness averred that Dodson smelled like alcohol, but
another witness avowed she did not smell alcohol.
Carrie Martin died at the location of the car accident. Blood testing revealed that
Martin’s blood contained methamphetamine, amphetamine, and gabapentin at the time of
her death. Nevertheless, authorities ruled the cause of death to be blunt-force injuries
from the accident.
Law enforcement transported Christopher Dodson from the accident situs to
Spokane County jail, where officers obtained a warrant to draw a sample of his blood.
On March 11, 2021, the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory received, from
law enforcement, two vials of Dodson’s blood for testing. We refer to the vials as vial A
and vial B.
The Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory has suffered contamination in
its laboratory environs. Brian Capron, a supervisor at the toxicology laboratory, testified,
4 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
at a motion to dismiss hearing, about the contamination history. According to Capron,
the toxicology laboratory utilized a portion of the annex of the Washington State Patrol’s
Crime Laboratory, a separate unit of the State Patrol. Four toxicology laboratory
scientists reviewed data at desks in the annex. The same scientists also performed
chemical extractions under a hood inside the annex. In October 2018, a test result in the
annex showed the presence of methamphetamine in a blood vial, whereas an earlier
screening of the same sample showed no presence. The laboratory performs an initial
screening to save money if that screening shows no suspected substance. If the screening
demonstrates a presence of a substance, the laboratory performs the more expensive test
that quantifies the amount of the controlled substance. In June 2019, additional testing
also showed discrepancies with regard to the presence of methamphetamine. The
laboratory ceased using the annex in June 2019. The laboratory’s accreditation, however,
never lapsed.
Laboratory contamination extended beyond the Washington State Patrol Criminal
Laboratory annex and to Hood 1 in the toxicology laboratory’s main area. The
toxicology laboratory ceased operations at Hood 1 for a time.
In 2020, the toxicology laboratory contracted with BioClean to scrub the
contamination from the annex. Because of the extent of the contamination, BioClean
cleaned at least twice. As of trial, an outside organization quarterly still tested the
5 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
laboratory for contamination.
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FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39755-6-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) CHRISTOPHER EDWARD DODSON, ) ) Appellant. )
FEARING, J.P.T.† — In Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 219 L. Ed.
2d 420 (2024), the United States Supreme Court clarified that the confrontation clause
bars a testifying expert from relying on the work prepared by a nontestifying expert when
the testifying expert renders an opinion for the jury. In State v. Hall-Haught, 4 Wn.3d
810, 569 P.3d 315 (2025), the Washington Supreme Court, bound by United States
Supreme Court precedent, joined the nation’s high Court in the same ruling. In this case,
tried before the release of Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught, the trial court, over
the objection of appellant Christopher Dodson, allowed Washington State Patrol
† George B. Fearing, a retired judge of the Washington State Court of Appeals, is serving as a judge pro tempore of this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150(1). No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Toxicology Laboratory scientist Andrew Gingras to testify to blood content test results
emanating from tests conducted by a second scientist, Kelly Daniel, who did not testify.
On appeal, Dodson seeks reversal of his conviction for vehicular homicide based on a
State breach of the confrontation clause. The State, in turn, seeks to distinguish the facts
in Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught. This effort by the State demands that we
submerge ourselves into the intricacies of blood testing. Christopher Dodson also
contends the trial court should not have allowed into evidence any test results because of
the storing of blood in a vial beyond the vial’s expiration date.
We conclude that Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught control. Andrew
Gingras’ testimony breached the confrontation clause. We, nonetheless, find the error
harmless and affirm the conviction. We do not address the assignment of error stemming
from the toxicology laboratory’s use of an expired vial because Christopher Dodson did
not seek to exclude evidence at trial on this basis.
FACTS
The prosecution of Christopher Dodson arises from the death of his girlfriend,
Carrie Martin, from an automobile accident. The State alleged that Dodson drove the car,
in which Martin rode as a passenger. Because of Dodson’s right to remain silent, we
know little about events leading to the dreadful accident. Some evidence suggests that
both Carrie Martin and Dodson consumed methamphetamine and cannabis in the days
2 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
and hours before Martin’s demise.
We begin the story with testimony of those who approached the scene of the
accident after the tragedy. On March 6, 2021, at 3 a.m., William Sexton drove on
Government Way in Spokane County to begin his job as a truck driver. His wife Molly
accompanied him. The couple noticed a vehicle off the road and a man flagging them
down. William Sexton stopped his vehicle. The flagger, later identified as Christopher
Dodson, told the Sextons that he had walked along the road, saw the vehicle off the road,
and he noticed a female inside the vehicle. William Sexton examined the female
passenger. She had suffered a head injury, was unconscious, and lacked a pulse. Molly
Sexton called 9-1-1. The passenger was Carrie Martin. Dodson commented to the
Sextons that the couple “seem to have this [situation] under control.” Rep. of Proc. (RP)
at 441. Dodson announced he would leave the scene and allow the Sextons to care for
the predicament.
Law enforcement arrived on the scene before Christopher Dodson sauntered away.
Officers noticed Dodson’s vehicle was severely damaged, and one officer administered
CPR on Carrie Martin. Another officer approached Dodson, who declared that the driver
of the wrecked vehicle had jumped out of the car and exited the scene. Dodson, however,
later admitted he drove the automobile. Dodson initially told law enforcement that a deer
scampered across the road, and he swerved to avoid the animal. According to Dodson,
3 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
after he veered from the animal, his car struck a utility pole and a tree.
A later investigation at the accident scene revealed that Christopher Dodson did
not apply the car brakes. Tire impressions showed no sliding, skidding, or digging.
Other individuals gathered at the accident site. At trial, these witnesses testified
that Christopher Dodson exhibited slurred speech, droopy eyes, anxiety, and restlessness
that early morning. Dodson kept moving and repeatedly placed his hands in and out of
his sweatshirt pockets. One witness averred that Dodson smelled like alcohol, but
another witness avowed she did not smell alcohol.
Carrie Martin died at the location of the car accident. Blood testing revealed that
Martin’s blood contained methamphetamine, amphetamine, and gabapentin at the time of
her death. Nevertheless, authorities ruled the cause of death to be blunt-force injuries
from the accident.
Law enforcement transported Christopher Dodson from the accident situs to
Spokane County jail, where officers obtained a warrant to draw a sample of his blood.
On March 11, 2021, the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory received, from
law enforcement, two vials of Dodson’s blood for testing. We refer to the vials as vial A
and vial B.
The Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory has suffered contamination in
its laboratory environs. Brian Capron, a supervisor at the toxicology laboratory, testified,
4 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
at a motion to dismiss hearing, about the contamination history. According to Capron,
the toxicology laboratory utilized a portion of the annex of the Washington State Patrol’s
Crime Laboratory, a separate unit of the State Patrol. Four toxicology laboratory
scientists reviewed data at desks in the annex. The same scientists also performed
chemical extractions under a hood inside the annex. In October 2018, a test result in the
annex showed the presence of methamphetamine in a blood vial, whereas an earlier
screening of the same sample showed no presence. The laboratory performs an initial
screening to save money if that screening shows no suspected substance. If the screening
demonstrates a presence of a substance, the laboratory performs the more expensive test
that quantifies the amount of the controlled substance. In June 2019, additional testing
also showed discrepancies with regard to the presence of methamphetamine. The
laboratory ceased using the annex in June 2019. The laboratory’s accreditation, however,
never lapsed.
Laboratory contamination extended beyond the Washington State Patrol Criminal
Laboratory annex and to Hood 1 in the toxicology laboratory’s main area. The
toxicology laboratory ceased operations at Hood 1 for a time.
In 2020, the toxicology laboratory contracted with BioClean to scrub the
contamination from the annex. Because of the extent of the contamination, BioClean
cleaned at least twice. As of trial, an outside organization quarterly still tested the
5 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
laboratory for contamination.
On May 4, 5, 7, and 25 and June 3, 2021, the Washington State Patrol Toxicology
Laboratory tested vial A, which revealed a methamphetamine level of 0.63 milligrams
per liter. This first vial’s blood carried a THC concentration of 3.3 nanograms per
milliliter. Andrew Gingras performed the test for methamphetamine in vial A. Kelly
Daniel performed the THC testing in the vial.
In May 2021, the toxicology laboratory continued to investigate ongoing
methamphetamine contamination. The testing for contamination continues today.
On May 26, 2022, the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory Lab tested
vial B, which revealed 0.049 milligrams per liter of amphetamine and 0.59 milligrams per
liter of methamphetamine. The testing result for THC in vial B echoed the result from
vial A. Kelly Daniel performed the testing for both the methamphetamine and THC.
Vial B’s expiration date was November 30, 2021, more than five months before the
toxicology laboratory tested its contents. Andrew Gingras opined at trial that the results
of vial A confirmed the accuracy of the results of vial B and vice versa.
With his motion to dismiss, Christopher Dodson filed a declaration by a
representative of Becton Dickinson (BD) in response to a subpoena. BD manufactures
the vials utilized by the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory. The declaration
proclaimed that BD guarantees its vials to accurately determine blood content up to the
6 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
date of expiration. The company, however, will not warrant the efficacy of a vial after
the expiration date.
Brian Capron, who testified about contamination at the toxicology laboratory, also
testified about the use of expired blood vials in response to Christopher Dodson’s motion
to dismiss. Capron explained that a vial does not automatically fail after it passes its
expiration date. He had not seen any data that indicated testing after the expiration date
would create unreliable results. Dodson did not object to Capron’s testimony regarding
the expiration date of vials.
In this appeal, the State of Washington argues that its forensic scientists, including
Kelly Daniel and Andrew Gingras, only place a vial of blood into a machine and push a
button when testing a blood sample for foreign substances. One of the State’s witnesses
promoted this simplistic view of the work of the scientist. Brian Capron averred that
“[y]ou place the vials on there, hit go, and the instrument does all the work.” RP at 28.
One might wonder if a trained, disinterested, and disinfected rhinoceros could then test
blood samples. Regardless, contrary to the State’s portrayal, evidence showed a
protracted process for testing blood at the Washington State Patrol Toxicology
Laboratory. Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory rules required that Kelly
Daniel exactingly follow protocol when administering the tests for Christopher Dodson’s
blood in vials A and B. The protocol employs procedures commonly accepted in the
7 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
scientific community.
The toxicology laboratory protocol demanded examination of Christopher
Dodson’s blood vials to confirm his blood lay inside. This examination of the label
extended to comparing its content with the police request for an analysis. Daniel next,
according to protocol, needed to transfer Dodson’s blood, with a dropper called a pipette,
into new vials. Use of the pipette enables the scientist to place the appropriate level of
blood into the new vials. Next, the protocol required the addition of solvent chemicals to
the blood to produce a concentrated extract for testing. If Daniel carelessly performed
one of these tasks, she risked contaminating the blood.
Toxicology laboratory protocol demanded that scientist Kelly Daniel use multiple
controls to test for machine error and contamination in order to prevent inaccurate blood
readings. Protocol required a blank sample to ensure no contamination. A blank sample
contains no substances and should generate no positive result for drugs. Protocol also
commanded that Daniel run a “negative control” or “internal standard,” a sample that
mimics the drug being tested. RP at 693-94. Finally, the laboratory standards insisted on
a “positive control” containing a known quantity of the drug being tested to confirm the
machine was properly calibrated. RP at 694.
After purportedly performing the series in the protocol, Kelly Daniel collected
initial measurements and results, known as raw data, that had yet to be interpreted.
8 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Daniel then prepared three pages of typed and handwritten notes, for each of the two vials
of Christopher Dodson’s blood, which included the raw data. As part of preparing the
notes, the toxicology laboratory protocol required Daniel to confirm calibrators and
controls being within acceptable range. Protocol then demanded peer review by another
person of Daniel’s testing and notes.
Kelly Daniel’s notes for vial A cover both THC and methamphetamine testing.
The notes for vial B cover only methamphetamine testing. The typed and handwritten
notes detailed the blank tests, working standards, controls, pipettes, and variables used by
Daniel. She signed and dated those notes.
At trial, Andrew Gingras testified that he reviewed Kelly Daniel’s paperwork.
Based on the paperwork, Gingras opined that Christopher Dodson’s blood samples
contained narcotics. Gingras authored the reports on the quantity of THC and
methamphetamine in Dodson’s system based on the data produced at least in part by
Daniel’s testing. Gingras also based his quantifications on information found in Daniel’s
notes about whether “positive controls” met the accepted criteria and about machine
calibration.
Andrew Gingras conducted the testing of the methamphetamine in the blood found
in vial A. Christopher Dodson does not challenge the results of that testing based on the
confrontation clause.
9 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
At trial, Andrew Gingras testified to the interaction of methamphetamine and
THC. According to Gingras, the combination of both drugs alters the physiology to a
greater extent than the sum of each drug operating separately.
At trial, Spokane County Sheriff’s Office Detective Jeffrey Welton testified that
Christopher Dodson, in a jail phone call, commented: “I know what’s in [Martin’s] blood.
I know what prescriptions she takes. We were both doing the same thing.” RP at 661.
Dodson added that he and Martin had used methamphetamine “up until the event for the
last couple of days, that he wasn’t doing a whole lot of it but had only taken about two or
three hits a day.” RP at 662. During the call, Dodson admitted he drove the car at the
time of the collision.
PROCEDURE
On March 9, 2021, the State of Washington charged Christopher Dodson with
vehicular homicide for killing Carrie Martin while operating a motor vehicle. The State
alleged Dodson committed the crime by any one of three alternative means: by driving
while under the intoxicating influence of a drug, by driving in a reckless manner, or by
driving with disregard for the safety of others.
Christopher Dodson moved the trial court to dismiss the charge of vehicular
homicide pursuant to CrR 8.3 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.
Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Dodson argued: (1) methamphetamine contamination at the
10 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory’s annex occurred, resulting in
governmental mismanagement; (2) the prosecution failed to preserve exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady by opening vial B and testing its blood contents in a
potentially contaminated facility; (3) the prosecution failed to preserve exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady when testing the contents of vial B after the vial’s
expiration date; and (4) the State failed to make relevant disclosure of defects in the tubes
used to store Dodson’s blood.
Christopher Dodson, in his motion to dismiss, did not argue that use of the expired
vial B violated the terms of RCW 46.61.506(3), which precludes the admission of blood-
test evidence unless testing was “performed according to methods approved by the state
toxicologist.” Nor did Dodson contend that use of an expired vial failed to conform to
any theory or principle that has achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community as demanded by Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013
(1923).
In response to Christopher Dodson’s motion to dismiss, the State argued that
Dodson could not show prejudice that impacted his right to a fair a trial. The State
asserted that remedial action taken by the Washington State Patrol Toxicology
Laboratory after the contamination and its current redundancy process showed the current
reliability of the laboratory. The State added that the contamination occurred in the
11 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
laboratory’s annex, which closed in 2019, years before the testing of vials A and B. The
State contended that the results of the methamphetamine level being the same in both
vials defeated Dodson’s claim that the State failed to preserve material exculpatory
evidence. Finally, the State argued it disclosed defects in tubes because it posted the
manufacturer’s recall notice on the Washington State Patrol website.
The superior court conducted a hearing on Christopher Dodson’s motion to
dismiss. Brian Capron, a supervisor at the toxicology laboratory, and Amanda Black, the
laboratory’s quality assurance manager, testified at the hearing. Capron did not
participate in the testing of Dodson’s blood. We previously narrated some of Capron’s
testimony.
The trial court denied Christopher Dodson’s motion to dismiss. According to
the court, Dodson could challenge the reliability of the toxicology laboratory results, but
he had failed to meet the high burden for the extraordinary remedy of dismissal under
CrR 8.3 or a lesser burden to suppress evidence. According to the trial court, the
laboratory had taken appropriate measures to clean the contaminated area of the
laboratory. According to the court, evidence attended to the vials did not exculpate
Dodson such that the State did not need to disclose information surrounding the vials.
The recall notice emphasized by Dodson concerned methanol, while the laboratory tested
Dodson’s blood for drugs. Also, the laboratory posted the recall notice on its website.
12 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
During trial, Christopher Dodson filed a motion to limit Andrew Gingras’
testimony to statements about methamphetamine in blood vial B. Conversely, Dodson
sought to preclude Gingras from testifying about test results for THC in vial A and
methamphetamine in vial B. Dodson argued that the toxicology results inculpated him.
Thus, the confrontation clause demanded that Kelly Daniel, the forensic scientist who
performed the toxicology analysis for THC in vial A and methamphetamine in vial B,
confront him such he might cross-examine her. According to Dodson, the confrontation
clause disabled Gingras from testifying about the process Dodson’s blood underwent,
data generated from the blood samples, or discretionary decisions Daniel made while
conducting her analysis.
The superior court entertained testimony from Andrew Gingras in response to
Christopher Dodson’s motion to eliminate much of Gingras’ testimony. We have already
outlined most of that testimony. In addition, however, Gingras insisted that he reviewed
and performed an independent analysis of the blood data generated by Kelly Daniel. He
did not detail what that review entailed. Gingras admitted he played no role in producing
the data.
In its oral ruling, the trial court mentioned the confusing and unstable nature and
the tortured history of the law meshing blood testing and the confrontation clause. The
court denied Dodson’s motion.
13 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Kelly Daniel never testified at trial.
Christopher Dodson’s expert, Ken Meneely, testified about Christopher Dodson’s
blood results. Meneely labeled the testing of the contents of vial A as a “failure” because
of contamination in the toxicology laboratory that caused corruption of the vial and its
contents. Meneely rejected the results of testing of the blood in vial B because the
laboratory violated its own protocol when failing to perform two independent tests.
The trial court instructed the jury on the three means by which it might convict
Christopher Dodson of the crime of vehicular homicide. Therefore, the State did not
necessarily need to prove that methamphetamine or THC impaired Christopher Dodson’s
driving at the time of the fatal accident. Two of the means did not require a controlled
substance in the blood.
During closing argument, the State devoted substantial time to convincing the jury
of Christopher Dodson’s driving impairment. After arguing at length about Dodson’s
impairment, the State mentioned alternative grounds for proving vehicular homicide.
But then the State inserted driving impairment as a factor in showing the alternative
means. The State insisted that Dodson acted rashly, heedlessly, or with indifference to
the consequences because he drove while knowing he had consumed methamphetamine
and smoked cannabis. According to the State, Dodson also acted with disregard to the
safety of Carrie Martin because he drove “with a whole spattering of chemicals in [his]
14 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
system that [were] clearly affecting [him].” RP at 844. The State throughout its closing
argument emphasized the blood test results to demonstrate Dodson’s driving while
impaired by chemicals.
The jury found Christopher Dodson guilty of vehicular homicide. The jury did not
decide in the verdict under which alternative means Dodson committed the crime. The
superior court sentenced Dodson to 90 months imprisonment and ordered him to pay a
$500 victim penalty assessment.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, Christopher Dodson argues the State violated his constitutional right to
confront witnesses against him when the trial court permitted Andrew Gingras to testify
to blood test results created by the work of Kelly Daniel. Dodson also contends the trial
court erred when it allowed the jury to hear about test results from blood that came from
a vial whose life span had ended. Finally, Dodson maintains the trial court erred when
imposing a victim penalty assessment because of his indigency. Assuming we agree with
Dodson on one of his first two assignments of error, we must determine whether the error
was harmless. If harmful, we would reverse Dodson’s conviction.
Confrontation Clause
On appeal, Christopher Dodson argues that the testimony of Andrew Gingras
violated his rights under the confrontation clauses of both the United States and the
15 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Washington State Constitutions. According to Dodson, Gingras served as a surrogate
witness for toxicologist Kelly Daniel, who incriminated him through her testing of his
blood and her notation of the results of the testing. Gingras did not conduct the testing of
the THC found in vial A or the THC and methamphetamine found in Vial B. Dodson
complains that, because the person who tested the THC in vial A and both substances in
vial B did not appear at trial, he could not effectively challenge, by cross-examination,
the validity of the blood test results.
In response, the State downplays any independent judgment exercised by Kelly
Daniel when performing her testing. The State claims that Andrew Gingras, when
testifying to the quantity of the THC and methamphetamine found in the blood, obtained
the numbers from a machine, not from Kelly Daniel. Therefore, Andrew Gingras’
testimony did not form hearsay and did not violate the confrontation clause.
The United States Constitution states that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Washington State Constitution provides the accused the
right “to meet the witnesses against him face to face.” CONST. art. I, § 22. Washington
courts refer to these equivalent provisions collectively as the confrontation clause. The
Washington State Supreme Court applies the state constitution’s clause consistent with
the reading of the federal confrontation clause. State v. Lui, 179 Wn.2d 457, 469, 315
16 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
P.3d 493 (2014), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Hall-Haught, 4 Wn.3d 810, 569
P.3d 315 (2025). This court reviews de novo an alleged violation of the confrontation
clause. State v. Hall-Haught, 4 Wn.3d 810, 816 (2025).
The confrontation clause vindicates the right of cross-examination. State v.
Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441, 456, 957 P.2d 712 (1998). According to the United States
Supreme Court, the confrontation clause ensures the reliability of evidence against a
criminal defendant by subjecting the evidence to rigorous testing in the context of an
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845,
110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).
The confrontation clause’s prohibition applies only to testimonial hearsay. Smith
v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 784, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 219 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2024). Thus, two
predicates apply to the confrontation clause. First, the challenged testimony must be
testimonial. Second, the testimony must be hearsay. Sometimes the courts conflate the
two concepts without knowing it is doing so. We address each requirement separately.
We then address whether the error in admitting the testimony of Andrew Gingras was
harmless.
Issue 1: Was the testimony of Andrew Gingras as to the level of THC and
methamphetamine in vial B and the level of THC in vial A testimonial?
Answer 2: Yes.
17 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
We do not value the cavalier attitude to which the State, in this appeal, has
approached the question of whether Andrew Gingras’ testimony was testimonial. In its
opening brief, the State once, if not twice, conceded the challenged testimony is
testimonial. On page 39 of the brief, the State wrote: “Although the statements at issue
were testimonial, they were not hearsay. . . .” On page 57 of the brief, the State wrote
that the blood test results arguably were testimonial because of being created for an
evidentiary purpose. But the State informed the court it need not address the testimonial
nature of the blood test results because the evidence was not hearsay. Then in a
statement of additional authorities, the State first suggested the record may not be
sufficient to adjudicate the question of the testimonial nature of the challenged testimony.
Taken literally, the confrontation clause should preclude the State from
introducing any person’s testimony through the testimony of another. Every person’s
testimony should be under oath and cross-examined, not entered through a spokesperson
without firsthand knowledge of the content of the testimony. Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 851 (1990). Christopher Dodson claims that Andrew Gingras bespoke the
testimony of Kelly Daniel when Gingras told the jury the results of tests performed by
Daniel. He complains that Daniel never underwent the witness oath. Nevertheless,
perhaps perverting the term “testimony,” a testifying witness may repeat for the jury out-
of-court statements of someone else as long as confrontation clause jurisprudence does
18 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
not deem the statements “testimonial” in nature.
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177
(2004), the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of an out-of-court recorded
statement by a third person, which implicated Michael Crawford, and held that the
confrontation clause barred its admission because the statement was “testimonial.” Based
on a reading of the confrontation clause text and the history behind the clause, the Court
reasoned that the confrontation clause applies to “witnesses” against the accused, that is
those who “bear testimony.” 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). Thus, the Supreme Court
concluded that the confrontation clause was primarily concerned with testimonial
statements. Statements become testimonial if made for the primary purpose of
establishing or proving past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006).
Even hearsay with an applicable exception becomes inadmissible in violation of the
clause if it is testimonial hearsay. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006).
Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington advise generally how to assess
a statement as testimonial. Statements made under circumstances that would lead an
objective person to reasonably believe the statement would be available for use at a later
trial are testimonial. State v. Hall-Haught, 4 Wn.3d 810, 819 (2025). When the out-of-
court declaration passes as a casual statement made to a friend, it is nontestimonial.
19 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
The United States Supreme Court has held that testimonial certificates of the
results of forensic analysis are created under circumstances that would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe the results would be available for use at a later trial.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314
(2009). Kelly Daniel performed her tests and reached her results for the sole purpose of
presenting the information in court.
Even if a witness imparts facts to the court, the witness is not a witness for
purposes of the confrontation clause unless those facts inculpate the defendant. State v.
Lui, 179 Wn.2d 457, 480-81, 315 P.3d 493 (2014), abrogated on other grounds by State
v. Hall-Haught, 4 Wn.3d 810, 569 P.3d 315 (2025); City of Seattle v. Wiggins, 23 Wn.
App. 2d 401, 410, 515 P.3d 1029 (2022). The State impliedly concedes that the blood
test results incriminate Christopher Dodson. The State rested its quest for a guilty verdict
on the blood tests’ recording of palpable amounts of THC and methamphetamine.
Issue 2: Is the data created by Kelly Daniel hearsay when testified to by Andrew
Gingras?
Christopher Dodson’s appeal concerns statements made by a scientist during
chemical testing, some of which statements the scientist placed in notes. Courts,
20 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
including the United States Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court, have
struggled to apply the confrontation clause to the common situation when one scientist
testifies to test results from a test conducted by another scientist. This struggle has
engendered the question of whether the testing scientist’s work and notes constitute
hearsay. Typically, the testifying scientist reviewed the test results or functioned as the
supervisor of the testing scientist.
A decade ago, testifying expert witnesses could rely on technical data prepared by
others when reaching their own conclusions without requiring each laboratory technician
to take the witness stand. State v. Lui, 179 Wn.2d 457, 483, 315 P.3d 493 (2014). This
rule echoed ER 703, which allows an expert to rely on information, on which experts
typically rely, even if the information would not otherwise be admissible at trial. The
confrontation clause scope did not sweep in analysts whose only role was to operate a
machine or add a reagent to a mixture. State v. Lui, 179 Wn.2d 457, 480 (2014). In
Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 219 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2024), the nation’s
high Court shifted its analysis in this setting, which, in turn, caused a shift in this state
high court’s analysis. In fairness to Christopher Dodson’s trial court, the respective
courts issued their decisions after Dodson’s trial.
As the law stands now, the confrontation clause’s bar of testimonial statements of
an absent witness applies in full to forensic evidence. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779,
21 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
783, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 219 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2024). Thus, a prosecutor cannot introduce an
absent laboratory analyst’s testimonial out-of-court statements to prove the results of
forensic testing. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 783 (2024); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307, 329, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009). The
prohibition operates when an expert relays an absent lab analyst’s statement as part of
offering his opinion. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 783 (2024). A State may not
introduce one lab analyst’s written findings through the testimony of another.
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 651-52, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610
(2011). The State’s use of a substitute or surrogate expert, who did not participate in any
relevant scientific testing, violates the accused’s confrontation clause rights and requires
reversal. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 219 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2024).
The confrontation clause bars one scientist from testifying to the results of another
scientist’s work because the surrogate witness lacks percipient knowledge of what the
certifying analyst comprehended or observed about the particular test and testing process.
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661 (2011). Also, lab tests remain subject to
the risk of manipulation or mistake. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318
(2009). When the State elects to introduce the certification of test results, its author—and
not any substitute—becomes the witness that the defendant has the right to confront.
Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 786 (2024). The jury cannot decide whether the
22 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
surrogate expert’s opinion is credible without evaluating the truth of the factual assertions
on which it is based. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 796 (2024).
An initial review of the principles emanating from Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779
(2024), suggest that the trial court erred when allowing Andrew Gingras to testify to the
measurements of the THC levels in blood vials A and B and the methamphetamine level
in blood vial B. The State, nonetheless, implores the court to reject the application of the
Smith rules to Christopher Dodson’s prosecution because of distinguishing facts. The
State also insists that the facts in the Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision of
State v. Hall-Haught, 4 Wn.3d 810 (2025), which follows Smith v. Arizona, materially
diverge. Thus, we dissect the facts in both Smith and Hall-Haught as well as this court’s
decision in City of Seattle v. Wiggins, 23 Wn. App. 2d 401, 515 P.3d 1029 (2022).
Before Smith v. Arizona, this court resolved City of Seattle v. Wiggins, 23 Wn.
App. 2d 401 (2022). This court held that the testing toxicologist, Christie Mitchell-Mata,
rather than the reviewing analyst, Brian Capron, was the necessary witness against
Roosevelt Wiggins because the toxicologist actually performed the blood test that created
the incriminating evidence against Wiggins. The blood alcohol content number found by
the toxicologist inculpated Wiggins. Mitchell-Mata’s work included handling, preparing,
and testing the samples; interpreting the data in real time; and running additional testing
as necessary. After completing the testing and initial review process, Mitchell-Mata
23 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
prepared a final report of her results and conclusions. Brian Capron signed the final
report as the “reviewer.” Because the State presented only the reviewing analyst to
testify at trial and the analyst was not the “witness against” Wiggins, the court reversed
Wiggins’ conviction. Wiggins could not cross-examine the person who made
discretionary decisions during the testing process. This court noted the numerous
subjective and human factors that exist when testing that the testifying analyst did not
personally observe and could not discuss or defend.
In Christopher Dodson’s prosecution, Andrew Gingras reviewed Kelly Daniel’s
notes for methamphetamine and THC in vial B and her notes for the THC for vial A
without any participation in the testing. Gingras relied on those notes when testifying to
the accuracy of the measurement of the THC and methamphetamine levels in Dodson’s
blood. As in City of Seattle v. Wiggins, the laboratory test results inculpated Dodson.
The State of Washington emphasizes that Kelly Daniel never prepared a report,
while Christie Mitchell-Mata, the toxicologist conducting the test, prepared the report for
Roosevelt Wiggins’ blood test. Andrew Gingras, the reviewing analyst, unlike Brian
Capron, the reviewing analyst in City of Seattle v. Wiggins, prepared the only report.
Thus, the State considers the author of the report and only the author to be the witness
against the accused who the law permits or needs to testify. This court, in City of Seattle
v. Wiggins, never focused on the author of the report, however. The court focused on the
24 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
person conducting the test and the need to cross-examine the testing process. The United
States Supreme Court, in Smith v. Arizona, and the Washington Supreme Court, in State
v. Hall-Haught, also concentrated on the confrontation clause’s demand that the accused
cross-examine the person who performed the test leading to the inculpatory toxicology
measurements.
Two years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided Smith v. Arizona, 602
U.S. 779 (2024). The State of Arizona convicted Jason Smith of drug offenses. The state
crime lab tested drugs seized from Smith. Lab analyst Elizabeth Rast performed the
testing, generated typed notes, and prepared a signed report documenting her results. The
report, in addition to outlining the procedures she followed, included Rast’s conclusion
that the items were methamphetamine and cannabis. Rast did not testify at trial. Instead,
the State called Greggory Longoni, a forensic scientist with no prior connection to
Smith’s case to provide a purported independent opinion on the drug testing performed
by Rast. The Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause’s prohibition on
testimonial statements admitted at trial applies in full to forensic evidence. The Court
also rejected the view that, when an expert recites another analyst’s statements as the
basis of his opinion, the confrontation right is not implicated. The Court emphasized that
the State admitted the test results for their truth. The State may not introduce the test
results through a surrogate analyst who did not participate in their creation, even if the
25 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
surrogate analyst presents the out-of-court statements as the basis for his own expert
opinion.
In Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), the United States Supreme Court wrote
that the State of Arizona impliedly argued that every testimonial lab report could come
into evidence through any trained surrogate, however remote from the case. Such a rule
would arrogate an accused’s right to cross-examine the testing analyst about what she
did, how she did it, and whether her results should be trusted. Arizona’s position
amounted to an end run around the confrontation clause.
The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Hall-Haught, 3 Wn.3d 810, 569 P.3d
315 (2025), revisited the issue of whether the State breaches the confrontation clause
when it admits forensic test results into evidence without testimony from the lab analyst
who conducted the testing. Based on Smith v. Arizona, the court answered: yes. The
court noted that Smith abrogated in part its decision in State v. Lui.
Samantha Hall-Haught’s car collided head-on with Kyra Hall’s vehicle. The
impact popped Hall-Haught’s car’s trunk open. Drug paraphernalia spewed onto the
road. A law enforcement officer, armed with a search warrant, drew blood from Hall-
Haught, who reposed in the hospital. Hall-Haught’s lab results showed 1.5±0.40
nanograms per milliliter of THC in her blood. The State charged Hall-Haught with
vehicular assault under RCW 46.61.502.
26 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
At Samantha Hall-Haught’s jury trial, the State called Katie Harris, a supervisor
with the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory, who testified that she did not
test the blood samples, but reviewed and signed the lab report of Hall-Haught’s blood
samples testing. Forensic analyst Mindy Krantz performed the toxicology examination
and produced the report on Hall-Haught’s blood samples. Hall-Haught objected to
Harris’ testimony. Hall-Haught argued that introducing the test results without the
testimony of Krantz violated her right to confront and cross-examine a witness against
her. The trial court admitted the lab test results. The trial court followed the Washington
Supreme Court’s former ruling, in State v. Lui, that an expert witness could testify to her
own conclusions even when relying on data prepared by a nontestifying technician.
On appeal, the State contended that Katie Harris testified to her independent
conclusion and therefore her testimony did not violate the confrontation clause.
Additionally, the State asserted that Harris’ independent opinion was not hearsay because
the opinion did not convey another analyst’s out-of-court statements. Instead, Harris
supervised Mindy Krantz’s work from the start of the case and also reviewed the sample
testing before approving the release of the test results.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed Samatha Hall-Haught’s conviction
because of the violation of the confrontation clause. During her trial testimony, Harris
referred to the toxicology test report. Harris relied on Krantz’s test results and Krantz’s
27 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
confirmation that she followed standard protocol during the testing.
The State argues that forensic scientist Kelly Daniel never formulated an opinion
or analysis. But the State does not explain the relevance of the contention. The
confrontation clause bars Andrew Gingras from testifying to the product of Daniel’s work
not because it may or may not result in the construction of an opinion by Daniel, but
because Daniel, not Gingras, possesses the percipient knowledge of how she performed
the testing.
The State emphasizes that Andrew Gingras reviewed Kelly Daniel’s work before
forming his own opinions. Yet, Katie Harris did the same with Mindy Krantz’s work.
Katie Harris also reviewed the sample testing before approving the release of the test
results. Andrew Gingras may have even finalized some of the testing. Nevertheless, like
Katie Harris, Andrew Gingras relied on Kelly Daniel’s confirmation in her notes that she
followed standard protocol during the testing. Gingras would not have testified to the
blood test results without the confirmation from Daniel.
The State argues that the question of whether Kelly Daniel followed protocol
when performing her testing goes to foundation or authenticity. We do not respond to
this argument. Assuming Christopher Dodson could exclude the testing results reached
by Kelly Daniel on foundational grounds, the law would not preclude him from asserting
other grounds such as the confrontation clause.
28 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Despite the teachings of Smith v. Arizona and State v. Hall-Haught, the State
continues to insist that the methamphetamine and THC data was not hearsay by
employing evidence rules and decisions outside the context of the confrontation clause.
According to the State, the liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry machine, not Kelly
Daniel, generated the raw data. The State cites numerous foreign decisions for the
proposition that a litigant may introduce at trial information automatically produced by a
machine without the constraints of the hearsay rule. The State contends that only
statements uttered by someone outside the court or information created by a person other
than the witness falls within the confines of the hearsay rule. ER 801(a) defines a
“statement” as “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it
is intended by the person as an assertion.” (Emphasis added.)
The State too narrowly regurgitates the contentions asserted by Christopher
Dodson. Dodson does not only complain about Andrew Gingras testifying about the
THC and methamphetamine levels discerned from the work performed by Kelly Daniel.
Dodson complains that, for Gingras to opine to an accurate end result, Gingras must
assume that Daniel engaged in no fraud or mistakes during the process she undertook.
Dodson complains that the trial court allowed the State’s witness to testify to the end
result being correct without his being able to cross-examine the person primarily
responsible for the accuracy of the journey to the end. Dodson murmurs that Gingras
29 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
relied on Daniel’s representations that she silently uttered when performing her work
accordance to protocol. Dodson was unable to question Daniel. The United States
Supreme Court in Smith v. Arizona particularly called foul to the practice of the State
sheltering the analyst from cross-examination by calling as a trial witness another
scientist who later reviewed the work of the analyst.
The foreign decisions, on which the State relies, all concern the automatic
response of a machine to an external stimulus, when this response cannot be manipulated
by a human being. For example, in State v. Ziegler, 855 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. Ct. App.
2014), the Minnesota court ruled that the State’s introduction of data from a car’s sensing
and diagnostic module (SDM) did not violate the confrontation clause. Contrary to the
State of Washington’s suggestion, Ziegler did not implicate the hearsay rule. The module
was a type of “event data recorder” that collected and recorded information such as
vehicle speed, engine speed, and brake-switch activation. No one could finesse the data
recorded.
The Minnesota court, in State v. Ziegler, distinguished its circumstances from the
circumstances when a human person performs a test or analysis. The Minnesota courts
had consistently ruled a laboratory technician’s report to be testimonial such that the
State needed to call that technician to testify at trial rather than someone else connected
to the laboratory.
30 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
In its legal analysis, the State characterizes Kelly Daniel’s task as merely loading
vials into the machine and “hitting go.” In our statement of facts, we delineated the
extensive tasks that Daniel performed that renders the State’s characterization fictitious.
For example, in her notes, Kelly Daniel wrote about pipettes, solvents, and control
samples she used to protect against miscalibration and contamination. Her signature at
the bottom of the notes testified that she employed the pipettes, solvents, and controls in
her testing. Gingras reached his opinion as to the amount of methamphetamine and THC
in Dodson’s blood in part on these statements of Daniel.
Cross-examining Kelly Daniel loomed important to Christopher Dodson for other
reasons. Dodson wanted to question Daniel as to whether she noticed that vial B had
expired when she performed the testing. The answer to that question could have
prompted other important questions. Dodson wanted to ask whether the vial or the
rubber cap had degraded due to its expiration. Dodson wanted to inquire whether the
expired vial contained the required anticoagulants and enzyme poisons.
Issue 3: Was the violation of Andrew Gingras right to confrontation harmless?
Answer 3: Yes.
The State asks us to affirm Christopher Dodson’s conviction regardless of a
confrontation clause violation on the basis of harmless error. We do so.
An error in a trial does not merit reversal unless the error prejudiced the defendant.
31 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
State v. Grenning, 169 Wn.2d 47, 57, 234 P.3d 169 (2010); State v. Cunningham, 93
Wn.2d 823, 831, 613 P.2d 1139 (1980). Confrontation clause errors are subject to a
harmless-error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431,
89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986); State v. Wilcoxon, 185 Wn.2d 324, 335-36, 373 P.3d 224
(2016).
The test of harmless error differs depending on whether the error was
constitutional or nonconstitutional in nature. Christopher Dodson suffered constitutional
error. With a constitutional error, this court presumes prejudice. State v. Anderson, 19
Wn. App. 2d 556, 564, 497 P.3d 880 (2021). We then apply the harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. State v. Nist, 77 Wn.2d 227, 234, 461 P.2d 322 (1969). We
place this heavy burden on the State to deter conduct that undermines the principle of
equal justice. State v. Jackson, 195 Wn.2d 841, 856, 467 P.3d 97 (2020).
One month ago, the Washington Supreme Court clarified the state’s constitutional
harmless error test in State v. Magana-Arevalo, No. 103586-1 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1035861.pdf. On that same day, the Supreme
Court applied the same test in State v. Wasuge, No. 103530-6 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1035306.pdf. One might wonder if Washington
courts should utilize the constitutional harmless error test employed by the United States
Supreme Court when trial error consists of a violation of the federal Constitution,
32 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
including the confrontation clause. Indeed, United States Supreme Court precedent
established minimum requirements state courts must follow in evaluating constitutional
error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705
(1967). A state, however, remains free to afford greater protections to its citizens than
required by Chapman and classify fewer such violations as harmless. Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 81, 103 S. Ct. 969, 74 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1983) (plurality opinion);
Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405-06, 383 A.2d 155 (1978). The Washington
Supreme Court deems this state’s constitutional harmless error test consistent with the
federal test. State v. Magana-Arevalo, slip op. at 36.
In State v. Magana-Arevalo, the Washington high court noted that it has used
different language to describe the test for deciding constitutional harmless error. The
court stated that some litigants, including Cristian Magana-Arevalo, have asserted that
the court promotes two separate and inconsistent tests. One iteration of the harmless
error rule has demanded that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
verdict did not rely on the error, known as the contribution test. State v. Lui, 179 Wn.2d
457, 495 (2014), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hall-Haught, 4 Wn.3d 810
(2025). Another replication has employed what was known as the overwhelming
untainted evidence test and looked to the untainted evidence to determine if it is so
overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt. State v. Anderson, 171
33 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Wn.2d 764, 770, 254 P.3d 815 (2011); State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 426, 705 P.2d
1182 (1985).
The court, in State v. Magana-Arevalo, insisted it has employed the same
assessment in practice by combining the two tests. The court, nonetheless, clarified the
test. Under the proper analysis, the reviewing court must consider whether the State has
carried its burden of proving that a constitutional error, like the unconstitutional
admission of evidence, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by considering both (1) the
strength of the properly admitted evidence of guilt as well as (2) the inculpatory or
prejudicial impact of the unconstitutionally admitted evidence on even the properly
admitted evidence. The court must then ask whether, considering both the properly
admitted evidence and the impact of the improperly admitted evidence, the State has
proved the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Stated less verbosely, the
reviewing court must ask whether the State has proved the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, considering both the strength of the properly admitted evidence of guilt
and the prejudicial impact of the erroneously admitted evidence on even the properly
admitted evidence.
A majority of this court’s panel faults the harmless error doctrine for two reasons.
First, a court in a jury trial should not be weighing evidence to determine the guilt of the
accused. The harmless error doctrine turns this reviewing court into a super-jury or
34 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
factfinder of guilt. Second, the test of harmless error includes the concept of how a
reasonable jury would vote if the trial had not been contaminated by error. But many
accused are acquitted because one or more jurors consider the facts or law unreasonably.
The harmless error doctrine removes this benefit from the accused.
Before channeling the Magana-Arevalo test, we review the assertions forwarded
by the State and Christopher Dodson. The State contends that Christopher Dodson’s
appearance and behavior at the accident scene confirmed his having partaken in illicit
substances such that evidence of Kelly Daniel’s test results added little to the prosecution.
Dodson’s muscles appeared rigid and stiff. Dodson used rapid speech and did not remain
still. His eyelids drooped.
Christopher Dodson meets the contention of the State by characterizing eyewitness
testimony as imprecise evidence. Those who observed him did so in the darkness of
3:00 a.m. Dodson complains that the inadmissible toxicology evidence bolstered this
inexact eyewitness evidence. Dodson adds that his erratic behavior at the scene of the
crash conformed as much to the conduct of one involved in a fatal collision as one under
the influence of drugs. According to Dodson, his behavior also understandably resulted
from the presence of numerous law enforcement officers at the collision location and
anxiety at being questioned by the officers.
35 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
The State highlights that Christopher Dodson admitted the use of
methamphetamine and alcohol during a jail call. Therefore, according to the State, the
jury would have convicted Dodson even without Daniel’s testing. Dodson responds that
his phone admission was vague. He confessed he had taken “two or three hits” of
methamphetamine per day before the accident. RP at 662. He did not expressly concede
the use of methamphetamine on March 5 or 6. Kelly Daniel’s testing did not confirm
alcohol in Dodson’s blood. A responding officer smelled no alcohol on Dodson.
The State underscores that Christopher Dodson ignores his comment on the phone
that his methamphetamine would be the same level as Carrie Martin’s level. Dodson’s
remark confirms that he knew he was influenced while driving in the early morning
hours.
The State argues that, because Andrew Gingras conducted the methamphetamine
testing on Christopher Dodson’s vial A, the jury could convict solely on those
unchallenged methamphetamine results. The State notes that it did not need to prove
Dodson under the influence of both methamphetamine and THC in order to demonstrate
driving while impaired. The presence of either drug sufficed. Also, the State observes
that it did not need to establish the presence of methamphetamine in both vial A and vial
B. The presence of methamphetamine in either vial established Dodson’s being under the
influence. Christopher Dodson responds that the State ignores the strong evidence of
36 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
methamphetamine contamination lingering in the toxicology laboratory that could have
corrupted vial A.
Christopher Dodson emphasizes a passage in the State’s closing argument when
the State’s attorney remarked that the State had not demonstrated Dodson drove under the
influence based only on one piece of evidence. “It’s based off of the entirety of the
evidence.” RP at 840. The totality of the evidence included the toxicology reports.
Christopher Dodson notes that the State argued the amplifying effects of the use of
THC and methamphetamine at the same time. If we agree with Dodson’s confrontation
clause challenge, we would strike all evidence of THC. Therefore, Dodson accentuates
that the State could no longer pose its amplification of effects theory to the jury. The
State does not respond.
The State emphasizes that it did not need to prove that Christopher Dodson drove
under the influence of either THC or methamphetamine because it charged Dodson with
vehicular homicide, an alternate means crime. RCW 46.61.520(1), the controlling
statute, declares:
(1) When the death of any person ensues within three years as a proximate result of injury proximately caused by the driving of any vehicle by any person, the driver is guilty of vehicular homicide if the driver was operating a motor vehicle: (a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.51.502; or (b) In a reckless manner; or
37 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
(c) With disregard for the safety of others.
Two of the other alternative manners in which the jury could have convicted Dodson
required no evidence of impairment by drugs. The State impliedly suggests that all
evidence of the use of cannabis and methamphetamine lacks relevance because of the
alternative means. The State even insists that the jury convicted Christopher Dodson on
all three alternative methods of committing the crime. The record is to the contrary. The
jury entered a general verdict of guilt.
According to Christopher Dodson, the State’s contention invites the question of
why the State devoted inordinate effort in its criminal investigation and at trial to
corroborate Dodson’s driving under the influence. The State had no evidence of how
Dodson operated the vehicle before the wreck. The State lacked evidence of how
Dodson lost control of the car. During closing, the State led with its argument of
impaired driving because of methamphetamine and THC and devoted significant time to
discuss intoxication by drugs. More importantly, the State employed evidence of
Dodson’s methamphetamine and THC levels and his knowledge of his impairment when
arguing that Dodson drove in a reckless manner and in disregard for the safety of others.
The State conflated the alternative means of committing vehicular homicide.
The State highlights that reconstruction of the car wreck revealed that Christopher
Dodson never swerved to avoid wildlife or attempted to navigate the curve in the road.
38 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Instead, Dodson drove straight off the road without activating his breaks and crashed into
a telephone pole and trees. According to the State, any reasonable jury would have
returned the same verdict in the absence of any constitutional error.
After our extensive review of the parties’ arguments on harmless error, we apply
the new Magana-Arevalo formulation. We consider the properly admitted evidence of
guilt to be compelling. We deem the prejudicial impact of the erroneously admitted
evidence on the properly admitted evidence to be minimal. The State has shown the
constitutional error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The theoretical reasonable
jury would have convicted Dodson with the crime without the tainted evidence.
Admissible evidence included the methamphetamine test performed by Andrew
Gingras. The testing revealed a methamphetamine level of 0.63 milligrams per liter. A
jury would deem this evidence convincing of driving while under the influence of the
drug. The tainted evidence did little to bolster the untainted evidence of Gingras’ testing
results. At trial, Christopher Dodson cleverly emphasized the methamphetamine
contamination even outside the toxicology laboratory annex. But other evidence showed
the laboratory had recently passed accreditation tests.
On appeal, Christopher Dodson shrewdly underscores the State’s emphasis, at
trial, of the mixture of THC with methamphetamine. Thus, according to Dodson, all of
the evidence of THC should have been excluded. We still consider the argument weak to
39 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
a reasonable jury, who will be impressed with the one methamphetamine result.
The circumstantial evidence shows Christopher Dodson drove recklessly even if
ignoring all drug testing results. The weather was fine. Dodson encountered no other
traffic at the time of the accident. The road showed no skid marks or use of brakes. The
car struck a tree and pole for no reason.
We doubt that a violent collision would cause someone to speak rapidly or quickly
pace the road. Injury or dizziness from the crash would more likely render someone
sluggish. One would also hope that Dodson would be concerned about his girlfriend and
later remorseful for having killed her. He would not have given inconsistent statements
to the officers. Christopher Dodson acted at the scene consistent with being intoxicated
by methamphetamine.
Christopher Dodson conceded in a recorded phone call taking two hits per day of
methamphetamine before the accident. Although he did not specify the particular days or
time, the jury would conclude he had recently taken methamphetamine. On appeal,
Dodson ignores his comments that his THC and methamphetamine level would be the
same as Carrie Martin.
The jury had three alternative means, under which to convict Christopher Dodson
of vehicular homicide. Even without the use of methamphetamine and THC,
overwhelming circumstantial evidence established Dodson’s driving in a reckless manner
40 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
and with disregard for the safety of others.
Expired Vial B
Issue 4: Should this court entertain Christopher Dodson’s assignment of error
pertaining to admission of the blood tests from vial B when he did not move to exclude
the evidence before the superior court?
Answer 4: No.
On appeal, Christopher Dodson faults the trial court for failing to exclude test
results from his blood contained in vial B. He argues that the expiration date of the vial
rendered the test results unreliable. He relies on RCW 46.61.506(3), which excludes
blood-test evidence unless testing was “performed according to methods approved by the
state toxicologist.” He also relies on Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013
(1923), while arguing that use of an expired vial did not conform to a theory or principle
that has achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.
Before the trial court, Christopher Dodson moved to dismiss the prosecution on
the grounds of government misconduct and Brady violations. The misconduct included
contamination at the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory and the Brady
violations included failure to disclose a manufacturer’s recall of tubes used to store blood.
The motion did not seek a narrower remedy of exclusion of evidence of test results from
vial B blood. He never mentioned RCW 46.61.506 nor Frye v. United States.
41 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
This court “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the
trial court.” RAP 2.5(a). Failure to object to the admissibility of evidence at trial
precludes appellate review of that issue unless the alleged error is a manifest error
affecting a constitutional right. In re Detention of Taylor, 132 Wn. App. 827, 836, 134
P.3d 254 (2006). Failure to lay an adequate foundation for a Frye challenge precludes
appellate review. In re Detention of Taylor, 132 Wn. App. 827, 836 (2006).
Christopher Dodson admits that he did not reference Frye or statutory challenges
in his pretrial motion. He claims his questions and argument at the motion to dismiss
sufficiently preserved his challenge to the use of expired vials. We disagree. Dodson
gave the State no notice such that it could prepare for a Frye hearing. Dodson afforded
the trial court no opportunity to review RCW 46.61.506(3). The motion to dismiss
focused on government mismanagement and dismissal of the prosecution not exclusion
of any evidence.
Victim Penalty Assessment
Issue 5: Whether this court should direct the trial court to strike the $500 victim
penalty assessment imposed on Christopher Dodson at sentencing?
Answer 5: Yes.
42 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
Christopher Dodson asks that, if we affirm his conviction, we direct the trial court
to strike the $500 victim penalty assessment imposed on him. The State concedes to the
removal of the assessment.
Prior to July 2023, former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) (2018) required the sentencing
court to impose the victim penalty assessment on any adult found guilty of a crime. In
July 2023, the legislature amended RCW 7.68.035 to preclude imposing the penalty
assessment “if the court finds that the defendant, at the time of sentencing, is indigent as
defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1(4). An individual is
indigent if he has “compelling circumstances that exist that demonstrate an inability to
pay.” RCW 10.01.160(3)(d).
Statutory amendments related to legal financial obligations generally apply to
cases on direct appeal not final. State v. Wemhoff, 24 Wn. App. 2d 198, 201-02, 519 P.3d
297 (2022). A financial obligation becomes final at the termination of all appeals. State
v. Wemhoff, 24 Wn. App. 2d 198, 201-02 (2022).
In fairness to the trial court, the court imposed the $500 victim penalty assessment
on May 11, 2023, before passage of the new statute. The trial court indicated on the
judgment and sentence that Dodson was indigent. Therefore, we remand to strike the
assessment.
43 No. 39755-6-III State v. Dodson
CONCLUSION
We affirm the conviction of Christopher Dodson for vehicular homicide. We
remand to the superior court to strike the victim penalty assessment.
_________________________________ Fearing, J.P.T.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ _________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. Murphy, J.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
State of Washington v. Christopher Edward Dodson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-washington-v-christopher-edward-dodson-washctapp-2026.