FILED JANUARY 28, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40071-9-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) CHARLES EDWARD JACKSON JR, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION Also known as CHARLES EDWARD ) JACKSON, CHARLES EDWARD JR ) JACKSON, and CHARLES JOHNSON, ) ) Appellant. )
STAAB, J. — Charles Jackson, Jr, appeals his guilty plea to charges of second
degree manslaughter and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing his plea
was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Specifically, Jackson contends nothing in the
plea statement or plea colloquy suggests that he understood the nature of the offenses in
relation to the law or facts. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 19, 2022, Charles E. Jackson was arrested and charged with one count
of first degree murder. On October 10, 2023, the court granted the State’s motion to
amend the information to charges of second degree manslaughter and first degree
unlawful possession of a firearm. The amended information listed each offense and the
requisite elements of the crimes as stated in the applicable criminal statutes. No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
On the same day, Jackson entered a plea of guilty to the amended charges pursuant
to a written plea statement that conformed with CrR 4.2(g). Jackson confirmed that he
had read the plea statement with his attorney and did not have any questions.
The plea statement listed the amended charges, but did not set forth the elements
for each charge. Instead, the section of the plea statement for listing the elements
included the hand written notation, “[a]s Amended.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 118. A
section within the plea statement that allows a defendant to make a statement in his own
words as to why he was guilty was left blank. Instead, Jackson checked a box next to the
following language: “Instead of making a statement, I agree that the court may review the
police reports and/or a statement of probable cause supplied by the prosecution to
establish a factual basis for the plea.” CP at 129. Finally, Jackson checked the box
confirming that his lawyer read him “the entire statement above and that the defendant
understood it in full.” CP at 129. Jackson and his attorney signed the plea statement.
The plea hearing began with the court granting the State’s motion to amend the
charges. Jackson’s counsel confirmed receipt of the amended information and waived
formal reading.
Jackson told the court that he completed eighth grade and did not obtain a GED,1
but denied that he had “[a]ny trouble reading or writing.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Oct. 10,
1 General Educational Development.
2 No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
2023) at 4. During the plea hearing, Jackson agreed that he understood each charge and
the maximum sentences. Jackson answered yes to each of the court’s inquiries into his
understanding of his criminal history and the effect of the sentencing ranges based on his
offender scores. In addition, Jackson acknowledged that the manslaughter conviction
would qualify as a second strike offense and pleading guilty would have collateral
consequences.
Jackson denied having anything to ask about the plea statement and stated that he
had read it over with his attorney. Finally, on the record, Jackson pleaded guilty to each
charge: one count of second degree manslaughter and one count of first degree unlawful
possession of a firearm.
The court accepted Jackson’s plea, indicating that the probable cause statement
provided a factual basis for the plea.
Jackson timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
Jackson contends that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Specifically, he argues that the record does not demonstrate that he possessed an
understanding of the law as it applied to the allegations in his case. We disagree.
The requirements for a valid plea of guilty to criminal charges are mandated by the
Constitution and set forth by CrR 4.2. “Due process requires that a plea must be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Codiga, 162 Wn.2d 912, 922, 175 P.3d
3 No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
1082 (2008). The constitution also requires a showing that the defendant understands the
essential elements of the offense. In re Pers. Restraint of Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. 723, 727,
695 P.2d 596 (1985). Both require that a defendant understand the nature of the charges
for which they are pleading guilty. CrR 4.2(d); Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 727.
The procedures set forth in CrR 4.2 were intended to aid the court in protecting the
constitutional right to a voluntary plea. See In re Pers. Restraint of Keene, 95 Wn.2d
203, 206, 622 P.2d 360 (1980); Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 726. The court rule provides
that “[t]he court shall not accept a plea of guilty, without first determining that it is made
voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea.” CrR 4.2(d). While the rule does not require the defendant to
know every element of the crime to which they are pleading guilty, the defendant must be
“‘aware of the acts and the requisite state of mind in which they must be performed to
constitute a crime.’” Keene, 95 Wn.2d at 207 (quoting State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d
148, 153 n.3, 607 P.2d 845 (1980)).
The mandated form of the statement of defendant on plea of guilty provides
additional aides to ensure that a defendant is aware of the nature of the charge. When a
defendant “fills out a written statement on plea of guilty in compliance with CrR 4.2(g)
and acknowledges that he or she has read it and understands it and that its contents are
true, the written statement provides prima facie verification of the plea’s voluntariness.”
State v. Perez, 33 Wn. App. 258, 261, 654 P.2d 708 (1982).
4 No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
Voluntariness is “well nigh irrefutable” when “the judge goes on to inquire orally
of the defendant and satisfies himself on the record of the . . . criteria of voluntariness.”
Id. at 262. The inference of a defendant’s voluntary plea is strengthened when the
defendant signs the plea statement coupled with “a judge’s on-record inquiry.” In re Det.
of Scott, 150 Wn. App. 414, 427, 208 P.3d 1211 (2009). When a defendant
acknowledges he or she has read, understands, and knows the contents to be true of a
written statement of a guilty plea, and the plea is filled out in compliance with CrR
4.2(g), it is prima facie evidence of the plea’s voluntariness. Id.
Jackson contends that the record does not include a factual basis for the plea and
the court did not inquire about his guilty conduct. While a valid plea requires the court to
make both determinations, these are different requirements with different purposes. See
Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 727.
Ensuring that the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED JANUARY 28, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40071-9-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) CHARLES EDWARD JACKSON JR, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION Also known as CHARLES EDWARD ) JACKSON, CHARLES EDWARD JR ) JACKSON, and CHARLES JOHNSON, ) ) Appellant. )
STAAB, J. — Charles Jackson, Jr, appeals his guilty plea to charges of second
degree manslaughter and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing his plea
was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Specifically, Jackson contends nothing in the
plea statement or plea colloquy suggests that he understood the nature of the offenses in
relation to the law or facts. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 19, 2022, Charles E. Jackson was arrested and charged with one count
of first degree murder. On October 10, 2023, the court granted the State’s motion to
amend the information to charges of second degree manslaughter and first degree
unlawful possession of a firearm. The amended information listed each offense and the
requisite elements of the crimes as stated in the applicable criminal statutes. No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
On the same day, Jackson entered a plea of guilty to the amended charges pursuant
to a written plea statement that conformed with CrR 4.2(g). Jackson confirmed that he
had read the plea statement with his attorney and did not have any questions.
The plea statement listed the amended charges, but did not set forth the elements
for each charge. Instead, the section of the plea statement for listing the elements
included the hand written notation, “[a]s Amended.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 118. A
section within the plea statement that allows a defendant to make a statement in his own
words as to why he was guilty was left blank. Instead, Jackson checked a box next to the
following language: “Instead of making a statement, I agree that the court may review the
police reports and/or a statement of probable cause supplied by the prosecution to
establish a factual basis for the plea.” CP at 129. Finally, Jackson checked the box
confirming that his lawyer read him “the entire statement above and that the defendant
understood it in full.” CP at 129. Jackson and his attorney signed the plea statement.
The plea hearing began with the court granting the State’s motion to amend the
charges. Jackson’s counsel confirmed receipt of the amended information and waived
formal reading.
Jackson told the court that he completed eighth grade and did not obtain a GED,1
but denied that he had “[a]ny trouble reading or writing.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Oct. 10,
1 General Educational Development.
2 No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
2023) at 4. During the plea hearing, Jackson agreed that he understood each charge and
the maximum sentences. Jackson answered yes to each of the court’s inquiries into his
understanding of his criminal history and the effect of the sentencing ranges based on his
offender scores. In addition, Jackson acknowledged that the manslaughter conviction
would qualify as a second strike offense and pleading guilty would have collateral
consequences.
Jackson denied having anything to ask about the plea statement and stated that he
had read it over with his attorney. Finally, on the record, Jackson pleaded guilty to each
charge: one count of second degree manslaughter and one count of first degree unlawful
possession of a firearm.
The court accepted Jackson’s plea, indicating that the probable cause statement
provided a factual basis for the plea.
Jackson timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
Jackson contends that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Specifically, he argues that the record does not demonstrate that he possessed an
understanding of the law as it applied to the allegations in his case. We disagree.
The requirements for a valid plea of guilty to criminal charges are mandated by the
Constitution and set forth by CrR 4.2. “Due process requires that a plea must be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Codiga, 162 Wn.2d 912, 922, 175 P.3d
3 No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
1082 (2008). The constitution also requires a showing that the defendant understands the
essential elements of the offense. In re Pers. Restraint of Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. 723, 727,
695 P.2d 596 (1985). Both require that a defendant understand the nature of the charges
for which they are pleading guilty. CrR 4.2(d); Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 727.
The procedures set forth in CrR 4.2 were intended to aid the court in protecting the
constitutional right to a voluntary plea. See In re Pers. Restraint of Keene, 95 Wn.2d
203, 206, 622 P.2d 360 (1980); Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 726. The court rule provides
that “[t]he court shall not accept a plea of guilty, without first determining that it is made
voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea.” CrR 4.2(d). While the rule does not require the defendant to
know every element of the crime to which they are pleading guilty, the defendant must be
“‘aware of the acts and the requisite state of mind in which they must be performed to
constitute a crime.’” Keene, 95 Wn.2d at 207 (quoting State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d
148, 153 n.3, 607 P.2d 845 (1980)).
The mandated form of the statement of defendant on plea of guilty provides
additional aides to ensure that a defendant is aware of the nature of the charge. When a
defendant “fills out a written statement on plea of guilty in compliance with CrR 4.2(g)
and acknowledges that he or she has read it and understands it and that its contents are
true, the written statement provides prima facie verification of the plea’s voluntariness.”
State v. Perez, 33 Wn. App. 258, 261, 654 P.2d 708 (1982).
4 No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
Voluntariness is “well nigh irrefutable” when “the judge goes on to inquire orally
of the defendant and satisfies himself on the record of the . . . criteria of voluntariness.”
Id. at 262. The inference of a defendant’s voluntary plea is strengthened when the
defendant signs the plea statement coupled with “a judge’s on-record inquiry.” In re Det.
of Scott, 150 Wn. App. 414, 427, 208 P.3d 1211 (2009). When a defendant
acknowledges he or she has read, understands, and knows the contents to be true of a
written statement of a guilty plea, and the plea is filled out in compliance with CrR
4.2(g), it is prima facie evidence of the plea’s voluntariness. Id.
Jackson contends that the record does not include a factual basis for the plea and
the court did not inquire about his guilty conduct. While a valid plea requires the court to
make both determinations, these are different requirements with different purposes. See
Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 727.
Ensuring that the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the
consequences of the plea does not require a detailed description of the elements on the
record. Keene, 95 Wn.2d at 207 (“Apprising the defendant of the nature of the offense
need not ‘always require a description of every element of the offense.’”) (quoting
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 n.18, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1996)).
However, the defendant “need[s] to be aware of the acts and the requisite state of mind in
which they must be performed to constitute a crime.” State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148,
153 n.3, 607 P.2d 845 (1980).
5 No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
Notice of the elements is satisfied by reference to an information that contains the
elements. Keene, 95 Wn.2d at 208-09. Here, Jackson acknowledged receiving and
reviewing the amended information that was filed the same day and contained all the
elements of the charged crimes.
The judge must also determine a factual basis for the plea. CrR 4.2(d). This
requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a crime when the defendant’s
conduct does not fall within the charge. Id. at 209. The factual basis must be developed
on the record. Id. “But so long as the documents relied upon are made part of the record,
the trial court can rely on any reliable source, including the prosecutor’s statement of the
facts if adopted by the defendant, to establish that there is a factual basis for the plea.”
Codiga, 162 Wn.2d at 924.
Here, by checking the box on the plea form, Jackson adopted the probable cause
statement and indicated that the court could review this document to determine whether
there was a factual basis for the plea. The probable cause statement was part of the
court’s record. The court indicated that it had read the probable cause statement and that
the allegations contained therein supported the plea. This was sufficient under Codiga.
Jackson fails to cite any authority that required the judge to read the probable cause
statement into the record under these circumstances.
Finally, Jackson argues that his circumstances of having an eighth-grade education
and experiencing housing insecurity overcomes the presumption that his plea was valid.
6 No. 40071-9-III State v. Jackson
We disagree. Jackson affirmed to the court that he did not have any trouble reading or
writing. He also acknowledged reviewing the plea statement with his attorney and did
not have any questions for the judge. He fails to point to anything in the record
suggesting he misunderstood the nature of the charges, and fails to cite any authority that
would support his position.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________ Staab, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
_________________________________ Cooney, J.