State Of Washington V. Christopher Collin Lester

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: May 18, 2026
• Docket: 88956-7
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 88956-7-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. PUBLISHED OPINION CHRISTOPHER COLLIN LESTER,

Appellant.

MANN, J. — After a bench trial, Christopher Lester was convicted of rape of a

child in the first degree, child molestation in the first degree, incest in the first degree,

and incest in the second degree. Before sentencing, Lester’s defense attorney learned

that during trial a court employee informed the trial court of the possibility of witness

signaling, but the trial court did not inform the parties of this allegation during the trial.

Lester appeals and argues that the trial court’s inaction on the allegation of

witness signaling violated the appearance of fairness doctrine. Because a reasonably

prudent and objective observer could conclude that Lester did not receive a fair,

impartial, and neutral hearing, we agree.

We reverse and remand for a new trial before a different judge. No. 88956-7-I-I/2

I FACTS

A Background

Lester married Amy LaPlante in July 2012. LaPlante had two children from

previous relationships, K.L.W. and J.M.K. LaPlante, Lester, and the two children lived

in a home in Soap Lake, Washington. Lester was a father figure to the children.

Around January 2018, J.M.K. told LaPlante that Lester put his mouth on J.M.K.’s

penis the day before. K.L.W. told LaPlante that Lester had been touching her

inappropriately as well. Lester soon moved out of the family home, but LaPlante

decided not to report him because she was afraid of Lester.

Around July 2019, LaPlante began a relationship with Alan Zufall. LaPlante

informed Zufall of what Lester had done to J.M.K. and K.L.W. Zufall served Lester with

LaPlante’s divorce papers and told Lester that if he did not turn himself in, Zufall and

LaPlante would report him.

On July 12, 2019, a few days after the encounter with Zufall, Lester told his boss

he was quitting and drove to Grant County Integrated Services in Moses Lake. Lester

then spoke with a designated crisis responder (DCR) and disclosed that he had

molested his two stepchildren. The DCR then contacted law enforcement.

B Trial

The State charged Lester with rape of a child in the first degree, child molestation

in the first degree, incest in the first degree, and incest in the second degree.

A trial was scheduled in the Grant County Superior Court. Two days before trial,

Lester waived his right to a jury trial. After a bench trial, on November 13, 2023, the trial

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court found Lester guilty on all counts. The trial court set a sentencing hearing for

January 31, 2024.

C Posttrial Events

On December 21, 2023, Lester’s defense attorney ran into a second Grant

County Superior Court judge outside the courthouse. The second judge told Lester’s

defense attorney that he heard from a jury administrator of the court that members of

New Hope 1 were in the courtroom while K.L.W. and J.M.K. were testifying and were

giving signals to them. Lester’s attorney contacted the jury administrator, who told him

that she heard members of New Hope coming up the stairs with K.L.W. and J.M.K. and

said to one of them “remember this signal” and pulled her ear to demonstrate the signal.

The jury administrator stated that she told the trial court about this allegation during

Lester’s trial.

At the scheduled sentencing hearing, the trial court made a record of the above

timeline. The court explained that after hearing the allegation from the jury

administrator it decided it would “keep a watchful eye to see if I see any indication of

any signs going back and forth, as of course that would be horribly inappropriate.” The

court also explained that it remembered thinking that

worst case scenario, as I do believe in any way that New Hope would ever be giving a sign to a witness on how to answer a question, but it may be something along the lines of if a person, especially a minor witness might need a break or they needed to speak up, that maybe there might be a sign for that. But even if that was true, it would be terribly inappropriate.

1 New Hope is a victim/witness advocacy group.

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And after seeing no indication during trial that any signs were given, the court

“completely forgot about it after that.” The court acknowledged that in hindsight it would

have been better to bring the allegation to the attention of the attorneys during the trial.

The State said that it would contact the employees at New Hope and explain the

allegation and ask for a declaration. The trial court set a special hearing date and

postponed sentencing.

Lester then filed a series of motions including: (1) a motion for the court to

compel the attendance of all witnesses under its own “hand”; (2) a motion to withdraw

as an attorney and appoint a new attorney; (3) a motion for the trial judge to recuse; (4)

a motion for discovery of New Hope employees; (5) a motion to reverse convictions and

dismiss charges; and (6) a motion for new trial. Lester argued that he was unaware of

any meetings between the victims and New Hope, so he did not have an opportunity to

cross-examine any witness about prior meetings with New Hope. Lester also argued

that the appearance of fairness doctrine was violated by the trial court’s inaction.

The trial court directed the State to subpoena witnesses for an evidentiary

hearing to determine whether there were signals being given to witnesses during

Lester’s trial. The court denied the defense attorney’s motion to withdraw as an

attorney. The trial court determined a different Grant County Superior Court judge

would be appointed to conduct the evidentiary hearing on witness signaling, citing the

appearance of fairness doctrine. The trial court deferred ruling on Lester’s motion for a

new trial until after the evidentiary hearing.

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The evidentiary hearing was held on March 12, 2024. After taking evidence, the

judge presiding over the hearing concluded there were no signs or signaling during

J.M.K.’s testimony.

The trial court then denied Lester’s motion to dismiss and sentenced Lester to

318 months.

Lester appeals.

II

Lester argues that the trial court’s failure to inform the parties of the allegation of

witness signaling violated the appearance of fairness doctrine. 2 We agree.

Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a judge must be both impartial and

appear impartial. State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 187, 225 P.3d 973 (2010). A

judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned where a judge has a personal bias

toward a party or a party’s lawyer. See Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) 2.11(A)(1).

Additionally, under CJC 2.9(B), “[i]f a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex

parte communication bearing upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall make

provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the communication and

provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.” (Emphasis added.)

2 Lester also argues that his due process rights were violated. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has identified three categories in which there was an unconstitutional potential for bias in violation of the due process clause: (1) where a judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the case; (2) where a judge previously participated in a case in an investigative or prosecutorial capacity, and (3) when an individual with an interest in a case had a significant and disproportionate role in placing a judge on the case through the campaign process. State v. Blizzard, 195 Wn. App. 717, 727-28, 381 P.3d 1241 (2016) (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877-84, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009)). Because none of these situations applies, we decline to reach the due process argument.

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A judicial proceeding satisfies the appearance of fairness doctrine if a reasonably

prudent and disinterested person would conclude that all parties received a fair,

impartial, and neutral hearing. Tatham v. Rogers, 170 Wn. App. 76, 96, 283 P.3d 583

(2012). “The test for determining whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned is an objective test that assumes that ‘a reasonable person knows and

understands all the relevant facts.’” Tatham, 170 Wn. App. at 96 (quoting Sherman v.

State, 128 Wn.2d 164, 206, 905 P.2d 355 (1995)).

We presume that a trial judge regularly and properly performs its job without

prejudice or bias. West v. Wash. Ass’n of County Officials, 162 Wn. App. 120, 136, 252

P.3d 406 (2011). “To overcome this presumption, the party raising the challenge ‘must

provide specific facts establishing bias.’” Tacoma S. Hosp., LLC v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co.,

19 Wn. App. 2d 210, 218, 494 P.3d 450 (2021) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Davis,

152 Wn.2d 647, 692, 101 P.3d 1 (2004)). A party need not prove actual bias, as a mere

suspicion of partiality may be sufficient to require recusal. Tacoma S., 19 Wn. App. 2d

at 218. But there must be more than mere speculation. Tatham, 170 Wn. App. at 96.

There is no dispute that the trial court did not inform the parties during trial about

the allegation of witness signaling. We agree with Lester that this inaction violated the

appearance of fairness doctrine. First, Lester was unable to address the allegation of

witness signaling during trial, on the record. This deprived Lester of the opportunity at

trial to inquire about the nature and extent of New Hope’s involvement, request curative

measures, or cross-examine witnesses about potential signaling or coaching. This

could not be cured by the posttrial evidentiary hearing because J.M.K. had already

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testified with New Hope in the courtroom and that evidentiary hearing occurred several

weeks after J.M.K.’s testimony.

Second, an objective observer could view the trial court’s statements after Lester

learned of the allegation as evidence of bias. The court stated that it could not imagine

that employees from New Hope were giving signals. This could be viewed as bias

toward the State and New Hope. An objective observer could conclude that the trial

court received ex parte information bearing on witness testimony, assumed New Hope’s

neutrality, and then kept the allegation to itself while serving as the fact finder. Lester

does not need to prove the trial court’s actions were malicious or that there was actual

bias; instead, it is sufficient if there is an appearance of partiality.

Third, the trial court’s failure to inform the parties of the witness signaling

allegation conflicts with the CJC. The trial court had a duty to inform the parties of any

ex parte communication that bears on the substance of the matter and provide the

parties an opportunity to respond. CJC 2.9(B). This communication was not merely

administrative or unrelated to the trial. The statement went directly to the credibility of

the witnesses and the integrity of the proceedings. While a violation of the CJC alone

may not violate the appearance of fairness doctrine, an objective observer could

conclude that the trial court’s action deprived Lester of a fair hearing since it directly

impacted his criminal trial. See State v. Williams, 15 Wn. App. 2d 841, 850, 480 P.3d

1145 (2020) (holding that trial judge’s violation of the CJC did not violate the

appearance of fairness doctrine when there was no showing of impact on the case

itself).

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Fourth, and lastly, “[t]he CJC recognizes that where a trial judge’s decisions are

tainted by even a mere suspicion of partiality, the effect on the public’s confidence in our

judicial system can be debilitating.” Sherman, 128 Wn.2d at 205. The trial court’s

inaction here could taint public confidence in the judicial system. We cannot condone

informal and off the record handling of serious trial irregularities or allegations. Because

there is a basis to reasonably question whether Lester received a fair, impartial, and

neutral hearing, we conclude that the trial court violated the appearance of fairness

doctrine.

We reverse and remand for a new trial before a different judge. 3

WE CONCUR:

3 Lester makes other arguments on appeal including: (1) that improper ER 404(b) evidence was

admitted; (2) that Lester’s statements to police were improperly admitted; (3) that Lester’s waiver of a jury trial was invalid; and (4) that Lester’s due process rights were violated by appearing remotely for pretrial proceedings. Because we conclude that the trial court violated the appearance of fairness doctrine and remand for a new trial, we do not review these arguments.

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