IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE Respondent, No. 68812-0-1 v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION ^ o/ CHRIS ROBERT MORTENSON, 03
crtr' Appellant. FILED: March 31, 2014 t."-*
XT '"r'.~ Dwyer, J. — Chris Mortenson's first trial on charges of felony driving
under the influence of intoxicants (DUI) and attempting to elude a pursuing police
vehicle ended in a mistrial. Prior to both the first and second trials, Mortenson's
counsel went to great lengths to arrange a procedure whereby Mortenson could stipulate to an element of the DUI charge (that he had four prior DUI convictions) without directly informing the jury of that highly prejudicial fact. After a series of rulings, the judge who presided over the first trial allowed Mortenson to enter into a stipulation that he had four prior convictions for violation of RCW 46.61.5055, a reference to the DUI sentencing statute. In this way, the court intended to allow Mortenson to "sanitize" the impact of the prior offenses while still allowing the
State to prove the charge.
After the mistrial, the case was assigned to a second judge. Pretrial
motions resulted in the second judge adopting the first judge's ruling on the stipulation procedure. However, atthe beginning of jury selection for the second trial, the judge chose to read the information to the prospective jurors. This No. 68812-0-1/2
resulted in the jurors learning that Mortenson was charged with DUI,
accompanied by a statutory reference to RCW 46.61.5055, and that he was
alleged to have four prior offenses that constituted violations of RCW 46.61.5055.
In this way, the judge inadvertently informed the jurors of Mortenson's prior DUI
conviction history, notwithstanding the previous efforts of counsel and the court
to keep this knowledge from the jury.
At the next break in the proceedings, while the prospective jurors were out
of the court room, Mortenson requested that the present prospective jurors be
replaced with a new venire. The trial court denied his request for relief and took
no action designed to address the problem created for Mortenson and his
counsel by the inadvertent disclosure of Mortenson's DUI conviction history to
the prospective jurors. Believing that Mortenson was entitled to a remedy and,
on the DUI charge, was prejudiced by the absence of a remedy, we reverse that
conviction. Finding that the error did not prejudice Mortenson on the attempting
to elude charge, and that sufficient evidence was admitted in support of the jury's
verdict on that count, we affirm that conviction.
I
On August 21, 2010, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Mortenson was driving a
Ford Thunderbird after an evening at a bar in Milton. Mortenson had two
passengers in his vehicle—Catherine Lowrey and John Underdown. At that same time, Deputy Jeffrey Petrenchak was on patrol on Military Road South in King County, driving a marked sheriff's department vehicle. Deputy Petrenchak observed a Ford Thunderbird driving northbound at 65 miles per hour on a
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stretch of road with a posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour. Deputy
Petrenchak pulled onto the shoulder and activated his lights. The Thunderbird,
however, did not stop or slow down.
Deputy Petrenchak made a u-turn and accelerated to 75 miles per hour in order to catch up to the vehicle. The deputy activated his siren, but the vehicle
still did not stop. The vehicle turned left onto South 342nd Street. As Deputy Petrenchak pursued the vehicle, he observed the vehicle cross the center line and the fog line a number of times. The deputy testified that, "He appeared to be driving erratically to me." Lowrey, in a statement to officers following the incident, also described Mortenson's driving as "erratic."
The Thunderbird proceeded to make five more turns as it travelled through a residential area. During this time, Lowrey told Mortenson to stop, but he did not do so. After driving for over a mile with the police vehicle pursuing him, Mortenson finally came to a stop. Mortenson did not pull to the side of the road, however, but, instead, "pulled into the oncoming lane and stopped at about a 45 degree angle."
Because the vehicle had failed to stop for a mile and a half, and because
he could see two passengers in the vehicle, Deputy Petrenchak approached the Thunderbird with his weapon drawn. The deputy demanded that the driver show his hands. Instead of showing his hands, Mortenson exited the vehicle and "started kind of stumbling and staggering back towards [the] patrol car." Deputy Petrenchak repeatedly yelled at Mortenson to get on the ground, but Mortenson did not do so. During this time, Deputy Petrenchak observed that Mortenson was -3- No. 68812-0-1/4
"uneasy on his feet," slurring his speech, and smelled strongly of intoxicants.
Mortenson crossed in front of the patrol vehicle and stumbled eastbound,
with his back toward the deputy. When Mortenson turned around, the deputy
fired his Taser. The Taser probes failed to penetrate Mortenson's clothing, and
Mortenson again turned away from the deputy. Deputy Petrenchak fired his
Taser a second time, this time causing Mortenson to fall face first to the ground.
Deputy Petrenchak ordered Mortenson to show his hands, but he would not
comply until the deputy activated his Taser once more. The deputy then placed
Mortenson under arrest.
The State charged Mortenson with felony DUI,1 attempting to elude a
1(1) Aperson is guilty ofdriving while under the influence ofintoxicating liquor, marijuana, or any drug if the person drives a vehicle within this state: (a) And the person has, within two hours after driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher as shown by analysis of the person's breath or blood made under RCW 46.61.506; or (b) The person has, within two hours after driving, a THC concentration of5.00 or higher as shown by analysis ofthe person's blood made under RCW 46.61.506; or (c) While the person is under the influence of oraffected by intoxicating liquor, marijuana, or any drug; or (d) While the person is under the combined influence ofor affected by intoxicating liquor, marijuana, and any drug.
(6) It is a class C felony punishable under chapter 9.94A RCW, or chapter 13.40 RCW ifthe person is a juvenile, if: (a) The person has four or more prior offenses within ten years as defined in RCW 46.61.5055; or (b) The person has ever previously been convicted of: (i) Vehicular homicide while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, RCW 46.61.520(1 )(a); (ii) Vehicular assault while under the influence ofintoxicating liquor or any drug, RCW 46.61.522(1 )(b); (iii) An out-of-state offense comparable to the offense specified in (b)(i) or (ii) of this subsection; or (iv) Aviolation ofthis subsection (6) or RCW 46.61.504(6). RCW 46.61.502.
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pursuing police vehicle,2 driving while license suspended/revoked in the second
degree,3 and tampering with a witness.4 Mortenson pleaded guilty to driving
while license suspended, and the State dismissed the charge of tampering with a
witness.
Mortenson's initial trial proceeded before Judge Brian Gain. During that
trial, two witnesses testified to evidence that the court had previously excluded.
This caused Judge Gain to declare a mistrial.
Mortenson's case was reassigned to Judge Lori Smith. Before trial, in a
repeat of a procedure that had been worked out as the result of several rulings made by Judge Gain, Mortenson stipulated to the fact that he had four prior convictions "pursuant to RCW 46.61.5055" (the statute defining DUI convictions and controlling DUI sentencing). This was done to avoid having the jury hear
2Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his or her vehicle to a stop and who drives his or her vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty ofa class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, orsiren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and the vehicle shall be equipped with lights and sirens. RCW 46.61.024(1). 3It is unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle in this state while that person is in a suspended orrevoked status or when his or her privilege to drive is suspended or revoked in this or any other state. RCW 46.20.342(1). 4Aperson is guilty of tampering with a witness if he orshe attempts to induce a witness or person he or she has reason to believe is about to be called as a witness in any official proceeding or a person whom he or she has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal investigation orthe abuse or neglect of a minor child to: (a) Testify falsely or, without right or privilege to do so, to withhold any testimony; or (b) Absent himself or herself from such proceedings; or (c) Withhold from a law enforcement agency information which he or she has relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child to the agency. RCW 9A.72.120(1). No. 68812-0-1/6
evidence that Mortenson had been convicted of DUI four times in the past ten
years. At the commencement of jury selection, Judge Smith chose to read the
information to the jury pool. The information, as read to the potential jurors,
stated:
The defendant, Chris Robert Mortenson, in King County, Washington, on or about August 21, 2010, drove a vehicle within this State while under the influence or affected by intoxicating liquor or any drug while under the combined influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor and any drug, having at least four prior offenses as defined under RCW 46.61.5055(14)(a) within 10 years of the arrest for the current offense contrary to RCW 46.61.502 and RCW 46.61.5055 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.
Before the parties began questioning the panel, Mortenson moved for a new
venire. The judge denied the motion.
During voir dire, juror 31 stated before the entire panel that she would
have trouble being impartial because "I just heard prior that the defendant had
four prior convictions or something such as that that someone said."5 Mortenson
did not object, but noted later for the record that "our point was illustrated by
Juror No. 31 who was aware of four prior DUIs."
During the presentation of the evidence, the following stipulation was read
to the jury:
The Defendant, Chris Robert Mortenson, and the State of Washington stipulate and have agreed that certain facts are true. You must accept as true the following facts:
5 Juror 31 was dismissed for cause, along with five other panel members who stated that they could not be impartial in a DUI case. Two additional jurors were dismissed for cause because they stated that they could not be fair in any case involving alcohol. Three jurors were dismissed for cause due to reasons unrelated to the specific offenses charged.
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As to Count II:
(3) That at the time of the arrest, the defendant had been previously convicted of four or more prior offenses within ten years pursuant to RCW 46.61.5055.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court gave the following instruction to the
jury:
Certain evidence has been admitted in this case for only a limited purpose. This evidence consists of the stipulation, that at the time of the arrest in this case, the defendant had been previously convicted of four offenses within ten years as defined by RCW 46.61.5055(14)(a) and this evidence has been admitted only to establish element (3) of the offense of felony driving under the influence as charged in Count II. The jury is not to speculate as to the nature of the prior convictions. You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. You must not consider this evidence for the purpose of judging whether the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of, or affected by, an intoxicating liquor in this incident. Any discussion ofthe evidence during your deliberations must be consistent with this limitation.
Jury Instruction 5.
Mortenson was convicted by the jury offelony DUI and attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. The trial court sentenced Mortenson to 29 months on the charge of attempting to elude and 60 months on the charge of felony DUI, to run concurrently, plus 12 months of community custody.
Mortenson appeals.
Mortenson contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for a
new venire. This is so, he asserts, because he was prejudiced by the court's No. 68812-0-1/8
action in inadvertently connecting—by statutory reference—his stipulation to prior
convictions and the DUI charge in this case. We agree.
A trial court's denial of a request for a new venire is akin to a denial of a
motion for a mistrial.6 State v. Young, 129 Wn. App. 468, 472-73, 119 P.3d 870
(2005). This court reviews the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. Young. 129 Wn. App. at 473. "A trial court's denial of a motion for
mistrial 'will be overturned only when there is a substantial likelihood the
prejudice affected the jury's verdict.'" Young, 129 Wn. App. at 472-73 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Greiff. 141 Wn.2d 910, 921, 10 P.3d
390 (2000)).
A
Our decision today is guided by our opinion in Young. In that case, Young
stipulated prior to trial that he had previously been convicted of a "serious offense," which was an element of unlawful possession of a firearm. Young, 129
Wn. App. at 474. During voir dire, however, the judge told the jury that Young
had previously been convicted "'of a serious offense ... to wit: Second Degree Assault.'" Young. 129 Wn. App. at 471 (alteration in original). After the jury was
excused, Young requested a mistrial, which the trial court denied. Young. 129
Wn. App. at 471. We overturned Young's conviction, holding that the motion for
a mistrial should have been granted. Young. 129 Wn. App. at 479.
In assessing whether the trial court's improper comment affected the jury's
6Unlike the stage in the proceeding when a motion for a mistrial is typically made, however, jeopardy had not yet attached when Mortenson requested a new venire. Thus, the trial court had broad discretion to fashion a remedy.
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verdict, we analyzed the following three factors: "(1) the seriousness of the
irregularity; (2) whether it involved cumulative evidence; and (3) whether the trial
court properly instructed the jury to disregard it." Young. 129 Wn. App. at 473.
Analyzing the first factor, we stated that "[w]hen the sole purpose of the
evidence is to prove the element of the prior conviction, revealing a defendant's
prior offense is prejudicial in that it raises the risk that the verdict will be
improperly based on considerations of the defendant's propensity to commit the
crime charged." Young. 129 Wn. App. at 475 (citing Old Chief v. United States.
519 U.S. 172, 174, 117 S. Ct. 644, 136 L Ed. 2d 574 (1997); State v. Johnson.
90 Wn. App. 54, 63, 950 P.2d 981 (1998)). Accordingly, we held that the trial
court's revelation of Young's prior assault conviction was "inherently prejudicial"
and constituted a serious irregularity. Young, 129 Wn. App. at 476.
Here, the trial court told the jury that Mortenson had "at least four prior
offenses as defined under RCW 46.61.5055(14)(a) within 10 years of the arrest
for the current offense." The trial court also told the jury that the present charge
was that Mortenson "drove a vehicle within this State while under the influence or
affected by intoxicating liquor or any drug while under the combined influence of
or affected by intoxicating liquor and any drug, . . . contrary to RCW 46.61.502
and RCW 46.61.5055 and against the peace and dignity of the State of
Washington." The trial court's mention of RCW 46.61.5055 with respect to both
the current offense and the prior offenses informed the jury that Mortenson had
been convicted of DUI on four prior occasions within the last ten years. As in
Young, this revelation was inherently prejudicial. Indeed, given that it involves
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four prior convictions for the identical crime charged herein, the error here is
likely more prejudicial than the error in Young, which involved one prior
conviction for a related offense.
The State contends that it was unlikely that the jurors recognized the
significance of the statutory citation or concluded therefrom that Mortenson had
four prior DUI convictions. The State's assertion is belied by the fact that juror 31
did make this connection. Juror 31 stated, in front of the entire panel, that she
"just heard prior that the defendant had four prior convictions." Had any other
jurors not initially made the connection between the two references to the same
statute, they certainly did after juror 31 announced it to them. Thus, the trial
court's disclosure that Mortenson had four prior DUI convictions was a serious
irregularity.
Analyzing the second factor, whether the irregularity presented cumulative
evidence, the Young court held that because "there was nothing else that
disclosed to the jury the nature of the prior offense, either at the time of the trial
irregularity or thereafter[,]" the trial court's revelation did not present cumulative
evidence.7 129 Wn. App. at 476. Here, although Mortenson stipulated to the fact
that he had four prior predicate convictions, he purposely was allowed to not
refer to them as DUI convictions, but, rather, to only refer to them by statutory
reference. This was in an effort to "sanitize" the convictions, a proper ruling
made by Judge Gain and adopted by Judge Smith. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at
7Where the irregularity presents cumulative evidence, the necessity of declaring a mistrial is diminished. State v. Garcia. 177 Wn. App. 769, 781, 313 P.3d 422 (2013), review denied. P.3d (Wash. Mar. 5, 2014).
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186.
Moreover, the trial court's statement did not constitute the presentation of
cumulative evidence because the trial court's disclosure—although stated to the
jurors—was not evidence. Ordinarily, the jury may not discount statements made
by the trial court. Cf. State v. Gamble. 168Wn.2d 161, 178, 225 P.3d 973 (2010)
(jury presumed to follow court's instructions). While the jury is told to weigh
evidence and discount it if it chooses, the jury is not told to weigh statements
from the judge. Jurors are told to accept instruction from the court "regardless of
what you personally believe the law is or what you personally think it should be."
11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal
1.02, at 13 (3d ed. 2008). Thus, for both reasons, the irregularity did not present
cumulative evidence of Mortenson's prior convictions. This factor also weighs in
his favor on appeal.
The third factor considered in Young was whether the trial court properly
instructed the jury to disregard the comment. In Young, the trial court gave no
curative instructions. 129 Wn. App. at 477. Rather, the trial court told the jury
that "'the Information in this case is only an accusation against the defendants
which informs them of the charges. You are not to consider the filing of the
Information or its contents as proof of the crimes charged.'" Young. 129 Wn.
App. at 476-77. We held that this instruction was inadequate to cure the error:
"[A]n instruction that fails to expressly direct the jury to disregard evidence,
particularly where, as here, the instruction does not directly address the specific evidence at issue, cannot logically be said to remove the prejudicial impression
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created by revelation of identical other acts." Young. 129 Wn. App. at 477.
Here, the trial court offered the following instruction at the close of trial:
Certain evidence has been admitted in this case for only a limited purpose. This evidence consists of the stipulation, that at the time of the arrest in this case, the defendant had been previously convicted of four offenses within ten years as defined by RCW 46.61.5055(14)(a) and this evidence has been admitted only to establish element (3) of the offense of felony driving under the influence as charged in Count II. The jury is not to speculate as to the nature of the prior convictions. You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. You must not consider this evidence for the purpose of judging whether the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of, or affected by, an intoxicating liquor in this incident.
Jury Instruction 5. However, the trial court—during voir dire—gave no
contemporaneous instruction to disregard the court's own comment. Thus, "the
jury venire was left with the knowledge that" Mortenson had been previously
convicted of DUI on four previous occasions, "before it even heard the State's
case." Young. 129 Wn. App. at 477. Moreover, the instruction given was aimed
at the stipulation itself—not at the trial court's comment during voir dire. This is
so because the instruction given referred to "evidence" and specifically
referenced the stipulation. The court's statement during voir dire was not
"evidence," but the stipulation was. Thus, a careful juror would not understand
the instruction to apply to the court's statement during voir dire. The trial court
did not effectively instruct the jury to disregard the disclosure it made during voir
dire. The prejudice to Mortenson was never cured.
As in Young, all three factors weigh in Mortenson's favor. This case is not
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distinguishable from Young such that a different result is compelled. The trial
court erred by not granting Mortenson's request for relief.
B
When a trial court makes an improper comment during venire, that
irregularity is subject to harmless error analysis. Young. 129 Wn. App. at 478.
"'A harmless error is an error which is trivial, or formal, or merely academic, and
was not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and in no
way affected the final outcome of the case.'" State v. Wanrow. 88 Wn.2d 221,
237, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (guoting State v. Golladav, 78 Wn.2d 121, 139, 470
P.2d 191 (1970)). The error here was not harmless with respect to the felony
DUI conviction.
With regard to the felony DUI charge, the prejudicial effect of the trial
court's comment was that the jury might infer that because Mortenson had been
convicted of four prior DUIs, he had a propensity for driving while intoxicated and
acted in a manner consistent with that propensity on the date charged.
When the sole purpose of the evidence is to prove the element of the prior conviction, revealing a defendant's prior offense is prejudicial in that it raises the risk that the verdict will be improperly based on considerations of the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. This risk is especially great when the prior offense is similar to the current charged offense.
Young. 129 Wn. App. at 475 (footnote omitted).
Here, the prior offenses were not just similar to the current charged
offense—they were identical to the current offense. This is exactly the type of
13 No. 68812-0-1/14
evidence that Evidence Rule 4048 normally seeks to exclude. Moreover, there
was not just one prior offense introduced by the court, as in Young; rather, there
were four. In light of these factors, there is a substantial likelihood that the
comment affected the outcome at trial. The error committed by the trial court
was not harmless with respect to the felony DUI charge. Accordingly, we reverse
Mortenson's conviction for felony DUI.9
Ill
Mortenson next contends that his conviction for attempting to elude should
be overturned because it was not supported by sufficient evidence. This is so,
he asserts, because the State failed to prove that he drove in a reckless manner.
We disagree.
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, "'the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Green. 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616
P.2d 628 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a
criminal case, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in
8"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." ER 404(b). 9While this appeal was pending, the parties filed a joint motion to strike the term of community custody from Mortenson's felony DUI sentence. Because we reverse Mortenson's felony DUI conviction, the parties' motion is mootand we decline to address it. We also choose not to address Mortenson's other assignments of error arising out of his DUI conviction.
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favor of the State. State v. Salinas. 119Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences
that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. Salinas. 119 Wn.2d at 201.
"Deference must be given to the trier of fact who resolves conflicting testimony
and evaluates the credibility of witnesses and persuasiveness of material
evidence." State v. Carver. 113 Wn.2d 591, 604, 781 P.2d 1308, 789 P.2d 306
(1989).
In order for an individual to be found guilty of attempting to elude a
pursuing police vehicle, the State must prove that he or she "willfully fail[ed] or
refuse[d] to immediately bring his or her vehicle to a stop and [drove] his or her
vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle,
after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop." RCW
46.61.024. "'[I]n a reckless manner'" is defined as "'in a rash or heedless
manner, indifferent to the consequences.'" State v. Roggenkamp. 153Wn.2d
614, 622, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (defining "reckless manner" as used in RCW
46.61.520 and 46.61.522) (quoting State v. Bowman. 57 Wn.2d 266, 270-71, 356
P.2d 999 (1960)); State v. Ridglev. 141 Wn. App. 771, 781, 174 P.3d 105 (2007)
("[T]he 'reckless manner' standard of RCW 46.61.024 at issue here takes the
same meaning as the 'reckless manner' standard of RCW 46.61.520 (vehicular
homicide) and RCW 46.61.522 (vehicular assault).").
Here, the evidence sufficiently supports the jury's finding that Mortenson
drove in a reckless manner. When Deputy Petrenchak first saw Mortenson, he
was driving 20 miles per hour over the speed limit. Deputy Petrenchak described
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Mortenson's driving as erratic, and testified that Mortenson crossed both the
center line and the fog line multiple times. Lowrey, who was a passenger in
Mortenson's vehicle at the time of the incident, also described Mortenson's
driving as "erratic." When Mortenson finally stopped the vehicle, he pulled into
the oncoming lane at a 45 degree angle. From these facts, a rational juror could
find that Mortenson drove in a reckless manner. Therefore, the conviction for
attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle is supported by sufficient evidence.
Nevertheless, Mortenson contends that he was not driving in a reckless
manner because he did not endanger other drivers or pedestrians. Mortenson's
contention was expressly rejected by this court in State v. Whitcomb, 51 Wn.
App. 322, 753 P.2d 565 (1988). In that case, the trial court held that the State
had presented insufficient evidence that the defendant drove with "wanton or
willful disregard," because "no pedestrians or other vehicles were present."
Whitcomb. 51 Wn. App. at 327. This court overturned the trial court's ruling
because the trial court had misinterpreted the attempting to elude a pursuing
police vehicle statute. Whitcomb. 51 Wn. App. at 327. We held that in order to
prove that an individual attempted to elude a pursuing police vehicle, "[t]he State
need not prove that anyone else was endangered by the defendant's conduct, or
that a high probability of harm actually existed. Rather, the State need only show
that the defendant engaged in certain conduct, from which a particular disposition
or mental state . . . may be inferred."10 Whitcomb. 51 Wn. App. at 327. Because
10 Whitcomb was construing a prior version of the attempting to elude statute, which incorporated a "willful or wanton disregard" mens rea requirement. Nonetheless, Whitcomb's
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actual endangerment of others is not an element of attempting to elude a
pursuing police vehicle, Mortenson's contention lacks merit.
The final question presented is whether the trial court's error in revealing
that Mortenson had four prior DUI convictions was harmless with respect to the
attempting to elude charge. As previously stated, "'A harmless error is an error
which is trivial, or formal, or merely academic, and was not prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the party assigning it, and in no way affected the final
outcome of the case.'" Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d at 237 (quoting Golladav, 78 Wn.2d
at 139). Here, the error committed by the trial court did not affect the outcome of
the attempting to elude charge. The trial court informed the potential jurors only
about Mortenson's DUI convictions; it did not inform them about any prior
convictions for attempting to elude or reckless driving. In other words, the trial
court's error revealed prior convictions for an unrelated crime, which did not
speak to any of the elements of the attempting to elude charge. Thus,
Mortenson's four DUI convictions did not demonstrate a propensity to elude
police vehicles.
Additionally, with respect to the attempting to elude charge, the trial court's
revelation of Mortenson's four prior DUI convictions was no more prejudicial than
the stipulation itself. The stipulation informed the jurythat Mortenson "had been
previously convicted of four or more prior offenses," without revealing what those
holding still applies because "in a reckless manner" is a lessermens rea requirement than "willful or wanton disregard." Ridglev, 141 Wn. App. at 781.
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offenses were. Had the trial court not read the information to the jury, it would
still have learned that Mortenson had four prior criminal convictions. The specific
nature of the convictions created no additional inferences relevant to the
attempting to elude charge. Thus, the trial court's error in disclosing the prior
DUI convictions to the potential jurors was harmless with respect to this charge.
Accordingly, we affirm Mortenson's conviction for attempting to elude a pursuing
police vehicle.
C
Mortenson's felony DUI conviction was counted in his offender score for
sentencing on the conviction for attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle.
Thus, Mortenson must be resentenced on the attempting to elude conviction
following the disposition of the felony DUI charge on remand.11 Accordingly, we
remand the count of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle for
resentencing and the count of felony DUI for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
We concur:
&~4,e-/. 11 We do not address Mortenson's assignments of error to his offender score calculation. The trial court will need to calculate the score on remand based on evidence presented at that hearing. RCW 9.94A.525(1); State v. Collicott. 118 Wn.2d 649, 665, 827 P.2d 263 (1992).
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