4'4: •
FILED COUPT OF APPEALS DIV I STATE OF WASHINGTON 20I8 APR 23 All 8t43
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 76108-1-1 Respondent, ) ) DIVISION ONE v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHARLES JEROME COURTNEY, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: April 23, 2018 ) APPELWICK, J. — Courtney was convicted of first degree murder and possession of heroin with intent to distribute. He argues that police elicited
statements from him in violation of Miranda,1 and that the trial court erred in its jury
instructions. We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Charles Courtney with the murder of Anthony Boro, and
possession of heroin with intent to manufacture or deliver. The charges arose out
of events occurring on October 5 and 6, 2015. On the evening of October 5, Boro,
along with friends, went to Courtney's apartment complex. According to Courtney,
that night an unknown person tried to open the door to his apartment, and Courtney
and Jesse Landrum ran after him into the parking lot.
Courtney told police that the person, later identified as Boro, was running
away from him. While Boro was running away in the parking lot, Courtney stopped,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). No. 76108-1-1/2
pulled out his gun, and fired once. According to Courtney, Boro was about 20 feet
away when he shot him in the back. After being shot in the back, Boro fell to the
ground and died. Police determined, after doing a walkthrough of the apartment
complex, that Courtney was about 80 feet away from Borawhen he shot him.
In the preceding weeks, various people, including runaway teenagers, had
been staying at Courtney's apartment. One of the people staying with Courtney
was Lauren Tomita. Michael Knierim also spent one night at the apartment.
Knierim got into an argument with Courtney over Knierim's interaction with Tomita.
Courtney and Knierim threatened each other in text messages and over the phone.
On October 5, 2015, Knierim was spending time with Boro, lsadora
Nogales, and Sea-Land Ly, driving around in Nogales's car. That evening, they
ended up at the park at Martha Lake. Across the street from the park was the
apartment complex where Courtney lived. Ly testified that he and Knierim went to
the apartments to purchase drugs from Courtney. Ly also testified that Boro said
he wanted to rob Courtney. Ly, Knierim, and Boro were walking toward the
apartments, but decided to leave when they saw Tomita, and whom they thought
was Courtney or another one of his friends, outside.
Ly got into Nogales's car and they left the area. Another car picked up
Knierim, and the two cars met at apartments on Casino Road. They realized that
Boro was not in either car.
Police responded to a 911 call shortly before 1:00 AM on October 6. The
responding officers arrived at the Altia Apartments and found Boro deceased,
laying in the parking lot. Deputy Christopher Veentjer arrived at the apartments
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just after 6:00 AM to do scene security, which included asking residents in the area
if they had seen or heard anything. At one point, Deputy Veentjer asked detectives
on the scene to speak to two people who said that they had heard something
regarding the incident.
Detective Brad Pince spoke with one of the individuals, who identified
himself as Courtney. Detective Pince asked Courtney if he would mind walking
with him to his vehicle so they could talk privately, and Courtney agreed. Initially
while they talked, Detective Pince and Courtney stood in front of Pince's truck.
They talked for approximately 30 minutes outside of Pince's truck. Detective Dave
Bilyeu was also there for most of the conversation. Courtney told Pince some
information that Pince thought was relevant to the investigation, so Pince asked
Courtney if he could record a statement. Courtney agreed. Pince asked Courtney
to get into his truck to make it easier to hear the conversation on the recorder.
Pince testified that Courtney did so voluntarily.
While in the truck, Pince sat in the driver's seat and Courtney sat in the front
passenger seat.2 Pince and Courtney were the only ones in the truck. The doors
were closed and unlocked. After asking Courtney information about his identity,
Detective Pince asked Courtney:
Det. Pince: [Y]ou understand that, that you're here on your own free will and you're free to go any time? You don't have to give me a statement? Do you understand that?
2 In the transcript of Pince's recorded conversation with Courtney, Pince states to Courtney, "[Y]ou're sitting on the driver's side." In his testimony, Pince clarified that it was a misstatement during the recording, and Courtney was on the passenger side.
3 No. 76108-1-1/4
Mr. Courtney: I didn't know that. No, sir.
Det. Pince: 'kay. . . . are you willing to give me a statement freely and voluntarily at this point?
Mr. Courtney: Yes, sir.
Det. Pince: N'kay. That. . . and we're sittin' in a vehicle but, but you're sitting on the driver's side and the door's unlocked and you can get out and go any time you want to. Is that accurate?
(Boldface omitted.)
About 30 minutes into the recording, Detective Bilyeu returned to Pince's
truck. In Pince's four door truck, Bilyeu sat in the back seat on the passenger side,
directly behind Courtney. Bilyeu told Courtney that one of the teenagers staying
with him said Courtney was the shooter. Courtney told the detectives that he was
not the shooter. Then there was the following exchange:
Det. Bilyeu: Where's the gun?
Mr. Courtney: What? I don't have a gun, sir.
Det. Bilyeu: I didn't ask you if you have a gun. I asked you, where is the gun?
Mr. Courtney: I don't know where the gun is, what like, the pistol that he would have would be on him, most likely. And he left earlier. He left right before I left.
Det. Bilyeu: Well, Lead Detective Conley has probably [sic] cause for your arrest for murder.
Mr. Courtney: Well, I . . you said I could leave in ten minutes and I'm coming back to the apartments anyways. (Alteration in original.)
4 No. 76108-1-1/5
At this point, Detective Pince attempted to wrap up the interview:
Det. Pince: 'kay. Step out. Let's stop this ah, recording for a second here. .. .
Mr. Courtney: But he said that I could leave in ten minutes. You lied to me.
Det. Pince: The time is now 0835
Mr. Courtney: No.
Det. Pince: . . . hours . . .
Mr. Courtney: That's not fair. Okay. Okay. Wait though, wait then, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, please. Wait, fine. Fine. I heard someone was tryin' to . . . hurt me and my family. . . me and the people inside the place. This guy, 2-0-6, that Payton knows.
Det. Bilyeu: Maybe we should turn the recording back on.
Det. Pince: The recording's still going.
Det. Bilyeu: Alright.
Mr. Courtney: Payton's uncle, a guy named 2-0-6, was trying to kill me. He was trying to rob me. That's what they were [telling] me. And it's what people were saying. So I went to get a pistol because I didn't want to get, I didn't want to get killed.... And then all this happened and then that guy was trying to get into my house. He was the . . . door was jiggling so I called Jesse. . . . And then when I opened the door he started running away. So I went after him. I had Jesse loop around the back and I shot him because I didn't want him to get away and I didn't want him, I didn't want it to happen ever again.
(Some alterations in original.)
The officers asked Courtney for more details. Courtney answered that the
man he shot was trying to break into his house. Then, Courtney stated that he
5 No. 76108-1-116
wanted to get cigarettes because he said he knew he was going to "get cuffed."
Pince replied that they were not going to have cigarettes yet, and that he wanted
to clarify what happened. Courtney stated, "You lied before. I'd like it now before
I go further." Pince asked him, "[A]re you telling me you don't want to talk
anymore?" Courtney said he wanted to talk, and answered a few more questions.
Courtney stated more than once that he wanted a cigarette, and then stated that
he wanted to talk to his girlfriend, Eileen. Pince replied, "That's not gonna happen.
You either talk to us now or you don't." Courtney said he was going to kill himself,
but then continued to answer Pince's questions. After Pince began asking about
the gun again, Courtney stated, "I can kill myself with the pill I have in my hand."
At that point, Pince testified,
I grabbed his arm. And then there was a little bit of a struggle and I took a gun off him, so there was some physical contact at that point. He was then moved from my vehicle and placed in handcuff [sic].
The officers arrested Courtney, and Bilyeu read him the Miranda warnings.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,478-79,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694(1966).
Courtney voluntarily waived them. The officers resumed the recording and
Courtney gave the officers more details about the shooting.
At the pretrial hearing under CrR 3.5, the court determined that Courtney's
statements to Pince and Bilyeu, both before and after the Miranda warnings, were
knowing, voluntary, and admissible.
Courtney was charged with one count of first degree murder and one count
of possession of heroin with intent to manufacture or deliver. The jury found
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Courtney guilty on both charges. The court imposed a standard range sentence
with firearm enhancements for both counts. Courtney appeals.
DISCUSSION
Courtney makes four arguments. First, he argues that the court should
have suppressed the statements he made before the police advised him of his
Miranda rights, because he was in custody. Second, he argues that the court
should have suppressed his statements after the Detective gave the Miranda
warnings, because they violate the two-step interrogation test of Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 1248. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643(2004). Third, he argues
that the court's error in admitting his statements was not harmless, and that the
error requires this court to reverse his conviction. Fourth, he argues that the jury
instructions were ambiguous regarding self-defense and the duty to retreat, also
requiring reversal.
I. Miranda Rights
Courtney argues the trial court erred when it admitted statements he made
to police in a custodial interrogation before the police advised him of his rights
under Miranda.
The United States Supreme Court has held that when the authorities take
an individual into custody or otherwise deprive him of his freedom, it jeopardizes
the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. Under Miranda,
before questioning a person, authorities must warn him that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
7 No. 76108-1-1/8
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him if he so desires. Id. at 479.
If police conduct a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings,
statements made by the suspect during the interrogation must be suppressed. Id.
To determine if a person was in custody, the court uses an objective test: whether
a reasonable person in the individual's position would have felt that his or her
freedom was curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. State v.
Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 218, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). The defendant must show
some objective facts indicating his or her freedom of movement was restricted or
curtailed. State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 37, 93 P.3d 133 (2004). This court
reviews a trial court's custodial determination de novo. Id. at 36.
A. Custodial Interrogation
Here, Courtney argues that his encounter with detectives became a
custodial interrogation when he was sitting in Detective Pince's vehicle and
Detective Bilyeu told him that there was probable cause to arrest him for murder.
Distinguishing this case from Berkemer v. McCarty,468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138,
82 L. Ed. 2d. 317(1984), he argues that he was in a police dominated atmosphere.
And, he contends that a reasonable person would have believed himself to be
under arrest after learning the police had probable cause to arrest him.
In Berkemer, the Supreme Court held that the atmosphere surrounding an
ordinary traffic stop is substantially less police dominated than that surrounding the
kinds of interrogation discussed in Miranda. 468 U.S. at 438-39. Courtney
contends that the scene of a homicide investigation is a more police dominated
8 No. 76108-1-1/9
atmosphere than a traffic stop. In State v. Ferguson, this court declined to find a
custodial interrogation in the investigation of a vehicular homicide. 76 Wn. App.
560, 567-68, 886 P.2d 1164 (1995). There, this court noted that the seriousness
of the potential traffic charge did not alter the analysis. Id. at 567. The mere fact
that the police were investigating a homicide when questioning Courtney does not
require this court to find that he was in custody.
Then, Courtney contends that he was in custody after Bilyeu told him a
witness had identified him as the shooter and there was probable cause to arrest
him for murder. He cites to non-Washington cases to support his argument that
when police inform the person there is probable cause to arrest, this weighs heavily
in favor of finding the person was in custody.
First, he relies on State v. Pitts, 936 So.2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
There, the court stated that "if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would
understand that the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for a serious
crime such as murder or kidnapping, that circumstance militates strongly toward
the conclusion that the suspect is in custody." Pitts, 936 So.2d at 1128 (footnote
omitted). But, the court found that because police confronted Pitts with only a bare
uncorroborated accusation that he had killed the victims—without any details
concerning how, when, or where the crime was committed—it was not readily apparent that the detectives considered him the prime suspect. Id. And, even if a
reasonable person in Pitts's position would have understood from what the officers
said that he was a prime suspect, that would not be, in itself, dispositive of the
custody issue. Id.
9 No. 76108-1-1/10
The uncorroborated accusation in Pitts resembles what police told Courtney
here. In Pitts, during an interview with the suspect, police wrote down on a
notepad,"'TJ says Sammy killed these guys,'"(a false accusation against Pitts,
the suspect). 936 So.2d at 1119. The officer intentionally left the notepad for Pitts
to see it. Id. Here, the police told Courtney that a teenage witness, someone
Courtney had known for about a week, said that he was the shooter. As in Pitts,
this was an uncorroborated accusation that lacked details, and one that would not
lead a reasonable person in Courtney's circumstances to understand that he was
in custody.
Second, Courtney relies on State v. Schwerbel, 233 Or. App. 391, 226 P.3d
100 (2010). Article I, section 12 of the Oregon State Constitution requires that
police give a suspect Miranda warnings when police interrogation occurs under
"'compelling' "circumstances or when that suspect is in full custody. Schwerbel,
233 Or. App. at 395 (quoting State v. Shaff, 343 Or. 639, 645, 175 P.3d 454
(2007)). A suspect is placed in compelling circumstances when a reasonable
person in the suspect's position would have felt compelled to answer a police
officer's questions. Id. In Schwerbel, the court's Miranda analysis centered on
whether the police interrogation of the suspect occurred under "compelling
circumstances." Id.
Conversely,the protection provided by article 1, section 9 of the Washington
State Constitution is coextensive with that provided by the Fifth Amendment. State
v. Unqa, 165 Wn.2d 95, 100, 196 P.3d 645(2008). Washington courts consistently
hold that Miranda warnings are required when a reasonable person would believe
10 No. 76108-1-1/11
he was in police custody to a degree associated with formal arrest—not when a
person would have felt compelled to answer a police officer's questions. See
Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d at 36-37. Thus, the analysis in Schwerbel is not persuasive
here.
Third, Courtney cites to United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466(9th Cir. 1982).
In Lee, two agents interrogated the defendant in a closed FBI car for well over an
hour, as investigators were in and around his house. Id. at 468. The court affirmed
the district court's finding that the defendant was in custody, because a reasonable
innocent person in that circumstance could conclude that he was not free to leave.
Id. Notably, the court sustained the suppression under the clearly erroneous
standard, finding that the district court held a reasonable view of the evidence. Id.
This case differs factually from Lee because, here, police were not
searching Courtney's apartment at the time of the questioning. Moreover, in a later
decision, the 10th circuit found that Lee was decided under an outmoded standard 3
of review. United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1242 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008). The
Jones court noted that under Berkemer the question is not whether a reasonable
person would believe he was ,not free to leave, which was the question the Lee
court asked. Id. Instead, the proper inquiry is whether such a person would believe
he was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.3 Id.
3Believing one was free to leave might be dispositive of the question of whether the person believed he or she was in custody. But, the converse, believing that one was not free to leave, would not necessarily establish that the person was in custody to the degree associated with formal arrest. See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(c) (4th ed. 2017) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted an objective standard; determining whether the
11 No. 76108-1-1/12
Courtney argues that he was in custody when the detectives confronted him
with probable cause to arrest him for murder. The only relevant inquiry is how a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.
State v. D.R., 84 Wn. App. 832, 836, 930 P.2d 350 (1997). Thus, it is irrelevant
whether the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, whether the
defendant was a focus of the police investigation, whether the officer subjectively
believed the suspect was or was not in custody, or even whether the defendant
was or was not psychologically intimidated. Id.
This case is similar to Jones. There, after intercepting an iodine package
addressed to Jones, agents approached Jones in a parking lot and asked to speak
with her. Jones, 523 F.3d at 1237. She agreed to speak in the agent's car. Id. at
1238. Inside the car, an agent told Jones that she was not under arrest, did not
have to talk to him, and was free to leave. Id. He told her the door was unlocked.
Id. At one point, as in this case, an agent told Jones that he could arrest her based
on the iodine package. Id. The encounter lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Id.
The court affirmed the district Court's finding that Jones was not in custody when
she spoke with the agent in his car. Id. at 1240. The court focused on key factors
including: the agent told Jones she was free to leave; it was a less coercive
environment; and the lack of police domination in the encounter. See id. at 1240-
42.
situation was "custodial" for Miranda purposes will often require a careful examination of all the circumstances of the particular case).
12 No. 76108-1-1/13
Applying these cases and Miranda's objective standard to these facts, the
trial court did not err. Similar to the suspect in Jones, Courtney was not ordered
into Detective Pince's truck. Instead, Pince asked to speak with Courtney inside
the truck, to facilitate the recording, and Courtney agreed. As in Jones, the
detective told Courtney the doors were unlocked, and that he could get out and go
at any at time. The conversation in Pince's truck was about 45 minutes long, and
the police did not attempt to 'block or restrain Courtney from leaving until he
threatened to kill himself with a pill. At that point, the police had physical contact
with Courtney and placed him in handcuffs. Pince also reminded Courtney more
than once that he could choose to talk or not.
When Bilyeu joined them in the truck and sat behind Courtney, Bilyeu took
his gun out of holster and held, it on his leg, but Courtney could not see it. Bilyeu
testified that the atmosphere did not change when he joined the truck, and that
Courtney's demeanor did not change at all. While Bilyeu told Courtney that there
was probable cause for his arrest, neither Pince nor Bilyeu told Courtney that he
was going to be arrested. Bilyeu testified that after he told Courtney that there was
probable cause for his arrest, Courtney's demeanor did not change, and he
continued to answer questions, but was a "little more animated in his innocence."
Pince testified, "We asked him questions and got the same answer. We weren't
getting him to change his mind, so I was just getting ready to wrap up the
interview." Pince tried to end the interview, and have Courtney step out of the
vehicle. But, because Courtney said 'no,' told them to wait, and kept talking, Pince
13 No. 76108-1-1/14
did not end the interview. Then, Courtney stated that he had shot an individual.
The decision to continue the interview was Courtney's.
Courtney was not in custody before his confession for Miranda purposes.
A reasonable person in his position would not feel his liberty was restricted to a
degree associated with formal arrest. The trial court did not err in denying
Courtney's motion to suppress his statements before the Miranda warnings.
B. Post-Miranda Statements
Courtney first confessed before the police gave him Miranda warnings.
After the police read him the Miranda warnings, he confessed again. Courtney
argues that his post-Miranda statements must be suppressed as the result of a
deliberate interrogation strategy that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
in Seibert.
In Seibert, the police deliberately refrained from providing Miranda warnings
as part of a "question first" strategy. See 542 U.S. at 605-06. Police took Seibert
into custody and deliberately withheld the Miranda warnings:
In arresting her, OfficerKevin Clinton followed instructions from . . . Officer Richard Harahan that he refrain from giving Miranda warnings. After Seibert had been taken to the police station and left alone in an interview room for 15 to 20 minutes, Officer Hanrahan questioned her without Miranda warnings for 30 to 40 minutes. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604-05. After Seibert confessed, police advised her of her
rights, reminded her of her prior confession, and then went over the same
information a second time during a recorded interview, all under the safe harbor of
the Miranda warning. Id. at 605. Washington courts have held that the controlling
constitutional rule of Seibert is that of Justice Kennedy's concurrence. State v.
14 No. 76108-1-1/15
Hickman, 157 Wn.App. 767,774-75,238 P.3d 1240(2010). In Hickman,this court
recognized that a trial court must suppress post-warning confessions obtained
during a deliberate two-step interrogation where the midstream Miranda warning
did not effectively apprise the Suspect of his rights. Id.
1. Preserved Error
Courtney did not cite Seibert in the proceeding below, but he contends that
the issue was preserved for appeal because, in his CrR 3.6 motion to suppress,
citing State v. Erho, 77 Wn.2d 553, 463 P.2d (1970), he argued that the post-
Miranda statements were inadmissible.4 Alternatively, Courtney contends that if
the issue was not preserved for appeal, the court should still address the
admissibility of the post-Miranda statements, because it is manifest constitutional
error that warrants review under RAP 2.5(a)(3).
In order to preserve error for consideration on appeal, the general rule is
that the alleged error must be called to the trial court's attention at a time that will
afford the court an opportunity to correct it. State v. Wicke, 91 Wn.2d 638, 642,
591 P.2d 452 (1979). While Courtney did not argue the correct legal standard
under Seibert, he did raise the substantive issue that the post-Miranda statements
were inadmissible.
To meet RAP 2.5(a) and raise an error for the first time on appeal, an
appellant must demonstrate (1) the error is manifest and (2) the error is of
4 Courtney also briefly raised the issue at trial, arguing to the court that "the explicit purpose of not stopping that conversation, arresting him, and informing him of his right to remain silent is the fact that they want to continue eliciting incriminating responses."
15 No. 76108-1-1/16
constitutional dimension. State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91,98,217 P.3d 756(2009).
To show the error is manifest the defendant must show actual prejudice. Id. at 99.
Prejudice is shown when it is plausible that the claimed error had practical and
identifiable consequences in the trial. Id. If the facts necessary to adjudicate the
claimed error are not in the record, no actual prejudice has been shown, and the
error is not manifest. Id.
The admissibility of a defendant's statements postarrest implicates the Fifth
Amendment. See Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 772-73. Courtney's post-Miranda
statements were used at trial. The State, in closing, said,
He intended to do the very act. What evidence do we have? These are from Mr. Courtney's own mouth, his own words to law enforcement, his own words to Detective Bilyeu, both during a recorded statement and a walk-through that he stopped -- he stopped right by that path, and he waited.
And why did he wait? Because he knew Jesse Landrum was at the other end. He had told Jesse Landrum to go the opposite direction. So why not? You stand and you wait because you know if the other guy is coming the other way, he's coming back to you.
He takes a shooting stance... This isn't some instantaneous act; he's waiting for a clearshot. He's watching as he runs away from him.
He pulls his gun out of his holster. Yes, this is quick. Pulling it out, but he even says that he's getting a sight picture, lining him up. And he pulls the trigger as Anthony continues to run away from him.
His statement to law enforcement. . . I knew I was going to hit him. What better statement of your intent when you pull the trigger, knowing that you're going to hit someone?
These comments closely mirror Courtney's post-Miranda statements:
Mr. Courtney: I stopped at the ... there's like a pathway .. . where the cars park on one side, . . . he runs down there. I'm like,'Jesse go right side. So Jesse goes through
16 No. 76108-1-1/17
and I wait. And when he comes out that side he has his hand out and I don't know what he's grabbing. I pulled out my pistol from the holster that I have and then I shoot so that I wouldn't like, I didn't want to get shot, too. . . .
Det. Bilyeu: So this guy, was he running away from you?
Mr. Courtney: Yes,[because] he, he knew I had a, a pistol. ...
Det. Bilyeu: Was he running or walking?
Mr. Courtney: Running: And he was bolting. He was running and I was, I stopped. I'm prior service so my shot . . . I knew I Was gonna hit him.
The State used Courtney's statements to argue intent and premeditation. It is
plausible that these statements had practical and identifiable consequences at
trial. We analyze the issue as manifest constitutional error, and address the
substantive issue of whether the admission of the post-Miranda statements
violated Seibert.
2. Deliberate Two-Step Interrogation
Courtney argues that Detective Bilyeu made a deliberate choice to engage
in a two-part interrogation. Seibert requires a trial court to consider whether
objective evidence and any available subjective evidence, such as an officer's
testimony, support an inference that the interrogator deliberately employed a two-
step interrogation technique to undermine Miranda. Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at
775. The objective evidence includes the timing, setting, and completeness of the
17 No. 76108-1-1/18
pre-warning interrogation, the continuity of police personnel and the overlapping
content of the pre- and post-warning statements. Id.
Detective Pince did not know who had shot Boro when he began the
interview with Courtney. He could not have deliberately employed a two-step
interrogation before he knew that Courtney was the shooter.
Interrogation refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words
or actions on the part of the police, other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody, that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct.
1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980). Courtney stated that he had been told he could
leave in ten minutes when the interview started, so Pince began to make a record
that the interview was ending'when Courtney objected and volunteered that he
had shot the victim. There is no objective evidence that shows why Pince's attempt
to end the interview would elicit an incriminating statement from Courtney.
Courtney's confession to shooting the victim was a voluntary statement. After
Courtney volunteered that he ,had shot someone, Pince gave him the choice to
keep talking. Pince asked, "[Aye you telling me you don't want to talk anymore?"
Courtney replied, "I want to talk. I just want. . . to get stuff." After Courtney was
arrested and Bilyeu read the Miranda warnings, Courtney voluntarily waived them.
Courtney relies on State v. Rhoden, 189 Wn. App. 193, 356 P.3d 242
(2015). In Rhoden, police questioned the defendant while he was restrained with
handcuffs in his home, before advising him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 196. Police
then took him to another area of the home, advised him of his Miranda rights, and
18 No. 76108-1-1/19
questioned him a second time in the same vein. Id. The parties agreed that
Rhoden was subject to custodial interrogation both before and after the Miranda
warnings, and the court held that the trial court erred in failing to suppress
Rhoden's post-Miranda statements. Id. at 199, 202.
Here, Courtney argues that Bilyeu made a similar choice in questioning
Courtney when he had probable cause to arrest him, continued to question
Courtney after his confession,.and then gave him his Miranda warnings. But, in
fact, Pince tried to end the interview after Bilyeu told Courtney that there was
probable cause for his arrest, but Courtney stopped the detective and voluntarily
stated that he had shot someone.
Courtney also cites United States v. Barnes, 713 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2013).
In Barnes, the defendant's parole officer summoned him to a meeting where FBI
agents confronted him with evidence of his drug distribution and questioned him
before advising him of his Miranda rights. See id. at 1203. The court found that
Barnes was in custody during the interrogation. Id. at 1205. One of the agents
testified that he believed that Barnes would think that he was not free to leave the
meeting, and intended to question Barnes about his involvement in a crime. Id. at
1205. The court held that the agents made a deliberate decision to engage in a
two-step tactic to contravene Miranda warnings. Id. at 1206.
Courtney argues that the officers here made a similar decision to delay
Miranda warnings. But, Courtney was not in a position in which a reasonable
person would have felt that his freedom was curtailed to the degree associated
with a formal arrest. Thus, he was not in custody when Bilyeu told him there was
19 No. 76108-1-1/20
probable cause for his arrest, and Pince even attempted to end the interview after
Courtney responded to Bilyeu's statement. The detectives did not deliberately
employ a two-step interrogation to undermine Miranda.
The trial court did not err in admitting the post-Miranda statements.
3. Harmless Error
Courtney next argues that the admission of his statements in violation of
Miranda and Seibert is a constitutional error that requires this court to reverse his
conviction. He argues that the jury would have been far more likely to believe
Courtney's self-defense claim without his statements to police. Since we conclude
there was no error, we need not address this argument to reach our decision. But,
for the sake of completeness we will address it.
A constitutional error is harmless if the appellate court is convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result
in the absence of the error. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425, 705 P.2d 1182
(1985). If the untainted evidence at trial was so overwhelming that it necessarily
led to a finding of guilt, reversal is not required, because there is no reasonable
possibility that the use of inadmissible evidence was necessary to reach a guilty
verdict. Id. at 426. The State bears the burden of proving a constitutional error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 425.
Here, the evidence clearly established that Courtney was the shooter. At
trial, the State admitted into evidence the gun that the officers recovered from
Courtney when they arrested him. An officer also testified about the shell casing
recovered from Courtney's girlfriend, about four hours after the shooting, that the
20 No. 76108-1-1/21
officers believed came from Courtney's gun. And, other witnesses testified that
Courtney admitted he shot someone. Eileen Marasigan, Courtney's fiancée,
testified that she heard one gunshot and when Courtney returned to the apartment
he said that he "got one of them." Tomita also testified that after Courtney returned
to the apartment he said he "might have got my first one," which she clarified meant
one "kill" or that he "killed somebody." Andrew Muilenburg testified that Courtney
said he shot Boro in the back. Stanley Adams, a medical examiner who examined
the victim, testified that the victim was shot in the back, and that the manner of
death was homicide. Patrick Guanzon, a resident of the Altia Apartments, testified
that he heard a gunshot and saw a man with a gun. Guanzon recognized the man
as someone who lived in the apartment across from him. Guanzon testified that
he heard the man with a gun say, "I'm going to kill all of you [expletive]." While
Courtney's statements to police were a more detailed description of his actions,
any reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict with the untainted
evidence.
II. Jury Instructions
Finally, Courtney contends that this court should reverse his conviction
because the jury instructions failed to make it clear that there is no duty to retreat
when acting in self-defense. He argues that instruction 23 and instruction 26 were
contradictory and likely confused the jury. He asserts that instruction 26 indicated
that that there must be no reasonable alternative to the use of force, while
instruction 23 indicated that the use of force is lawful even if retreat is a reasonable
alternative.
21 No. 76108-1-1/22
The jury is to presume each instruction has meaning. State v. Hutchinson,
135 Wn.2d 863, 885, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998). Jury instructions, when read as a
whole, must correctly tell the jury of the applicable law, not be misleading, and
permit the defendant to present his theory of the case. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 105.
A jury instruction misstating the law of self-defense amounts to an error of
constitutional magnitude and is presumed prejudicial. State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d
469, 473, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997). The degree of force used in self-defense is
limited to what a reasonably prudent person would find necessary under the
conditions as they appeared to the defendant. Id. at 474. When instructions are
inconsistent, it is the duty of the reviewing court to determine whether the jury was
misled as to its function and responsibilities under the law by that inconsistency.
Id. at 478.
In instruction 21 (shown in part), the trial court instructed the jury that the
homicide was justified if Courtney was acting in self-defense or defense of another:
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not justifiable. If you find that the State has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
In instruction 23, the court gave the no duty to retreat instruction:
It is lawful for a person who is in a place where that person has a right to be and who has reasonable grounds for believing that he is being attacked to stand his ground and defend against such attack by the use of lawful force. The law does not impose a duty to retreat. 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
16.08, at 263-64 (4th ed. 2016)(WPIC).
22 No. 76108-1-1/23
In number 25, the court also gave the aggressor—defense of self
instruction:
No person may,,by any intentional act reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response, create a necessity for acting in self- defense or defense,of another and thereupon kill another person. Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the aggressor, and that defendant's acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense or defense of another is not available as a defense. WPIC 16.04.
And, in instruction 26, the court gave the jury WPIC 16.05, definition of
necessary:
Necessary means that, under the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the actor at the time, (1) no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist and (2) the amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended.
Courtney likens this case to Walden. In Walden, the trial court's jury
instructions on great bodily injury could have impermissibly restricted the jury from
considering the defendant's subjective beliefs about the possible consequence of
an assault by others. 131 VVn.2d at 473. Our Supreme Court held that the
instructions were internally inconsistent, and that the definition of great bodily injury
in one instruction was a misstatement of the law, requiring reversal. Id. at 478-79.
Here, the State argues that instruction 26 defining "necessary" was given in
connection with instruction number 25, the first aggressor instruction. It asserts
that the definition of "necessary" defined "necessity" in that instruction. It argues
there was no inconsistency and that the instructions properly advised the jury of
the law. We disagree.
23 No. 76108-1-1/24
WPIC 16.05 says to use the "necessary" definition "when the word
'necessary' is used in instructions relating to defenses in WPIC Chapters 16 and
17." WPIC 16.05, note on use at 259. The word "necessary" does not appear in
the instructions given in this " case. WPIC 16.04.01, Aggressor—Defense of
Others, does use the word "necessary" and the note indicates to use WPIC 16.05
(Necessary—Definition) with this instruction. WPIC 16.04.01, note on use at 258.
But, this instruction was not given in this case. The court gave WPIC 16.04,
Aggressor—Defense of Self, which uses the word "necessity," but the note does
not suggest the use of WPIC 16.05 with this instruction. WPIC 16.04, note on use
at 256. Therefore, the trial court erred in giving the instruction defining "necessary"
from WPIC 16.05.
Courtney asserts that the instruction error is constitutional error that
requires reversal. Since the error infringed upon Courtney's constitutional rights,
the error is presumed prejudicial, and the State has the burden of proving that the
error was harmless. State v. Caldwell, 94 Wn.2d 614, 618, 618 P.2d 508 (1980).
The constitutional error cannot be declared harmless unless it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. An error in instructions is harmless only if it in no
way affected the final outcome of the case. Id.
Courtney contends that there was evidence from which a reasonable jury
could have found that the State failed to disprove self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt. First, that he had been informed of a threat that an armed group
of men had arrived at his apartment complex. And second, that he told police that
he saw Boro reach for his waistband.
24 No. 76108-1-1/25
But, the overwhelming evidence at trial was that Courtney shot Boro in the
back while Boro was running away from him, approximately 70 to 80 feet away.
And, according to Courtney, he had chased Boro from his apartment, down stairs,
and through the parking lot. No reasonable jury could conclude on these facts that
Courtney shot Boro in self-defense. It could not have reached the conflict in the
jury instructions. We conclude that, on this record, beyond all reasonable doubt
the instructional error was harmless.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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